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Introduction 
 
 
 
The central role played by normativity in pragmatism has become in the past years a center of renewed 
interest from different sides. Not only the pragmatist scholarship has recently produced new studies in ethics 
(LaFollette 2000; Pappas 2008; de Waal and Skowronki 2012; Frega 2012), but also thinkers trained in the 
analytic tradition came to endorse some of the pragmatist views on normativity in relation to the pragmatics and 
semantics of language. In particular, Robert B. Brandom defends a form of “inferentialism” according to which, 
roughly put, the meaning of a proposition is given by the normative function that that proposition plays within 
an inference (e.g. 2000; see Thibaud 1997; Pape 2009). The aim of my dissertation is to go back to the tenets of 
two central figures of the so-called classic American pragmatism, namely, Charles S. Peirce and John Dewey, in 
order to point out in which ways the problem of normativity emerges in the womb of human agency and 
experience. As a consequence, my perspective is broader than contemporary inferentialism in semantics, since it 
includes topics such as the nature of the human actor, the problem of ethical normativity, the constitution of the 
objects of experience, the nature of truth, and some others. The choice to circumscribe my analysis to Peirce and 
Dewey is due to both scholarly and theoretical reasons: first, not much work has been done to identify the 
specific problems related to normativity on which both Peirce and Dewey focus (see however Colapietro 2004b; 
Pihlstrom 2004); second, I believe that Peirce and Dewey are the two authors within the tradition of classic 
pragmatism who better developed, in the light of a strong pragmatic epistemology, the problem of the different 
figures that normativity assumes in human experience. As a consequence, authors such as William James, Josiah 
Royce, George H. Mead and Clarence I. Lewis are only mentioned when needed, but never studied directly. It is 
the reader’s onus to find out at the end of this dissertation whether the choice of the author’s is flawed or not. 
As Vincent M. Colapietro insightfully observes, “Dewey saw his own work in logic as an extension of Peirce’s 
efforts in this field” (2004b: 107). I would subscribe one further remark in Colapietro’s article, in which we read 
that “for Dewey, no less than for Peirce … it is more appropriate to speak of a semiotic turn rather than the 
linguistic turn, a turn toward signs in all of their variety and not just toward that form of symbolization so 
prominent in our lives” that is “language” narrowly taken (2004b: 112). Thus, a broad semeiotic approach 
constitutes the common ground for both Peirce and Dewey. Working on the assumption that this approach is 
correct, I will show its many implications in developing Peirce’s and Dewey’s theory of human agency, 
experience and normativity. My aim is not to develop a point-to-point comparison between the two authors’ 
tenets, rather to show that they addressed the same questions and worked with a pragmatically semeiotic 
approach.  
I proceed as follows. Chapter 1 aims to provide a theory of the human individual understood as an agent on 
the basis of Peirce’s reflections on the notions of “individual,” “self-consciousness” and “developmental 
teleology.” In particular, my analysis moves from an appraisal of how Peirce scholarship has struggled with a 
confused account of the notion of individuality in the so-called “philosophies of process,” including not only 
Peirce’s philosophy but also Dewey’s. By arguing against those interpretations that take Peirce to be a nihilist 
about the human individual, I try to offer a different reading in which Peirce’s alleged “intellectual 
embarrassment” about the concept of individuality is actually the mark of a complex and sound account of that 
notion. The chapter is divided in three parts, in which I develop the three ideas that represent the three aspects 
of Peirce’s understanding of the individual human agent. These three ideas are: (1) “individual” = the continuity 
of each, unique series of spatio-temporal instantiations of bundles of habits; (2) “individual” = the human being 
as able of self-consciousness and psychological self-ascriptions; (3) “individual” = the human being as called to a 
unique mission in the ongoing process of creation. 
The section on Peirce’s theory of individual objects aims to show that the only possible way to make sense of 
Peirce’s theory of individuals is in the light of his three universal categories, 1stness, 2ndness and 3rdness, 
understood in their semeiotic, phaneroscopic and metaphysical meanings. In particular, I try to underscore that 
different notions used by Peirce (such as “actual fact,” “permanent fact,” “subject,” “existence quasi-existence,” 
“influx” relation) are meant to describe from different viewpoints the reality of an individual as a modal 
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organism, in which actuality (2ndness, “will-be”), possibility (1stness, “might-be”) and non-deterministic 
necessity (3rdness, “would-be”) are all constitutive and irreducible elements. The question that remains open in 
this section is the following: if it is true that a series of instantiations is unified by the general laws that govern it, 
and if it is true that an entity is a bundle of habits, what is that provides a bundle of habits with its unity? The 
answer can be found, I believe, in Peirce’s theory of final causality, which is reintroduced by him in every field of 
knowledge. I focus on Peirce’s theory of final causality in the third section of this chapter, with particular 
attention to its realization in the life of the human being. 
The second section dwells upon Peirce’s account of self-consciousness on the basis of first-person, indexical 
self-referential statements (or all statements that can be transformed into first-person statements). In so doing, I 
sketch Peirce’s semeiotic classification of the types on indices, with particular attention to the personal pronoun 
“I.” I try to show how the conditions of use of “I” are fulfilled not only by some weak experiences, usually 
mentioned by Peirce scholarship in order to account for Peirce’s tenets (e.g. the experiences of linguistic 
testimonies and error), but also by two stronger cases of “perception,” i.e. the consciousness of the present and 
the sense of effort in agency (which I name conjointly the “present&effort-perception”). Thus, I also reconstruct 
Peirce’s account of perception as the basic epistemic unity of experience. The conclusion is that the 
present&effort-perception represents the informational index (almost pure index, “reagent”) on the basis of 
which the possibility of self-referential statements with monstrative indices (e.g. “I”) emerges. For reasons that 
will be clear in the chapter, the presence of something like the present&effort-perception guarantees that our 
belief in a “private self” or “I” has an existent object and not only a hypothetical object in a Logical Universe. I 
conclude the section with some remarks on Peirce’s partial rejection of Kant’s “I think” and on a interpretative 
issue present in Peirce scholarship on the nature of corporate personalities, i.e., higher-order persons such as 
nations, corporations, churches, etc. On this second point, I argue against those interpretations that take Peirce’s 
defense of the reality of higher-order personalities to imply the belief in the reality of higher-order self-
consciousnesses. 
The third section focuses on Peirce’s tenet that human individuality is further grounded in the strong 
teleological nature of the human being. The human being is called to realize a unique mission or function in the 
ongoing process of creation. Such a “mission” is the final cause that unifies, as a vocation to be realized, all the 
habits and concrete actions of an agent. The human being, who is “rational instinct” in her deepest reality, ought 
to realize her rational function in the universe. How so? Moreover, Peirce adds that the human teleology is 
always “in evolution.” How should we understand this claim? In order to answer these questions, I focus on an 
early manuscript (R1116), in which Peirce introduces two important notions, i.e. “Incarnation” and 
“Carnification.” These notions show that a final cause (or a “plan” or “function”) can be realized in a “matter” 
in a multiplicity of degrees: while “Incarnation” means any one of the manifold partial realizations of the final 
cause in a matter, “Carnification” stands for its full and flawless realization. I believe that Peirce’s later 
metaphysical claims on “destined habits” develop the germinal and inchoate ideas present in “Incarnation” and 
“Carnification.” In the reminder of this third section, I explain that according to Peirce the partial realization of 
the final cause should be understand as a “vague” realization. In order to do this, I sketch some of Peirce’s 
distinctions between different forms of indeterminacy (ambiguity VS. generality) and different forms of 
vagueness (subjective vagueness and objective vagueness). My conclusive thesis is that the final cause is 
“developmental” insofar as its vague realization asks for a determination. The way in which the human being 
determines the vague final cause is through an adequate “semeiosis” of the signs of her experience. The first-
person viewpoint identifies in particular those signs with propositions, beliefs, interests, desires, and ultimate 
ideals. How should the individual interpret those signs and produce actions, beliefs and further propositions? In 
particular, what habits of action are good and what evil? As it is clear, the problem of the determination of the 
vagueness of the human being’s rational end opens to the problem of normativity.  
Chapter 2’s task is to analyze critically Peirce’s doctrine of the “Normative Sciences,” which include logic, 
ethics and aesthetics. The chapter is divided in three parts. First, I try to reconstruct what Peirce has truly said 
about the normative sciences, given the fact that Peirce’s classification of the normative sciences has had a 
troubled story, both from the point of view of their genesis and the point of view of their interpretation by the 
scholarship. From a general standpoint, Peirce defines the normative sciences as the study of the normative 
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“forms,” or “normative facts,” of human, self-controlled behavior. This comprises principles of logical inference 
in reasoning, norms of behavior in a broader sense and affective dispositions. After unpacking the evaluative 
categories of each one of the normative sciences (truth and veracity for logic, or semeiotic; adequateness and 
effectiveness of a mean for an end – assuming that the end is good – for ethics; the admirable in itself beyond 
any reasons for aesthetics), I clarify that for Peirce only the aesthetic ideal constitutes the ultimate justification of 
the dimension of ethical and logical values. The aesthetic values, which Peirce identifies with the “development 
of concrete reasonableness,” is therefore the teleological ground of any value. A further point is what type of 
perspective Peirce’s semeiotic brings to the problem of the metaphysical status of normative facts. In particular, 
the idea of “final logical interpretant” (= habit) allows for an understanding of normative facts as human virtues. 
This does not prevent Peirce from stressing the importance of “norms” understood as linguistic formulations of 
a good purpose. The metaphysical status of the normative facts is further developed in the third section of the 
chapter, in which I inquiry into the nature of Peirce’s metaethical “realism” in relation to the so-called 
contemporary moral realism. 
Second, I bring my attention to the influence that Peirce’s growing confidence in the normative sciences had 
on his more mature pragmatism. However, the influence does not go only in one direction. As a matter of fact, I 
claim that Peirce’s more mature reflection on the nature of semeiotic and meaning led him to see the need for a 
normative perspective within pragmatism itself. In particular, I deal with the consequences that the normative 
sciences have on the evolution of Peirce’s pragmatic maxim. As it is know, the pragmatic maxim, formulated by 
Peirce in 1978 “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” for the first time, is mainly a principle of semantic clarification, 
according to which the meaning a believed proposition is ultimately given by the habits of action that that 
proposition would bring about in the believer. By studying the development of the maxim both from a historical 
and theoretical viewpoint, it becomes clear that the maxim shows an internal tension between two irreducible 
functions. The first function, the pragmatic-explicating, is simply aimed to determine what is the pragmatic level 
of the meaning of any proposition whatsoever. The second function, the pragmatic-normative, is not only meant 
to clarifying, but also to point at the direction in which the interpretation of the signs ought to be pursued, and, 
as a consequence, which propositions ought to be believed and for what purposes a proposition ought to be 
applied. 
Third, I go back to the problem of the metaphysical status of the normative facts, trying to establish a 
comparison between Peirce and some contemporary moral realists. In particular, I argue against four main theses 
of these contemporary moral realists, according to which, in order to avoid some form of moral constructivism 
(both relativistic and non-relativistic), it is necessary to claim that (i) moral language and knowledge are 
descriptive in nature; (ii) the task of moral knowledge is to provide an adequate account of what is genuinely 
good from a moral viewpoint; (iii) the reality of moral facts and properties is independent from any type of 
human function or disposition; (iv) at least some of our moral propositions are true. In the light of Peirce’s 
understanding of a normative fact, I show that the claim that Peirce is a non-relativistic moral constructivist is 
misplaced, if the assumption of this claim is that a normative fact is only something that is existent “out there” in 
the world, independently from the human mind. On the contrary, a normative fact is for Peirce the result of a 
practical self-comprehension by the human agent as a able of self-controlled agency. 
Chapter 3 concludes the section of the dissertation devoted specifically to Peirce with a reflection on Peirce’s 
understanding of deliberation and his alleged “moral sentimentalism.” In some passages (in particular the lecture 
“Philosophy and the Conduct of Life”), Peirce asserts that in “vitally important matters” sentiment should have 
a greater weight than reason in guiding human decision. This claim has led some interpreters to say that Peirce is 
a non-cognitivist in ethics. On the contrary, I show how Peirce’s statements can be given a more convincing 
reading by in the broader framework of his philosophy, which includes both the normative sciences and what he 
called “critical-common sensism.” It is highly improbable that Peirce is advocating for a non-cognitivist position 
in ethics in so far as his normative sciences also include a theory of deliberation, whose centrality would be at 
odds with an alleged non-cognitivist position. In particular, the incompatibility between a strong theory of 
deliberation and non-cognitivism in ethics is even less likely given the fact that Peirce puts forth (somehow in an 
anti-Aristotelian way), that deliberation is mainly about ends and ideals, not about means (in so doing, he also 
avoids the possibility of being confused with a humean of some sort). For Peirce, therefore, deliberations is at 
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work first and foremost in figuring out what ideals are truly good for the human beings, not what particular 
action ought to be performed in a particular context (this is why he also claims that the most important mental 
act in a particular situation is not deliberation, but perception). This set of considerations help us to put Peirce’s 
allegedly non-cognitivist claims in a clearer light. Furthermore, Peirce articulates a semeiotic theory of sentiments 
for which sentiments (but also emotions, affections, passions, which are not distinguished by Peirce) is a specific 
type of interpretant and has therefore cognitive nature, as much as any other interpretant. From all these 
considerations, it follows that when Peirce underscores the “wisdom” of sentiment in vitally important matters, 
he is actually claiming that sentimental has a higher epistemic authority than rational deliberation in order to 
grasp certain normative facts. In this sense, we understand what is Peirce’s thesis and what is the correct question 
we should ask about that thesis: if moral sentiment has a greater epistemic authority than rational deliberation in 
certain dimensions of life, what are Peirce’s reasons to justify such a claim? In order to tackle this issues, I deal 
briefly with Peirce’s doctrine of human “instincts” and their evolution, including that particular instinct that is 
the moral sentiment. Two points are interesting about this: first, Peirce sees a continuity between the way in 
which instinct apprehends certain actions as good (and other as evil) and the forms in which this instinct has 
been and is articulated by human traditions over time; second, Peirce also points out a normative discontinuity 
between the development of certain moral instincts and the free and critical endorsement of those instincts as 
reliable guides in moral issues. In order to clarify these two points, I develop an analysis of Peirce “critical 
common sensism” and a related justification of the superior epistemic value of sentiment over reason in vitally 
important matters. 
The second part of the dissertation deals in a specific way with two problems of agency and normativity in 
the philosophy of John Dewey. Chapter 4 focuses on Dewey’s theory of experience, on which virtually all Dewey 
scholars have written. However, in this chapter, I try to show that all the objections to Dewey’s alleged 
subjectivist idealism and reductionist naturalism partially fade away when we study Dewey’s theory of experience 
in semeiotic terms. In particular, by relying on Dewey’s study of the notion of “appearance” and his naturalistic 
theory of perception, I develop the idea of indexical existence. I believe that this notion can put in a new light 
fundamental tenets of Dewey’s philosophy such as the processes of constitution of the objects of experience, the 
struggle between constructivism and realism, the alleged incompatibility among different ontologies, and finally 
the notion of truth, on which I focus in one section by drawing from both Peirce and Dewey. My intention is to 
show that Dewey’s metaphysical question is mainly a normative question and how this question admits different 
answers. We could formulate the question in the following way: “how ought we think about indexical 
existences?”. In this sense, the common sense objects and the experimental sciences objects are not in 
contradiction among themselves; rather, they are different but equally legitimate articulations of the semeiotic 
potentialities of experience, in so far as the same types of indexical existences enter different systems of 
interactions with the human beings. Furthermore, in relation to the problem of truth, I show not only that 
Peirce’s and Dewey’s stances are not so distant as it scholars used to think, but also that their verificationism 
cannot be equated to the doctrines of the logical positivists. Peirce’s and Dewey’s doctrine of truth cannot even 
be interpreted as implying a “plastic” conception of truth, as it was maybe in the case of F. C. S. Schiller and 
William James. Although different in some details, Peirce’s and Dewey’s theory of truth does not state that true 
propositions are only those propositions that are experientially verified (now or in an indefinitely distant future), 
but that true propositions are those propositions that would be indefinitely verified (or non-falsified) on the basis 
of experience if all the necessary epistemic conditions occurred. 
In Chapter 5, which is the last chapter of the dissertation, I provide a critical reconstruction of Dewey’s 
theory of practical, moral judgment and his ethical contextualism. In fact, according to Dewey, practical 
judgment is the locus in which moral normativity emerges as such. This point is even more important if we think 
that Dewey’s proposal represents the most articulated example of an account of practical deliberation in the 
pragmatist tradition. Somehow differently from Peirce, for Dewey the primary locus of exercise of deliberation is 
more the context of particular situations rather than the ultimate ideals (however, I am talking here of a nuanced 
difference in stress, without claiming that the two tendencies are mutually exclusive; as a matter of fact, both of 
them are present in Peirce and Dewey). After providing an overview of Dewey’s theory of the habits of action, I 
focus on the logical structure of moral deliberation in its various discursive components (experience of the 
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problem, articulation of the problem, hypothesis of solution, final judgment/concrete act, passage from “is” to 
“ought”), including its virtues (rigor, epistemic productivity and creativity). Moreover, I dwell upon the non-
discursive factors in deliberation, in particular what Dewey calls “qualitative thought,” understood as a semeiotic 
activity that is not alternative but complementary to the merely proposition and discursive dimensions of 
deliberation. 
It has also been usually claimed that the fact that Dewey speaks of practical deliberation as “construction of 
good” implies some for of anti-realism about values, or even some sort of moral subjectivism and relativism. On 
the contrary, I claim that not only Dewey’s account of deliberation as partially constructive of its object does not 
entail moral subjectivism or relativism (being on the contrary the crux of practical knowledge), but also that 
Dewey maintains that there is a dynamic in experience that “happens” to the subject and subverts any pretension 
of being lawless moral legislator. In other words, I believe that is not possible to put Dewey in the tradition of 
moral philosophers who, starting from the Modern age, tries to provide a normative theory of ethics without 
appealing to a human teleology. On the contrary, Dewey’s writings on ethics and mainly on logic and aesthetic 
show that Dewey is committed to a teleological conception of human experience, although cutting short with 
any that disagrees with the transactional paradigm. This teleological dimension of human experience is described 
by Dewey as “having an experience,” understood as a determinate situation in which the subject experiences an 
aesthetic teleology common to all the elements of that situation (it is for this reason that all the elements of the 
situation are unified in an experience). This teleology also includes the experience of the moral value, in which 
the subjects experience and acknowledge (more than reasoning by appealing to abstract principles) those 
tendencies that are then codified in different conceptions of the human nature. In this sense, the aesthetic 
experience of the good precedes and guides the constructive work of practical judgment (tentatively, without 
aestheticism or undifferentiated abandonment to the different particular experiences). 
A conspicuous part of this final chapter is also devoted to highlight how Dewey’s ethical fallibilism does not 
entail ultimately a radical skepticism about moral principles. Dewey’s doubts about the stability of moral 
principles can be traced back to the following three problems: (1) moral principles are known through specific 
experiences (see again the aesthetic teleology of experience); as a consequence, since new experiences are always 
possible, nothing excludes that the moral principles we acknowledge now can undergo serious changes; (2) when 
the principles (but the same can be said of ends and ideals) are maximally general, they do not determine a 
difference in human agency (pragmatic principle of semantics), or, in other words, they do not have the power of 
being “means” for action; as a consequence, they require a determination for become actually operable; the 
importance of this principle consists in having this or that determinate form; therefore, these moral principles are 
certainly subject to modifications; (3) a further, broader point is about the genuine use of general moral 
principles in moral deliberation. According to Dewey, deliberation appeals more often and effectively to 
exemplar cases of good morality rather than general principles. Just like the works of art in the aesthetic 
experience and the methodological norms in the scientific inquiry are the “forms” that result over time from the 
experience of generations of human beings, moral experience appeals to exemplars patterns of behavior, 
established as such by the common and individual experience. In this sense, I also focus on the notion of 
“formativity,” understood as the property of exemplar cases of morality that contribute to reconstruct the 
individual’s experience and make possible in her life the experience of certain teleologies. In conclusion, I dwell 
upon the topic of fallibilism and evolution of moral principles, showing that according to Dewey fallibilism does 
not mean necessary falsification. Moreover, I also point out that the exigency of ethical fallibilism is defended by 
Dewey is the necessary consequence of the constant possibility of an improvement and extension of the moral 
principles rather than the kernel of a moral skepticism. 
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Chapter 1 
“Incarnation” and “Carnification.” A Peircean Theory of the Individual Human Agent 
 
 
 
In a famous comment, Richard J. Bernstein has written that “the nature of human individuality always 
seemed to be a source of intellectual embarrassment for Peirce” (Bernstein 1965: 90). In this chapter, I aim to 
show that there is no conclusive evidence in Peirce’s thought for such a claim. Although a great deal of work has 
been done in this field by Peirce scholarship (see in particular Colapietro 1989, commonly considered the 
groundwork on this subject), I believe that further study should be devoted to this topic. As I will show in my 
chapter, it seems to me that the existent scholarship still suffers from a confusion among three different meanings of the 
notion of “individuality” once it is applied to the human being. I believe that Peirce's complex approach to the 
problem of human individuality covers all the three meanings of “individuality” that I will show in the next 
pages. I use the phrase “individual human agent” (sometimes, also “individual human being”) to avoid the 
ambiguities carried by expression such as “self,” “I,” “subject,” and “person”. Therefore, I will use these 
different notions only in relation to specific aspects of the “individual human agent,” trying to follow the rigor of 
Peirce's thought.1 The chapter has the following structure. In the first part (§§ 1., 1.1., 1.2, 1.3.) I reconstruct 
Peirce's understanding of the metaphysical status of individual objects. In the second part (§§ 2., 2.1., 2.2., 2.3., 
2.4.) I focus on the problem of the reality of the empirical self and the logical nature of self-consciousness. In the 
third part (§§ 3., 3.1., 3.2., 3.3., 3.4., 3.5.), I introduce the topic of final causation in relation to human beings and 
show that teleology provides with a further and somehow architectonic notion of individuality. 
 
 
 
0. Introduction 
 
My overall interpretation is that human individuality has to be understood in a threefold way (so that every 
reference to only one of these three ways is a form of reduction of Peirce's perspective): 
(1) “Individuality” is the law-like continuity of a unique series of instantiations that constitutes the reality of every 
human being. 
(2) “Individuality” means the constant possibility in the mental life of adult human beings to refer to her or 
his empirical self through acts of self-reference and psychological self-ascription (synthetically, “self-consciousness”) 
(3) “Individuality” also refers to the unique mission to which a human being is called in the process of creation. 
 
I take these three meanings to be displayed, although in an overlapping way, by three 1903 texts. It is worth 
quoting these three passages at length, since they constitute the textual background of everything I will say in this 
chapter and in part in Chapter 2 and 3. 
 
These circumstances [all the different experiences of acquaintance with the same individual object] 
have led me semi-instinctively to suppose that one person preserving an identity through the 
continuity of space, time, character, memory, etc., has been one singular connected with all these 
phenomena; and though I have not made any formal induction to test this theory, yet my impression 
is that I am in possession of an abundance of facts that would support such an induction quite 
irresistibly. In a similar way I have no doubt that the phenomena which may have presented 
themselves to you, together with many more that persons whom I know well must recollect, all unite 
to support the hypothesis that there is one singular Theodor Roosevelt quite unmistakable for a 
phantom or for any other man them himself. In each of my own perception, if my memory does not 
deceive me, there was a decided double consciousness or direct consciousness of reaction, and I have 
abundance of reason to think it was so with your perception and with those of all his acquaintances 
whom I know or have heard of. The notion that all those reacting singulars were in the relation of 
personal identity to one another, and that their separate singularities consist in a connection to one 
                                                            
1 The linguistic rigor of Peirce's thought does not coincide always with the linguistic rigor of Peirce's writings.  
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singular, the collection of them all, this notion is an element of Thirdness abductively connected with 
them. We may express the matter by saying that all these singular percepts were aspects or parts of 
one collective singular which may include non-perceptual parts for aught we are now prepared to say” 
(EP2: 222, 1903) 
 
The creation of the universe, which did not take place during a certain busy week, in the year 4004 
B.C., but is going on today and never will be done, is this very development of Reason. … Under this 
conception, the ideal of conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation 
by giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is “up to 
us” to do so.” (EP2: 255, 1903) 
 
… the essence of Reason is such that its being never can have completely perfected. It always 
must be in a state of incipiency, of growth. It is like the character of a man which consists in the ideas 
that he will conceive and in the efforts that he will make, and which only develops as the occasions 
actually arise. Yet in all his life long no son of Adam has ever fully manifested what there was in him. 
(EP2: 255, 1903) 
 
There is at least one more fundamental quotation in Peirce about the way in which the “vir is begotten” 
through a repeated exercise of the self-control upon itself (CP 5.402 n.3). This quotation is closely related to 
point (3), although not reducible to it.  Although crucial, I will not deal with it in this chapter, since a consistent 
part of Chapter 2 and 3 is devoted to an analysis of Peirce's theory of normativity and deliberation. At the same 
time, point (3) clearly refers to the dimension of human moral life and even religious eschatology. I will deal with 
the problem the final causality in its metaphysical and semeiotic aspects in the last part of this chapter, leaving on 
the other hand a more extensive consideration of the problem of ethics and normativity (Peirce's theory of the 
“Normative Sciences”) in Chapter 2.  
As I have already mentioned, Colapietro 1989 represents not only a fundamental scholarly work in Peirce's 
conception of the “self,” but it is also the background of many articles and papers that have been written on this 
topic.2 In this chapter, I further the work of this scholarship by defending the thesis that Peirce did have a positive 
and articulated conception of the human being as an individual. I take this to be an important endeavor, since also 
recently has been claimed that Peirce holds a nihilistic understanding of the individual self. I mention two 
remarkable cases. First, Cornelis de Waal writes that according to Peirce the individual human being is “wholly 
defined in terms of [his or her] imperfections” (2006: 154). Second, Thomas L. Short claims that for Peirce the 
“self” is “no more than a harmony of parts, like a well-tuned lyre” (1997: 307). As I will show, the interpretative 
theses exemplified in these two quotations are either wrong or partial.3  
There are three classical interpretations of Peirce's pragmatism that take Peirce to deny the 
individuality/existence of the human “self.” One of these is the already quoted Bernstein 1965, according to 
which Peirce's metaphysics cannot account for the originality and spontaneity of agency that characterizes the 
human agent (including in this the human reasoner). For similar reasons, a second interpretation, Weiss 1965, 
maintains that in Peirce's terms there are no real “individuals” and that what we call individuals are actually only 
the parts of bigger wholes. Finally, Boler 1963 concluded from a compared study of Duns Scotus's and Peirce's 
metaphysics that since Peirce wedded himself to a sort of Scotistic metaphysics but rejected at the same time the 
notion of “contraction,” he could never produce a genuine notion of “individuality.” The three nihilistic 
interpretation I have mentioned rely on a series of passages in which Peirce prima facie either denies (1) an original 
capacity of self-consciousness, or (2) the existence of the individual human being as existent apart from the social 
organism, or finally (3) limits the metaphysical status of the individual self to error and ignorance bearer (e.g. CP 
3.93; 1.637; 5.317; 5.235). At the same time, however, not only Colapietro 1989, but also some other scholars 
(Delaney 1973; Delaney 1979; Delaney 1993; DiLeo 1991; Harrison 1964; Holmes 1964; Riley 1974; Maddalena 
2006; Michael 1976; Muoio 1984; Pape 1980; Sorrell 2001; Sorrell 2004; Stephens 1980; Thibaud 1987)4 have 
shown that the nihilistic interpretation of the self is a misunderstanding of Peirce's thought. The common 
conclusion of these works can be summed up in the three tenets: (i) Peirce's alleged negative claims about the 
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instance, how does this “harmony of parts” relate to the three different meanings of “individuality” above mentioned? 
4 Less fundamental are Uslucan 2012 and Magada-Ward 2003. 
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“self” are actually a defense of a conception of self-consciousness (in general, introspection) as inferential and 
non-intuitive; (ii) the same claims underscore the developmental origin of the individual self-consciousness, 
which relies mainly upon social and linguistic dynamics; (iii) finally, the apparently ambiguous place of 
“individuality” in Peirce's metaphysics is due to his conception of individuality as a limit-case within continuity 
and as ultimately indivisible from continuity. 
Although all these studies provide essential insights in Peirce's theory, I believe that they all work more or less 
on the background of an ambiguity about three different uses of the notion of individuality in Peirce's texts. In what 
follows, I present Peirce's three different meanings of the notion of “individuality” in relation to the problem of 
human individuality. 
 
 
 
1. 1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness, and the Metaphysics of Individual Objects 
 
First of all, it is necessary to approach the chore of Peirce's philosophy, i.e., his theory of the “Universal 
Categories.” The story of the development of the three “universal categories” in Peirce's thought is a long and 
articulate one. Some scholars (see in particular De Tienne 1989; 1993, Liszka 1996, Short 1994, Hausman 1993; 
2008; Parker 1994) have attempted a reconstruction of it from both a historical and theoretical standpoint. An 
adequate account of Peirce's categories should include a discussion of Peirce's early list of “conceptions” in his 
1868 “New List of Categories” in relation to the mature developments of his semeiotic. Peirce's reconsideration 
of the intermediate categories developed in the “New List” begins as early as 1885, although it was not until 1992 
that he acknowledged that this reworking process was a new stage of his inquiry.5 The result of this new inquiry 
was the acknowledgement of three categories, named by Peirce respectively Firstness, Secondess and Thirdness. 
Although my analysis of Peirce's metaphysical theory of individual objects draws abundantly on the three 
categories, it is not possible here to repeat a comprehensive overview of their origin and structure. I will limit 
myself to some necessary remarks in order to introduce the problem I want to address in this first part of the 
chapter, namely, the problem of the metaphysical status of individual objects. As a consequence, I will neither 
reconstruct Peirce's arguments in favor of his categories, nor provide any further argument in relation to them. 
The aim of this section is only to introduce to Peirce's approach to categories and to identify the problem of 
individual objects. 
Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness are “the most universal categories of elements of all experience,” 
“natural” and even “poetical” (CP 1.417). Talking about the categories requires making clear what type of 
question we are addressing. First, we can ask a methodological question about the way in which the categories 
are discovered: how are the categories found? Second, the question can be about the relationship between the 
status of the categories in phaneroscopy and their status in metaphysics: how do we move from a mere 
phaneroscopic understanding of the categories to further commitments about their metaphysical status? Third, 
the approach to the categories can be bluntly a-methodological and focus straightforwardly on what the use of 
the categories adds to topics of different nature. This first part of the chapter fits in the third approach, as long 
as I will show in what sense the categories, metaphysically interpreted, are the elements that constitute a Peircean 
individual object. The first two questions are still object of discussion and are somehow more fundamental than 
the third one. However, Peirce stresses the fact that a recognition of the categories cannot proceed a priori but 
requires instead prolonged attention to common experience and intersubjective confirmation and correction.6 
The method for finding the categories is phaneroscopic, namely, observational. As Peirce suggests, “Go out 
under the blue dome of heaven and look at what is present … [as with an] artist’s eye” (CP 5.44) is the method of 
phaneroscopy. Peirce refers broadly to the world of experience when he identifies the object of phaneroscopy 
with the phaneron in general. For Peirce, the phaneron is “the collective total of all that is in any way or in any 
sense present to the mind” (CP 1.284, 1905). Hence, my analysis of individual objects in relation to the three 
categories is an instance of the experimental or experiential approach the inquirer should keep toward the 
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6 See Short (1994: 65-66). On the contrary, Apel 1981 and Murphy 1961 lament that Peirce does not justify the fact that it is the logic of 
relations (or algebra of relations) that part of mathematics that provides to phaneroscopy its formal principles. 
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categories. In order to be justified, the categories must prove experientially fundamental and heuristically fruitful 
in every domain of experience.  In a often-quoted passage, Peirce claims that “the elements of every concept 
enter into logical thought at the gate of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and 
whatever cannot show its passport at both those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason” (CP 
5.212). Therefore, I will also make reference to perception as the epistemic fundamental unity in which the 
categories take shape at first. 
As I have already mentioned, Peirce's mature universal categories are “Firstness,” “Secondness,” and 
“Thirdness.” They can be regarded from different perspectives, insofar as they are supposed to constitute the 
most fundamental components of every phaneron. In themselves, the three categories can be understood as the 
mere rendition of three formal relations, based on the principles of the algebra of relations developed in 
mathematics. 1stness corresponds to the monadic relation (Px), 2ndness to the dyadic relation (Qxy) and 3rdness 
to the triadic relation (Rxyz). However, the categories can be regarded from a more material perspective, and in 
particular (1) from the point of view of experience, as their genetical matrix; (2) from the point of view of 
semeiosis, as their fundamental dynamic structure; and (3) from the point of metaphysics, as the science of their 
articulation in metaphysical modalities. The three different perspectives are obviously interconnected.  
The first category we find is Firstness (1stness). In its phanoroscopic nature, 1stness is what the phaneron is 
independently from anything else (CP 8.328). It is a “quality,” a “feeling,” a quidditas, or a suchness (CP 1.148; 
1.424; see also EP2: 268, 1903). It has to be prescinded from the concrete occurrence of the phaneron, which is 
always happening in a point in time and space (CP 8.329; 1.304; 1.422). It also requires prescision from all the 
generalities implied in the perception of the phaneron (CP 1.357). Retrospectively, the monadic quality can be 
referred to as the experience of an isolated object (“this ball”) or to something more complex (“the three-weeks 
long trip to Mongolia as characterized by a unitary monadic aspect”; see CP 1.311, 1.304, 1.531, 1.418). This fact 
does not change the phaneroscopic character of the quality as an irreducible, indecomposable monadic 
dimension of the phaneron. In its metaphysical nature, 1stness is for Peirce mere possibility. By using the logical 
structures of subjunctive and counterfactual conditionals, Peirce defines metaphysical possibility as “may-be” or 
“might-be” (CP 1.304). It is what may happen or might happen if certain conditions C occurred. Broadly taken, 
it can be predicamental of an existent instantiation (a particular happening may occur if C) or of a general 
disposition (a general disposition may develop if C). In this sense, Peirce describes it as “the embryo of being” 
(EP2: 268-269, 1903). In relation to perception, the “quality” is what remains of the percept of the perceptual 
judgment once it has been prescinded by its actual occurrence. From the semeiotic standpoint, it corresponds to 
the signs that have “iconicity” as their prevailing aspect, which are in particular rhematic iconic qualisigns (the 
purest example of iconicity), rhematic iconic sinsigns and rhematic iconic legisign.7 
The second category is Secondness (2ndness). In its phanoroscopic nature, 2ndness is what the phaneron is 
in relation to a quidditas, but only insofar as that quidditas is given in a reactive dumb experience. Peirce's 
descriptions talk about “struggle” (CP 1.322), “experience of effort prescinded from the idea of a purpose” (CP 
8.330), “experience of resistance” (CP 8.330), “opposition” (CP 1.436), “attraction and repulsion” (CP 1.487; 
6.343), “compulsion” (CP 7.674), double-sidedness (CP 1.324). This is the formal account of the experience of 
the conscious life as being “double consciousness” or a “consciousness of reaction” (CP 1.324). It has to be 
prescinded by any experience of growth or regularity in order to be obtained as a pure category. It requires the 
implicit reference to the quidditas of the phaneron, but it prescinds from reference to anything else. In relation 
to perception, it is the percept as an actual event insofar as it is prescinded from the generality of perceptual 
judgment. In its metaphysical nature, 2ndness is described by Peirce as actuality. It is actual action or reaction 
(EP2: 268, 1903). By drawing from Scotus, Peirce refers to this metaphysical principle as “haecceity” (e.g. CP 
1.458), a unique occurrence in a point of time and space. He also refers to it as  “individuality,” “fact,” 
“existence” (EP2: 270-271, 1903; CP1.432; 1.456; 1.457; 3.613), and sometimes “materiality” (CP 1.419; 1.436). 
By using the logical structures of subjunctive and counterfactuals, Peirce claims that metaphysical 2ndness is 
expressible as a “will-be.” It is what will happen if C occurs. As such, it is the actualization or the instantiation of 
a mere possibility but does not require conceptually referring to a general disposition. From the semeiotic 
standpoint, it corresponds to the sign that has indexicality as its main character, in particular rhematic indexical 
                                                            
7 Liszka (1996: 48-50). 
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sinsigns, dicentic indexical sinsigns, rhematic indexical legisigns, and dicentic indexical legisigns.8 
The third category we find is Thirdness (3rdness), or continuum.9 In its phaneroscopic nature, 3rdness is the 
experience of growth and habit-taking (EP1: 277), learning (CP 7.536), generalization (MS942: 14), continuity of 
time (CP 7.466), space (CP 6.82), and regularity in general.10 In relation to perception, it corresponds to the 
generality of perception, namely, the lawful element implicit in the perceptual judgment, which is a necessary 
inferential moment of perception (see “cotary propositions,” EP2: 238, 1903). In its metaphysical nature, 3rdness 
is defined by Peirce as non-deterministic necessity. It is general rule, law, habit, growth and life, thought, and 
general disposition (CP 1.23-1.27; 5.121; EP2: 314, 1904; EP2: 271, 1903; EP2: 439, 1908; EP2: 450), “original or 
acquired” (CP 5.538). It is a real operative power in nature (EP2: 181; 183, 1903). Peirce commitment to the 
reality of general laws brought him to develop a form of extreme Scholastic realism (CP 5.470) and a synechistic 
metaphysics. Metaphysical 3rdness is also sometimes referred to as a “permanent fact,” “general fact,” and 
“individuality” (CP 1.419; 1.434). It is the “rudimentary form” in which continua manifest themselves. (CP 
6.172). As such, it is a regularity of possible actualizations that strictly speaking exceed all multitudes (EP2: 269, 
1993). It is a power or function of “mediation” between what is 1st and what is 2nd in phaneroscopy, 
metaphysics and semeiotic (e.g. CP1.515). By using the logical structures of subjunctive and counterfactual 
conditionals, Peirce renders it as a “would-be” (e.g. CP 2.666). A general disposition is what would happen if 
certain conditions C occurred. It covers both existential “real” events independent from our knowledge and the 
dynamic of our thinking. The reality of a general disposition consists in the activity of regulating or governing the 
actual occurrences of an X, in which mere possibilities become spatio-temporally existent. It can be a specific 
general disposition (such as, the hardness of the wood, the stubbornness of a friend, the validity of a logical 
principle, the permanence on an “ideal” of life), or the extremely broad general dispositions of time and space, 
understood as the laws of any event. In fact, time and space, as general dispositions, are the continua that 
constitute the forms of all possible instantiations. As such, they must apply to (they require) specific bundles of 
habits in order to determine phenomena that follow their structuring power (CP 1.132). As such, space and time 
are two different but connected forms of extension. Time describes the general would-be concerning the order 
of two or more instantiations (CP 1.439; see also EP1: 278), while space is the general would be of the relation of 
reaction between two existents or more existents (CP 3.613).11 Hence, the spatio-temporal extended reality of an 
existent object does not consist only in its past, present, and future actual instantiations (EP2: 434-435, 1908), 
but also in the general dispositions which have regulated them and would determine different instantiations if C 
occurred (CP 1.432). In its semeiotic nature, 3rdness is the capacity of the phaneron of being represented by a 
general sign or symbol (CP 8.268). The phaneron can be translated into a symbol, namely, into a representamen 
governed by general rules (legisign). As such, it overlaps with previous iconic and indexical instances of sign. In 
its specificity, it also includes rhematic symbolic legisigns, dicentic symbolic legisigns, and argumentative 
symbolic legisigns.12  
It is also important to stress the fact that the three different material perspective on the categories 
(phaneroscopic, metaphysical and semeiotic) are intertwined (e.g. EP2: 427-428).13 First, the categories of the 
different metaphysical modalities include the phaneroscopic categories (since also the phaneron is a reality) and 
the semeiotic category (since not only the signs are part of reality, but they are at a certain level the dynamical 
                                                            
8 Liszka (1996: 49-51). 
9 On Peirce's notion of continuum in mathematics and metaphysics see in particular Maddalena (2009: 193-223), Moore 2007, Potter 
and Shields 1977, Putnam 1995, Sfendoni-Mentzou 1997 and Zalamea (manuscript).  
10 Short (1994: 85) talks of an “experience of nonlogical necessity” exemplified in the experience of causal regularity (both active and 
passive). Such experiences, instead of being syntheses of atomic impressions and ideas, like in the British empiricism, are “law-
governed continua.”  
11 It is worth mentioning that “time” has a “dyad requirement” insofar as all the existent events have specific directionality. Peirce 
speaks of “evolution” and “involution” as the dynamic moments present in every event (CP 1.493; 1.495). It is the directionality of 
“evolution” and “involution” that determines a stage of the event to be temporally anterior to the following ones.     
12 Lizska (1996: 51-51). 
13 The connectedness of the three approaches to 1stness, 2ndness and 3rdness is exemplified by passages such as the following: “So, 
then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an 
atmospheric possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet but capable of rationalization; secondly, there is the being that 
consists in arbitrary brute action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to rationalize it would be to destroy its 
being; and thirdly, there is living intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is rational necessity and 
necessitation” (CP 6.342; see also 1.535). 
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structure of interaction among the different metaphysical modalities). Second, the semeiotic categories include 
the phaneroscopic categories (since the signs are the dynamic of interaction among the modalities of reality and 
therefore also of the phaneron) and the metaphysical categories (since they stay for the dynamic of interaction 
among the modalities of reality). Third, the phaneroscopic categories include the categories of semeiosis (since 
the apprehension of a sign-agency is experiential and phaneroscopic) and the categories of metaphysics (since the 
distinction among the different metaphysical modalities rely upon the differences found in experience and 
therefore in the phaneron).  
As it is clear, the problem of the reality and status of individual objects mainly concern the categories in their 
metaphysical import. Peirce makes clear that metaphysically speaking the categories describe not different 
entities, but the different metaphysical principles of all entities. An ambiguity in Peirce's approach to the problem 
of the metaphysical status of individual objects relies in his characterization of the synonymic notions of 
“substance,” “thing,” and “object”14 (and the connected notions of “existence,” “individuality,” and “fact”) 
sometimes as 2ndness and sometimes as 3rdness. As we have seen, this alleged inconsistency in Peirce's texts has 
led many commentators to produce partial and not fully adequate reconstructions of the notion of individuality 
and fact in relation to the entities of our common experience. The further consequence of this misconception 
has been interpreting Peirce as if he denied the reality of something like metaphysical individuality. On one side, 
Peirce claims that “the existence of things consists in their regular behaviour” (EP1: 278; see also EP2: 357, 
1905). Similarly, he observes that a “substance,” “in the old sense of thing, not in the modern chemical sense” 
represents a “bundle of habits” (EP1: 279). A “thing” does not consist in anything else than “in the truth of a 
general conditional proposition,” that is, “if a substance of a certain kind should be exposed to an agency of a 
certain kind, a certain kind of sensible result would ensue” (EP2: 357, 1905). According to these passages, Peirce 
seems to assume a notion of “object” which is reduced to a cluster of general dispositions, 3rdness. However, in 
other passages, Peirce refers to objects as “single existent objects” individualized in particular sections of time 
and space (CP 6.335). In this case, haecceity or individuation, 2ndness, is included in his characterization of an 
object. The same ambiguity is displayed in Peirce's treatment of the notion of “individuality” in Baldwin's 
Dictionary. In the entry “individual,” Peirce approaches his analysis by providing two definitions. According to the 
first definition, “individual” is a definite cluster of general properties, so that for every property, either x has P or 
has not P (CP 3.612). However, this definition does not include Leibniz’s principle of indiscernibles, insofar as 
there can be two things, x and y, exactly similar in all their general properties and still not coincident as a unique 
individual insofar as they are distinct for their haecceities. The point is therefore that this first definition is 
insufficient. The second definition appeals not to general properties, but to instances of reaction, insofar as 
“individual is something that reacts” (CP 3.613). In this case, the principle of indiscernible works since it includes 
also the haecceitaties. Therefore, although two individual things are exactly alike in all other respects, they will be 
different for their spatio-temporal different instantiation, “since space is nothing but the intuitional presentation 
of the conditions of reaction, or of some of them. But there will be no logical hindrance to two things being 
exactly alike in all other respects” (CP 3.613). In the same entry, Peirce explicitly claims for the second definition. 
However, can we only understand individual objects as reagents or mere 2ndnesses? The ambiguity about 
Peirce's alleged contradictory account of “substance” (as 3rdness and as 2ndness) is solved insofar as the 
different claims about the nature of a substance are read in relation to Aristotle's distinction between primary and 
secondary substance.15 Peirce hints at this when he claims that a “general” exists only insofar as it inheres in 
individuals, which are “first substances” having absolute, independent existence (NEM, III: 58). In an explicit 
text, he writes: 
 
… single objects exist, and that each of these at each single date exists only in a single place. 
These, no doubt, are what Aristotle meant by {to kath' hekaston} and by {ai pro ̈tai ousiai} in his 
earlier works, particularly the Predicaments. For {ousia} there plainly means existent, and {to ti einai} 
is existence. (I cannot satisfy myself that this was his meaning in his later writings; nor do I think it 
possible that Aristotle was such a dolt as never to modify his metaphysical opinions.) But {to 
atomon} was, I think, the strict logical individual, determinate in every respect. (CP 6.335) 
                                                            
14 I will use the three notions as synonyms as well. 
15 Cf. Aristotle 2a35-2b7. 
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Peirce clearly connects the dimension of 2ndness and 3rdness in characterizing the reality of an individual 
thing. “What we call a thing is a cluster of habit of reactions, or, to use a more familiar phrase, is a centre of 
forces” (CP 4.157; see also EP1: 348, 1892). In what follows, I show not only that Peirce's notion of individuality 
is not ambiguous, but also that the three categories allows for an understanding of the metaphysical status of an 
individual object as a law-like series of different instantiations. An individual object is a continuity (3rdness) of 
spatio-temporal slices (2ndnesses). Stressing unilaterally the meaning of individuality as 2ndness and the meaning 
of individuality as 3rdness leads to a partial and mistaken account of what an individual object is in its entirety. If 
any, the contribution of this section consists in the study of certain terminological connections and 
developments present in Peirce’s texts. It will be clear that for Peirce an adequate account of individual objects 
requires a modal metaphysics. In particular, I will show through textual analysis that an individual object is for 
Peirce a spatio-temporal continuity of existentially conjoined instantiations or actions.  
 
 
 
1.1. Individuality, A-Facts and B-Facts 
 
An example of alleged ambiguity in Peirce's text in relation to “facts” and “individuals” is found in his 
presentation of 2ndness. I will show that this alleged ambiguity is actually due to a genuine, positive tension that 
characterizes the idea of fact once the fact is dwelt phaneroscopically. In other words, Peirce classifies facts and 
individuals sometimes as 2ndnesses and sometimes as 3rdnesses because the fact itself is subject to different 
phaneroscopic perspectives. On one side, the aspect of brute reaction can be stressed, while in the other the 
aspect of generality and perdurance can be dominant. In the fist case, I will talk about A-facts, while in the 
second case I will use the locution B-facts. Again, A-facts and B-facts must not be understood as different 
entities, but as different phaneroscopic and metaphysical dimensions of reality, which is a complex interaction of 
1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness. In a passage, Peirce introduces 2ndness referring to an “actual fact.” The 
interesting aspect is that he analyzes the notion of “actual fact” in a twofold way, both as a “perfect individuality” 
and as a “less pure individuality.” Thus, talking about the actual fact, Peirce observes that  
 
… an occurrence is perfectly individual. It happens here and now. A permanent fact is less purely 
individual; yet so far as it is actual, its permanence and generality only consist in its being there at 
every individual instant. (CP 1.419; see Maddalena 2003: 182-184) 
 
In the remainder of the passage, the notions of “actual fact” and “occurrence” are linked to the ones of 
“action” and “reaction.” By combining these notions, it is possible to say in a first approximation that Peirce's 
“actual fact” in the meaning of “perfect individual” corresponds to an instance of metaphysical 2ndness. A 
perfect individual or A-fact is therefore each and all the instantiations of an X in their respective spatio-temporal 
points (see CP 3.613 for a treatment of “existence” is close to A-fact). Strictly speaking, an actual fact is the 
existent slice in the career of an X actualized in a punctual spatio-temporal locus, so that a different actualization 
of X in a further spatio-temporal point would result in a different “actual fact.”16 Sometimes Peirce refers to this 
aspect of reality as a spatio-temporal “state” (CP 1.494; EP2: 378), namely, the spatio-temporal slice of an entity 
on which it is possible to focus by abstracting from the continuum of the vicissitudes of an entity. An A-fact is 
an actuality considered “by itself … apart from [the] governing uniformity” present in it, or “without 
emphasizing any element of law” (CP 1.428). In other words, in order to highlight the phaneroscopic and 
metaphysical nature of an A-fact it is necessary to prescind from any element of generality. “The exclusions,” 
says Peirce, “leave for the category of fact, first, that which the logicians call the contingent, that is, the accidentally 
actual, and second, whatever involves an unconditional necessity, that is, force without law or reason, brute force” 
(CP 1.427). 
At the same time, the notion of actual fact can be understood in a broader way, in which 2ndness is much 
less pure. “Actual fact” can mean “permanent fact.” As such, it describes a series of different instantiations and 
                                                            
16 Ishida (2009: 49-50) talks about “snap-shots” instead of spatio-temporal slices.  
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occurrences of X. This is what I call a B-fact. In this second sense, the actuality of the fact does not consist in an 
isolated instance of reaction, but in a connection of different instances of reactions, or A-facts (see CP 1.436 for 
a treatment of “existence” akin to B-fact).  Also the B-fact is an instance of “individuality,” although of a lower 
purity. The question is: what is the permanent, identical element that can be actualized in different spatio-
temporal points and guarantees for the continuity among them (“its being there at every individual instant”)? 
According to the quoted passage, a B-fact includes at least the following elements: (1) the possibility of 
something to be actualized in and through different A-facts in different spatio-temporal points; (2) the series or 
chain of different A-facts at different spatio-temporal points; (3) the permanency of something through all the 
different A-facts. The reference to the ideas of possibility and permanence makes clear that 2ndness in its purity 
is not sufficient anymore to account for a B-fact. From the previous introduction to Peirce's category, it should 
be clear that this something is an element of 3rdness, in the metaphysical form of a general disposition. We have 
already read Peirce's statement according to which a “thing” is a “cluster of habit of reactions” (CP 4.157). The 
element of possibility and permanence that underlies a B-fact is therefore some general disposition, which allows 
for different and indefinite instantiations (possibility) and remains the same along each and all of them as their 
inner general tendency. Thus, a B-fact can be described as a chain or series of subsequent and contiguous A-facts 
(2ndness) in which the same general disposition (3rdness) is instantiated. At a more fundamental level (or from a 
broader perspective), the general disposition is represented by the law of space and time. At a more specific level, 
the generality can be every general disposition that characterizes a substance as such (see next section). 
Therefore, Peirce writes in relation to the problem of space that “everything whose identity consists in a 
continuity of reactions will be a single logical individual. Thus any portion of space, so far as it can be regarded as 
reacting, is for logic a single individual; its spatial extension is no objection” (CP 3.613). Similarly, addressing the 
problem of the extension in time, he clarifies that a fact, “if it is continued for some time … involves the third 
category. … A generalized reaction is a law” (CP 7.532). Notice that, from a phaneroscopic viewpoint, it is 
2ndness itself (compulsion, brute reaction) that grows into an experience which shows a certain regularity 
(3rdness).17 It is the fact itself that, emerging in experience as A-fact, then grows in intelligibility and generality 
into a B-fact, in which the general element of rationality is begotten and at the same time the brute element of 
reaction is maintained, although at a different level (see also CP 6.326). This is true for Peirce since the 1868 
“New List of Categories.” In it, what is apprehended at first as an “IT” or “PRESENT in general”18 (the 
conception which is closer to the sensuous multifold) grows through experience and inquiry into a more 
determinate object of experience. In any case, the important point to stress here is that there is some “general 
way of action” which operates “throughout [every] fraction of a second” (EP2: 123, 1902) and therefore 
regulates the series of different A-facts. Peirce spells out that the condition of permanence throughout different 
A-facts is an element of “law.” As Peirce observes, the law also imparts to the different instantiations a kind of 
“unity,” so that different A-facts are gathered together into a unitary B-fact. Peirce implies this when he claims 
that “the third category also has a mode of unity which does not belong to either of the others” (CP 7.532). 
Hence, the unity of the law consists in the regularity according to which all of its actualizations occur and hence 
in the general way in which their occurrence can be described (CP 5.538). 
One further textual evidence helps us to understand Peirce's complex notion of B-fact. As early as 1859, in a 
manuscript titled “The Limits of Religious Thought” (MS53), Peirce introduces the notion of “influx” as 
distinguished from “causality.”19 In this passage we read that every fact: 
 
… is a relation of dependency. The motion of a ball though the air, for example, is a complex 
event composed of an indefinite number of elementary events each of which is the relation of the ball 
at any moment to itself at the previous moment. Every dependency has one of three necessary modes. 
The first is community. This is where there is no dependency and therefore no event at all, as two 
balls at the same instant of time. The second necessary mode is causality, which is the mode of 
dependence everything at each moment has upon things at the last moment. The third necessary 
mode is influx which is the mode of dependence substance to form, character to acts, things to 
qualities. (W1: 38) 
                                                            
17 Colapietro (2003: 110) describes this phenomenon as the fact that “experience is perpetually transforming and transcending itself.” 
18 Peirce also calls this stage in the development of semeiosis “substance,” see EP1: 1-2, 1968. 
19 See De Tienne (1989: 389). My analysis is more metaphysical than De Tienne's. 
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Although this passage can be interpreted in different ways, given its early date,20 I would read it as 
foreshadowing the later doctrine of the relationship between “law” and instantiations I have highlighted in the 
notion of B-fact. In particular, the notion of “causality” describes here the productive relation that each spatio-
temporal slice, A-fact, bears with the immediately following one. A causal process is here the inner constitution 
of a “permanent fact” insofar as causality is understood as the chain or series of subsequent and contiguous 
instantiations of X in which the stress is on the element of 2ndness rather than on the element of 3rdness. As 
Peirce will claim later, a B-fact must have among its conditions an existential connection among contiguous 
spatio-temporal “states” in order to be a unitary fact or “event” (CP 1.439). Temporal and spatial continuity is 
the fact of commonality that makes different A-facts only the different spatio-temporal slices of an X instead of 
the different events of different objects. However, the important idea contained in this passage is “influx.” What 
we read is that there is a parallelism between “substance,” “character,” and “thing,” on one side, and “form,” 
“act,” and “quality” on the other side. Although it is not clear from the context what “form” means here, we can 
guess on the basis of other early texts21 that “form” stays for an actual property of X. The ambiguity of the series 
of analogies is therefore solved: while substance, character, and things are examples of generalities, form, acts, 
and qualities are examples of actualities. The influx-relation turns out to be a relation of dependency that 
actualities have with their generalities. There is some set of generalities that govern and gathers into unity (this is 
the “influx” here at stake) every event and instantiation of X. 
 
 
 
1.2. What is the “Subject” of a B-Fact? The Logical Subject and the Individual Thing 
 
It is important to underscore that the account of B-facts that we have articulated so far does not entail, sic et 
simpliciter, that the B-fact coincides with an individual object (or individual substance). In fact, it is possible to 
limit the definition of a B-fact to an isolated, specific law and its instantiations. In this respect, Peirce notices that 
what “happens” “is something that can only happen by having a subject with an independent mode of being not 
dependent upon this nor upon any determination whatsoever” (CP 1.440). Therefore, the only formal 
requirement of a “permanent fact” is that there is something that constitutes the condition of possibility and the 
general factor of permanence throughout different spatio-temporal actual slices of existence. For instance, a 
colored surface is the general condition and the factor of permanence making possible the perception as a 
continuum of different, actual manifestations of the color in some of its different gradations. At the same time, 
however, the fact that that same surface is actually resisting the gravitation force over and over again in 
contiguous spatio-temporal points is not due to the color of the surface. This means that even though the first 
case meets all the conditions for being a B-fact, it does not meet the conditions for being an individual object, 
since the lawful element present in that B-fact cannot account for the example of instantiation described in the 
second case that is supposed to be an event of the same individual object. Peirce writes: 
 
… while it is not necessary that the subjects should be … of the nature of subjects – that is, that 
they should be substantial things – since it may be a mere wave, or an optical focus, or something else 
of like nature which is the subject of change, yet it is necessary that these subject should be in some 
measure permanent, that is, should be capable of accidental determinations … . (CP 1.493; see also 
1.111) 
                                                            
20 Whether Peirce was a “nominalist” or a “realist” about generals before 1868 is an ongoing debate. Neglecting the small interpretative 
differences, we can say that Fisch 1967 and Michael 1988 believe that Peirce was a nominalist before 1868 (in addition, Michael claims 
that Peirce’s shift from nominalism to realism in 1868 was only “nominal,” since he kept claiming that generality is only in language 
and thought, without changing his ontology up to 1883). On the contrary, Roberts 1970 and Lane 2004 claim that Peirce was a realist 
about generals also before 1868. Roberts maintains that Peirce's “nominalist” passages do not characterize his philosophy as 
nominalistic, although they display a secondary nominalistic “aspect” in Peirce's thought. Lane stresses that fact that Peirce's early 
anti-realism about generals should be interpreted only as a rejection of generals as existent things (anti-Platonism). Somewhere in 
between the two opposite interpretations, see Mayorga 2007, according to whom Peirce before 1868 was a “scholastic nominalist” but 
not a modern nominalist. I follow Lane's interpretation. 
21 See for instance “Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension,” in which Peirce refers to the “concrete forms” of a substance as the 
actual predicates of that substance, W2: 79. 
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The necessary condition for being a “subject,” or a B-fact, is to be some kind of generality capable of being 
actualized in and through different determinations. Strictly speaking, the sound I am hearing right now is a 
spatio-temporal extended B-fact insofar not only it is instantiated now in my perceptive act but it also allows for 
the continuous variation of tonalities I am experiencing. The “subject” of this phenomenon is the phenomenon 
itself insofar it is constituted by some spatio-temporal and specific 3rdnesses and is instantiated in this individual 
way in my experience. “Every fact has a subject, which is the grammatical subject of the sentence that asserts the 
existence of the fact” (CP 1.436). It is not directly necessary to appeal to an “individual substance” or “thing” to 
account for the phenomenon. From these considerations important consequences follow: (1) the “subject” 
which makes a B-fact metaphysically possible and epistemically describable is a 3rdness, although it can be 
different from what we usually refer to as a “thing,” “substance,” or “object,” that is, a fundamental and 
permanent bundle of habits. The habits that constitute an object are not permanent only as long as the a 
particular chain of instantiations, or B-fact, is actually occurring (like in the case of the sound I was hearing), but 
exceed every particular B-fact and comprehend all the B-facts which constitute the existence of an X. (2) Among 
the realities that play the role of “subject” in a B-fact, there can be also the 3rdnesses that constitute the 
substance.  (3) If it is true that an object as a general is a bundle of basic habits, these habits must manifest 
themselves in each and all of its spatio-temporal instantiations. As a consequence, although a B-fact can be 
immediately reconstructed without appealing to a “substance,” it is also true that through experience and inquiry 
we are led to find an ultimate set of habits which makes ultimately possible all those clusters of continuous 
reactions with which we are acquainted and that we experienced as “this” or “that” unity. 
 
 
 
1.3. Events and Individual Objects 
 
In some writings, Peirce articulates the relationship between A-facts and B-facts by introducing two 
interesting notions, “event” and “existential quasi-existence.” While to my knowledge these ideas do not have a 
systematic development in Peirce's thought, I believe that a reconsideration of their use in the context of our 
problem is highly instructive. As he observes, event is “the root of logical individuality” and corresponds in this 
way to that of “continuity of reactions” (CP 7.532). First, a real event is something that has “dates” and “takes 
place” in “real time” (CP 1.492). However, an event does not occupy a single and punctual spatio-temporal 
section but extends as a chain of different occurrences. Peirce adds more details to this characterization of an 
event as a spatio-temporally extended existence (CP 1.492; see also 1.493). In order to explain the notion of “real 
event,” Peirce remarks the following points: (1) it is “an existential junction of incompossible facts,” or the 
junction of “contradictory” facts (“that both should be true of precisely the same subject is absurd”); (2) that 
contradictory facts are true of a “subject existentially identical is not absurd, since they are mere accidents of an 
individual thing, which, as such, has no essence”; (3) the compossibility of contradictory facts has the nature of a 
“junction” and not of a “combination.” The previous reference to time and the three remarks about the 
“junctional” compossibility of contradictory facts can be summarized in saying that Peirce is simply describing 
the phenomenon of becoming. “Time,” repeats he, is the “universal form of change” (CP 6.132). As such, it is, 
together with space, the broadest continuum regulating events and phenomena. Time makes possible the 
conjunction of contradictory facts and states, namely, A-facts. All the actual properties or concrete “qualities” 
which determine an individual object in a precise spatio-temporal slice are unique and therefore in contradiction 
with different instantiations of the same object. An individual object, abstractly considered only as a punctual 
instantiation, is always determined in all its concrete properties (2ndness). However, the total reality of the same 
object exceeds and comprehends each and all of its instantiations because it includes also a multifold dimension 
of generality (3rdness). Peirce states that “the instantaneous Philip who can be drunk and sober at once has a 
potential being which does not quite amount to existence” (CP 1.494). The potentiality to which Peirce refers in 
this statement refers to the modality of being rooted in 3rdness, in the sense that a habit is a possibility of 
different and indefinite instantiations. Hence, every real object has always a certain amount of indeterminacy.  In 
this light, Peirce claims that no real object is “absolutely individual” if individual means complete determination 
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or absence of potentiality (CP 3.93; 5.311; 5.349; 5.503; see also EP1: 348, 1892). As on the logical side there is 
no “logical atom” (every concept can always be further analyzed, MS345), on the metaphysical side “you do not 
get down to anything completely determinate till you specify an indivisible instant in time, which is an ideal limit 
not attained in thought or in re” (EP1: 106-107, 1877). These statements do not contradict Peirce's commitment 
to the reality of individual objects insofar as they only deny that individual objects can be logically conceived in 
their uniqueness or metaphysically reduced to a 2ndness with no 3rdness. The thesis that every individual object, 
even in its concrete actualization, implies a constitutive indeterminacy is the reason for which according to Peirce 
PNC and PEM apply to reality as 2ndness but not as 3rdness, respectively in its dimension of vagueness and 
generality.22 However, the interesting point is that in order to have something like an event there has to be a 
“junction” among different instantiations. It is sometimes defined as the junction of two or more states (CP 
1.495). 
This point is further illustrated by Peirce's notion of “existential quasi-existence.” This concept results from 
“that approach to existence where contraries can be united in one subject” (CP 1.494). Peirce explains that the 
“law of time” has three requirements: 
 
The monadic clause in the law of time is that whatever fact or dyadic dyad exists, exists during a 
time, and this time. The event is the existential junction of states (that is, to what in existence 
corresponds to a statement about a given subject in representation) whose combination in one subject 
would violate the logical law of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a 
subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is, then? Its mode of being is existential quasi-existence 
… . (CP 1.494) 
 
It is clear that existential quasi-existence is a hybrid metaphysical notion. It is not mere possibility, 1stness, 
since possibility is defined as the suchness of the phaneron that remains once it has been prescinded from its 
actual existence. It is not an A-fact, since this is existence in its purest meaning, 2ndness. At the same time, it is 
not a general disposition, 3rdness, since strictly speaking a general disposition does not exist as such but governs 
any existential instantiations that may result from it. The mode of being of “existential quasi-existence” is 
therefore a combination of the three categories: the element of 1stness is the possible reality of those suchnesses 
which become eventually actualized; the element of 2ndness is the moment of brute reaction characterizing the 
instantiations and coincides in this passage with the different incompossible states; the element of 3rdness is the 
set of general dispositions underlying the phenomenon in virtue of which different instantiations are possible 
and their occurrence can happen as a lawful chain and not as a juxtaposition of metaphysical atoms. However, 
this modality of being seems to display a certain predominance of the element of 2ndness, both in its insistence 
on the idea of “state” and “existential junction of states.” The element of 3rdness is overshadowed as the 
possibility of this junction, but the focus of Peirce’s definition is on the existential character of it. It is the notion 
of existential quasi-existence that Peirce echoes when he writes that “it is impossible to count but cluster of acts, 
i.e., events and things (including persons); for nothing but reaction-acts are individual and discrete” (CP 4.159). It 
is also what Peirce is suggesting in apparently ambiguous expressions such as: “time is that diversity of existence 
whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations in existence” (CP 
1.494). As we have already seen, Peirce writes as early as 1859 that there is a causal relation of dependency 
among the elements constituting an event. Peirce is repeating the same thesis, making sure that this causal 
relationship is an almost brute relation of contiguity and absence of intervals.  
Thus, the reality of an individual object as a “numerical identity” coincides with its particular happenings at 
each time and the eventual completion as a continuity of its spatio-temporal events, among which no causal 
break has been produced. Stressing the dimension of 2ndness, this continuity is given the presence of an 
existential connection between the different A-facts that constitute the successive B-facts and events. Stressing 
the dimension of 3rdness, this continuity is provided by the operation of habits, which are permanent and make 
possible all the different instantiations. Peirce writes that 
 
… existence, though brought about by dyadism, or opposition, as its proper determination, yet 
when brought about, lies abstractly and in itself considered, within itself. It is numerical identity, 
                                                            
22 See e.g. CP 5.448; MS 530:16, c. 1903. See Lane 1997. 
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which is a dyadic relation of a subject to itself of which nothing but an existent individual is capable. It 
is to be observed that numerical identity is not empty vagueness, as the identity of a quality with itself 
is, but a positive fact. This is due to the possibility of the individual's assuming different accidents. 
Throughout all vicissitudes its oppositions to other things remain intact, although they may be 
accidentally modified; and therein is manifest the positive character of identity. (CP 1.461) 
 
An individual object as a spatio-temporal evolving entity constitutes a law-like (3rdness) series of 
reactions/actions (2ndness) in the history of the universe that is its spatio-temporal existence, or individuality.23 
“Individuality” is not the property of an object which is already given at the beginning of its career and that 
remains identical through its becoming. On the contrary, individuation is obtained through a law-like continuum 
of instantiations (see CP 1.433; 5.429).24 Peirce confirms this when he states that if we had to describe an object 
in its individuality we should describe the “continuity of [its] history” (R283: 145-146, c.1905).25 In this claim,  
“continuity” refers to the element of legality in individuals (3rdness), while the notion of “history” stresses more 
the series of reactions through which individuals extend in space and time (2ndness). The dyadic relation of 
existence can be rendered, at least in one of its possible articulation,26 as the relation R(x,y), where “x” is the 
individual object at stake and “y” is the state of the surrounding existent universe at each time reacting with it 
(CP 6.336; see also EP2:378, 1906). An individual object is therefore a continuous instantiation of general 
dispositions, in which the element of continuity among the “parts” distinguishes the individual object from a 
“collection.”27 The metaphysical status of an individual object can be also approached through the concept of 
“system” (e.g. CP 3.562; 4.5). In fact, if we name “objects” each all the spatio-temporal slices (A-facts) and the 
events (B-fact) that constitute an existent spatio-temporal extension, the ordered series of these objects would be 
a system. The individual human being could be defined at least as a growing system.28 Although the habits play a 
fundamental role in the continuous constitution of an individual object, their permanence in and through the 
different instantiations of the same object should not be understood monolithically. On the contrary, according 
to Peirce, there is not only the possibility but also the need for the development of the habits of individual 
objects.29 The range of evolution of the habits varies according to the differences among the different objects 
and substances in a way that only empirical studies can bring to light. In the limits of our task, it is 
straightforwardly true that Peirce believed that this development in the life of each individual human being 
assumes a “normative” connotation (see Chapter 2). The thesis that the habits characterizing of individual 
objects evolve over time seems to contradict the tenet that it is the habit as a general disposition that provides B-
facts and events with their character of permanency and continuity. If we state that also the general dispositions 
                                                            
23 On this interpretation, Boler’s opposition between a “dynamic process” and an “individual” disappears. See in particular Boler (1963: 
141). Also Browning 1964 sees in the doctrine of the processual nature of a “substance” (in which he includes both Peirce and 
Dewey) the impossibility of its individual permanence.  
24 Thibaud 1987 and Short (1994: 80; 87) are close to this interpretation of “individuality.” On the contrary, Sorrell (2001: 263-264) 
introduces a mysterious “reference to individuality” as something different from the organic articulation of metaphysical 1stness, 
2ndness, and 3rdness. I also agree formally with Olshewsky (1981: 91), who maintains that the solution to the problem of individuals 
is “to construe the individual, as well and the general, semiotically.” However, Olshewsky interpretation seems to overlook the role of 
the individual as the matrix of true beliefs (“the individual is not the antecedent of the semiotic process … but the consequent”) and 
uses a dangerously nominalistic vocabulary in describing the semiotic process (individuals “are made intelligible only by the addition 
of interpretation in the semiotic process”). 
25 Weber (2008: 352) hints at this point. On the contrary, Aydin (2009: 426 ff.), though appealing to the three universal categories in 
order to make sense of Peirce’s theory of “personal identity” (in the same way Muoio 1984 did before), does not recognize this. 
Williamson (1994: 282) rejects Peirce's conception of identity as applied to “human identity”: “Peirce held that, strictly speaking, even 
a proper name of an individual yields some indeterminacy, because an individual changes from moment to moment (CP 3.93, 5.448 
n.1). Certainly an implicit “sometimes” or “always” could make “Philip was tactful” indeterminate in his sense, but no such 
qualification is implicit in “Philip lived 46 years.” No acceptable view of personal identity sustains Peirce's apparent suggestion that 
genuinely singular reference has not been achieved until a particular moment of Philip's life has been specified.”  
26 For a different approach, see the Existential Graphs and the rendition of “existence” on the “sheet of assertions.” See on this Robert 
(1973: 31ff.).  
27 See also EP2: 98, 1901; HP2: 737-742. 
28  See in particular Hebernick (1970: 94), “the “system concept” consists of a set of objects comprising all that stands to one another in 
a group of connected relations inclusive of the relation of sequential order.” To my knowledge, however, Peirce does not apply 
explicitly the idea of system to the problem of metaphysical individuality. The present “systemic” account is therefore a tentative 
Peircean model for characterizing Peirce's metaphysical stance on objectual individuality.  
29 I should stress again that the focus of my attention here is not the nature of Peirce's views on cosmological evolution, or cosmogony, 
but Peirce's understanding of individual objects and how the internal variations in their spatio-temporal extension do not affect their 
individuality and substantiality but on the contrary contribute to continue them. 
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vary over time, how can we state that it is this same cluster of general dispositions to guarantee the stability of a 
substance in and through its vicissitudes? I believe that Peirce is consistent also on this point. As I will show (§§ 
3.3., 3.4.), this is possible in the measure in which the continuity among the habits of an individual substance is 
not given by the permanence of the same habits in their specific configuration, but by a more fundamental 
teleology.30 However, for the purpose of this first part, it is not necessary to anticipate further considerations 
about final causality. For now, I consider accomplished the first task set in the introduction: Peirce does have a 
positive notion objectual individuality, which can be grasped only if all the three categories are kept together in 
their mutual interplay. 
 
 
 
2. Indexicality and Self-Reference 
 
Let me now move to a new problem associated to human individuality, that is, the problem of “self-
consciousness.” In order to develop my analysis, I rely on Peirce’s semeiotic account of self-referential 
statements and psychological self-ascriptions. To the question, “How do we talk about our own individuality?”, 
we shall answer, with Peirce, “We formulate narratives and descriptions ultimately based on indexical self-
referential statements.” Although self-referential statements resort to different terms (i.e. the personal pronoun 
“I,” the possessive adjective “my,” or the possessive pronoun “mine”), I focus on the use of the first-person 
pronoun and I take it as an example of what goes on also in the other cases. Therefore, an analysis of Peirce's 
account of the meaning and the use of “I” seems to be the best way to approach the study of individual self-
consciousness.31 This approach coincides with Peirce's externalist methodology in the study of mental 
phenomena (see Delaney 1979; Delaney 1993; Short 1997; also Stephens 1980), according to which an adequate 
inquiry into our mental states and powers requires an inferential approach from public, “external facts” (W2: 
214, EP1: 30). The linguistic production of self-referential statements is such a public and external phenomenon. 
A good deal of work has been done in the field of Peirce's theory of signs, including the theory of indices.32 This 
is in part due to the fact that Peirce has greatly drawn the attention of commentators and philosophers interested 
in the philosophy of language; in part to the fact that his theories seem to be echoed by new theorists of proper 
names, pronouns, and indices in general (see Agler 2010; Boersema 2002; Goudge 1965; Pietarinen 2010; 
Hilpinen 1995; Maddalena 2006: 41-56; Lizska 1996; Pape 1980; Short 2007; Thibaud 1987; Weber 2008). In this 
section, I simply give a brief account of Peirce's treatment of what he calls “rhematic indexical legisigns,” by 
focusing in particular on the first-person pronoun “I.”33 I believe that once we grasp the semeiotic referential 
structure of a rhematic indexical legisign, we will be able to acknowledge what the use of “I” tells us about the 
problem of human individuality. According to Peirce, a personal pronoun, when it is not used as a common 
name, is a rhematic indexical legisign and refers to a singular or individual object. In short, a rhematic indexical 
legisign (1) is non-descriptive (e.g. EP2: 342, 1905), (2) incorporates but does not reduce to the background or 
collateral factors necessary to the fixation of the reference (e.g. EP2: 494, 1909), and (3) is directly referential. 
Moreover, (4) personal pronouns are indexical artificial types or legisigns and are therefore governed by social 
and linguistic conventions (e.g. EP2: 274; 297, 1903). In addition, (5) the singular object to which a rhematic 
indexical legisign refers does not need to be an existent physical object but can also be a mere logical object, it 
can have a mere “logical” existence (e.g. R280: 36-37). Peirce distinguishes between degenerate indices and 
genuine or proper indices (CP 8.368). While genuine indices are “reagents,” degenerate indices are 
“designations.” Being simply a conventional legisign, the first-person pronoun “I” is a degenerate index insofar 
as it does not require a present, actual relation with a dynamic object in order to be a referring term. Let me 
                                                            
30 Hausman (1974: 21) hints at this point when he talks about a “teleological continuum” in Peirce's evolutionary cosmology. 
31 Only Stephens 1980 deals explicitly with the problem of “psychological self-ascriptions.” Hookway (1985: 26) claims: “it is rather 
surprising that Peirce does not offer an account of our ordinary first-person avowals.” Although challenging, Hookway’s remark 
might be wrong if it is taken to entail that Peirce did not address the topic of what we call self-referential statements. A striking 
example of the massive presence of this topic in Peirce’s thought is his constant reflection on self-control as one of the essential 
dimensions of human rationality. On human rationality, deliberation, and self-control, see Colapietro 1999. 
32 The best general introductions to Peirce's theory of signs are Liszka 1996 and Short 2007.  
33 In order to do this, I mainly rely on David W. Agler's excellent reconstruction (2010). 
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explain this claim by saying a few words on point (5). A rhematic indexical legisign is different from a proper 
index insofar as its referent can simply be a logically real object, or an abstract object that is taken to be real in a 
“Universe of Discourse” or “Logical Universe” (R280: 36-37, 1905; see also 1.433), while a proper index refers 
only in virtue of an existential relation to a spatio-temporally present object. This semeiotic fact implies that the 
simple use of the indexical “I” is not enough to go beyond the possibility that the referent of self-referential 
statements is merely a logically real object. Hence, the fact that a rhematic indexical legisign is used in order to 
refer to an alleged individual self does not rule out the possibility that the individual self is only a fictive object. 
We will thoroughly discuss this problem in the next section. Also point (2) is fundamental in order to understand 
how self-referential statements apply to the study of the individual self. According to Peirce, there is a set of 
“collateral” conditions upon which the referring capacity of the rhematic indexical legisign depends. This 
includes epistemic, experiential and discursive factors (EP2: 494, 1909). Although these conditions are necessary, 
they are not part of the semantic function of the index, but belong more properly to the metasemantic 
conditions of its functioning. David W. Agler calls this background the “familiarity condition for reference” 
(2010: 619). It can be described as a kind of acquaintance with the individual object referred to that is prior or 
contextual to the actual indexical referential act and represents its metasemantic condition, without being 
included in its semantic content. In a 1908 text, “Common Ground” (R612), Peirce writes:  
By a Proper Name [also a personal pronoun, for the present purpose], I mean a name of anything 
considered as a single thing; and this thing which the Proper Name denominates must have been one 
which the Interpreter was already acquainted by direct or indirect experience. The process of gaining 
this experience is either one of two, or is some mixture of these. The first of the two is that the 
Interpreter should first by his own personal experience become sufficiently acquainted with that to 
which the Proper name applies, and subsequently with the Proper Name as denominating that thing. 
(R612: 33-34, 1908) 
 
This passage is important because it points out that the experiential conditions for the fixation of the 
individual referent can be of two types, which usually work together. There is a direct experience process and an 
indirect one. In the second case, the referent can be fixed in two ways, both by collecting information about the 
object in various modalities and by receiving directions and indications on how to find that object (R612: 34-35, 
1908; see also EP2: 286, 1903; R280: 38x, 1905; EP2: 405, 1907). It is important to stress again that this set of 
information is not part of the meaning of the index, but one of the conditions for fixing its reference (see EP2: 
163, 1903; EP2: 172, 1903; EP2: 306, 1904). Although these two experiential modalities are equally important, 
direct experience is more crucial in order to grasp Peirce's understanding of self-reference. This is because, as I 
will show in the next section, Peirce believes that there is a specific direct experience, in the epistemic form of 
perception, that constitutes the fundamental condition for self-reference. Peirce writes that a rhematic indexical 
legisign, “when one meets with it for the first time, is existentially connected with some percept or equivalent 
individual knowledge of the individual it names” (EP2: 286, 1903).34 It is at this level that the distinction between 
degenerate indices (designations) and pure or genuine indices (reagents) proves to be fundamental. In 
characterizing the two classes of indices, Peirce observes that while designations do not convey any information 
about their objects, reagents are potentially informative (CP 8.368). I believe that Peirce maintains that there is a 
direct perceptual experience that grounds the possibility of self-reference. In particular, I maintain that the 
possibility of self-reference rests upon a perceptual judgment which grows out of a singular genuine index, or 
reagent, which makes its appearance as the “percept” of that perceptual judgment. This is what I call, drawing 
from Peirce's analyses, the present&effort-perception. A few more words are needed in order to clarify the 
question I will address in the next section. As a matter of fact, the personal pronoun “I” is a conventional 
representamen that can be used in different ways, although it is primarily used as a “rhematic indexical legisign.” 
Peirce himself explicitly uses the pronoun “I” as a common name in different instances. For example, Peirce 
claims that “ … the leading part of the meaning which we express by “I” is the idea of an unrestrained cause of 
some future events” (R668: 16-17; see also R649: 36). It is clear that here the representamen “I” functions as a 
                                                            
34  Peirce is talking here about “proper names,” but his claim is also valid for the first-person pronoun. 
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“rhematic symbolic legisign.” The paradigm of this class of sign is the common noun (CP 2.260).35 As a common 
name, “I” represents a definite description of philosophical expressions such as “empirical self,” “individual 
self,” or “human individuality.” The important point to stress here is that this is not the use of the word “I” that 
will occupy us in the next section. On the contrary, it will be crucial to see whether the first-person pronoun “I” 
is used as a “rhematic indexical legisign” in self-referential statements, by delving into the conditions for this use. 
In other words, the immediate question is not what is, according to Peirce, the real nature of the human self, but 
what are the experiential conditions for the emergence and use of “I” as a rhematic indexical legisign in self-
referential statements. It is my opinion that among the conditions for the use of “I” that have been pointed out 
by Peirce scholarship so far, insufficient attention has been devoted to what Peirce could have called the 
present&effort perception. Although my focus is on the conditions of indexical self-reference, I believe that this 
semeiotic approach can ultimately put us in the condition to understand more deeply Peirce’s conception of the 
nature of human individuality.  
2.1. Perception and Indexical Self-Reference  
In the previous section I have given a general account of the conditions under which a rhematic indexical 
legisign can function as such. The aim of the present section is to substantiate the formal treatment of the 
previous section in relation to self-reference. I want to show that Peirce acknowledges a specific type of perception 
that constitutes the fundamental collateral experience, and therefore the fundamental condition, for the indexical 
functioning of “I.” This is what I call the present&effort-perception. It also follows that it is this specific 
perception that constitutes, in Peirce's terms, the existent object to which the first-person pronoun refers when self-
consciousness develops. Peirce claims that “the elements of every concept enter into logical thought at the gate 
of perception and make their exit at the gate of purposive action; and whatever cannot show its passport at both 
those two gates is to be arrested as unauthorized by reason” (EP2: 241, CP 5.212, 1903). Hence, it is necessary to 
clarify what is the precise role that perception plays in the possibility of self-reference. Let me introduce my 
overall understanding of the present&effort-perception. Now, it seems to me that according to Peirce the 
perceptual condition of self-reference has at least two forms. The first is what Peirce in his 1905 “Issues of 
Pragmaticism” calls the “conative externality of the Present.” In this light, a fundamental aspect of Peirce's 
doctrine of the “I” is his analysis of the consciousness of time. I will call this perception simply consciousness of 
the present. Although the structures of human “inwardness” have not been overlooked by Peirce scholarship,36 
they have not been connected explicitly to the consciousness of time. However, in Peirce's view the 
consciousness of the present is not the only perceptual basis for self-reference. The second experience is the 
perception of a capacity of initiative and causal efficacy in agency. Peirce identifies it with that part of free will 
that is the “sense of effort.”37 I will call this second perception simply sense of effort in agency. It has been 
claimed that Peirce puts forward a broad notion of perception, which is not limited to sense-organ perceptions 
and which relies on a broad phaneroscopic approach rather than assuming the viewpoint of the special 
sciences.38 As I will show, self-reference hits an existent target (the individual self) in virtue of a composite act of 
perception based on the consciousness of the present and the sense of effort in agency. Let me put my thesis in 
the following way by using the terminology of Peirce's theory of perception: there is a composite percept, the 
present&effort-percept, which is at the origin of our perception of ourselves and which constitute the existent 
referent of our indexical self-referential statements. All our narratives and descriptions of ourselves are ultimately 
rooted in this indexical self-reference. In what follows, I simply articulate this idea in greater detail. Let me begin 
by introducing Peirce's explicit claims about the consciousness of the present and the sense of effort in agency. 
                                                            
35  See Lizska (1996: 51). 
36  See in particular Colapietro 1985 and DiLeo 1991 on this point. 
37  The “sense of effort” (2ndness) is only one dimension of the free will because the free will also entails self-control and therefore 
genuine knowledge (3rdness). 
38  Peirce reserves the same treatment to the notion of “experience,” as Cheryl Misak has amply shown. See e.g. (1994: 43-45), (1995: 99-
108), and (2004: 152-158). See Chapter 2. 
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The clearest example of Peirce's analysis of the consciousness of time is found in 1905 “Issues of Pragmaticism.” 
After having provided a metaphysical account of the past and the future in modal terms, Peirce provides a 
phaneroscopic and metaphysical theory of the present, according to which the consciousness of the present is 
the “conative externality” (something that presses and pushes) of the “Nascent State of the Actual” (EP2: 359, 
CP 5.462). This experience is the “living present” or the “Living Death” (EP2: 358) of what is actual. It coincides 
with the continuously perceived point in experience in which from the inevitable transformation of the present 
moment into a past event a new present emerges, in which “we are born anew” (EP2: 358, CP 5.459). In this 
context, Peirce observes:  
What is the bearing of the Present instant upon conduct? Introspection is wholly a matter of 
inference. One is immediately conscious of his Feelings, no doubt; but not that they are feelings of an 
ego. The self is only inferred. (EP2: 359, CP 5.462)  
As we know, while the belief in the ego is inferred (and therefore takes time and a whole set of conditions), 
the immediate “feeling” of the instantaneous coming to being of a new actuality (= present) is not. I believe that 
Peirce's seemingly random association of “introspection” and “Present” in this passage suggests instead that we 
have to look at the consciousness of the present in order to have a better grasp of Peirce's understanding of self-
reference.  
Let me turn now to the second crucial instance of perception, the sense of effort in agency. Whereas the 
consciousness of the present has a more passive connotation, the sense of effort in agency is more of the type of 
an active experience.39 When I speak of the “sense of effort in agency” I mean that specific percept that arises 
from the human individual's initiative, in which the immediate experience of one's causal efficacy on something 
can be considered more crucial than the other experiential factors involved. It is the essentially dyadic experience 
that Peirce describes as “the sense of an opposing resistance then and there,” which is “entirely different from 
purpose, which is the idea of a possible general” (R283: 76; see also R614: 3; EP2: 383, 1906). This experience 
occurs at least in a twofold way. The first instance of the sense of effort in agency resides in the semeiotic and 
dialogic nature of the self. In Peirce’s words, “the person is not absolutely an individual,” since “his thoughts are 
what he is saying to himself” (CP 5.421). In this case, the self has the nature of an inner “conversation” (EP2: 
402, 1907) between an old, critical self and a new, emergent self, where the former tries to determine and 
persuade the latter to give its assent to something. This thesis, which prima facie seems to contradict the thesis 
that there is something like a human individual, simply points out the dialogical nature of the self, whose entire 
reality is an inferential, semeiotic reality. What is important to acknowledge here is that it is this dialogical nature 
that makes possible the sense of effort in agency, at least in one of its modalities. In this case, part of the self 
performs paradoxically (but interestingly) the function of that opposing “non-Ego” (EP2: 154, 1903; EP2: 195, 
1903; EP2: 268, 1903) against which the sense effort is born. The second instance of the sense of effort in 
agency is more closely related to the bodily nature of the self. As an organism, the self can initiate a new 
movement and produce some changes through a muscular effort in itself (the “central body”) and in the 
surrounding environment (EP2: 412-413, 1907).40 Also in this second case, the experience is an internal reaction 
against an X, which is identified in its function of being a “non-Ego.” I quote at length a passage in which Peirce 
spells out what the sense of effort in agency is:  
It may be said that there is no such phenomenon in the universe as brute force, or freedom of will, 
and nothing accidental. I do not assent to either opinion; but granting that both are correct, it still 
                                                            
39  Peirce foreshadows this point when he describes the “first” in human agency: “The first is agent, the second is patient, the third is the 
action by which the former influences the latter. Between the beginning as first, and the end as last, comes the process which leads 
from first to last” (W6: 173, EP1: 250, 1887-1888). 
40  Certainly, the acquaintance with that particular body that we end up considering “our” body plays an incredibly important function in 
the development of self-referential capacity. In other words, it constitutes part of the experiential collateral condition for the 
development of the use of “I” (see how crucial is the “central body” in Peirce's treatment of self-consciousness, W2: 202, EP1: 19-20, 
1868). However, the fact that the acquaintance with one's central body is crucial for the human mind does not imply that the referent 
of self-ascriptions is first and foremost, or essentially, the body. 
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remains true that considering a single action by itself, apart from all others and, therefore, apart from 
the governing uniformity, it is in itself brute, whether it show brute force or not. I shall presently point 
out a sense in which it does display force. That it is possible for a phenomenon in some sense to 
present force to our notice without emphasizing any element of law, is familiar to everybody. We 
often regard our own exertions of will in that way. … It is not pretended that what is here termed is 
the whole phenomenon, but only an element of the phenomenon – so much as belongs to a particular 
place and time. That when more is taken into account, the observer finds himself in the real of law in 
every case, I fully admit. (CP 1.428)  
For Peirce, these two phenomena exemplify the most fundamental moments in which the human “force” or 
brute will is immediately perceived in initiating a new action (see CP 5.520).41 But, we might ask, why should 
Peirce need to appeal to the present&effort-perception in order to ground the possibility of self-reference? In 
particular, hasn’t Peirce made clear in his 1868 “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man” that 
at least the experience of ignorance and error is sufficient to give the start to the development of self-reference? 
In order to answer these questions, I will focus now on Peirce’s 1868 treatment of the development and nature 
of self-consciousness. If my reading is correct, the conclusion is that the phenomena considered in 1868 are not 
conclusive in order to grant that the referent of self-referential statements is an existent object. If we are seeking for 
a Peircean conclusive argument for the existence of the individual self, we have to look somewhere else. Let me 
consider the two phenomena at stake in Peirce’s 1868 essay “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed 
for Man.” The first phenomenon is the experience of ignorance and error. This case is crucial for the appearance 
of “self-consciousness,” namely, for the semeiotic process that leads to the development of the power of self-
reference. Peirce's idea is that from a number of instances of error 1, 2, 3, …, n, the child abductively infers the 
hypothetical belief in the existence of a private self, at first abstractly grasped as “X responsible for ignorance 
and error.” In this case, the external facts from which the belief in the private self is inferred by a child are, on 
the one side, the agreement between people's linguistic testimony about a certain state of affairs and her own 
perception of that state of affairs, and, on the other side, her previous ignorance or different belief about the 
same state of affairs. “Abduction” is here an instance of inference to the possible explanation of the surprising 
event, which is then deductively and inductively confirmed through further experiences (e.g. W2: 218-219, EP1: 
34-35, 1868). To my knowledge, Peirce does not mention explicitly what are the further experiences that 
corroborate the belief in the private self. However, it follows from what he says that these experiences are at least 
further experiences of ignorance and error. The repeated contrast between the public “evidence of fact,” 
conveyed in linguistic testimony about a certain state of affairs, and one's beliefs about the same state of affair, 
keeps pointing at the reality of something like a “private” self and strengthens the probability of this conclusion. 
However, why cannot it be simply an abstract object, product of the human mind's tendency to seek for an 
explanation at all costs? As a matter of fact, the mere logical existence of the private self in a highly probable 
explanatory hypothesis would still ground the possibility of the indexical use of the “I” in self-referential 
statements. The second phenomenon considered by Peirce is that the multifold of mental activity can be reduced 
to some sort of unity. In this case, perception refers first to different external facts and second to the subjective, 
mental powers that the human being can infer from those external facts. At a higher inferential level, the human 
being can also infer a further unitary mental power from the multifold “objects” of consciousness manifested in 
experience and their corresponding subjective modalities. In this case, abduction functions as a process of 
reduction of a multifold to a higher-order conceptual unity (e.g. W2: 217, EP1: 33). As in the first case, also in 
this case the validity of the conceptual reduction requires inductive evidence, which is partially provided by the 
fact that this abductive operation of unification is always possible to the human being (at least, in normal 
conditions of mental development). In this sense, by questioning the arguments in favor of an “intuitive self-
consciousness,” Peirce makes clear that it is because the individual self can be inferred from “every other fact” 
                                                            
41  The obvious objection to my reading is that Peirce's statements about human “force” and “brute will” are usually extremely critical. 
For instance, in CP 5.520 Peirce talks about the force of an agent as “sham” if compared to the “power” of agency, which is 
ultimately identifiable with “reasonableness,” “knowledge,” and “love.” In CP 1.673 Peirce mentions the need to “annihilate” our 
“blind will.” Although from a general viewpoint it is probably true that Peirce believes that the reasonable growth (3rdness) of the 
individual human agents in mutual communion is the most important point to make about the human condition, it is also true that 
overlooking the aspect of indexical self-reference (2ndness) in Peirce's account of the self results in a partial and less convincing 
interpretation of his theory as a whole. The fact that a thesis is considered by a philosopher less central then others does not imply 
that a complete reconstruction of his thought should forget or deny also the less central theses. 
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that the belief in its existence is close to certainty, and not because we have an intuitive power of self-knowledge 
(W2: 169, EP1: 20-21, 1868). This constant inferential possibility counts as an inductive validation of the 
hypothesis in the existence of a private self. Furthermore, it is probably possible to say that the two types of 
evidence that support the two cases of abduction work conjointly, so that the first abductive conclusion to the 
existence of a private self is supported by and supports in turn the second one. However, it still remains true that 
insofar as only these two phenomena are considered, we can take the referent of indexical self-ascriptions to be a 
mere abstract object represented in a highly probable hypothesis.  
The two cases just highlighted constitute a collateral experience sufficiently strong to fix the self as an abstract 
object and to make of it the referent of the first-person pronoun “I.” However, insofar as the two phenomena 
are the only background for the belief in the private self, it is still possible that the private self is only a logically 
existent object in a specific Universe of Discourse (i.e., the explanatory context in which we seek for an 
explanation of the experiences of ignorance and error and the ubiquity of reflection in the mature mental life). In 
other words, these two phenomena justify the conclusion that the referent of the term “I” is an existent object in 
the real world only in a weak sense. I would like to point out that this difficulty is displayed also by the best 
Peirce scholarship. In an important article, Thomas L. Short 1997 shows that the individuation of the self in the 
mental development of the child occurs as a hypostatic abstraction. Short addresses the question whether the 
object represented in the hypostatic abstraction, i.e. the “self,” is real or not. His conclusion is very instructive, 
both for the remarkable insights and the weakness it contains. For Short, the Peircean “self” is “no more than a 
harmony of parts” (1997: 307). He adds that “one cannot dismiss such as self as unreal, since every entity of any 
degree of complexity whatsoever is itself real only insofar as its parts are organized by and subordinated to some 
law” (1997: 307). In addition, Short explains that for Peirce “the self is not a single, simple, stable entity, but is 
constantly in the process of being formed” (1997: 305). Short has the merit to avoid a nihilistic interpretation of 
Peirce's theory of the self and to show its experiential and developmental nature. Nevertheless, it seems to me 
that Short’s interpretation is partial insofar as it does not grasp the kernel of Peirce's account of self-reference. In 
fact, although Short refers to “self-consciousness” as a necessary condition for self-controlled behavior and 
growth, he seems to deny that self-consciousness displays an irreducible element of singularity. On the contrary, 
in the very act of ascribing to oneself the more or less integrated harmony of one's character, the human being is 
referring to a point of singularity. For Peirce, the indexical component in self-referential statements is precisely 
what accounts for this phenomenon. I believe that the present&effort-perception provides the perceptual 
ground on the basis of which self-reference refers to an existent object in the real world. If my interpretation is 
correct, the abstract object abducted in the two cases treated in 1868 are not the only referents of the first-person 
pronoun. In order to understand how “I” refers to a real object, the two 1868 theses must be read together with 
a third set of phenomena, i.e. the consciousness of the present and the sense of effort in agency. If it is the 
conjunction of these three phenomena that constitutes the complete collateral experience on which the existent 
referent of indexical self-ascriptions is fixed, it is only the present&effort-perception that plays the crucial role of 
a genuine indexical experience. Before tackling the analysis of the present&effort-perception, we have now to 
consider some elements of Peirce's theory of perception and phaneroscopy.42 Let me start with perception. 
According to Peirce, perception is in a sense the epistemically fundamental operation, since all the concepts are 
acquired through it. Peirce acknowledges in perception three different factors, which are irreducible to each 
other even though they can only perform their function in connection, i.e., the “percept,” the “percipuum,” and 
the “perceptual judgment.” The percipuum is in turn a particular instance of perceptual judgment, as the 
immediate interpretative judgment of the percept (CP 7.643, 1903). According to Peirce's analysis, the percept is 
the moment of immediate determination of the human consciousness, in which something is already affecting 
the capacity of feeling but is not a content of cognition yet (e.g. EP2: 4). Hence, “a percept contains only two 
kinds of elements, those of firstness and those of secondness” (CP 7.630). The percept is a “quality of feeling,” 
or a “quale-consciousness” (1stness) actualized as a modification of the consciousness and hence acting as a 
compulsion (2ndness). Thus, “the percept is a single event happening hic et nunc. It cannot be generalized without 
                                                            
42 The best account of Peirce's theory of perception is still Bernstein 1964. Also Almeder 1970, Delaney (1993: 118-129), and Rosenthal 
2004 are enlightening analyses. 
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losing its essential character. For it is an actual passage at arms between the non-ego and the ego” (CP 2.146). 
On the other hand, the perceptual judgment (including in this sketch also the percipuum) represents the 
emergence of the element of generality implied in cognition (3rdness) right from its beginning. All the elements 
implied in perception follow a non-controlled dynamic:43 although perception can be educated over time and it is 
subject of criticism within certain limits, while it happens it is not controlled. Furthermore, the perceptual judgment 
has the formal structure of an abductive inference in which a general predicate synthesizes a manifold matter and 
has therefore a variable hypothetical logical force. The fundamental point to stress here is that although the 
perceptual judgment is an abductive inference, its logical force is particularly strong or “nearly approximating to 
necessary inference” (CP 4.541, 1906) as far as the attribution of “existence” is concerned. Indeed, “existence” is 
for Peirce the first conception that performs the unifying function operating in perception. In a striking 1906 
passage, Peirce links together the perceptual judgment and the abduction to the existence of an object. He writes:  
how then is the Perceptual Judgment to be explained? In reply, I note that a percept cannot be 
dismissed at will, even from memory. … Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming that the perceiver is 
aware if this compulsion upon him; … Now existence means precisely the exercise of compulsion. 
Consequently, whatever feature of the percept is brought into relief by some association and this 
attains a logical position like that of the observational premise of an explaining Abduction, the 
attribution of Existence to it in the Perceptual Judgment is virtually and in an extended sense, a logical 
Abductive Inference nearly approximating to necessary inference. (CP 4.541, 1906)44 
Let me note two things about this passage. First, the “percept” does not have a cognitive status. We can have 
access to the percept as an isolated element and talk about it only through an act of prescision. Technically 
speaking, the percept coincides with an instance of reactive experience and not with knowledge (see CP 6.336, 
1906).45 Second, the concept of existence is attributed to the “percept” through an abductive inference that has 
an almost necessary logical force. This constitutes the first moment of the percipuum, in which, although a 
perceptual judgment has not been fully developed yet, the percept has already entered the realm of cognition 
through an almost necessary abductive inference that states that there is something. The conclusion that I would 
draw from this passage is that the attribution of existence to an object is logically stronger when it is 
accompanied by the direct perception of that object in a percept. In considering the experiential conditions of 
self-referential operations, is there anything that resembles a direct perception of a self? I believe that the 
present&effort-perception plays this function in human life. In the two cases discussed in the 1868 article, the 
percepts involved are always withdrawn from the external, public world and do not refer directly to something 
like the self. In the first case, the percept is most likely the experience of the clash between one's expectancy and 
someone else's linguistic testimony, while in the second case the percept is each one of the qualities of feeling 
actualized in human consciousness. As a consequence, the self to which the personal pronoun “I” seems to refer 
on the basis of those two cases could be the product of a wrong hypothesis, although even at this level the belief 
in the private self is supported by some evidence. On the contrary, if something such as the present&effort-
perception is really given in experience, the percepts of that perception constitute a specific class of signs on the 
basis of which indexical self-reference can be grounded in a stronger sense.  
Let me now integrate Peirce's theory of perception in the light of his phaneroscopy. In virtue of this 
approach, we discover that the present&effort-perception is characterized by two main aspects, namely, 
compulsion and inwardness. The first character, compulsion, is an immediate experience of effort, resistance and 
reaction against an X (which Peirce calls generically “non-Ego”). Peirce's analysis shows that the concept of 
“individuality” is derived from the concept of “relation” and that the concept of relation is derived from the 
dyadic experience of relation in its “dumb” force, or pure 2ndness. It is important to stress that at this level of 
analysis we cannot say that the existence of two individual reagents is prior and that the dyadic experience of 
connection is secondary. On the contrary, Peirce's phaneroscopic insight shows that the dyadic and “dumb” 
                                                            
43  See e.g. “If one sees one cannot avoid the percept; and if one looks one cannot avoid the perceptual judgment” (CP 7.627). 
44  This analysis could be furthered through a study of the “concepts” of “present in general,” “IT in general,” and “substance,” in 
Peirce’s early “On a New List of Categories” (W2: 49-59). 
45  See Delaney (1993: 50).  
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experience of compulsion, effort, and reaction is at the origin of the concept of individual reagents and is 
therefore phaneroscopically prior. We could say that the concepts of individuality and relation are contextually 
derived from a previous dumb experience of compulsion, effort, or reaction. This point is even more instructive if 
we reflect on the fact that the object of the indexical self-reference must have some kind of individuality. 
Furthermore, Peirce often connects the notion of individuality to the notion of existence (e.g. EP2: 270-271, 
1903; CP 1.432; 1.456; 1.457; 3.613). As a consequence, I am inclined to say that it is mainly from the 
compulsiveness of the present&effort-perception that human beings grow the notion of their existential 
individuality. The second characteristic of the present&effort-perception is inwardness. According to Peirce, 
although a perception brings with itself an almost immediate attribution of existence to the object perceived, the 
classification of the origin of the percept as “external” or “internal” is the less immediate inferential result of a 
series of experiential tests (CP 6.333-335). Peirce observes that “we are conscious of hitting and of getting hit, of 
meeting with a fact. But whether the activity is within or without we know only by secondary signs and not by 
original faculty of recognizing fact” (W5: 246; CP 1.366, 1885). In fact, the experience of compulsion and 
reaction could simply refer to the mere external contrast between a part of the environment and my body. On 
the contrary, the present&effort-percept results from the experience of a radical initiative in conduct, not from 
the reactive contact of the external physical environment with my body. For example, by describing an imaginary 
“dreamer” moving from sleep to wake, Peirce writes about the pure “sense of Reaction” occurring in experience 
as 2ndness:  
imagine our dreamer suddenly to hear a loud and prolonged steam whistle. At the instant it begins, 
he is startled. He instinctively tries to get away; his hands go to his ears. It is not so much that it is 
unpleasing, but it forces itself so upon him. The instinctive resistance is a necessary part of it: the man 
would not be sensible his will was not borne down, if he had no-assertion to be borne down. It is the 
same when we exert ourselves against outer resistance; except for that resistance we should not have 
anything upon which to exercise strength. This sense of acting and of being acted upon, which is our 
sense of the reality of things, – both of outward things and of ourselves, – may be called the sense of 
Reaction. … It essentially involves two things acting upon one another. (EP2: 4-5, c. 1894; see also 
the case of “surprise,” EP2: 195, CP 5.57-58, 1903)  
In this passage there is no explicit reference to an experience of inward compulsion of reaction. From a 
general point of view, although the “sense of acting and being acted upon” can include something like an inner 
compulsion, it does not entail it necessarily. The sense of compulsion taken in its pureness can invariably refer to 
the resistance performed by the items of the internal world (such as in the case of the present&effort-perception) 
and by those of the external, physical world (such as in the case of the reaction between my body and the bodies 
around me). Similarly, in a 1906 passage, Peirce develops the phaneroscopic analysis of the notion of “action” 
which echoes what he says about the sense of Reaction. He observes that “Action,” as a “surd dyadic relation,” 
entails an agent and a patient and can occur in the form of either an “active effort” or a “passive surprise” (EP2: 
382-385, 1906), but does not mention the problem of the external or internal origin of the compulsion. 
According to Peirce's theory of perception, it is clear that the classification of the percepts as “external” or 
“internal” pertains to the percipuum and the perceptual judgment and is not present at the level of the mere 
quality-feeling.46 One must subject her perceptual experience to “various tests in order to ascertain whether it be 
of internal or of external provenance” (CP 6.333). Peirce proposes three tests. The first test is the test by 
“physical concomitance.” If the object that I infer from my percept (e.g., a tree) is also represented by a 
recording device (e.g., a camera that reproduces the tree in a picture), then there is an extremely high probability 
that the origin of the percept is external and consequently a very low probability that the origin is internal. The 
second test is the test by “experience of other observers,” including oneself at different times. In this case, if the 
object that I infer from my percept is also acknowledged by other observers or by myself at different times, then 
the reality of the percept is certified in its public nature, although the probabilities that its origin is internal or 
external are even. The third test is the test by “criticism of all the circumstances of apparition” of the percept, 
which also takes the form of “making a direct inward effort to suppress the apparition.” Let me apply the three 
                                                            
46  DiLeo (1991: 96-97) comments: “This can only be determined by subjecting the activity to the “Tests of Externality” (CP 6.334). 
Haecceity is perceived and not inferred, whereas externality is inferred from tests and not perceived.” 
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tests to the present&effort-perception. If we have to recur to a “direct inward effort” in order to test any percept 
(third test), it follows that that the effort to suppress the percept should also be directed to the present&effort-
percept. According to Peirce (and I think we all agree with him on this), the consciousness of the present and the 
sense of effort in agency have an invincible insistency on us. Philosophically speaking, this fact is even more 
striking in the case of the sense of effort, because the direct effort performed to suppress the apparition of the 
percept coincides in this case with the percept itself that is the target of the suppressing effort. The reality and 
insistency of the present&effort-percept is also confirmed by its unavoidability in each and all moments of our 
lives (second test). At the same time, it is neither possible to other observers to have experiential access to the 
same present&effort-percept (second test), nor to record it through an external device (first test). In conclusion, 
the present&effort-percept should be classified in Peirce's terms as deriving from an internal origin. Let me 
conclude this section by analyzing the elements involved in the present&effort-perception and indexical self-
reference from a semeiotic, phaneroscopic, and metaphysical standpoint. From a semeiotic viewpoint, the 
quality-feeling (“percept”) of present&effort, as an actual determination of human consciousness, is a pure, 
genuine index, while the perceptual judgment that emerges from it brings with itself an element of generality that 
turns the pure index into a degenerate index (e.g. CP 8.266).47 The unifying function of the perceptual judgment 
is an instance of the synthesizing role of “conception” introduced by Peirce as early as 1867 in his “On a New 
List of Categories.” As in any other cognition, also in the case of perceptual judgment the cognitive unification is 
imposed on a percept (the “manifold” of the impression) only because the percept teleologically calls for a 
certain type of unification. The possibility of self-reference through the personal pronoun “I” emerges therefore 
from the conjunction of the present&effort perception and the ability to master patterns of use of a natural 
language. As we have seen, the first-person pronoun “I” is a rhematic indexical legisign, i.e. a degenerate index. 
According to my interpretation, the present&effort-percept is a “rhematic indexical sinsign” that grows into a 
“dicentic indexical sinsign” and eventually grounds the possibility of self-reference by the use of the “rhematic 
indexical legisign” “I.”48 In other words, the present&effort-percept is the “Informational index” on the ground of 
which the “Monstrative index” “I” grows up and stands (see EP2: 172, 1903). From a phaneroscopic viewpoint, 
the present&effort-percept is a brute experience of compulsion, effort and contrast, and is therefore an instance 
of pure 2ndness. In it, the mere possibility of consciousness (1rstness) has become actual. The perceptual 
judgment grows out of the percept as a synthesis of general traits (3rdness) and is characterized by a 
corresponding sense of specialization in one’s mental habits (e.g. EP1: 327-329, CP 6.145, 1892). From the 
semeiotic and phaneroscopic standpoint, we see that the attribution of the concept “existence” to the 
present&effort-percept corresponds to the first moment in the development of the perceptual judgment and 
plays the role of an almost necessary logical quantification on that pure index or percept. Finally, from a 
metaphysical viewpoint, the percept corresponds to an instantiation (actuality) of a mere possibility of 
instantiation (possibility or might-be), which grows into the general tendency and disposition (generality or 
would-be) of a perceptual judgment and eventually of a habit, which is in this case the habitual capacity of saying 
“I.” It should be clear now in what sense Peirce believes that the first-person pronoun “I” has an individual 
existent referent.  
 
 
2.2. Peirce on Kant's “I  think” and the Empirical Self 
 
Another important aspect of Peirce's approach to the problem of human “individuality” is the distinction 
between the empirical self, found in self-reference and psychological self-ascription, and what Kant called the 
transcendental unity of apperception, or “I think.” Some scholars have focused their analysis on the relationship 
between Peirce and Kant on this topic and have produced enlightening commentaries (Ishida 2009, in particular; 
also De Tienne 1996; Colapietro 2006; Apel 1989; 1995; Harrison 1981; Maddalena 2012). Nevertheless, I 
                                                            
47  What Delaney (1993: 129) says about the relation between “perception” and “science” can be said about the relation between 
indexical self-reference, on one side, and the growth of one's self and one's self-knowledge on the other side. 
48 See Liszka (1996: 49-50).  
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believe that further work is needed in this field, in particular in relation to what problem Peirce is addressing 
while developing his reading of Kant's “I think.” Peirce is concerned with the problem of the Kantian “I think” 
early on in his “On a New List of Categories” (1867). The aim of this section is not to peruse in a detailed way 
the Kantian legacy which is found in Peirce's thought, but to highlight on the contrary that what Peirce says 
about the Kantian “I think” does not affect his conviction in the reality of the empirical self.  
According to Kant, the “I think” is the transcendental unity of apperception, which constitutes the condition 
of possibility of experience or the phenomenon in general (B134). In other words, it is the numerically unitary 
self understood as a transcendental “I” which enables to bring the sensuous manifold to the unity of the 
representation. In commenting Kant's stance, Peirce writes: 
 
In his first-edition, he [Kant] does not call the act “the I think,” but “the object = X.” That which 
the act has to effect is the consecution of ideas: now the need of consecution of ideas is a logical need, 
and is due not, as Kant thinks, to their taking the form of the Urtheil, the assertion, but to their making 
an argument; and it is not “I think” that that always virtually accompanies an argument, but it is “Don't 
you think so?”. (MS 636:26, 1909) 
 
It is clear from this passage that the problem at issue is the logical unity (namely, the intelligibility) of the 
object of thought in general. The main argument of this passage is that the most fundamental unity of this 
object, or representation, is not given by the inquirer's judgment (Peirce says “assertion”), but by the elements of 
the sensuous manifold experience that are considered and grow at a certain point a symbolic unity. Peirce 
stresses correctly the two concerns of Kant's approach, which are: (1) the problem is the logical unity of the 
representation, as it is displayed by Kant's expression in the first edition of the Critique of Pure Reason “the object 
= X”; (2) the solution provided by Kant is that this logical unity results from the synthetic acts of judgment 
performed by the transcendental ego, or “I think.” Therefore, Kant is neither saying that the representation of 
the “I” accompanies every representation as a further element of the object, nor that the belief in the 
transcendental ego results from the fact that from every representation it is possible to refer to an “I.” Kant is 
dealing with the conditions of intelligibility of the object (same problem that Peirce is addressing in the “New 
List”) and is furnishing a solution that Peirce will reject in part. In fact, according to Peirce, the synthetic 
function of “conceptions” emerges within the sensuous manifold itself as the consistency of the symbol and is 
not given by the activity of an alleged transcendental ego. Peirce substitutes the Kantian transcendental unity of 
apperception with the unity of consistency of the phenomenon that is already foreshadowed in the category of 
“substance” introduced in the “New List” (EP1: 1-2, 1868). Moreover, in the formation of the argument, self-
reference does not have the assertive status of a positive and definite “I think,” but the more fallibilist one of a 
“Don’t you think so?”. The X, the unity of consistence that grows in the formation of the object is a plea in the 
face of the empirical “I” who is articulating it. The teleological structure of semeiosis is already evident in this 
phenomenon. In conclusion, according to Peirce, there is no need to postulate a transcendental “I” which 
performs the activity of synthesis according to a priori principles, categories or rules, but is sufficient to admit 
that through experience certain general “forms” and “conceptions” emerge in the representation itself as the 
structures of experience or understanding in general. In this sense, Peirce's new conceptions (“transcendental” in 
a classical sense) are “general signs” or “symbols.” 
In any case, the main point to stress here is that Peirce's dissolution or rejection of the “I think” does not 
entail a correspondent dissolution of the empirical “I” of each individual agent. The fact that the transcendental 
super-empirical “ego” of Kant's analysis is not necessary according to Peirce's naturalistic approach to 
transcendentalism is not evidence in favor of the annihilation of the empirical ego. The mistake of interpreting 
the first rejection as a premise from which the second rejection follows results from (a) a wrong interpretation of 
the Kantian “I think” and (b) a connection of this rejection with the set of claims about the nature of 
individuality and self-consciousness dwelt above and often misunderstood.  
In a passage of “Questions” (1868) Peirce distinguishes between the empirical “I” of the human individual 
and the “I” of pure apperception. Asking “whether we have an intuitive self-consciousness” and therefore how 
we know our self, Peirce makes clear that while 
 
Pure apperception is the self-assertion of THE ego … the self-consciousness here meant is the 
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recognition of my private self. I know that I (not merely the I) exist. (EP1: 18, 1868) 
 
It is important to keep in mind what Peirce wrote in the “New List” about the transcendental ego, because it 
is that theoretical framework which constitutes the background of what Peirce is claiming in this passage. Peirce 
is asking whether human beings have an “intuitive” self-consciousness. According to his externalist method in 
philosophy of mind, his first concern is to identify the mental fact that requires analysis and explanation, in this 
case the “fact” of self-consciousness. To do this, Peirce makes clear that the “self” or the “I” that is the focus of 
his analysis is not the “I” of pure apperception (granted that something like this existed) but the existent 
empirical “I” of each human individual. Peirce is individuating the subject of his inquiry by contrasting the 
empirical “I” of self-consciousness to the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception, but he is not agreeing 
with Kant. We learn from the “New List” how the conditions of unity of the phenomenon in general are not the 
unity of the transcendental ego but the “unity of consistency” of the represented object itself (articulated in new 
list of categories). Presenting Peirce's new approach to the self as a semeiotic alternative to the Kantian 
transcendental unity of the “I think” (De Tienne 1996: 1070-1071) is correct and useful, but faces at least a risk 
of partiality.49 In this context, it is clear again that it is fundamental to understand what is the precise problem 
that Peirce is addressing. The risk of partiality results from the fact that the new approach to the “self” resulting 
from the semeiotic turn dissolves only the “self” understood as the “I think” of pure apperception but does not 
affect the empirical “I.” On the contrary, the semeiotic approach highlights the new theoretical framework 
within which the empirical self is known and can be indexically pointed at. Peirce hints at this when he states in 
“Questions” that we do know our empirical “I” and not “the I,” although in this article he does not address 
directly again his interpretation of the Kantian transcendental ego (EP1: 18, 1868). This analysis is confirmed by 
a later passage about the meaning of Kantian “I think.” In it, Peirce makes clear again that his interest in 
questioning the need and plausibility of the transcendental ego for logic neither questions the representability of 
the “I” as an object, nor the existence of the empirical “I” manifested in such a representation. 
 
But Kant holds that though there is a distinction between cognition with self-consciousness and 
cognition without self-consciousness, yet the “I think” accompanies all our judgments; or rather … 
that it must be able to accompany every judgment. … But it is only necessary … that there should be a 
recognized unity in the objects of thought and that there should be a unity of the ego, but not that I 
should always refer the one to the other. And this seems to be nearly Kant's own opinion. For he 
does not … hold that the “I think” of which he speaks is a perception of one's own existence or that 
it is any knowledge of fact at all, but only that it is a form or point of view from which objects are 
conceived. To think consistently is one thing, to think about ourselves is surely quite another (W3: 51-
52, 1872) 
 
We learn from this passage that the unity of the ego is necessary not as a represented “object” but as the 
point of view from which everything is represented. I discern four different references here to the notion of “I”: 
(1) “I” understood as the Kantian “I think,” about which Peirce has already expressed his critical opinions; in 
this case, Peirce talks of “THE I”; (2) “I” understood as the “point of view” from which every object is 
conceived; (3) “I” understood as the empirical “self” of each human individual, to which Peirce sometimes refers 
as the personal individual or private “I”; (4) “I” understood as the forms of understanding or universal 
                                                            
49 In De Tienne (1996: 1070) we read that “it is because of this unity of representation in general that consciousness is one and capable 
of saying “I,” not the reverse.” De Tienne's interpretation is incorrect insofar it is partial. it is true that the consistency of an object or 
representation precedes the possibility of self-reference, and that self-reference is itself an object or representation, and cannot be 
represented but as an object. Therefore: “the bucket is heavy” (object 1); “I feel that the bucket is heavy” (self-reference, object2). 
However, although the unity of the self as an object is the same unity of any other object of representation, given by the unity of a 
symbol, the possibility of representation in general and the constant possibility of self-reference are facts which must be considered 
and explained. Peirce is denying the necessity of the Kantian transcendental unity of apperception, but is not claiming that the unity of 
symbolization/representation is the only condition of self-reference. What Peirce is further denying is that the “I think” is the origin of 
the categories and of the unity of representation; the “I think” is instead the intelligence in actu of reality, or the synthetic function 
performed by an empirical individual agent on the basis of a few categories born through experience. Thus, we have: (1) the “I think” 
as the transcendental unity of apperception becomes in Peirce the unity of consistency of a symbol, of an object and in the end of 
reality itself in its capacity of being represented; (2) the “I think” is fundamentally structured according to the “new” categories 
developed in “New List,” which are the forms of all thinking or all possible experience. (3) Therefore, the individuality, or the 
empirical self, is not necessary insofar we want to describe the nature of this logical structure. However, from thesis (3) it does not 
follow that the empirical self is not existent. It simply follows that the empirical self, or what makes me different from you, is not the 
origin of logical laws and representability of reality. Midtgarden (2002: 115) makes the same mistake on this point. 
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conceptions found in experience. If we accept to discuss these different notions, it is possible to say that Peirce's 
reformation of Kant's transcendentalism transforms point (1) into point (4), so that it is not possible to 
distinguish anymore between a transcendental “I,” its synthetic activity and the intelligibility that is a property of 
the sensuous multifold itself once it grows into a symbol. Point (2), the “I” understood as the point of view of 
understanding, is straightforwardly identified with the empirical “I” (point 3), although it can also be identified 
with point 4, namely, with the “forms” through which experience is always conceptualized. 
In conclusion, it is possible to say, first, that the Kantian “I think” reinterpreted by Peirce is not a substance 
different from the laws of thought, the general forms of understanding or categories, but is the synthetic function 
performed by the same categories. Second, the “I think” understood as a the performance of the categories 
cannot be understood as the origin of the categories (see MS 636: 25-26, 1909): the categories are the forms of 
the whole phenomenal world, or the world of all possible experiences, and therefore the reference to the “I 
think” is partial; the laws belong to the phenomena and to the “I think” at the same title. Third, the “I” 
understood as the possible objective correlate Y of every object of thought X in what is called “self-
consciousness” does not accompany Y all the time.50 Rather, the “I” becomes an object and accompanies 
another object X only when an explicit act of self-consciousness is performed. The “I” to whom we have access 
in this case is not the “transcendental ego,” but the empirical self of each individual human being. 
 
 
 
2.3. “Corporate Personality” Reinterpreted 
 
Peirce’s ontological belief in the reality of corporate personalities intersects importantly with the problem of 
the empirical self. It is important to consider briefly this issue because it clarifies further Peirce's theory of the 
individual human agent, with particular reference to the problem of individual self-consciousness. I do not 
accept those interpretations (see Lane 2009; de Waal 2006) that tend to include in Peirce's ontology something 
like a higher-order consciousness understood as a higher order possibility of self-reference and psychological self-
ascription.51 At least, these interpretations do not clarify if higher-order consciousnesses are capable of self-
consciousness. In fact it is clear that every time Peirce addresses the problem of what he calls “corporate 
personality,” the focus of the discussion is not the demonstration of the existence of a higher-order 
consciousness but the explanation of certain phenomena among individual consciousnesses in relation.52 Early 
on, in a manuscript titled “Critique of Positivism” (MS146; W2: 122-130, 1867-1868), Peirce comments two 
different meanings of “personality.” He writes: 
 
We, also, feel within us in addition to elements peculiar to ourselves, elements also which are 
common to ourselves and others, among which are personality and intellect. Personality has two 
senses, 1st being personal and 2nd the special idiosyncrasy of a particular person. It is in the first 
sense that the sympathy we exhibit shows that we feel that it is the same, in others as in ourselves. 
Hence the love of the life of others is still a passion which centers in ourselves because we love them 
as having something in common with ourselves, that is, because a part of them is identical with a part 
of ourselves. This would be quite false if these elements were material but as they are general and 
purely formal objects, there is nothing in nominalism to refute such a sentiment. (W2: 124) 
                             
In this quotation, Peirce takes “person” to mean: (1) the mere “ … being personal”; (2) “the special 
idiosyncrasy of a particular person.” Strictly speaking, it is true that Peirce is not making clear whether the 
                                                            
50 It seems to me that Pape (1980: 220) is wrong on this point. 
51 Though representing important studies, Lane 2009 and de Waal 2006 are lacking insofar as do not address the problem of self-
reference in dealing with the metaphysical status of selves and corporate personalities. I think that these interpretations are a further 
example of the need to keep distinct all of Peirce's different approaches to the problem of human individuality. Also Harrison 1981 is 
lacking on this point. 
52 My interpretation fits with Short's interpretation of “corporate personalities” and social entities as spatio-temporal continua. 
“Personalities” are general dispositions that govern the behavior of certain human beings and are instantiated though their spatio-
temporal embodied actions. However, Short is not attentive enough in distinguishing the continuity found in 3rdness from the spatio-
temporal continuity in individuals that include also an existential connection among the spatio-temporal parts of the extension. See 
Short (1994: 80). 
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“particular person” here mentioned numerically coincides with an individual human being or with a super-
individual personal being. However, Peirce explicitly connects the first meaning to shared experiences such as 
“sympathy” and states that these shared passions “center in ourselves.” The last expression makes us think to 
what we have been calling the empirical self, which numerically coincides with the individual human being. 
Moreover, in a passage of the same period, Peirce repeats the reference to the idiosyncrasy of the human being, 
which clearly entails individuality and reference to an empirical self. He writes that “each man has his own 
peculiar character. It enters into all that he does. It is his consciousness and … enters into all his cognition … his 
way of regarding things; not a philosophy of the head alone – but one of that pervades the whole man. This 
idiosyncrasy is the idea of the man; and if this is true he lives forever” (W1: 501, 1867).  
We find in the “Critique of Positivism” passage all the elements which are necessary to understand that the 
reference to a “corporate personality” is not the admittance of a higher-order individual able of a higher order 
self-consciousness, but is the repetition of the traditional thesis that certain phenomena such as “sympathy” 
require a common ground among the human individuals involved. In other passages Peirce also puts forward the 
same thesis in relation to the phenomenon of communication. Peirce writes that “two minds can communicate 
only by becoming in so far one mind” (MS 498).53 It is unmistakable that Peirce claims that, no matter what 
synechism and personality mean, still the passion we share “centers in ourselves.” Once again, synechism does 
not imply individual nihilism. The individual self is the empirical center of all mental events, although this does 
not imply that human individuals live in isolation from one another or that they do not share metaphysically 
some reality with the other selves. Peirce's thesis is against a solipsistic self, not in favor of the annihilation of the 
individual self. This is also clear if the passages on the positive idiosyncrasy of the human individual are taken 
seriously. 
I believe that Peirce's statements about “sympathy” aim to highlight three different aspects of synechism 
within the human community: (1) what is shared by different human individuals (beliefs, desires, purposes, etc.); 
(2) what are the conditions of sharing in general; (3) what are the conditions of specific experiences of sharing, 
such as sympathy, or, as in other passages, national and religious sentiments and moral sense (R 961a: 87, 1981; 
CP 1.337). It seems to me that the usual interpretations systematically overlooks (3). The fact that thesis (3) is 
usually overlooked produces misunderstanding of Peirce's theory, such as in the case of admitting the reality of a 
higher-order self-consciousness. It is true that Peirce claims sometimes that corporate personalities are instance 
of higher-order consciousness. For example, he admits that “the esprit the corps of a military company, a club, a 
university, a nation, is essentially of the same nature as consciousness of a person” (R 961a: 87, 1981). However, 
Peirce never writes that corporate personalities perform something like self-consciousness or psychological self-
ascription. When Peirce connects corporate personality and consciousness he simply means to highlight the fact 
that certain experiences require a continuity among the individuals, which, however, does not annihilate the 
differences.54 As Short observes, “continuity does not preclude but rather entails difference” (2007: 152). In 
particular, experiences such as sympathy and national sentiment require a shared set of semeiotic dispositions 
among the individuals. This thesis is not at odd with Peirce's claim that even in the case of a corporate 
personality the human individuals remain the centers of (their and most of the time shared) experiences. On the 
contrary, this claim fits nicely with the other different parts of his account of the individual human agent that I 
am trying to reconstruct in the present chapter and in the following chapters. 
One of the passages that are usually taken to display Peirce's argument in favor of a higher-order self-
consciousness is found in “Man's Glassy Essence.” Peirce says that, if something like the law of mind is true and 
something like a corporate personality exists, 
 
there should be something like personal consciousness in bodies of men who are in intimate and 
intensely sympathetic communion. It is true that when the generalisation of feeling has been carried so 
                                                            
53 See also EP2: 3, “All communication from mind to mind is only through continuity of being.” Peirce's argument is the following: (P1) 
All thinking is in signs; (P2) In order to communicate, people (different individual human beings) need to have something in 
common, namely, signs and symbols; (C) Insofar as these individual human beings share the same signs and symbols in 
communication, their thinking is identical with these signs symbols, and therefore these individual human beings coincide (are “one 
mind”). From this it follows that human beings in communication are the same type, not that they are the same token. 
54 See also “Self-consciousness, as the term is here used, is to be distinguished both from consciousness generally, from the internal 
sense, and from pure apperception” (EP1: 18, 1868).  
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far as to include all within a person, a stopping-place, in a certain sense, has been attained; and further 
generalisation will have less lively character. But we must not think it will cease. Esprit de corps, national 
sentiment, sym-pathy, are no mere metaphors. None of us can fully realise what the minds of 
corporations are, any more than one of my brain-cells can know what the whole brain is thinking. But 
the law of mind clearly points to the existence of such personalities, and there are many ordinary 
observations which, if they were critically examined … might … give evidence of the influence of 
such greater persons upon individuals. (EP1: 350, 1892) 
 
What is clear in this passage is that, according to Peirce, (1) “corporate personalities” are real and that it is 
possible to provide experimental evidence for it; (2) at the same time, “corporate personalities” have an 
influence upon individuals. The problem of consciousness emerges therefore at this point. Do (1) and (2) imply 
that there is a corporate personality with a higher-order self-consciousness that influences individual 
personalities with their own self-consciousness (Lane 2009)? Or, do (1) and (2) imply that once a corporate 
personality with its higher-order self-consciousness is constituted, the lower-order self-consciousnesses 
disappear? Both interpretations are to be rejected. Not only it is metaphysically more economic to deny the 
existence of a higher-order consciousness, but also it is more consistent with what Peirce explicitly says and with 
what he claims in relation to different topics (in particular, morality; see Chapter 2 and 3). Moreover, the claim 
that corporate personalities have an influence upon individuals makes more sense if read in relation to the 
passage in which Peirce states that the human individual is always the center of psychological self-ascriptions.  
Peirce's idea is not only that a corporate personality exists, but also that (1) the association of men makes 
possible certain types of sign-functioning which would not be possible without this association, (2) that this 
association is analogue to the possibility of sign-functioning which is enabled by brain cells in unity (compared to 
brain cells in isolation), and that (3) this thesis is confirmed by the law of mind. It is my opinion that the 
reference to the “body of men in intimate connection” and to the brain cells in isolation or in systemic 
connection has to be taken seriously. As the brain cells together make possible certain “feeling-qualities” which 
would not be possible in isolation, so the association among men understood as organisms and physical bodies 
make possible certain “feeling-qualities” which would not be possible in different conditions.55 Peirce's view is 
therefore that human social association allows for the growth in human individuals of habits and sensibilities that 
could never emerge in an individual isolated from other individuals. Among the class of these phenomena, I 
would include moral sentiments, national sentiments and sympathy. The connection that Peirce makes between 
these phenomena and the “Esprit the corps” is literally true from his viewpoint and illuminating for understanding 
his stance (see also R961a: 87, 1981). As a consequence, it seems that Peirce's “corporate personality” thesis is a 
specification of (not a different thesis from) the “overlapping” thesis exposed by Lane; it is a specification of the 
“overlapping” thesis insofar as it states that: (i) human beings overlap because of their common habits of belief, 
feeling, desire, etc.56; (ii) these habits can emerge from the interaction of human beings with their environment or 
from their interaction among themselves. On my interpretation, Peirce is claiming for a type of shared sign-
functioning that would not develop in human beings' consciousnesses taken in isolation. Those interpretations 
that take Peirce to admit in his ontology “higher-order consciousness, one that somehow transcends that of the 
individual group members” (Lane 2009:14) are correct insofar as they exclude at the same time the possibility of 
higher-order self-consciousness, but are limited insofar as leave this issue in a fundamental ambiguity. 
While talking about the consequences of embracing “synechism,” Peirce observes: 
 
Nor must any synechist say “I am altogether myself, and not at all you.” If you embrace 
synechism, you must abjure this metaphysics of wickedness. In the first place, your neighbors are, in a 
measure, yourself … . Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the 
vulgarist delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men who resemble you and are in analogous 
circumstances are, in a measure, yourself, though not quite in the same way in which your neighbors 
are you. (CP 7.571) 
 
The metaphysical statement which is at odds with Peirce's synechism is “I am altogether myself, and not at all 
                                                            
55  See “the consciousness is a sort of public spirit among the nerve-cells” (CP 1.354). 
56 Peirce explains that consciousness “really belongs to the subconscious man, to that part of the soul which is hardly distinct in 
different individuals, a sort of community-consciousness, or public spirit, not absolutely one and the same in different citizens, and yet 
not by any means independent in them” (CP 1.56, 1906). 
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you,” where the stress has to fall on the denial of any metaphysical relation and shared reality. Similarly, Peirce 
states that neighbors are “in a measure” part of an individual’s metaphysical constitution. In addition, the passage 
has a not-so veiled moral background and taste in its reference to “wickedness” and “vanity.” These quotations 
do not contradict at all the status of objectual individuality or the possibility of reference to an empirical 
irreducible self which both belong to human beings. 
An example of the dynamic of experiences that emerge only on the condition of a continuous interaction 
among human individuals is surely the case of a nation: without the unity of purpose, intents and values 
emerging among different human individuals through physical interaction with one another, something like a 
national sentiment would never arise. Similarly, Peirce talks about the necessity of admitting “such an entity as 
the spirit of an age or of a people,” since “the individual intelligence will not account for all the phenomena” 
(EP1: 369). A further, more important example brings us in the field of morality: it is true that without the 
contact with other human beings, or without the “feeling-quality,” or percept, produced by the repeated presence 
of other men, an individual would never develop over time something like a moral sentiment or a sense of 
human sympathy. It is true that “it may be possible to submit to experimental test” (EP1: 350) all these cases. In 
other words, it is easy to conceive cases in which a refined moral sense has not developed because of the scarcity 
of human interactions. The physical interaction provides human individuals with the necessary experiential 
condition for the development of certain “ideas,” among which national and moral senses are the most 
important instances. The same consideration can be extended to the enterprise of science and civilization, which 
cannot be achieved in isolation (read in this sense the passage on “cells”; see also EP1: 246). 
At this point of the analysis, it is possible to further the earlier twofold definition of “personality” given by 
Peirce. Always in “Man's Glassy Essence,” Peirce states that “a person is only a particular kind of general idea” 
(EP1: 350). In another passage, he claims that this idea is a growing “idea” (e.g. EP2: 254-255, 1903). What is 
important to underscore in this section is that these different claims about the nature of personality not only are 
consistent, but are also more intelligible if understood in relation to the thesis that only a lower-level self-
consciousness is real. Therefore, we have the two following notions of personality: 
 
(i) Lower-order “personality”: it is the growing “idea,” or developing total sum of semeiotic dispositions of a 
human individual. “Self-consciousness” is the property of the human individual, not of the “personality.” 
(ii) Higher-order “personality”: it is the growing “idea,” or developing total sum of semeiotic dispositions of a 
group of human individuals, as it is made possible not only by their physical organisms in isolation, but by their 
physical organisms in connection and interaction. Since “self-consciousness” is the property of the human 
individual, at this level of personality, self-consciousness is still present but as the property of each human 
individual and not of the group of individuals. Something like a higher-order self-consciousness does not exist at 
all. The confusion among the different notions of “self,” “person” and “personality” not only results from 
Peirce's terminological inconsistency, but also from their intimate interconnection. For instance, Peirce writes 
that “personality so far as it is apprehended in a moment, is immediate self-consciousness” (CP 6.155). This 
means that self-reference is accompanied by personality and that there is a strict link between the two. However, 
at the same time self-reference implies an indexical component that is not reducible to the generality of 
personality. 
From the passages analyzed is clear that, when something like a corporate personality has developed among 
human individuals according to a process of “generalization” (see “law of mind”) in virtue of a repeated mutual 
interaction (including physical proximity and perception of each other's behavior) (EP1: 350-351), this higher-
order personality has the power to be shared, instantiated and furthered by its members, who are human 
individuals.57 At the same time, however, self-consciousness and psychological self-ascription remain a 
prerogative of the individual human agents. 
 
 
 
                                                            
57 Human individuals are the locus of instantiation of more than one personality. Hence, for Peirce, the conflicting presence of multiple 
personalities and the somewhat imperfect unity and continuity among the different personalities which characterize individuals (e.g., 
NEM4: ix).  
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3. Individuality as “Destination” of Developmental Teleology. An Overview of “Incarnation” and 
“Carnification” 
 
The aim of the final part of this chapter is to show that teleology or “final causality” is a further, 
indispensable ingredient in order to understand another facet of Peirce’s account of the reality of the individual 
human agent. In particular, I will claim that Peirce's evolutionist appropriation of Aristotle's notion of final 
causality constitutes the metaphysical principle that grounds the most important meaning of “individuality” in 
relation to the human being.58 “Teleology” has in Peirce's system many different facets. First, it means the 
metaphysical principle according to which a thing or individual object can be classified as an instance of this or 
that “kind” (“natural” or “artificial”). Second, it means the principle grounding Peirce's evolutionary cosmology. 
Third, in relation to human beings’ life, it also refers to the fact that according to Peirce every individual human 
being, in relation with other human beings, is called to a unique although shared mission in life, which is 
ultimately identifiable as a contribution to the development of “creation.” It is clear that this third aspect of 
Peirce's doctrine of teleology opens to the dimension of morality and normativity in general. While I will deal 
with these two latter issues in Chapter 2 and 3, I focus here on the metaphysical structure of the human 
individual as teleologically characterized. It is also true that in Peirce's terms the metaphysical and the normative 
approaches in characterizing the human being cannot be fully disjoined. However, this point instead of 
representing an objection to my analysis helps to fix the focus of this conclusive section and its meaning as a 
bridge to the next chapter on the “Normative Sciences.” The fundamental claim of this section is therefore that a 
metaphysical account of the human beings’ final cause shows an implicit reference to a normative dimension. In what follows, I 
only offer a more detailed account of this claim in relation to the problem of evolution and vagueness. As a 
further interpretative proposal, I will consider central two notions that occur in an early manuscript, 1864 “The 
Analysis of the Ego” (R1116, W1: 144-151, 1864), the notion of “Incarnation” and that of “Carnification.” In § 
3.1. I give an analysis of this manuscript. The background of my reflection is provided by an important statement 
contained respectively in 1892 “The Law of Mind,” in which Peirce focuses on some consequences of his 
synechism. In it we read that “in the case of personality … teleology is more than a mere purposive pursuit of a 
predetermined end; it is a developmental teleology” (EP1: 331). Peirce continues by observing that 
 
This is personal character. A general idea, living and conscious now, it is already determinative of 
acts in the future to an extent to which it is not now conscious. This reference to the future is an 
essential element of personality. Were the ends of a person already explicit, there would be no room 
for development, for growth, for life; and consequently there would be no personality. The mere 
carrying out of predetermined purposes is mechanical. (EP1: 331)  
 
As I will show in what follows, I take the structure of Peirce's argument on this issue to be the following: 
 
(i) The final cause of an individual substance is (metaphysically coincides with) that substance in its 
developmental nature.59 In particular, it coincides with the substance as a vague realization of a “function” that 
tends toward a more determinate realization. If Peirce's extreme Scholastic realism accounts for the nature of a 
substance as a bundle of habits, the insistence on the final cause shows how the habits that constitute a 
substance have a developmental vocation. The final cause of a substance has a developmental nature which has 
to be understood as what is “destined” to happen to this substance. In the case of the human being, the general 
function that is only vaguely realized but tends toward a better determination is what Peirce refers to with the 
phrase “rational instinct.” 
 
                                                            
58 This thesis is also true from a broader cosmological perspective. However, I will focus here on that particular type of entity that is the 
“human being”.  
59 I approach the notion of “substance” aproblematically here only because I discuss it the first part of the present chapter. For further 
studies and commentaries on the notion of substance in Peirce's thought, see Sorrell 2001; Sorrell (2004: 33-75); Potter 1992; 
Colapietro (1985: 81-83); Rosenthal (1986: 113-114). While Sorrell, Potter, and Colapietro affirm that Peirce admitted and articulated a 
notion of substance compatible with Aristotle's (although Sorrell's reconstruction based on the three Universal Categories presents 
several mistakes), Rosenthal claims that Peirce is actually replacing a metaphysics of the substance with a metaphysics of the process. 
As I have showed, I agree with the first three scholars's interpretation. 
 29 
(ii) In turn, destination has to be understood not as a dyadic, brute “force” which acts on the events 
deterministically, but as a rational “power” which attracts a substance through the mediation of love, or like a 
beloved attracts the lover. 
 
(iii) The dynamics of development of the final cause has the metaphysical and semeiotic structure of a gradual 
determination of the original “objective vagueness” of the final cause, or “idea.”  
 
(iv) The realization of the final cause in the substance is multi-level. In other words, at every point of the 
spatio-temporal development of a substance, the final cause is already realized at a certain level of vagueness but 
not yet developed in all its potentiality. Peirce's metaphysical account of the multi-level realization of the final 
cause in the substance resembles saint Paul's description of the present moment in the history of Salvation as an 
“already but not yet.” This coincides with Peirce's theological evolutionary cosmology. Peirce's observations on 
this point open therefore to the perspective of an eschatological metaphysics of the human individual. While 
“Incarnation” stands for the vague and somehow indeterminate realization of a final cause in the substance, 
“Carnification” refers to its perfect realization. 
I will start with the analysis of R1116 by showing that in this early text all the facets of Peirce's understanding 
of final cause are already foreshadowed. It seems to me that the notions of “Incarnation” and “Carnification” 
turn out to be an enlightening early perspective on Peirce's later thought on the status of individuals. 
 
 
 
3.1. R1116, “Analysis of the Ego” 
 
Before addressing points (i), (ii), (iii), and (iv), I dwell upon an early manuscript, the “Analysis of the Ego” 
(R1116, W1: 144-151, 1864). I devote an entire subsection to the analysis of this manuscript for the simple 
reason that it is almost never quoted in Peirce scholarship, although at a close reading it proves to be an 
extremely rich and promising early writing. Although a detailed commentary of this text is still needed and would 
be of great utility, also for its interesting early mix of Aristotelianism, Kantianism, and objective idealism,60 I limit 
my analysis here to a few notions which casts an interesting light on Peirce’s approach to the problem of the 
individual human agent. My task is twofold: on one side, I aim to highlight the terminology with which Peirce, at 
this early point of his intellectual life, characterizes the notion of “final cause”; on the other side, I want to stress 
three theoretical points, which will prove to be crucial in my following discussion. First, Peirce points out that 
the final cause is the metaphysical principle that gives a unity to a substance understood as a bundle of habits; the 
unity of the bundle is provided by the organizing power of the final cause.  Second, I show that the realization of 
the final cause in a substance is a series of different degrees of perfection. Third, Peirce already refers in this early 
text to the individuality of a substance understood as a continuity of reactions. The formula used in the 
manuscript is a “collective subject” with “extension.” 
We have seen that for Peirce there is an “influx-relation” between a substance and we have interpreted this 
statement in the sense that, if there is a substance, there should also be an identical, general predicate under 
which every single instantiations of that substance can be described. In the passages we have read, Peirce does 
not specify which kind of property we should appeal to. In this early manuscript, Peirce claims that the common 
property that unifies a substance (as a general and as an individual), and that is shared by all the members of a 
“natural class,” is a specific “idea”61 in its teleological orientation (“plan,” “function,” or “final cause”). 
The opening question of the manuscript is: “how does anything which exists, exist? or What are the 
conditions of subjectivity?” (W1: 144). To be sure, the question is not about the metaphysical principle that 
determines a substance in its numerical individuality, but, rather, about the specific character, or type, of an 
                                                            
60 This does not imply that Peirce did not develop later on new his studies and understanding of Aristotle, Kant and German 
Naturalphilosophie (for historical information on this, see Reynolds 2002, in particular Ch.1). Therefore, my interpretation does not 
imply that the interesting mix of Aristotelianism, Kantianism, and objective idealism displayed in R1116 is a mature formulation of 
Peirce's view on these different traditions. 
61 For a different meaning of “idea,” see for instance EP2: 434. 
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existing entity and of the logical subject that represents it. The confirmation that the question relates to an entity 
as a law-like series of instantiations and not isolated series of instantiations is confirmed by Peirce’s example, 
according to which, “the first thing to be said is that [whatever exists,] exists by virtue of being whatever it is. 
Thus, Gold is, by virtue of being heavy and yellow” (W 1: 144). A “subject” is specified by being the incarnation 
of an “idea”: 
 
The subject is subject by being an incarnation of a predicate, which is an abstraction, and which 
when incarnated in the consciousness is called a conception or in relation to the exterior incarnation 
an idea. It is only, then, by its idea, that any thing exists. Of most things we do not know the ideas, of 
none wholly (W 1: 144).  
 
In this passage, Peirce already foreshadows his later objective idealism (see EP1: 285-297, 1891) and 
introduces the notion of incarnation. The “predicate” is said to be an “abstraction” insofar it stays for a real 
general which cannot coincide with an individual thing.62 The general predicate can be considered in a twofold 
way: in relation to cognitions, it is a “conception,” while in relation to external things it is an “idea.” However, 
the general is both the metaphysical principle that specifies a substance as this or that type of substance and the 
intelligibility that guaranties the unity of its representation.63 The “idea” to which Peirce refers is an organizing 
and specifying general principle that makes whatever exists to be a certain type of being. In the case of its 
Incarnation in a substance, the idea is the principle which provides a matter with a certain unity, while in the case 
of its Incarnation in a representation, the idea is the semeiotic unity out of which a sensuous multifold is reduced 
to an “object.” As we have seen (see §§ 1., 1.1., 1.2.), Peirce identifies this unifying principle in objects and 
substances with a metaphysical 3rdness, or habit. 
However, what the notion of bundle of habits carries with it is just the statement of the unity itself of a 
subject more than the explanation of it. Moreover, as we have seen, a habit provides unity to different 
instantiations (so that different “prescinded” A-facts belong in reality to a unitary B-fact or event), but it is still 
unclear what provides unity to a substance understood as a bundle of habits. How can a bundle of habits be 
unified? Peirce's inquiry into the notion of “idea” seems to provide some clarifications. In explaining what an 
“idea” is, Peirce puts forward four, synonymical notions: “final cause” (W1: 144), “function” (W1: 148), “plan” 
(W1: 150), and performance (what the idea “performs,” W1: 147). Peirce seems to say as early as 1864 that the 
“final cause” is the metaphysical principle that accounts for the unity of a substance. The interesting point is that 
the “idea” receives its ultimate unity and further unifying power from the final cause. In this early manuscript, 
Peirce refers to the final cause also with the synonymical notions of “plan,” “function” and “performance.” To 
be sure, there is not metaphysical distinction between the “idea” and its unifying final cause, but a possible 
logical separation. According to Peirce's account, the idea can be described as the organic agency of the habits of an 
X insofar as these habits show a certain common realization of a final cause. According to this perspective, there 
are different levels of realization of the same objectively vague final cause. At each level of realization, the vague 
final cause is “limited” or determined in a specific way, which corresponds to the specific final cause characterizing 
a substance. In this way, Peirce's metaphysical perspective contemplates a hierarchy of specific final causes and 
forms which are in mutual relationship of inclusion (the vaguer includes the more determinate) and limitation 
(the more determinate limits the vaguer). A final cause has therefore different levels of “application” to a matter 
(W1: 150). Let us consider one of Peirce's examples, i.e., the case of an artificial object such as a piano. The final 
cause of a musical instrument as a piano can be understood in a very broad and vague way, such as: “the final 
cause of an organ or a piano widely stated is to exalt the aesthetic nature and to produce remote effects upon the 
whole nature of man and thus to improve the condition of the universe” (W 1: 147). However, this final cause 
could also define something else, such as a work of art of any type. It is possible to define the final cause of the 
piano also in a more determinate way, so that we have that “all that this instrument can in itself do is to make the 
                                                            
62 See the study on the notion of “quality,” “abstraction,” “predicate,” “fiction” or “figment” in relation to Peirce's early linguistically 
problematical approach to nominalism and realism. In particular, see Peirce's early cognitivism about the reality of the general that is 
at the same time a refusal of nominalism. 
63 The emerging, inchoative unity of the “substance” in the development of a representation as it is described in the “New List” (see 
EP1: 1-2, 1868) is the point of intersection of semeiotic and metaphysics. For an insightful commentary of this early essay, see Ishida 
2009, in particular 13-16 on the notion of “substance.” 
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sounds when placed within an atmosphere of proper density” (W 1: 147). For this reason, “the idea of the piano 
is its final cause, namely a sonorous vibrating instrument” (W 1: 146). The proper “idea” of the piano is a final 
cause that is a “limitation” or restriction of a more indeterminate and comprehensive final cause. This restriction, 
of course, entails certain features, like being made of a material capable of producing vibrations. In other words, 
the specific restriction of a general final cause requires corresponding, specific means (W1: 150).  
The further point to stress is that a function can specify a subject without being perfectly realized in it. There 
is a multi-level or multi-degree possibility of realization of the final cause that corresponds to its different level of 
determination. Peirce's distinction between Incarnation and Carnification is explicitly based on this possibility of 
multi-level realization and determination of the final cause. Peirce writes:  
 
When that incarnation of a predicate which we have called Function becomes Perfect, we have no 
matter left, in the sense of an impressed thing, so that there is no longer an incarnation but rather a 
Carnification of the predicate. … It is easy to see that this is not a subject except so far as the abstract 
predicate itself is its own subject; hence it is entirely beyond our present field of thought. The 
incarnation reduced to a nullity is merely the Function of Function … it may be called Materiafication. 
… Incarnation may be regarded as a Combination between Carnification and Materiafication. And 
how can this occur? By the determination of the Material by its idea. (W1: 149) 
 
The partial realization of a plan (Incarnation) means that the function has a multi-level realization. Since this 
realization has the nature of the “application” of a function or plan to a matter, the gradual realization 
corresponds to the increasing level of organization that the matter and its lower “functions” and “forms” 
receives. In fact, a matter has already some set of structuring functions, which are not dismissed by the new 
instance of application but only subsumed under a new organized pattern of agency. For example, in describing 
human thinking from a neuro-physiological standpoint, Peirce makes clear that “thinking, as cerebration, is not 
doubt subject to the general laws of nervous action” (CP 3.155). However, the higher-level plan, as a new 
overarching function, transforms the previous structuring functions and makes a new subject out of them by 
giving them a new, comprehensive final cause. In this way, the matter becomes the actualizing mean for a new 
plan, or the occasion of application of a new function. In a R1116 example, the wood, considered as the material 
of a piano, has its own inherent structures. When the wood is used to build a piano, its original function is 
functionalized to a new function, e.g. a particular kind of capacity of vibrating. It is however possible that some 
of the previous forms are functionalized, while others are not. This corresponds to the possibility of a bad 
realization of the piano-plan and a good realization of a piano-plan. This point is not directly related to the 
different modalities of realization of a vague function (i.e., the different “classes” obtained through the multifold 
realization of the plan: piano, organ, harpsichord, etc., W1: 150-151; see EP2: 125, 1902), but to the possibility of 
a better or worse realization of the same determination (the same “class”). There can be different “intermediate 
conditions” of Incarnation between the two extremes of Materiafication and Carnification. Therefore, the reality 
of substance is an issue of “equilibrium” (W1: 150) among a defying function and the other functions that have 
to be organized by it. 
A last point to make here is a reflection about Peirce's characterization of a real individual as a “collective 
subject” endowed with “extension.” Peirce, after distinguishing among “monads,” “collective subjects” and 
“universal subjects,” observes that “no monad is known to exists, for all subjects which we know have 
extension” (W1: 144). It follows from this statement that a subject is something that have “extension” among its 
essential features. Peirce's rejection of monads echoes his later critical consideration about the possibility of an 
“absolute individual”64 in metaphysics and “logical atoms” in logics (see e.g. CP3.93 n.1). However, an 
interpretative problem arises from this passage since Peirce does not seem to clarify further his notion of 
extension. The only suggestions he provides are that “extension is infinite” and that “all collective subjects are 
partial subjects” (W1: 144).65 My interpretative proposal is to read this passage in the light of what I have shown 
in the first part of this chapter, when I developed a Peircean theory of individual objects as a law-like series of 
subsequent instantiations. As a consequence, Peirce's statement can be elucidated by saying that the “extension” 
of a subject coincides with its subsequent actualizations and developments in space and in time. In other words, 
                                                            
64 Or simply “individual” as distinct from “singular,” see above. 
65 See De Tienne (1989: 388-389) on the early development of the notion of “infinite.”  
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a subject is extended if it has spatio-temporal parts. In this sense, a subject is a “collective subject,” namely, a 
continuous series of instances in which every spatio-temporal slice has the metaphysical and semeiotic status of a 
“singular” (see e.g. EP1: 106-107, 1877; EP2: 208, 1903). Moreover, since “extension is infinite,” “all collective 
subjects are partial subjects” (W1: 144). The potential extension of S and T, as we have seen in the section on the 
continuum, implies infinity, even though potential infinity.66 Indeed, T, as a continuum, is the form of the 
indefinite, potential actualizations of the specific continuities that characterize a substance as this or that type of 
substance. Therefore, also the general dispositions of a substance (habits, laws, 3dnesses) have a metaphysical 
potential infinity. In other words, space, time and specific general dispositions are the inexhaustible matrix from 
which an infinite number of concrete instantiations can result. If this interpretative account is correct, Peirce's 
characterization of a “collective subject” as “partial” becomes simple and clear. In fact, (P1) if a subject 
considered as a general substance is a bundle of specific habits (produced on the metaphysical background of 
space and time), and (P2) if the metaphysical status of a habit is that of being potentially infinite in relation to 
existence, it follows that (C) every subject in its concrete reality (a law-like sum or set of successive spatio-
temporal slices) is only a partial realization of what it could be. Later on, in an often-quoted text, Peirce makes 
this point clear in relation to the human life: 
 
The very being of the General, of Reason, consists in its governing individual events. So, then, the 
essence of reason is such that its being never can have been completely perfected. It always must be in 
a state of incipiency, of growth. It is like the character of a man which consists in the ideas that he will 
conceive and in the efforts that he will make, and which only develops as the occasions actually arise. 
Yet in all his life long no son of Adam has ever fully manifested what there was in him. So, then, the 
development of Reason requires as a part of it the occurrence of more individual events than ever can 
occur. (EP2: 255, 1903) 
 
In this text we witness in a clear way how the logical and metaphysical account of individuality in general also 
accounts for the reality and experience of human beings. The individual human carries in herself both the 
limitedness of a spatio-temporal existence (she really is a “collective subject” partially realized in her extension) 
and the metaphysical vocation to a (impossible?) complete actualization of potentially infinite possibilities. 
 
 
 
3.2. Final Causality and “Destination” 
 
In this section I develop point (i). Just like the notion of “substance,” also the metaphysical principle of final 
causation is drawn by Peirce from Aristotle (CP 1.22). Since this is a very broad topic in Peirce's philosophy and 
there is already a good deal of work in this field (Hulswit 2002; Short (1994: 91-150); Colapietro 2004a; Potter 
(1997: 112-121); Reynolds (2002: 57-59); Oliver 1964; Pape 1993; Wang 2005)67, I will not develop it here as a 
separate topic, but only refer to it insofar as it is crucial for an adequate understanding of Peirce's philosophy of 
the human individual. Peirce provides at least two definitions of final causation. First, final causation is the 
metaphysical principle of a substance which determines not in what particular way an event has to be brought 
about, but only that that event “shall have a certain general character” (e.g., EP2: 120, 1902). In this sense, the 
final cause of an object is the general plan that regulates all the events that are subjected to that final cause. As a 
general, however, it leaves room for a certain amount of indeterminacy, so that different instantiations of the 
same final cause can have different traits, even though traits which do not contradict the “general character” of 
the final cause. Second, a final cause is the metaphysical principle that determines a substance not through a 
physical “force,” but through an attractive “power” (CP 5.520). Final cause always becomes actualized through 
some efficient cause, which works as the organized matter determined attractively by the final cause and which 
interacts with the spatio-temporal concrete environment in which it finds itself. However, the two aspects of the 
                                                            
66 See e.g. “In any succession of events that have occurred there must be some kind of regularity. Nay, there must be regularities strictly 
exceeding all multitude” (EP2: 269, 1893). 
67 In particular, Hulswit (2002: 84-91) offers an insightful reconstruction of Peirce's doctrine of teleology in relation to the notions of 
“objective chance,” “creativity” and development. However, he does not focus on the problem of human teleology, being more 
interested in final causation as a cosmological principle.  
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final cause, generality and attractiveness, have to be understood in the context of Peirce's evolutionary 
philosophy (the cosmos is in the making) and tychism (objective chance is real). This is also true in relation to 
the human being, to whom I will limit my analysis. As we have read, the teleology characterizing a human being 
has a fundamental “developmental” structure, in which both generality and attractiveness evolve.  
What I want to stress at this point is Peirce's characterization of the evolution of the human final cause as a 
“destined” development. In one of his defense of the teleological nature of all processes, Peirce writes: “what is a 
“final” cause? It is merely a tendency to produce some determinate kind of effect having some relation to the 
destiny of things” (EP2: 464-465, 1913; see also EP2: 342-343, 1905). In order to make clear Peirce's stance on 
this point, I would suggest to consider abstractly the notion of “destiny of things” either (1) in relation to a thing 
understood as a series of events characterized by a common final cause, or (2) in relation to the final cause in 
itself. Distinguishing these two points is important to underscore two aspects of the notion of destiny that do 
not coincide. (1) Now, a thing can be said destined in its tendency insofar as all its happenings, events and 
actions follow somehow a general character. This is a requisite that follows from the first definition of the final 
cause as a “general character” imparted to things, as well as from Peirce's extreme Scholastic realism. In this case, 
the subject of the destination is the thing considered as a series of instantiations. To give an example drawn from 
everyday life, if the ultimate purpose of my life at t is to become a music player, every single action that I will 
perform will show in different ways and degrees this ultimate aspiration of mine. (2) However, this is not the 
only point stressed by Peirce about final causation, insofar as destination has for him also a developmental 
implication. This developmental clause becomes clear when the destination is attributed not primarily to the 
thing understood as a series of instantiations, but to the final cause itself of that thing. In this second case, 
destination of a final cause means that the final cause that characterizes a substance evolves over time, assumes a 
different form. Taking again the same example, although the ultimate purpose of an agent at t is to become a 
music player, it is likely that that purpose develops over time at t2 into a more determinate one, such as 
becoming a piano player, and maybe a jazz player. In the fourth 1903 Harvard Lecture, Peirce reinterprets the 
Aristotelian notion of potentia as that particular modality of being that is esse in futuro (EP2: 180, 1903; see also 
EP2: 123, 1903). Similarly, Peirce reminds us that the notions of “law of nature,” or simply “nature,” means in an 
Aristotelian and Scotistic sense “being in futuro” and “Germinal being,” namely, the matrix from which not only 
new instances but also new habits can take shape (EP2: 68-69, 1901). Peirce also connects the idea of final cause 
to the notions of “birth,” “natura,” and “physis” (EP2: 121-122, 1902). Accordingly, the potentia or esse in futuro 
do not refer only to the will-bes of future instances of already established dispositions (given these dispositions, 
actions A would happen if conditions C occurred), but also to the would-bes of future habits which would take 
shape in the substance (and that would in a sense re-shape the substance) if certain conditions C occurred. In 
this sense, law of nature, natures and final cause are the different facets of the same “reasonableness energizing 
the world … which belonged to the essentially evolutionary metaphysics of Aristotle, as well as to the scholastic 
modifications of it by Aquinas and Scotus … and Gassendi” (EP2: 69, 1901). 
A further analysis found in a 1909 letter to Williams James (EP2: 500-501, 1909) can help the understanding 
of the developmental teleology defended by Peirce. In this letter, Peirce distinguishes between three different 
metaphysical dimensions of reality, the “would-bes,” the “may-bes” and the “facts” or “occurrences.” The 
would-bes are the powers or the general laws according to which a substance interacts with the world; the “may-
bes” are the positive, possible configurations (also names “qualities”) of the being of a substance which could 
emerge and become actual if certain conditions occurred; finally, the “facts” or “occurrences” are the 
instantiations of the possible qualities, which actualize in a particular way the general character determined by the 
would-be. Now, the may-bes of a substance are determined by its would-bes, while the facts are the 
instantiations of these two dimensions.68 The determination has to be understood as a final process and not as a 
deterministic process. What is important to stress here is the fact that the developmental aspect that characterizes 
the final cause of a substance concerns not only the facts and the may-bes, but also the would-bes.69 
                                                            
68 Read this passage together with an earlier text, in which Peirce observes that a Thirdness, a “capacity or a habit,” implies certain 
possibilities and certain impossibilities” (EP2: 396, 1906). 
69 Peirce refers sometimes to the teleological dimension of events as a “finious” instead of teleological dimension (CP 7.471). It is 
defined as the general tension to “act in one determinate direction and tend asymptotically toward bringing about an ultimate state of 
things.” The notion of “finious” should add to the more traditional idea of teleology a component of evolution and irreversibility.  
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A last question should be asked about this point in order to solve an ambiguity in Peirce's thesis. In fact, if it 
is true that the cosmos is in the making and that part of this evolutionary process happens as development of the 
teleology of the substances, how is it possible then to talk about permanent substances as having this or that set 
of habits? From the standpoint of evolutionary cosmology,70 the habits displayed in reality (including the habit of 
taking-habit) have developed over time (e.g. EP1: 297, 1891; EP1: 245-279) and will most likely keep developing. 
Peirce writes that “tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature 
and of mind are regarded as products of growth” (EP1: 313, 1892; see also EP1: 352, 1893). As it is clear, this 
point is linked to the problem of “classification” of reality and to the related issue of the identity of a substance 
through different realizations. Although I cannot dwell here with the difficult problem of classification,71 it is 
important to stress in relation to the first question that Peirce claimed for the possibility of “natural 
classification” (see EP2: 115-132, 1902). Interesting enough, Peirce believed that part of the task of knowledge 
was natural classification at least since 1864. In the “Analysis of the Ego,” Peirce shows that the shortcomings of 
existent taxonomies depend upon the limits of our empirical knowledge and not upon the impossibility of such a 
task. Peirce makes clear that the “arbitrary” character of our taxonomies result both from considerations of 
contextual convenience and from the partiality of the information available to us. However, even though “we 
can classify [an X] according to any of its predicates,” Peirce remarks that “were the representation perfect, it 
would be represent the idea of [X] fully, so that [X] would have no predicate which this representation failed to 
express; and classification according to such a representation would have nothing arbitrary in it. It is this 
classification which is the infinitely distant point at which we aim” (W1: 145). Always in this text, Peirce spells 
out that the restriction of the “final cause” that constitutes the specific plan of an entity should conform to the 
“really inherent” final cause of the substance, although the identification of this inherent property in science has 
always the perspective nature of an approximation. It is the “inherent purpose expressed as inherent” that 
constitutes the regulative criterion of the natural classification (W1: 147-148). 
Moving now to the second question, we can ask: Is it possible to talk of stable substances if the world is a 
world in the making and the final cause and the habits characteristic of substances develop over time? The 
answer is no, in one sense, and yes, in another. The answer is no if we take stable substances in the sense of 
eternal entities, such in an Aristotelian cosmos, or entities incapable of any change.72 In this respect, Peirce 
objection is not to a theory of a substance but to a theory of fixed cosmos. However, in this light, the problem 
turns into a slightly different one, which I would formulate in the following way: is it possible to talk of stable 
substances, namely, substances characterized by permanent habits and final causes, insofar as these substances 
have already appeared in the cosmos and have not disappeared yet? This question is an interesting one because it 
goes at the heart of the metaphysical and scientific implications of Peirce's theory of developmental teleology. A 
hint of Peirce's answer to this question is provided by a text on natural classes in which Peirce's characterizes 
“classification as genealogical.” In this text, we read that 
 
… genealogical classification, among those objects of which the genesis is genealogical, is the 
classification we can most certainly rely upon as being natural. No harm will be done if, in those cases, 
we define the natural classification as the genealogical; or, at least, that we make the genealogical 
character one of the essential characters of a natural classification. It cannot be more; because if we 
had before us ranged in ancestral order all the intermediate forms through which the human stock has 
passed in developing from non-man into man, it is plain that other considerations would be necessary 
in determining (if it admitted of determination) at what point in the series the forms begin to merit the 
name of human. (EP2: 126, 1902) 
 
There are at least two points in this passage that I want to underline. First, Peirce stresses the fact that, if 
                                                            
70 See also “idealism” or “Cosmogonic Philosophy” (EP1: 97, 1891). Short 2010 has recently claimed that Peirce did not manage to 
develop a “cosmology.” Even assuming that this is a correct interpretation, it does not follow from this that Peirce did not conceive 
the world as a reality in the making. On passing, I only want to mention the fact that Short seems to take the notion of cosmology in 
too a narrow sense, as referring not to the general metaphysical doctrine that reality evolves but as the experimental science of the 
empirical laws of this evolution. 
71 There is an ongoing debate on the precise understanding of Peirce's theory of “natural classes.” See Hulswit 1997, Haack 1992, 
Hookway 1995, Rosenthal 1994, Hawkins 2007.  I agree with Hulswit and Haack realistic interpretation of Peirce on this point. 
72 Although Sorrell's recent reconstruction of Peirce's notion of substance is wrong in many respects, I agree on him on this point. See 
Sorrell (2001: 265). 
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there is something like a human being, it means that at the certain point a substance with this or that final cause 
and this or that habits made its appearance as an original reality (“non-human”), although in a synechistic 
continuity with what preceded her. Although the synechistic perspective prescribes “the passage from one form 
to another by insensible degrees” (CP 2.646), the passage is still real and can be known. Second, Peirce claims 
that it is at least a rational scientific hypothesis of work, connected to the activity of discovery of natural classes, 
to ask what is the point in the evolution of the cosmos in which the human being made her appearance. In other 
words, the problem highlighted in this passage is epistemological or scientific and not metaphysical. It fact, it is 
possible that “in the case of natural classes the final cause remains occult” (EP2: 116-117, 1902). This is however 
a description of the hard task of scientific discovery, which has to rely on empirical studies and statistical 
inductions, but not a skepticism about the reality of stable, defining final causes. This is so true that in the case of 
artifacts human beings can clearly state to identify the final cause. In many passages, Peirce hints at the “nature” 
of the human beings. For instance, in MS299:00021, Peirce observes that part of the human being's task in life is 
to “to work out his own nature and impulses.” At the same time, Peirce was interested in the study and 
classification of human instincts, a topic that is closely linked to his doctrine of the “critical common sense.”73 In 
particular, Ayim (1982: 23-25) lists ten different types of human instincts, which are the evolutive ramification of 
the rational instinct.  
We have now all the elements to answer the question about the stability of the human being as a substance in 
the face of the development of her final cause. We can say that for Peirce the ultimate final cause and most 
fundamental habit of the human being is what he calls the “rational instinct.” Peirce arrives at the belief in the 
human “rational instinct” through epistemic and metaphysical considerations on the very possibility of the 
abductive inference, which we cannot reconstruct here.74 I am interested here not in the structure of the method 
through which Peirce comes to this conclusion, but in the conclusion itself. The human mind is “akin” to reality 
because has evolved through it and it is this original familiarity that grounds metaphysically the capacity of 
guessing true explanatory hypothesis about phenomena or true judgments about moral, aesthetic etc. issues. 
Rationality plays its function in the human beings as a continuous attraction toward 3rdness in its entirety. The 
instinctive mind consists for Peirce in “in posse innate cognitive habits” (CP 5.504). In speaking about the 
“function” (the Aristotelian ergon) of the human individual, Peirce writes: “What is man’s proper function if it not 
be to embody general ideas in art-creations, utilities, and above all theoretical recognition?” (EP2: 443, 1908). If 
we had to identify one property that is distinctive of the human being and of her teleological destination is the 
rational instinct. However, it should be clear that the property “ … being rational” is extremely vague in its 
reality. The rational instinct, although vague, does not mean for Peirce emptiness of being or absolute 
indeterminacy, but refers on the contrary to a final cause already realized in the human being, although in a way 
which requires further development and specification. As such, the vague final cause overshadowed by the 
“rational instinct” can be considered as that final cause which both provides the “general,” stable character” of 
all human activity, although its original objective vagueness undergoes a process of transformation (at different 
levels, both in the history of human stock and in the personal history of every human individual in her lifetime). 
The continuity in the evolution of the human being, understood as a general substance or type, is the stable 
teleology of each individual human being to model her or his vague sense of rationality onto the 3rdness of the 
world and to contribute to its evolution in this way. Again, the concept of evolution must be understood at 
different levels: 1. there is the evolution of the human being, who remains however the same general substance 
or type through this evolution insofar as the continuity coincides with different stages of determination of the 
same vague final cause; 2. there is cosmological evolution (without considering the contribution of human 
beings), according to which substances come into light and perish; 3. there is a cosmological evolution, which 
takes place mainly through the cooperation of human beings. The evolutive “destiny” of the human teleology is 
therefore to determine the vagueness of their rational vocation into the knowledge of the world and in the 
intelligence of a creative agency, mainly moral and artistic. Therefore, the important point to stress at the end of 
this subsection is only that the development of the vague teleology is not at odds with the permanency of this 
same teleology in its vagueness.75 This permanency is manifested not in the permanency of a stable, specific habit 
                                                            
73 See Chapter 3. 
74 See on this Ayim 1974 and Maddalena 2003. 
75 I agree here with Short (1994: 406). 
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of behavior but in the continuity of the vocation of the human being to an intelligent growth. 
A last point I want to make here is the connection between the action of the final cause, the destination 
implicit in the teleology of all things and the type of evolutive process that is considered by Peirce pivotal. As we 
have seen, the final cause performs a function different from the efficient cause, even though the two 
metaphysical principles always work in connection. While the efficient cause provide the actual “material” on 
through which the final cause can exercise its organizing and productive agency76, the final cause constitutes the 
“ideal” general tendency in the light of which the matter is organized and put to work in one direction or the 
other. “Efficient causation is that kind of causation whereby the parts compose the whole; final causation is that 
kind of causation whereby the whole calls out its part. Final causation without efficient causation is helpless, by 
far; it is mere chaos; and chaos is not even so much as chaos, without final causation: it is blank nothing” (EP2: 
124, 1902). A further clarification of the action of the final cause, as distinct from the efficient, is the distinction 
between “force” and “power” (CP 5.520). While an actual reality exercises in its actuality a force all around itself, 
so that its mere spatio-temporal presence produces an efficient causal agency on the environment, the same thing 
as characterized by a general teleology produces changes in itself and in its environment determined by the 
attractive power of that final end and its internal vocation to development.77 Sometimes Peirce refers to this 
attractive dynamics as a phenomenon of “divination” in which early stages in the development of mind undergo 
a sympathetic fascination for what is still to come. “By the immediate attraction for the idea itself, whose nature 
is divined before the mind possesses it, by the power of sympathy, that is, by virtue of the continuity of mind” 
(CP 6.307). In a cosmological perspective, Peirce refers to this developmental dynamic as the Agapastic type of 
evolution (or “Evolutinary Love”) as contextual but not reducible to the Tychastic and Anancastic types of 
evolution (EP1: 352-371). In a narrower anthropological sense, this developmental dynamic states simply that the 
process of determination of the vague final cause is neither only a random process, determined by chaotic 
variations (corresponding to Tychism), nor only an efficient process fully determined by causal antecedent 
(physical, social and historical, corresponding to Ananchism), but is a process led by an attractive power that the 
the “idea” exercises on the individual agent. The “genesis” of a reality, says Peirce, is in its most important aspect 
“production from ideas” (EP2: 127, 1902) instead of determination from antecedent efficient causes. Peirce 
pictures this type of evolutions as the action of “love, [which] recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, 
gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. That is the sort of evolution which every careful student of my 
essay “The Law of Mind” must see that synechism calls for” (CP 6.289). 
 
 
 
3.3. Developmental Teleology as Determination of the “Objective Vagueness” of the Human 
Individual 
 
However, how does Peirce clarify the thesis that the development of the final cause is determined in virtue of 
a process of loving attraction? In this section, I claim for one main point, namely, that the process of 
development of the final cause has the structure of a semiotic process real determination of the objective 
vagueness of the final cause. Two passages we have already quoted are extremely instructive on this point. In one 
                                                            
76 In Peirce's account, the Aristotelian distinction between the efficient and the material cause is reduced to the matter of the efficient 
cause that is “organized” by the final cause. In a certain sense, the brain-cells, the arm and the hands on the computer are one 
composite efficient cause that actualizes my “ideas” in the form of a written dissertation. See e.g. EP2: 121, 1902. On this, see Holmes 
(1963: 370-371) and Skagestad 1999. 
77 It is worth quoting an illuminating commentary to this point contained in Colapietro (1985: 501-502): “Thus, in the course of one's 
life, one's mind is molded not only by the brute force of experience, but also by the gentle musing of mind. As Peirce suggests, a 
distinction can be drawn between being forceful and being powerful (CP 5.520). It is appropriate to speak of ideals being powerful, but 
not of them being forceful. Their mode of influence (which Peirce calls “logos-influence”) is not brute compulsion, but creative love. 
To speak of creative love in this way means that there are influences truly operative in the world which possess these characteristics: 
These influences are gentle rather than brutal, i.e., they call forth rather than push against; these influences qua loving are respectful of 
the natures of the things which they mold. The action of the sun upon a flower would be an example of such an influence. … What 
this means, in part, is that there are real influences in the world other than the actual force or brute compulsion. These influences are, 
in effect (thought not in intent), loving: they call forth the most complete realization of that which they influence. Their action is far 
more like a sign giving rise to an interpretant than a projectile colliding with an object. True maturity requires us to become like 
children again and to see nature as a cosmos, a real in which Reason is immanent (CP 1.349).” 
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of them, Peirce states that the structure of the function of the human person is “to work out his own nature and 
impulses, to aid others, and to contribute to the fulfillment of the destiny of a person’s generation” (MS299: 
00021). In a different text, he adds: “What is man’s proper function if it not be to embody general ideas in art-
creations, utilities, and above all theoretical recognition?” (CP 6.466). The latter statement is repeated not only in 
relation to human beings, but as a general statement about developmental teleology, when Peirce remarks that 
“evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a definite end. …” (EP2: 117, 1902). The first 
quotation points out the concrete aspect of human beings’ semeiotic agency, in the sense that “embodiment” 
refers to all the different concrete interpretants which every single individual produces in her life. Development 
of the final cause means here production of different instantiations (actual may-bes, Secondnesses) of the same 
final cause (would-be, Thirdness) in different contexts on the basis of the possibilities of instantiations allowed 
by the final cause (may-bes, Firstnesses). The second and third quotations, in their reference to the “working 
out” of the final cause, seem to imply more than the simple embodiment of the end. In fact, “working out” 
entails movement, transformation, creativity, and determination.78 It is precisely this movement of 
transformation that has in Peirce's terms the nature of a semeiotic determination of the objective vagueness of 
the final cause. In CP 5.536, in the context of the discussion of our possibility of knowing God, Peirce states that 
our knowledge can only be “vague,” so that we can approach theism only “vaguely like a man.79” This section 
focuses on human beings’ vagueness in relation to the destined evolution of their teleology.  
Talking of “objective vagueness” requires an adequate understanding of this notion in relation to different 
aspects of the issue of vagueness developed by Peirce. I will limit here to consider vagueness in relation to signs, 
in order to make clear what is the nature of the semeiotic determination of vagueness we see in developmental 
teleology. First of all, Peirce distinguishes two types of vagueness, one subjective and one objective. A sign is 
subjectively vague when its interpretability is already sufficiently determined but the interpreter’s ignorance about 
the sign hinders an adequate comprehension of it. On the contrary, a sign is objectively vague when its 
indeterminacy does not depend upon the shortcomings of the interpreter. Peirce also remarks that his extreme 
Scholastic realism entails not only a metaphysical commitment to “real generals” and “real possibilities,” but also 
to “real vagues” (EP2: 354, 1905; see also 355-356). Peirce writes: 
 
A sign is objectively vague, in so far as, leaving its interpretation more or less indeterminate, it 
reserves for some other possible sign or experience the function of completing the determination. 
“This month,” says the almanac-oracle, “a great event is to happen.” “What event?” “Oh, we shall see. 
The almanac doesn't tell that.” (CP 5.505; 5.447)   
 
In the case of the objectivity of vagueness of a sign, the indeterminacy is given by the fact that the sign 
requires further contextual knowledge which is not still available and the ignorance of which is not in the 
interpreter's responsibility.80 A second point that is important here is to distinguish the indeterminacy of 
vagueness from another form of indeterminacy, namely generality. One of Peirce's strategies to mark the 
distinction between vagueness and generality is strictly formal and relies on the observation that while the 
principle of excluded middle does not apply to a general reality, it is the principle of contradiction that does not 
apply to vagueness (CP 5.448; see 5.505).81 However, a more interesting analysis for our topic is a broader 
semeiotic approach to the distinction. According to Peirce, a sign is objectively general, and therefore 
indeterminate, when it leaves to the interpreter the interpretative function of determining it without the need of 
further signs and knowledge. If I say “Man is a rational being,” the interpretation and determination of the 
symbol “man” only requires that the interpreter picks the instance of “man” he wants, without the need to wait 
for collateral clarifications about what is the man to which the sentence is referring. On the other hand, a sign is 
objectively vague when further signs and contextual knowledge are needed in order to determine the correct 
interpretation of the sign, such as in the previous example of the great event foreseen by the oracle. It is true that 
                                                            
78 Hausman 1975 develops this point talking of the “radical creativity” or “radical growth” of reality. He also talks of “teleological 
continuity” as the fundamental tie of the different phases of evolution. 
79 For a discussion of Peirce's theism and theory of vagueness in the light of the expression “vaguely like a man,” see Potter 1996b. 
80 This point would require an analysis of Peirce's semeiotic in relation to the problem of reference, “entelechy,” and “Truth” 
(beautifully exemplified e.g. in EP: 303-304, 1904), which is however impossible here. For an interpretation of Peirce's mature 
semeiotic as dependent upon a conception of final causation, see e.g., Short (1994: 63). 
81 See Lane 1997. 
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every sign remains to some extent vague, so that its interpretability is never exhausted by present interpretations 
and signs but can always developed further (CP 2.357). This does not mean that the same reality, from a 
metaphysical viewpoint, cannot be both general and vague.82 
The process of development of the final cause of human beings is therefore the transformation of the signs 
relative to each individual’s purposes, ideals, desires, aspirations, etc. The signs here at stake should include the 
various dimensions of the human being's inner and outer life, propositions about moral goodness and aesthetic 
worth, events happened and planned, desires and emotions, feelings and hopes. I will deal with this topic in an 
ampler way in Chapter 2, so that it is not necessary to pull out the details of this topic here. However, what is 
important to stress here is a threefold thesis: 
 
(i) Human beings's objectively vague final cause manifests itself in their life in the form of objectively vague 
symbols – in particular, “purposes” – and therefore has this vagueness as its metaphysical status.83 
(ii) Thesis (i) fits nicely with Peirce's understanding of semeiosis as a teleological process (see e.g. EP2: 315-
317, 1904).84   
(iii) The semeiotic determination of the objective vagueness of the final cause-signs coincides with a 
metaphysical development of the final cause itself. In other words, there is no dualism between the development 
of life of the mind and the mind itself.85  
 
The process of determination of the objective vagueness of the final cause must be understood both from the 
viewpoint of humankind and from the viewpoint of each human individual. In the former case, the product of 
the process of determination is the set of (still vague) “instinctive beliefs” which according to Peirce 
characterizes all human beings with some kind of universality.86 In the latter case, the product of the process of 
determination is both the idiosyncratic development of the instinctive beliefs in each human being and the 
“Ideal” of life that each human being acknowledges as his or her unique normative responsibility.87 When Peirce 
defines real as “that which, sooner or later, information and reasoning would finally result in, and which is 
therefore independent of the vagaries of me and you” (EP1: 52 and W2: 239, 1868), he is not only referring to 
what is already existent and we do not know only for epistemic irresponsibility and human limits. He is also 
referring to the fact that the process of semeiosis will determine at some point some vague aspects of reality that 
cannot be determined at present.  
I conclude this subsection by simply illustrating Peirce's connection between metaphysical final causality,  
objective vagueness and practical purposes. In other words, for Peirce the development of the human teleology 
is brought about as a determination of the objective vagueness of the final cause through a constant semeiotic 
endeavor. In a 1903 text, Peirce spells out the dynamics of evolution implied in the idea of 3rdness: 
 
                                                            
82 “The qualities, in so far as they are general, are somewhat vague and potential” (CP 1.419). 
83 The nominalism generally opposed in Peirce’s early theory of cognition takes on an “incognizable reality” behind appearances (CP 
5.312), and the anti-nominalistic strategy undertaken asserts that “the absolutely incognizable does not exist, so that the phenomenal 
manifestation of a substance is the substance” (CP 5.313). See Colapietro (1985: 493), according to whom Peirce's doctrine of the 
“mind-as-semiosis” implies that a “substance is nothing other than the total range of its phenomenal manifestations. That is, there is 
no, in principle, unknowable entity underlying the totality of the appearances.” 
84 This is a shared conviction in Peirce scholarship, as displayed again by again Short and Lizska. See also: “the truth of the formula, that 
is, the law, is, in its strictest sense, the defining cause of the real individual facts. … Every sufficiently complete symbol is a final cause 
of, and “influences,” real events, in precisely the same sense in which my desire to have the window open, that is, the symbol in my 
mind of the agreeability of it, influences the physical facts of my rising from my chair, going to the window, and opening it” (EP2: 
315-317, 1904). See in particular Kruse 1986, who shows how the process of semeiosis is teleological and takes place through 
abductive phases that display a constant indexical element to the “object.”  
85 Some scholars have more or less explicitly related the topic of metaphysical teleology and semeiosis to the problem of the evolution 
of human mind. This is the fundamental tenet of Colapietro 1885, which constitutes the background of all his detailed analyses. See 
also Goudge 1964; Hausman 1974; Hausman (1993: 57-93; 140-193); Tiercelin-Engel 1992; Ventimiglia 2008; Wells 1964. Short 
(1994: 406) stresses the role of chance in the evolutionary, teleological process: “chance thus leads to new ends, but only when the 
new is a way of fulfilling a more general and already operative end.” In addition, Potter (1997: 115-130) links together the 
metaphysical teleology of the human being and the practical life. However, none of these scholars point out what I believe is the crux 
of the problem, i.e. that the objective vagueness of the final cause evolves through determination in virtue of a semeiotic process 
performed by human beings. Only Oliver (1964: 297) seems to hint explicitly at this point. 
86 See Chapter 3. 
87 See Chapter 2. 
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… Thirdness consists in the formation of a habit. In any succession of events that have occurred 
there must be some kind of regularity. … But as soon as time adds another event to the series, a great 
part of those regularities will be broken, and soon indefinitely. If, however, there be a regularity that 
never will be and never would be broken, that has a mode of being consisting in this destiny or 
determination of the nature of things that the endless future shall conform to it, that is what we call a 
law. (EP2: 269, 1903)88 
 
Such a statement about the connection of evolution and lawfulness can be understood only in relation to 
objective vagueness. We have seen that Peirce believes that although we know what the final causes of human 
artifacts are (e.g., a lamp), when we come to natural classes “the final cause remains occult” (EP2: 117, 1902). 
However, this interpretation cannot be taken as definitive, insofar as it aims to highlights only a difficulty in 
natural classification (epistemic empirical problems of taxonomy) if compared to the classification of human 
beings' productions. This dynamics is also common to signs in general, since for instance the ground of a 
rhematic symbolic legisign89 (e.g., a common English word) is known more easily than, for instance, a dicentic 
indexical sinsign90 (e.g., an unknown biological process). If taken literally, this claim would turn Peirce’s position 
into a nominalistic approach to nature, substance and kinds, which is on the contrary Peirce's constant 
philosophical enemy. A few lines below, Peirce makes clear that we know our final cause in the shape of our 
“purposes,” although this imply neither that our present purpose ought to be our definitive final cause, nor that 
purpose is the only form in which final cause is operative in nature. “A purpose is … that form of final cause 
which is most familiar to our experience” (EP2: 120, 1902). Now, the purpose to which I refer here is, in its 
simplest form, a proposition about what the agent ought to do (a complex dicentic symbolic legisign instantiated 
in one or more signsigns, such as a mental image or a scribble on a notebook) and therefore the possibility of a 
general disposition of action (a habit, a metaphysical 3rdness) through a process of growth (development and 
growth, a phaneroscopic 3rdness). As a consequence, the purpose is a symbol (EP2: 184-185, 1903) and as such 
it is subjected to the laws of semeiosis. In asking how abstract symbols determine a concrete action (such as in 
the case in which my “idea” to open the window determines the actual operation of opening the window), Peirce 
observes: 
 
They certainly do not, in their character as symbols, directly react upon matter. Such action as they 
have is merely logical. It is not even psychological. It is merely that one symbol would justify another 
… (EP2: 184, 1903) 
 
As it is clear in this passage, the agency of the purpose and therefore of practical reasoning is not merely or 
primarily physical and not even psychological, but rather semeiotic. The final cause of human beings manifests in 
the form of “purposes” which attract upon review and ask for an adequate semeiotic interpretation by the 
interpreter. This thesis fits nicely with one of the passages in which Peirce mentions what the ideal of 
“reasonableness” is. In 1900, Peirce write: “experience of life has taught me that the only thing is really desirable 
without a reason for being so, is to render ideas and things reasonable. One cannot well demand a reason for 
reasonableness itself” (1900: 621). This implies that the development of concrete reasonableness most has most 
of the time the form of a determination of the objective vagueness of the purpose and produces the 
metaphysical development of the final cause of each and every man who is embarked in a process of self-
understanding and practical self-constitution. In this sense, the human being is “the total sum of his language,” a 
“symbol,” and “the ideas he will conceive” (EP2: 254). 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
88 Peirce connects this developmental dynamic to the way in which “substances will get to be permanent” (EP1: 279). Such a statement 
refers to the ongoing creation of the cosmos and therefore to the appearance and disappearance of specific substances. However, it 
can also be read in relation to Peirce's problem (and solution) about the possibility that a substance is already this or that type of 
substance and that at the same time it becomes itself more and more through a developmental process of acquisition of “destined” 
habits.    
89 See Liszka (1996: 51). 
90 See Lizska (1996: 51). 
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3.4. “Already but Not Yet.” Carnification and the Unique Mission of the Individual Human 
Individual 
 
I turn now to the notion of Carnification, which will give me the possibility to develop some conclusive 
reflections. As I have shown, Carnification is for Peirce the perfect realization of a “predicate” in a matter, where 
predicate here refers to the “function” or final cause specifying the matter as this or that type of substance.  
There is one interpretative problem in the ideal of perfect realization of the predicate. In fact, how should 
perfect realization of the final cause (Carnification) be understood? It seems there is a fluctuation in what Peirce 
says about this point. On one side, in R1116 he seems to claim that Carnification determines a substance in a 
definitive way, where “predicate” has to be understood both as a factual determination and as a general 
disposition. In this perspective, once achieved the condition of Carnification, the substance could not undergo 
any new change, including those changes that are mere haecceities91 (for instance, changes in spatial relations). 
However, this position seems to contradict later developments of Peirce's thought. The first interpretation of 
Carnification would mean the actualization of a “perfect” or “absolute individual,” the reality of which Peirce 
firmly denies not only from a logical (the impossibility of a “logical atom”) but also from a metaphysical 
standpoint. In a 1907 text, we read: 
 
Of the two loosely synonymous terms, “individual” and “singular,” the former translates 
Aristotle's τό άτοµον, the latter τό καθ έκαστον. “Individual” is usually and well defined as that which 
is absolutely determinate; the “singular” is that which is absolutely determinate as long as the time is 
so, or to generalize this definition, is variable only in two precisely opposite and converse ways of 
varying. Now it is quite impossible that any collateral observations, however they might be eked out 
by imagination or thought, should ever approach a positive idea of a singular, let alone an individual; 
… It is plainly impracticable, therefore, to restrict the meaning of the term “object of a sign” to the 
Object strictly so called. (EP2: 408-409, 1907) 
 
Peirce is making clear that in speaking about individual objects only “singulars” are metaphysically admissible 
(which corresponds in my reconstruction to an A-fact, a punctual spatio-temporal instantiation of a 3rdness), 
although its reality constitutes a limit case of thought. An absolute individual, in which every possible predicate is 
actualized, is instead metaphysically impossible. The absence of any indeterminacy in a substance would 
correspond in Peirce's view to something like a metaphysical death. If we recall that the final cause is a general 
law of realization that, as a general, can never be fully actualized, it follows that a perfect realization of a 
predicate that entails also the impossibility of any further haecceity properties would contradict the final cause as 
an inexhaustible matrix of instantiations. It now appears in a clearer light every claim in which Peirce equates the 
absence of the final cause to the pure “nothingness.” For instance “it would not be the utter nothingness which 
would befall matter (or spirit) if it were to be deprived of the governance of ideas … it would not have even a 
potential existence; since potentiality is an affair of ideas. It would just be Nothing” (EP2: 123, 1902; see also 
EP2: 124, 1902; EP2: 343, 1905; CP 1.414).92 A further argument against the possibility of an absolute individual 
comes from semeiotic considerations, and in particular from Peirce’s rejection of the descriptivist theory of 
rhematic indexical legisigns (R283: 145-146, c.1905; see also EP2: 408-409). In Peirce's view, if the descriptivist 
approach to indices were correct, it would imply that an index user is able to develop a perfect knowledge 
(logical atom) of an individual entity (absolute individual). This hypothesis is not only unlikely for the fact that it 
places an unreasonable epistemic demand on the index user for her activity of reference.93 It is also absurd 
because in the perspective of Peirce's extreme Scholastic realism and anti-nominalism, since a logical atom is 
impossible, it is also impossible that something like an absolute individual exists. If it existed, it could not be 
experienced nor known, in a way that there would be something “real” which is however not knowable, not even 
                                                            
91 For a discussion of Peirce's notion of haecceity, see DiLeo (1991: 92-99). 
92 This point is already made clear in 1864 with the terminology of the “Analysis of the Ego”: “The Incarnation reduced to a nullity is 
merely the Function of Function … it may be called Materiafication” (W1: 149). The function which does not have a matter to 
organize is like a possibility of agency with no means of instantiation which hopelessly turns on itself (“Function of Function”); at the 
same time, the “matter” deprived of a teleological and organizing function is dumb absence of regularity, absolute chaos and therefore 
a nullity. In this case, an “absolute individual,” i.e. an existent whose whole reality coincides with anti-generals or 2ndnesses, coincides 
with a nothingness. 
93 See Agler (2010: 226). 
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in the long run. Also for this reason, Peirce rejects the metaphysical reality of the absolute individual. 
In any case, the first interpretation of the notion of Carnification is not the only possible, and maybe not even 
the most insightful. In fact, Peirce remarks that the nature of the perfect realization of the predicate is the perfect 
realization of the final cause. I would interpret this perfect realization as the ultimate determination of the 
objective vagueness of the final cause, according to the reconstruction I have given in the previous subsections. 
Peirce repeats many times that a general disposition, being a general reality, is always metaphysically richer than 
any and all of its concrete instantiations. The consequence of this claim is that the ultimate realization in a 
substance of the final cause coincides with the realization of a set of destined habits and not of every possible 
properties, including haecceitaties. It is something of the nature of a complete reign of law, in which the world 
has become a “perfect, rational, and symmetrical system” (see CP 6.33, 1891). In other words, Carnification 
implies its perfect realization in relation to its general dispositions but not in relation to its haecceitaties. In the 
terms of Peirce's mature semeiotic, in this second interpretation Carnification would mean a set of true ultimate 
interpretants and not the end of the process of semeiosis (see e.g. CP5.491).94 It is important to stress that the 
perfect determination of the vagueness of one’s final cause (or the development of one’s true ultimate 
interpretants, which are the same thing seen from two different perspectives) is not an evolutive dynamics that is 
identical in every human individual. In one of the passages quoted at the beginning of this chapter, we read that 
the character of a man “consists in the ideas he will conceive … which only develops as the occasions actually 
arise” (EP2: 255, 1903). Similarly, in the passage on the contribution that the human being can give to the 
ongoing cosmic creation, Peirce refers to the role and mission that each and all human beings have as it is “up” 
to them (EP2: 255, 1993). We have also seen that every individual human being has a unique idiosyncrasy, which 
instead of being destined to perish is called to become true (see W1: 501; W2: 124). Although general, the 
ultimate interpretants developed by different human individuals are not fully overlapping. There is a gap that 
coincides for Peirce with the unique mission to which every human being is called. 
The human individual lives in each moment within a polar dynamic of Incarnation and Carnification, of 
partial realization of a final cause and a perfectly realized determination of her Ideal mission in the process of 
creation, as in Saint Paul’s “already but not yet.” In the light of Peirce's evolutionary creationism, the different 
instances of Incarnation stay for the different intermediate phases between the “Absolute First,” or “God the 
Creator,” and the “Absolute Second,” or “God completely revealed” (EP1: 251). Peirce names each and all these 
intermediate phases “Third,” as the mediating reality in creation between the Alpha of absolute potentiality and 
the Omega of the perfection of creation.95 This teleological and almost eschatological approach to the final cause 
gives an ultimate and architectonic unity to the human being, which coincides with the unique duty of each 
human life. Using the two notions of Incarnation and Carnification, we could say that the life of each human 
individual metaphysically coincides with a real but vague “Incarnation” of the Reason of the universe in 
teleological tension toward a specific Carnification. 
 
 
                                                            
94 I follow on this point Short 2007 instead of Lizska 1996. 
95 See the excellent book Raposa 1989. On this point, see in particular Raposa (1989: 63-92). 
 42  
Chapter 2 
Peirce's “Normative Sciences” and Moral Realism 
 
 
 
As Kelly Parker has written, Peirce’s logic, ethics, and aesthetics, “together … constitute a comprehensive 
theory of value” (Parker 2003: 28). A significant part of the history of value theories in XXth century can be 
summed up as the struggle to find a place to human morality within narrow epistemic frameworks and 
physicalist ontologies. In a famous passage, John L. Mackie points out that moral facts and values have a “queer” 
metaphysical status if compared to the physical objects and properties we are acquainted with in life and science 
(Mackie 1977: 38), showing in a clear way the problem of finding the real identity of human morality. In this 
second chapter, I concentrate on Peirce's understanding of normativity in human life, by showing how his 
understanding of the “Normative Sciences” open to a broad theory of moral values. I proceed as follows. In the 
first part (§§ 0. - 1.9.), I reconstruct Peirce's theory of “Normative Sciences” and try to solve some interpretative 
problems related to alleged contradictions in Peirce's tenets. In particular, I show that Peirce's Normative 
Sciences should be understood as a unitary theory of human virtues. The fact that Peirce's “values” should be 
interpreted as “virtues” already gives to Peirce's theory a perspective that is not typical of the mainstream 
contemporary debate on “moral objects.” In the second part (§§ 2. - 2.4.), I consider Peirce's conception of the 
“pragmatic maxim,” the kernel semantic principle of his thought, and I point out how it is intrinsically 
intertwined with normativity. In the third part (§§ 3. and 3.1.), I focus on Peirce metaethical stance in relation to 
contemporary moral realism. For this last task, I develop Peirce's views and propose a theory of moral 
knowledge that is prescriptive in nature and of moral facts as dependent upon the judgment of a rational 
community. As I will show, Peirce's position can be considered as a kind of moral realism much deeper and 
refined than contemporary proposals. 
 
 
 
0. Historical Sketch of Peirce's Classification of the “Normative Sciences” 
 
Peirce's three “Normative Sciences” (NS) are logic, ethics and aesthetics. Before tackling the analysis of the 
NS, it is necessary to mention the fact that, as Peirce scholarship has amply understood (see at least Potter 1966; 
Potter 1997; Kent 1976; Kent 1987; Liszka 2005; Liszka 2012; Davis 1958), the reflection on the NS has always 
been for Peirce a constant and crucial object of philosophical interest but at the same time a perennial cause of 
perplexity. Apart from logic, his writings on the subject are often notes or isolated passages instead of fully 
developed studies. James Liszka writes: “As in much of Peirce's work, in his writing on ethics, there are only 
sketches, occasional remarks, differing – sometimes conflicting – drafts of material, fragments, and alternative 
terminologies. Still, Peirce does provide a general outline of a suggestive and innovative systematic approach to 
the subject matter, even if he does not provide us with a substantial body of completed material” (Liszka 2012: 
46). Similarly, Beverly Kent points out that Peirce produced twenty different classification of the NS between 
1866 and 1902 (Kent 1976: 267), point out constant doubts and perplexities. Although Peirce came to a better 
system of classification only in 1910, it is possible to say that his NS took an almost definite form from 1903. 
Since he was a boy, Peirce was really interested in the NS. He tells us that as an undergraduate at Harvard (ca. 
1855) he thoroughly read Shiller's Aesthetische Briefe with his friend Horatio Paine (CP 2.197). At the beginning of 
the XXth, Peirce would have expressed regret that he had not taken seriously the study of aesthetics (CP 2.210; 
2.197; 5.129). Although interested in ethical systems (CP 2.198), Peirce considered ethics to be nothing more 
than an art or a practical science until the 80s of the XIXth. He began to see the importance of ethics as a 
theoretical endeavor around 1882 (CP 2.198). In 1883 he undertook the study of the “great moralists” (CP 5.111; 
5.129) and saw the fundamental link between ethics and logic (CP 5.111). Afterwards, Peirce became firmly 
convinced of the profound connection between ethics and logic (CP 2.198) and in 1899 he acknowledged ethics 
to be truly a NS (CP 5.129). In 1903 he made public his conclusions on ethics and logic. However, he was not 
persuaded that aesthetics was a genuine NS, but restricted himself to the mere hypothesis that aesthetics is a 
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normative science (CP 2.197; 5.533; 5.129; EP2: 189; 200). Since I am going to deal with the details of Peirce's 
understanding of logic beyond the fact that it is a normative science, I focus here on Peirce's intellectual 
background in ethics. Among the moral philosophers studied, he mentions Jouffroy, Whewell and Kant.1 As 
Liszka remarks (Liszka 2012: 44-45), Whewell greatly influenced Peirce with his notion of “conscience,” while 
Jouffroy probably influenced Peirce with his teleological and evolutionary approach to ethics. Both Whewell and 
Jouffroy drew abundantly from the Scottish philosophy of the commonsense. In a manuscript text (R683: 20-
21), Peirce also mentions Shaftesbury, Edward Herbert, Thomas Hobbes, Ralph Cudworth, and Richard 
Cumberland. 
But what is the position of Peirce's NS in the entire system of his science? In c. 1902, Peirce produces a 
mature classification of the sciences. According to this classification, there are two main branches, the theoretical 
and the practical. Interestingly, ethics is present in both (CP 1.281, c. 1902; see also 5.125, 1903). Theoretical 
sciences are divided into sciences of discovery and sciences of review, the latter concerned with the “integration 
and dissemination of the sciences of discovery” (CP 1.181, 1903). The sciences of discovery include 
mathematics, philosophy, and the empirical sciences (under the main division of physics and psychics) (CP 1.183, 
1903). In turn, philosophy is subdivided in phenomenology (the study and classification of things as they appear, 
phenomena), normative sciences (the study of things as they ought to be), and metaphysics (the study of what is 
“real”). Let us focus on the NS, since this is the object of our present study. The NS include logic or semeiotic 
(the study of how we ought to proceed in thought and inquiry), ethics (the study of how should conduct 
ourselves in general), and aesthetics (the study of what ends we ought to pursue, or the study of the Summum 
Bonum, CP 1.186, 1903). “Ethics” as a theoretical science is different from ethics understood as a practical 
science (e.g. CP 5.125, 1903; EP2: 258; 458; 1.239; 1.243). This is not because the theoretical science “ethics” 
does not address the problem of normativity in human agency, as some interpreters seem to claim,2 but on the 
contrary because it is only supposed to discover what are the normative ends of human agency. The “practicality” 
of ethics, when ethics is taken not as a theoretical science but as a practical science, results from the fact that the 
practical science “ethics” has as its ends that of producing certain skills or virtue in the agent, something that is 
out of the business of theoretical ethics.3 In what follows, I only deal with ethics (but also with logic and 
aesthetics, insofar as they are relevant for an adequate understanding of Peirce’s concept of normativity) in the 
sense of a normative science. 
 
 
 
1. What Is the End of the Normative Sciences? 
 
At least starting from 1903, Peirce maintains that logic, ethics, and esthetics are “theoretical sciences” and 
“positive sciences” (EP 2: 144, 1903). According to Peirce, the first feature of a positive theoretical science is that 
it aims to account for real facts, by relying on the observation of experience. In the case of philosophy (which 
include the NS), the experience studied is the common, daily life experience of every man. It does not require 
any special type of observation, but only attentiveness and acuteness of sight to what occurs in every 
phenomenon or phaneron. As a consequence, it is different from mathematics, whose goal is to elaborate purely 
hypothetical premises and to deduce from them the correct conclusions.4 At the same time, however, the NS 
have a specific subject-matter of inquiry. They study particular kinds of “objects,” namely, the various dimensions 
of human self-controlled conduct, which Peirce identifies with three different departments, i.e. (a) the deliberate 
practice of thinking (reasoning), (b) the deliberate agency in general, and (c) the deliberate cultivation of habits of 
                                                            
1  For a compared study of Kant’s “power of judgment” on Peirce’s NS, see Atkins 2008. 
2 This is the wrong interpretation of Peirce's ethics when it is taken to be a “pre-normative” science. Davis 1958 and Feibleman 1943 
make this mistake. 
3 Short (2012: 331) writes: “Peirce distinguished “practical sciences” from “theoretical sciences” (EP2: 258, 458, 1.239) but seems to 
have viewed the practical sciences as arts or skills (CP 1.243), from which normative science is expressly distinguished (EP2: 197-198, 
1.243). That was in 1902-1903; earlier, in 1898, he was less certain about how to classify ethics (EP2: 36) and later, in 1904, he 
entertained the idea that ethics as a “doctrine of rights and duties” is not a science (CP 1.577). If there is a practical science of ethics, it 
is not much developed by Peirce, perhaps because he doubted its reliability versus custom and sentiment (EP2: Ch.4, CP 1.666-9); the 
influence of philosophy on our moral practices should be “only with secular slowness and the most conservative caution” (EP2: 29).” 
4 See e.g. CP 1.443. Cf. also De Wall 2005. 
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feeling. Hence, we have the two following definitions of the NS: 
 
Def. (1): the NS are positive theoretical sciences and study facts of common human experience.  
 
by a positive science I mean an inquiry which seeks for a positive knowledge, that is, for such 
knowledge as may conveniently be expressed in a categorical proposition” (EP 2: 144); [NS are different 
from mathematics because] “in the first place, the hypotheses from which the deductions of 
normative sciences proceed are intended to conform to positive truth of fact and those deductions 
derive their interest that circumstance almost exclusively; while the hypotheses of pure mathematics 
are purely ideal in intention, and their interest is purely intellectual. But in the second place, the 
procedure of the normative sciences is not purely deductive, as that of mathematics, nor even 
principally so. Their peculiar analyses of familiar phenomena, analyses which ought to be guided by 
the facts of phenomenology in a manner in which mathematics is not at all guided, separate normative 
science from mathematics quite radically. (EP 2: 198) 
 
Def. (2): the subject of the NS is the self-controlled conduct of human beings, identified with deliberate 
thinking, deliberate action and affective dispositions.5 
 
… esthetics considers those things whose ends are to embody qualities of feeling, ethics those 
things whose ends lie in action, and logic those things whose end is to represent something. (EP 2: 
200, CP 5.129; see also EP 2: 378) 
 
As we read in the last passage, “qualities of feeling,” “action,” and the reasoning that aims to “represent” 
reality are the three objects on which esthetics, ethics, and logic respectively focus. Let us move now to a closer 
analysis of the point of view from which these objects are studied.   
 
 
 
1.1. The General Formal Object of the NS 
 
It is a matter of fact that human beings have developed many different kinds of approaches and disciplines to 
study the self-controlled human conduct. The universe of human agency can be studied from various points of 
view: human thinking, for example, is studied from the viewpoint of experimental psychology, while the creative 
variety of human practices and their manifold systems of values are examined in anthropology. In turn, the 
various facets of human affective life constitute in turn the subject matter of other specialized sciences, such as 
psychology, anatomy, and physiology (EP2: 311; 385-386; EP2: 201; CP 1.579). As a logician, Peirce argued over 
and over again against the psychological tendencies of his time in the study of inferential processes, as it is shown 
exemplarily in 1903 “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?”, where Peirce rejects Sigwart's understanding of 
reasoning and validity as based on the sentiment of logicality (see Poggiani 2012).   
The normative approach represents a further viewpoint on human agency. Peirce's NS account for the facts 
of human behavior under a precise respectus, or in the light of a “peculiar appreciation” (EP 2: 199).  Their formal 
object is the distinction of what is valuable in human thinking, deliberate action and feeling from what is not. This means that 
the NS, as theoretical sciences, put forward statements about the goodness and badness of standard examples of 
behavior, and, in this sense, try to establish which are the facts in human experience which ought-to be considered 
good or bad. A “norm”, Peirce explains, is not an abstract precept, but is an “exemplar”, an exemplary pattern of 
conduct (CP 1.586). Then, “these sciences have, as their only principle end, the general distinction of the good 
and bad” (EP 2: 272). It is important to decisively stress that the account of facts that the NS engage implies an 
intrinsic evaluative dimension of the object they inquire into, i.e., human behavior. Thus, the task of NS is not to 
                                                            
5  On the origin and historical development of the concept of self-control in Peirce, see Petry1992. The article is highly instructive not 
only because it reconstructs the historical influences on Peirce (Henry James, Swedenborg, Friedrich Schiller), but also because it hints 
at the distinction in the phenomenon of self-control of two components, respectively accountable as 2ndness (see Chapter 1) and 
3rdness. As 3rdness, self-control is a type of knowledge, and coincides with rational deliberation. As it will appear clearly, the present 
chapter and Chapter 3 are about self-control as knowledge. 
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provide a precise catalogue of different logical6, moral, or aesthetical traditions, but to state which instances of 
human practices have a normative universal value, namely, what is the model according to which every human 
being ought to appraise his own agency and to shape his personal identity. The “normative facts” displayed by the 
NS are, metaphorically speaking, the “ideal”, normative characters of a fully rational community (see on this 
Bernstein 1981 and Smith 1965). From what we have just said, it is possible to draw the following third 
definition of the NS:  
 
Def. (3): the general formal object of the NS is the distinction of good and bad in thinking, deliberate action, 
and affective dispositions. The “good” is what ought to be in thinking, deliberate action, and affective 
dispositions. 
 
… it is generally said that the three normative sciences are logic, ethics, and esthetics, being the 
three doctrines that distinguish good and bad; Logic in regard to representations of truth, Ethics in 
regard to efforts of will, and Esthetics in objects considered simply in their presentation. (EP 2: 143) 
 
We may say roughly that a normative science is the research into the theory of the distinction 
between what is good and what is bad; in the realm of cognition, in the realm of action, and in the 
realm of feeling, this theory being founded upon certain matters of fact that are open to the daily and 
hourly observation of every man and woman. (EP 2: 147) 
 
Logic and the other normative sciences, although they ask, not what is but what ought to be, 
nevertheless are positive sciences since it is by asserting positive, categorical truth that they are able to 
show that what they call good reality is so; and that right reason, right effort, and being of which they 
treat derive that character from positive categorical fact. (EP 2: 144) 
 
In addition, Peirce makes clear that the NS, being theoretical positive sciences, have a different status from 
the “practical sciences.” Peirce observes that “there is no doubt that they are closely related to three 
corresponding arts, or practical sciences. But that which renders the word normative needful (and not purely 
ornamental) is precisely the rather singular fact that, though these sciences do study what ought to be, i.e., ideals, 
they are the very most purely theoretical of purely theoretical sciences” (CP 1.281; see also 1.243; EP1: 101). On 
the contrary, the “practical sciences” represent a type of investigation pursued “not because of the august nature 
of the truth sought, but for the sake of some anticipated utility of it to some man or men” (EP2: 372). This 
distinction has troubled Peirce scholars for a long time (e.g. Hooway 1997; Anderson 1997; Sheriff 1994). It also 
looks prima facie in opposition to the Aristotelian tradition, according to which sciences are classified in 
theoretical, practical, and poietical. However, the difference between the NS as theoretical sciences and the 
practical sciences can be simply put in the following way: while the aim of a the NS is to discover what the 
normative ideals of human life are, the aim of the practical sciences is to develop different types of pedagogical 
instructions that lead human agents to embody those ideals in their concrete conduct. While “Normative Science 
is not a skill, nor is it an investigation conducted with a view to the production of skill” (EP 2: 197), practical 
science is explicitly focused on these skills. Certainly, as Peirce explains, there are practical sciences of reasoning 
and inquiry, conduct of life, and practical sciences devoted to the education of feelings, that correspond to the 
NS and can receive important clarifications from them. However, their status, their goal and – we might say – 
their “spirit” are deeply different (EP 2: 197-198).7 As we will see, Peirce's claims about the uselessness of 
philosophical ethics for life should be interpreted also in this light (CP 1.666-679): since the problem of life is 
not only to know what the good is, but to become good, philosophical ethics turn out to be a poor instrument to the 
development of the human personality. I think that Peirce's distinction is closer to David Hume's on this point 
                                                            
6 Notice that Peirce questioned Dewey’s approach to logic because he saw in Dewey’s method a clear misconception of the normative 
nature of logic. In his review of Dewey’s Studies in Logical Theory (CP 8.188-190), Peirce makes clear that Dewey’s conception of logic 
as a “natural history of thought” is not adequate to delve into the normative nature of logic. For a discussion of this point, see 
Colapietro 2002 and Kasser 1999. 
7 Peirce acknowledges that also “logic” has a practical side, EP1: 212. He also explicitly writes that “… the very focus and centre of 
common education should be placed in the art of thinking, ad omnium methodorum principia viam habens. I do not know why a man should 
not devote himself to the training of his reasoning powers with as much assiduity as to corporal athletics” (RLT: 181). 
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rather than to Aristotle’s. In his essay “Of the Different Species of Philosophy” (Hume 2000[1758]: 9), Hume 
draws a distinction between theoretical philosophy and practical philosophy. While the theoretical philosopher is 
like an “anatomist” who aims to discover the fundamental elements of the moral phenomenon, the practical 
philosopher is more like a “painter,” whose undertake is to depict moral virtues in order to raise in the human 
heart the desire of becoming virtuous. When Peirce talks about the theoretical nature of his NS he is making the 
same point. The task of logic, ethics, and aesthetics, is to discover moral facts instead of leading human beings to 
produce the virtue in themselves.8  
 
 
 
1.2. The Specific Formal Objects of Each NS 
 
Finally, the general formal object of the NS divides into the three specific formal objects of logic, ethics and 
aesthetics. A fourth definition of the NS reads as follows: 
 
Def. (4): the formal object of logic is the logical good, or the conditions for obtaining a true representation of 
reality; the formal object of ethics is the ethical good, or the conditions for acting in a right way; the formal 
object of aesthetics is the aesthetical good, or the conditions for having a good “taste” in human affairs.    
 
Normative Science, which investigates the universal and necessary laws of the relation of 
Phenomena to Ends, that is, perhaps, to Truth, Right, and Beauty. (EP 2: 197) 
 
The three NS, in their “emphatic dualism”, “may be regarded as being the sciences of the 
conditions of truth and falsity, of wise and foolish conduct, of attractive and repulsive ideas. (EP 2: 
378) 
 
According to the perspective developed in the NS, a value or normative fact has to meet two different 
requirements. First, a normative fact is a certain type of human conduct, broadly conceived (including thinking, 
acting and self-cultivated habits of feeling). Second, a normative fact is not only a certain type of human conduct, 
but must be a valuable example of self-controlled conduct, susceptible of being oriented toward different 
purposes and ends. The normative facts studies by the NS are therefore the exemplary outcomes of human self-controlled 
agency. In other words, in his NS, Peirce's focus is on what could be called moral value, since the category of 
“morality” simply stands for what in human life is susceptible of self-control. Peirce's normative facts do not 
belong to some “queer” realm of objects, but coincide on the contrary with our daily life, common behavior, 
considered in the light of what is truly valuable. In this sense, Dewey’s position on the metaphysical status of 
“moral values” represents a legitimate (and more articulated) continuation of Peirce’s thoughts (see Chapter 5). 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Peirce's understanding of the human being is characterized by a 
fundamental teleology, centered in his conception of “rational instinct.” I believe therefore that Peirce's 
conception of normative facts can be equated to a traditional virtue approach to human practices, according to 
which “virtue” stays for the Aristotelian adequate flourishing of human life, or the excellent actualization of the 
very ends and needs of human practices.9 If this interpretation of Peirce's stance is correct, then, we could 
interpret the normative facts described by logic, ethics, and aesthetics, as epistemic virtues, ethical virtues and 
esthetical virtues. Hence, the list of NS values identified by Peirce constitutes a sketch of the spectrum of human 
virtues. Before moving to consider some textual evidence for this interpretation, let us deal with the different 
evaluative categories present in Peirce's NS and with their mutual relation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
8 However, Peirce is not committed to a Humean understanding of ethics. See next chapter. 
9 Liszka (2012: 65) and Aydin (2009: 232) seem to agree with this interpretation. 
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1.3. The Evaluative Categories of the NS  
 
We have hinted at the fact that the structure of the NS is, at the same time, an evaluative account and a 
classification of normative facts. Furthermore, since the classification is a hierarchy of sciences that lays out the 
foundations for the validity of NS values, the more we move towards the top science, i.e. aesthetics, the more we 
find a conclusive and full vindication of the NS values. Peirce says that the NS are a “distinctly marked whole” 
(EP 2: 378). This means not only that all the different types of values are strictly linked in their nature, being the 
values of thinking (logic) a determination of the general values of deliberate agency (ethics), and the values of 
deliberate agency a regional configuration of what is good in itself (aesthetics; EP 2: 188-189; 201; 378; CP 5.108; 
5.551). According to Kent's reconstruction, there is a “principle-dependence” that governs for Peirce the mutual 
relations among the sciences. “According to that principle, preceding sciences supply principles to those which 
follow while succeeding sciences reciprocate by providing data or problems to those above” (Kent 1987: 263). 
The principle also implies that the three sciences themselves cannot be taken one by one in isolation. Thus, their 
descriptive function, as well as their justificatory power, comes from their combined effort. In this sense, it 
seems that what is at stake is not simply to state that aesthetics defines a particular department of NS values, i.e. 
the aesthetic values, different from the epistemic values and the ethical values. Maybe, this would be the case of a 
theory of beauty in nature and art, which however is not developed by Peirce (cf. CP 5.111; 5.112; 5.113). 
Instead, the point is that the aesthetic dimension of value provides the ultimate justification to the entire system 
of NS values. 
Since every NS, as Peirce says, has its own “peculiar appreciation” of human conduct (EP2: 199), it is 
important to analyze the specific evaluative category of each NS and their mutual relation. Starting from logic, we 
see that 
 
(i) X is good from the logical point of view if it enables the inquirer develop true beliefs about reality.  
 
As a consequence, the evaluative category of logic is then “veracity” (EP2: 203). From a general point of 
view, X can be a statement, a principle of inference or a method of inquiry. Let us remember that in “What 
Makes a Reasoning Sound?” Peirce explains that “logic,” understood as the study and classification of all the 
sound arguments, can be called “critic,” and constitutes only a narrow department of the whole logical study of 
thinking (distinct from psychological studies), i.e. “semeiotic”. The other department of logic in its broad sense 
are “speculative grammar”, the theory of the different kinds of signs, and “methodeutic”, the study of the norms 
that we have to pursue in the different fields of inquiry (EP2: 256). Hence, logical goodness relies upon a means-
end justificatory structure: if a mean is suitable for the realization of an end, that mean is therefore good and is 
justified. In the case of logic, a method of inquiry or a logical principle is “good” and “veracious” insofar as they 
bring about true beliefs about reality. The obvious problem of this account of veracity is that the end on which 
veracity is fixed, i.e., seeking the truth,” seems to be assumed as good instead of being justified in its normativity. 
Let us leave this problem open for now and move to the evaluative category of ethics. 
With respect to ethics, Peirce holds that: 
 
(ii) X is good from the ethical point of view if it enables the agent to realize, at least approximately, one of the 
ends of human conduct that are supposed to be objectively good. 
 
Thus, the fundamental category in ethical assessments is “adequacy,” “conformity” (see EP2: 377), or 
“righteousness” (EP2: 200), of a practical means for the realization of an end. I inserted the adverb 
“approximately” because for Peirce a means does not have to be perfectly “conform” to an end in order to be 
ethically good. According to his notion of “longitude” in the realization of an end (EP2: 118-119), there are 
different grades and levels in which a mean can realize that end and there are therefore different levels of ethical 
goodness. Also in this case, X can be different things: it covers all the possible means and sub-ends of human 
conduct in every conceivable field of activity. As Peirce says, an action has different conditions of adequacy 
(EP2: 199) to an objectively good end. What is important to stress here is that also in the case of ethical 
goodness, the structure that identifies what is good and what justifies an action as good is a means-end structure. 
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It follows that the evaluative category of ethics is only a generalization of the evaluative category of logic. This 
point is also made by Robin (1964), and in recent comments by Short on the NS (2012). For both of them, the 
development of Peirce's understanding of the NS follows the path of a growth from the mere assessment of the 
acts of reasoning to the broader scenario of human agency as a whole. If the logical goodness is the conformity 
of a mean to the specific end of seeking the truth, the ethical goodness is the conformity of a mean to each and 
all ends that are assumed to be worth of being pursued. In this sense, Peirce writes that ethical goodness 
“relate[s] to the conformity of phenomena to ends which are not immanent within those phenomena” (EP2: 199). 
Peirce continues stressing that “the approval of a voluntary act is a moral approval. Ethics is the study of what 
ends of action we are deliberately prepared to adopt. That is right action that is in conformity to ends which we 
are prepared deliberately to adopt. That is all there can be in the notion of righteousness, as it seems to me. The 
righteous man is the man who controls his passions, and makes them conform to such ends as he is prepared 
deliberately to adopt as ultimate” (EP2: 200). We face in the case of ethical goodness the same problem we 
found in the case of logical goodness, that is, the vicious circle of the definition of the ethical good, a mean, on 
the basis of something else, an end, which is assumed to be good. Also in this case, let us leave this problem 
open and move to esthetics, to see if the answer to the problem can be found there. 
According to Peirce's treatment of aesthetics, 
 
(iii) X is good from the aesthetical point of view if it is a habit of feeling oriented to what is 
admirable/adorable in itself, so that the human being comes to feel what is admirable/adorable in itself. 
Moreover, since aesthetics studies not only the aesthetically good habits of feeling, but also the ultimate ideal of 
human conduct, or the Summum Bonum, it is true that A is good from the aesthetical point of view if it is an ideal 
of human conduct and if it coincides with the admirable/adorable in itself. 
 
Aesthetics, then, deals with habits of feeling evaluated under the category of nobility (cf. Parker 2003) or 
absolute “admirability.” The puzzling aspect of Peirce's treatment of aesthetics is that esthetics is taken to deal 
with both the normative habits of feeling and the Summum Bonum itself. Between the normative habits of feeling 
and the normative ultimate ideal there is an immediate and essential link. In fact, on the one hand, Peirce states 
that since “ethics asks to what end all effort shall be directed,” “that question obviously depends upon the 
question what it would be that, independently of the effort, we should like to experience”, that is the essential 
question of aesthetics (CP 2.199). On the other hand, Peirce admits that “the moralist … merely tells us that we 
have a power of self-control, that no narrow or selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory …; and for any more 
definite information, as I conceive the matter, he has to refer us to the esthetician whose business it is to say 
what is the state of things which is most admirable in itself regardless of any ulterior reason” (EP 2: 253). The 
first quotation shows that esthetics aims to fix the good habits of feeling, while the second quotations makes 
clear that its object is extended to the definition of the nature of the Summum Bonum. As we know from the 
previous chapter, Peirce found that the ultimate normative ideal of human life, its Summum Bonum, is “the 
development of concrete reasonableness” in the world. The important issue that arises in this context, therefore, 
is what is the link between esthetics as the science of the normative habits of feeling and esthetics as the science 
of the “development of concrete reasonableness” in the world. 
First of all, it is necessary to consider an obvious objection, of which Peirce was perfectly aware. The 
objection is the following: if the right ends of human effort (ethics), including the normative end “seeking for 
truth” of every process of inquiry (logic), get their definitive warranty from a habit of feeling (aesthetic), than all 
the endeavor of thought and of human effort rely on a feeling of pleasure whatsoever. In this case, the 
architectonic doctrine of the NS would be some type of hedonism, implying that the ultimate evaluative category 
of human value and virtue would only be the subjective pleasure for something, whatever the object of the pleasure 
might be (EP2: 189). However, Peirce explains that this objection rests on an unjustified assumption, namely on 
the idea that it is possible to give a full account of the feelings of pleasure and pain without considering the 
different objects by which they can be excited. This thesis, far from being only unjustified, is also wrong, since it 
is not possible to “recognize with confidence any quality of feeling common” to all pleasures or pains (EP2: 189-190). 
It is worth noting that according to Peirce we cannot limit the notion of “feeling” only to the pain and pleasure 
in human reactions to events. Criticizing Kant's reduction of feeling to only “one department of the mind” (CP 
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1.375; 7.540) and embracing the broader notion developed by Tetens (CP 7.540), Peirce takes indeed “feeling” to 
stand for every possible content of consciousness, stating that “what is meant by consciousness is really in itself nothing 
but feeling.”10 As Peirce explains, 
 
Among phanerons there are certain qualities of feeling, such as the color of magenta, the odor of 
attar, the sound of a railway whistle, the taste of quinine, the quality of the emotion upon contemplating a 
fine mathematical demonstration, the quality of feeling of love, etc. I do not mean the sense of actually 
experiencing these feelings, whether primarily or in any memory or imagination. That is something that 
involves these qualities as an element of it. But I mean the qualities themselves which, in themselves, are 
mere may-bes, not necessarily realized. (CP 1.304) 
 
At the same time, however, Peirce has in mind a particular modality of feeling when he says that the object of 
aesthetics are the “habits of feeling” that every human being ought to develop in her own life, namely the affective 
dispositions of “sympathy” or “antipathy” for certain objects, or the  “secondary feelings”, whose nature is very 
close to pleasure and pain, which are the appropriate affective reactions to some previous content of 
consciousness (EP 2: 379; CP 1.311). Thus, 
 
Esthetic good and evil are closely akin to pleasure and pain … . What, then, are pleasure and pain? 
… They are secondary feelings or generalizations of such feelings; that is, of feeling attaching 
themeselves to, and excited by, other feelings. A toothache is painful. It is not pain, but pain 
accompanies it; and if you choose to say that pain is an ingredient of it, that is not far wrong. However, 
the quality of the feeling of toothache is a simple, positive feeling distinct from pain; though pain 
accompanies it. To use the old consecrated terms, pleasure is the feeling that a feeling is 
“sympathetical,” pain that it is “antipathetical.” The feeling of pain is a symptom of a feeling which 
repels us; the feeling of pleasure is the symptom of an attractive feeling. (EP 2: 379) 
 
We can make sense of the richness of Peirce's notion of feeling – that includes, we might say, subjective and 
objective elements of consciousness, insofar as it is prior to any distinction of “subject” and “object” – by saying 
that the normative habits of feeling pointed out in aesthetics imply that the human being who embodies them – 
“the fully developed superman” (EP2: 379) – shall experience as admirable/adorable (subjective dimension of 
feeling) those things that really are admirable/adorable in themselves (epistemically objective dimension of 
feeling). Feeling pleasure for something, then, is not a purely physiological reaction, but is an “esthetic 
judgement” (EP2: 189), susceptible to education and transformation. Peirce often refers to the fundamental 
epistemic role of the “wise man” in establishing what is truly admirable and what is not.11 In Peirce's terms, 
 
… when beginning in 1883 I came to read the works of the great moralists, whose great fertility of 
thought I found in wonderful contrast to the sterility of the logicians, I was forced to recognize the 
dependence of Logic upon Ethics; and then took refuge in the idea that there was no science of esthetics, 
that because de gustibus non est disputandum, therefore, there is no esthetic truth and falsity or generally valid 
goodness and badness. But I did not remain of this opinion long. I soon came to see that this whole 
objection rests upon a fundamental misconception. To say that morality, in the last resort, comes to an 
esthetic judgement is not hedonism, –  but is, directly opposed to hedonism. (EP 2: 189) 
 
As a consequence, the apparent risk of hedonism is completely avoided. Aesthetics is the NS of the habits of 
feeling, whose normative instances mark the difference between a virtuous habit of feeling, framed on what is 
truly admirable, and a vicious habit of feeling, that is the disposition of experiencing as valuable something that is 
not. As I will show in the next chapter, Peirce holds a broad theory of “cognition,” in which he implies every 
mental phenomenon, including emotions and sentiments (see Barnow 1994). 
Peirce claims that “the question of the goodness of anything is whether that thing fulfills its end” (EP2: 235). 
However, how does Peirce come to state that the ultimate normative fact is human life is the development of 
                                                            
10 On Kant and Tetens on pleasure and pain see also EP1: 258. On consciousness as “feeling” (EP1: 290-291) see the related notions of 
“pure indescribable quale” (EP1: 282-283) and “quale-consciousness” (CP 6.223). I believe that not enough work has been done in an 
account of Peirce’s notions of feeling and consciousness studied with the tools of his semeiotic. I take it to be a promising field of 
inquiry for a different approach to what is called today “philosophy of mind.” 
11 See e.g. “esthetic good and evil are closely akin to pleasure and pain; they are what would be pleasure or pain to the fully developed 
superman” (EP2: 379). See also CP 2.156; 1.653. 
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concrete reasonableness? In particular, what is the link explicitly put forth by Peirce between the identification of 
the normative habits of feeling and the study of the Summum Bonum? In order to address this question, we have 
to take one more preliminary step and explain why according to Peirce epistemic and ethical virtues presuppose 
esthetic virtues. 
 
 
 
1.4. Normative Facts as Virtues 
 
As I have already mentioned, my interpretation is that according to Peirce the nature of the normative facts 
should be understood in the light of the virtue approach to human agency, i.e., as the excellent realization of the 
different dimensions of human life and practices (reasoning and inquiry, moral exigencies in activity and desire), 
which include ideal purposes and standards of feelings. The idea of human flourishing can be taken from a 
broader conception of the development of life, which concerns “every kind of system, form, or compound,” 
according to which 
 
there is an absolute limit to a weakening process. It ends in destruction; there is no limit to strength. 
… Systems or compounds which have bad habits are quickly destroyed, those which have no habits 
follow the same course; only those which have good habits tend to survive (EP 1: 223).  
 
Every living creature, then, faces the possibility of developing good or bad habits. In relation to the human 
being, the synthetic ideal of human life, the development of concrete reasonableness, divides into many different 
kinds of virtue, each correspondent to the adequate development of the cognitive, affective and, in general, 
practical dimension of the human being (e.g. CP 8.136). This position seems to be at least problematical insofar 
as Peirce clearly committed himself to a kind of evolutionist conception of reality, a process metaphysics in 
which Darwinian and Lamarckian tenets intertwine with a Christian conception of the real world as the product 
of an ongoing process of creation. The problem arises in a twofold way. First, from a general viewpoint, if our 
cognitive capacities are the result of an evolutive process, what justifies their alleged alethic capacity? Second, 
from a narrower viewpoint, in 1977 “The Fixation of Belief” Peirce maintains that the need for inquiry springs 
out of the “irritation of the doubt,” so that its task becomes the removal of the doubt through the fixation of a 
belief. How do these positions fit with the claim that human “normative facts” are essentially related to the 
development of “reasonable” habits, in their relation to what is true, good, and admirable? 
The first point shows a difficulty that also Peirce recognized. However, Peirce’s psychologism flavored 
statements in “The Fixation” should be interpreted in the light of the following developments of his thought. 
The overall development of his thought on this point can be summed up in the following way: (1) the need for 
agency compels us to the “fixation” of a determinate belief (see e.g. CP 5.400: “The whole function of thought is 
to produce habits of action … we come down to what is tangible and conceivably practical, as the root of every 
real distinction of thought”; “The irritation of the doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain 
belief,” EP1: 114). However, in 1903 Peirce laments the seeming psychologism of his early position: “My original 
article carried this back to a psychological principle. The conception of truth according to me was developed out 
of an original impulse to act consistently, to have a definite intention. But in the first place, this was not very 
clearly made out, and in the second place, I do not think it satisfactory to reduce such fundamental things to 
facts of psychology”, EP2: 140, 1903). (2) Although the need for determining a belief for practical purposes is 
almost an efficient causality on our epistemic practices, it is true that from this need, it grows first a suspect 
about a “truth,” then a desire about the truth, and then the establishment of the pursuit of truth as a valuable 
end. The “social impulse” turns out to be only the inchoative manifestation of the desire for truth. I agree on this 
with Short’s comment on the “aversion to arbitrariness” that emerges in “The Fixation”: “the desire for 
consensus is merely one manifestation of that aversion, which is why consensus achieved by coercion or by 
fashion will not be satisfactory, either” (Short 2000: 7).12 Peirce points out that growth is due to the teleological 
                                                            
12 Talisse (2007: 56-56) provides an insightful reading of “The Fixation” as the description of the competition among epistemic 
practices, but misses the point of the developmental emergence of one perspective from the other. The movement from (1) to (2) is 
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power of Reason operating in every semeiotic process, even only in an inchoative way. Peirce writes: “My paper 
of November 1877, setting out from the proposition that the agitation of a question ceases when satisfaction is 
attained with the settlement of belief, and then only, goes on to consider how the conception of truth gradually 
develops from that principle under the action of experience” (CP 5.564). Of course, at this level, the 
establishment of what is normative neither has the systematic character resulting from the NS, nor appeals to the 
pragmatic maxim as a deliberate tool of inquiry (since we are assuming that at this time the pragmatic maxim has 
not born yet). The use of a logical strategy later described as “pragmatic maxim” would be the outcome, in the 
mind of the inquirer, of the end of pursuing the truth. Naturally, at this level the normativity of the pursuit of 
truth would be established without analyzing such a concept at its third level of clarity. 
The second point is a broad one, and considering it at length would lead us astray. However, I think that 
Peirce's general argument on this issue can be sketched in the following way. In an above quoted passage, Peirce 
charges his early 1877 position as dangerously inclining to psychologism in relation to the topic of truth-pursuing 
(EP2: 140). However, in the same passage, he asks the fundamental question: “Why has evolution made man's 
mind to be so constructed? That is the question we must nowadays ask, and all attempts to ground the 
fundamentals of logic on psychology are seen to be essentially shallow” (EP2: 140). I believe that unpacking this 
statement corresponds to the articulation of an argument against the essential association of evolutionism and 
non-alethic cognitive powers of human beings. Peirce’s point is the following: although it is true that belief-fixing 
processes are also regulated by a tendency to avoid the irritation of doubt with a stable belief (this would be the 
“facts of psychology”), how is it that our mind has evolved to consider certain beliefs stable and other beliefs 
unstable? In a certain sense, the final goal of evolutionism (which includes for Peirce Lamarckian and Darwinian 
elements) is subsistence and survival of a species, not the fixation of true beliefs. Peirce's crucial question is 
whether the law of survival can be an ultimate law in accounting for the process of evolution. For Peirce, at least 
starting from 1883-1884 “Design and Chance,” an adequate scientific approach to natural laws and general 
tendencies in nature should be thoroughly evolutionary, so that assuming that a specific law is final or ultimate is 
a mistake. If the law of survival has evolved through time, at the bottom of its evolution there is an “intelligent” 
process in action. In this specific case, the intelligent process of evolution would have occurred as the 
organization of previous conditions C in order to produce an effect B (in this case, the law of survival) as a mean 
for the realization of a regulative goal G. “Intelligence” here does not mean consciousness, but only the sound or 
appropriate selection of means for a general end. Now, if the “law of survival” is not the final goal G but the 
product B of a broader process of evolution, what is the final end of this process? For Peirce, as we know, it is 
Rationality itself in its temporal development, which coincides with an ongoing process of creation. But if at the 
bottom of the development of the universe there is a “loving” process of rational creation, we can also admit 
that our normative epistemic processes, principles, and beliefs, can be a fair instance of the rationality or “mind” 
of the universe and have genuine alethic-capacity. 
 
 
 
1.5. “Logic” and Epistemic Virtues 
 
We can now turn to a closer look at Peirce's characterization of what we can call epistemic virtues. In this 
case, we have: 
 
(i) The habit of the conscientious pursuit of truth (architectonic end of thinking), since truth is, at the same 
time, a self-subsistent “idea,” attracting man's mind, and ought to be the ideal of human self-controlled processes 
of inquiry (cf. EP2: 43; EP 2: 47; EP 2: 122-123; EP 2: 343).  
 
(ii) The habit of adopting the principles of logic and semiotics (leading principles-means of thinking).  
 
(iii) The habits related to the three logical sentiments, necessary to keep constant and effective the end of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
also highlighted by Skagestad 1979, although the role of teleology is not explicitly grasped by him. Also Hookway’s concern that 
Peirce has a psychologist conception of thinking (1985: 52-58) could be corrected in the light of my considerations.  
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pursuit of truth (habits of feeling).  
 
(iv) The virtue of Thirdness,13 namely, the ability of distinguishing what is true and what is false in the “art of 
[deliberate] mediation” (“logic is the art of reasoning”, EP2: 11), i.e. through the scientific method and through 
the principles of logic and semeiotics (EP1: 202; EP2: 188; 190-191). 
 
There is a great deal of textual evidence supporting Peirce's commitment to the above list of epistemic 
virtues, and some scholars have attentively worked on this department of Peirce's NS (e.g. Hookway 2010: 260 
ff.). As Peirce's states, the work of logic is to distinguish the good “habits of mind” from the bad ones, given that 
“the habit is good or otherwise, according as it produces true conclusions from true premises or not” (EP1: 112). 
Then, its business is to state which “guiding principles” of inference – the linguistic formulations of the habits of 
reasoning – ought to be used in the logical endeavor. Also within the field of normative principles of inference, 
“the question of its validity is purely one of fact and not of thinking” (EP1: 111-112), in the sense that a principle 
“that tends to carry us toward the truth more speedily than we could otherwise progress is good”, while “a 
method that has a tendency to carry us away from the truth is utterly bad, whether we naturally approve of it or 
not” (EP2: 252). Peirce himself provides a portrait of the virtuous inquirer – the ideal “man of science” (EP2: 58; 
372), or the “experimentalist” (EP2: 332) –, by describing what his “dispositions” are. Among these dispositions, 
there would be the fundamental habit of mind shaped on the pragmatic maxim itself (EP2: 332). Logical 
goodness, then, is simply the “excellence of argument” (EP2: 205). The man of science is the “living” definition 
of a science (EP2: 372) and is characterized by an unshakeable “scientific curiosity” (EP2: 34). It is within this 
framework that we have to place Peirce's theory of deduction, induction and hypothesis (or abduction), which 
correspond to “three chief modes of action of the human soul” (EP 1: 327). For instance, Peirce says that in 
induction “industry” and “a habit of probity is needed for success” (CP 1.576), and that in abduction “still higher 
virtues are needed – a true elevation of soul” (CP 1.576).    
A similar order of considerations applies to the problem of the method in inquiry, whose choice is “far more 
than the adoption of any intellectual opinion” and is instead “one of the ruling decisions of … life” (EP1: 122). 
Logic is, in Peirce's terms, “the art of devising methods of research, – the method of methods” (EP1: 209), or 
also “the theory of methods” (EP1: 211). Peirce's profession of faith in the “scientific method” is first of all due 
to the fact that the scientific method is the only method for the fixation of belief that rests upon “some external 
permanency – … upon which our thinking has no effect” (EP1: 120), that is self-corrective (EP1: 121; EP2: 43) 
and that, in the process of self-correction, “presents any distinction of a right and a wrong way” of conducing 
the inquiry (EP1: 121); in other words, the scientific method is the only method that can state, on the basis of 
experience itself, that “bad reasoning as well as good reasoning is possible; and this fact is the foundation of the 
practical side of logic” (EP1: 121). Among the epistemic virtues of the inquirer, then, Peirce also lists the trained 
skills of the three “mental operations concerned in reasoning”, namely “observation”, “experimentation” and 
“habituation” (RLT: 182). 
The affective dimension of the inquirer is not neglected as well, but rather plays a crucial role in the life of the 
inquirer. Indeed, Peirce puts “three social sentiments” at the base of logic, namely, the “interest in an indefinite 
community”, the “recognition of the possibility of this interest being made been supreme”, and the “hope in the 
unlimited continuance of intellectual activity”, as the indispensable requirements of good thinking (EP1: 150). 
These three sentiments coincide for Peirce with “that famous trio of Charity, Faith, and Hope, which, in the 
estimation of St. Paul, are the finest and greatest of spiritual gifts” (EP1: 150) and teach in the most authoritative 
way “the dispositions of heart which a man ought to have” (EP1: 151). Peirce also explains that inquiry ought to 
be animated by “true scientific Eros” (EP2: 29). In addition, methodological principles and sentiments can also 
work together, as in the “rule of hope” – an “intellectual hope” – namely the regulative principle, which should 
guide every kind of science, that every fact is intelligible, at least in principle (EP1: 275). At the same time, the 
self-correcting power of the scientific method can succeed only on the ground of the “Will to Learn” and of the 
“freedom from dogmatism”, since “there is but one thing needful for learning the truth, and that is the hearty 
and active desire to learn what is true” (EP2: 47-48). Science can make progresses only if it is nourished by a 
                                                            
13 Cf. the expression “virtue of thirdness” in EP1: 265. I use the expression in a different sense. 
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genuine “theoretical interest” (CP 7.433). The inquirer who thinks that “seeking such a truth is ... worthy of life-
long devotion” (EP2: 372), who “prefers the truth to his own interest and well-being” (CP 1.576), and who 
believes that “practical utilities, whether low or high, should be put out of sight by the investigator” (EP 2: 34; 
see also CP 1.43-45) is the best example of how the inquire ought to be.  
In Peirce's “The Fixation of Belief” we can find an internal justification of the epistemic virtues. For “internal 
justification” of the values of inquiry I mean the possibility of partially grounding the normativity of the 
epistemic values without resorting to ethics (and, even more so, to aesthetics), despite the fact that the simple 
standpoint of logic cannot give the full set of reasons for understanding the normativity of the epistemic virtues. 
In “The Fixation” we read that “the sole object of inquiry is the settlement of opinion” (EP2: 114-115) and 
that “the irritation of doubt is the only immediate motive for the struggle to attain a belief” (EP2: 114). Peirce's 
argument to support the “scientific method” is that, since the only goal of inquiry is to settle a belief, the scientific 
pattern is the best method that allows the inquirer to fix an unshakeable and reliable opinion. In particular, in 
what aspect does the “scientific method” outstrip the others, i.e. the “tenacity”, the “authority” and the “a 
priori” methods? First of all, it meets the exigency of settling a belief in the safest and most reliable way by being 
based on experience and by taking seriously every occasion of real doubt. Peirce explains that the method of tenacity 
consists in steadfastly ignoring every actual or possible occasion of doubt, which would disturb the beliefs that the 
subject already owns; in turn, the method of authority consists in struggling to constitute, or to join, a super-
individual institution whose aim is to prevent through the use of the force every occasion of doubt, actual or possible, that 
would disturb the doctrines that are already settled; finally, the a priori method consists in stubbornly avoiding what 
is foreign to our own education, trying again to preserve our cherished opinions from the falsification that would 
come from experience. Then, if the three non-scientific methods tend to preserve the existing beliefs by ignoring 
the “surprises” of experience and the resultant doubts, the “scientific method” is the only one that does not 
strive for preserving existing beliefs by immunizing them against the “rough facts” (EP1: 121), but that “goes out 
of its way to test hypothesis by experiment” (see Misak 2004: 80). Consequently, the scientific method tries to 
develop beliefs that can face the further challenges of experimentation and that will not occasion doubts any 
longer. In other words, the scientific method is the only one that establishes beliefs “caused by nothing human, 
but by some external permanency – by something upon which our thinking has no effect” (EP1: 120). It tries to 
obtain opinions that “coincide with facts” (EP1: 122). 
Second, Peirce's scientific method meets the exigency of intersubjective control and of ideal universality, which are a 
spontaneous desideratum of human inquiry. According to Peirce, the inquiry is often accompanied by the “social 
impulse”, that is as much strong as the impulse to escape the doubt is (EP2: 116; see also EP2: 116-117). This 
means that striving for fixing a belief aims implicitly at an (ideal) intersubjective and universal approval of the 
conclusions drawn. Recurring to the common and public experience, then, is the best way to meet this implicit 
requirement of human thinking and research.14 As Misak puts it, the responsiveness to reason and to public 
questioning is the constitutive norm of belief (2004b: 12). Thus, Peirce concludes, “the only cause of our 
planting ourselves on reason is that other methods of escaping doubt fail on account of the social impulse” 
(EP1: 150).  
However, as we have already glimpsed, the full justification of the epistemic virtues cannot be found only in 
logic, so that the internal justification of the epistemic virtues is only a part of their full justification. The 1877 
essay lets us think that Peirce has hastily identified the aim of the “fixation of a belief,” implied in every process 
of inquiry, with the pursuit of truth, which is only one of the possible aims the man can be headed to in escaping 
the doubt. Thus, the interpretation of “The Fixation” comes to a crossroad: on one side, if it is true that the aim 
of the fixation of the belief coincides directly with the pursuit of truth, then the end of the pursuit of truth, and 
the “scientific method” itself, does not need a further justification in ethics and aesthetics. The pursuit of truth 
stands just on the basis of an internal logical justification. On the other hand, even within “The Fixation” itself, 
Peirce is already aware of the fact that an inquirer can settle a belief using the non-scientific methods of inquiry, 
and the essay can be read as the dramatic acknowledgement that the non-scientific methods are “really pursued 
by many men” (EP2: 115) because “they have their own merits” (EP2: 123).15 Moreover, the later developments 
                                                            
14 “Experience being something forced upon us, belongs to the external type. Yet in so far as it is I or you who experiences the 
constraint, the experience is mine or yours, and thus belongs to the inner world” (CP 7.439). 
15 Cf. in relation to the method of tenacity: “The man feels that, if he only holds to his belief without wavering, it will be entirely 
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of his thought and the idea of the classification of the NS suggest that Peirce was not satisfied with the idea that 
the simple aim of the fixation of the belief is just the pursuit of the truth,16 or alike the rational conduct,17 and 
consequently he was not sure that the mere exigency of settling a belief is sufficient for a full justification of the 
epistemic virtues.18 Let us put Peirce's implicit struggle in this way: does the simple condition that every inquirer 
necessarily (we could say, psychologically) tends to settle a belief in order to escape the “irritation of doubt” 
(EP2: 114) directly imply that every human being ought to embrace the scientific method and the pursuit of 
truth? While Peirce was inclined in “The Fixation” to answer this question affirmatively, he came to realize that 
logic cannot give in itself an account of the normativity of the end “pursue the truth”, upon which the entire 
endeavor of thought and discovery is built (including the “scientific method”). The full validity of the aim of 
seeking the truth can be fully assessed only as a component of the objective moral good, which is studied by 
ethics. We can understand then in which sense the epistemic values ask for an external justification in ethics and 
aesthetics. 
 
 
 
1.6. “Ethics” and Ethical Virtues  
 
Let us now consider Peirce's ethics and his characterization of ethical virtues.19 At this level, moral sentiment 
and sentimental judgment play a fundamental role. Although I will deal extensively with the crucial importance 
of “sentiment” and “sentimental judgment” in Peirce's philosophy in Chapter 3, I present his thesis at this point 
for the sake of a systematic exposition of his catalogue of virtues (also Peirce’s arguments in support to his 
sentimentalist tendencies in ethics will be given there). Now, in the context of “ethics,” Peirce’s catalogue of 
virtues could be the following: 
 
(i) The habit of the courageous struggle for realizing the objective moral goodness (architectonic end of human 
purposive agency), or the right and just, since the right is a self-subsistent idea, attracting human energies, and, at 
the same time, a practical ideal for human beings' self-controlled conduct (cf. EP2: 122-123; EP2: 343). It is my 
opinion that, in Peirce's terms, the end of realizing the objective moral goodness is nothing else than the ultimate 
ideal – the development of the concrete reasonableness – considered in the light of what human beings ought to 
chose. If this interpretation is correct, then, the end of realizing the objective moral goodness requires the 
constant tension not to give up with a life devoted to the epistemic, ethical and esthetical values. At the same 
time, since the ethical virtues are the virtues of the human conduct in so far as it is considered as purposive 
conduct, and since the acquisition of the epistemic and of the aesthetic virtues depends on the human being’s 
self-determination, the ethical virtues include also, as normative facts, the strive for acquiring or renewing the 
epistemic virtues and the aesthetic virtues. We can interpret in this way Peirce's statement that ethics is the core 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
satisfactory. Nor can it be denied that a steady and immovable faith yields great peace of mind” (EP2: 116); in relation to the method 
of authority: “Its success is proportionately greater; and, in fact, it has over and over again worked the most majestic results. … the 
change is so slow as to be imperceptible during one person's life, so that individual belief remains sensibly fixed. For the mass of 
mankind, then, there is perhaps no better method than this” (EP2: 118); in relation to the three non-scientific methods: “It is not to 
be supposed that the first three methods of settling opinion present no advantage whatever over the scientific method. On the 
contrary, each has some peculiar convenience of its own” (EP2: 121-122). 
16 It seems to me that we can find clues of this perplexity also in “The Fixation”, even though Peirce's position in this essay is obviously 
inclined to identify the implicit meaning of the aim “fixing a belief” with “seeking the truth”: “Hence, the sole object of inquiry is the 
settlement of opinion. We may fancy that this is not enough for us, and that we seek, not merely an opinion, but a true opinion. But 
put this fancy to test, and it proves groundless; far as soon as a firm belief is reached we are entirely satisfied, whether the belief be 
true or false. And it is clear that nothing out of the sphere of our knowledge can be our object, for nothing which does not affect the 
mind can be the motive for a mental effort” (EP2: 114-115). 
17 In the case of the discussion of the method of tenacity, for example, “it would be an egoistical impertinence to object that his 
procedure is irrational, for that only amounts to saying that his method of settling belief is not ours. He does not propose to himself 
to be rational, and, indeed, will often talk with scorn of man's weak and illusive reason. So, let him think as he pleases” (EP2: 116). 
18 “Perhaps it might be possible to deduce the correct rules of reasoning from the mere assumption that we have some ultimate aim. But 
I cannot see how this could be done. If we had, for example, no other aim than the pleasure of the moment, we should fall back into 
the same absence of any logic that the fallacious argument would lead to. We should have no ideal of reasoning, and consequently no 
norm. It seems to me that the logician ought to recognize what our ultimate aim is” (EP2: 252-253). 
19  Notice that when “action” coincides with “reasoning,” the ethical virtues coincide with the epistemic virtues. 
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of the NS, in the sense that also the epistemic and the aesthetic virtues, since they imply normative ends of human 
action, need to be included in the list of ethical values (EP2: 377; EP2: 200).20 
 
(ii) The habits of action, in “vitally important topics”, based on sentimental judgments. As we will see in the next chapter, 
sentimental judgments are a particular kind of judgment provided by the “wisdom” of sentiment, instinct and 
tradition. Peirce's moral sentimentalism is a corollary of his “conservative sentimentalism” (CP 1.662). Among 
these habits, there are certainly the habits of benevolence and self-sacrifice (EP1: 357; CP 8.38). 
 
(iii) The deliberate habits of feeling calibrated on instinctual moral sentiments. 
 
(iv) The virtue of Secondness, namely, the ability to distinguish what is right and what is wrong. Peirce states that 
“every pronouncement between Good and Bad certainly comes under Category the Second; and for that reason 
such pronouncement comes out in the voice of conscience with an absoluteness of duality which we do not find 
even in logic” (EP2: 189). In particular, in “vitally important topics”, this means to develop habits of action and 
feeling based not on reasoning, but on the solid ground of sentiment. 
 
Also in this case, there is rich textual evidence in support of this interpretation of Peirce’s ethical “normative 
facts” as virtues. It is at this level that Peirce expresses his half-hearted conviction that philosophical ethics can 
be of any help in the moral life. Peirce explains that “in the conduct of life, we have to distinguish everyday 
affairs and great crises.” As far as “the great decisions” are concerned, he argues against the idea that “it is safe to 
trust to individual reason. In everyday business, reasoning is tolerably successful; but I am inclined to think that it 
is done as well without the aid of theory as with it. A logica utens, like the analytical mechanics resident in the 
billiard player's nerves, best fulfills familiar uses” (EP2: 30). In such things like religion and morality, “the man 
who would allow his religious life to be wounded by any sudden acceptance of a philosophy of religion or who 
would precipitately change his code of morals, at a dictate of a philosophy of ethics, – who would, let us say, 
hastily practice incest, – is a man whom we should consider unwise” (EP2: 32).21 It is in this light that we can 
understand some of the criticisms Peirce addresses to the philosophy of religion: “You will observe that I have 
not said a single word in disparagement of the philosophy of religion, in general, which seems to me a most 
interesting study, at any rate, and possibly likely to lead to some useful result. Nor have I attacked any sect of that 
philosophy. It is not the philosophy which I hold to be baleful, but the representing it to be of vitally 
importance, as if any genuine religion could come from the head instead of from the heart” (CP 1.665). 
Therefore, philosophy (but we can include here every kind of systematic knowledge) is “baleful”, harmful, only if 
one wants it to become the ground for the fixation of a belief about important in vitally matters; or if one thinks 
that it has to invalidate the “wisdom” of instinct and sentiment. What man has to remember is that “in practical 
affairs, in matters of vitally importance, it is very easy to exaggerate the importance of ratiocination” (EP2: 31). 
Indeed, “common sense, which is the resultant of the traditional experience of mankind, witnesses unequivocally 
that the heart is more than the head, and is in fact everything in our highest concerns, thus agreeing with my 
unproved logical theorem; and those persons who think that sentiment has no part in common sense forget that 
the dicta of common sense are objective facts, not the way some dyspeptic may feel, but what the healthy, 
natural, normal democracy thinks” (CP 1.654). Similarly, “true conservatism, which is sentimental conservatism 
… means not trusting to reasonings about questions of vitally importance but rather to hereditary instincts and 
traditional sentiments” (CP 1.661). As a matter of fact, Peirce argues, the “cold light of reason” leads man to 
regard his own self “as the highest thing”; on the contrary, the “conservative sentimentalism” teaches, as its “first 
command”, that “your quite highest business and duty” is “to recognize a higher business than your business, not 
merely an avocation after the daily task of your vocation is performed, but a generalized conception of duty 
which completes your personality by melting it into the neighboring parts of the universal cosmos. If this sounds 
unintelligible, just take for comparison the first good mother of a family that meets your eye”. This is the 
meaning of Peirce's claim that “the very supreme commandment of sentiment is that man should generalize …” 
                                                            
20 This is Vincent Potter's interpretative solution, see Potter 1967. 
21 See on this Colapietro 1992. 
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(CP 1.673). As also Parker stresses (Parker 2003), in everyday life, (a) it is not possible to act according to a fully-
developed reasoning, (b) it is not necessary to act according to a reasoned plan, or sometimes, (c) it is not 
desirable or ethically virtuous to act without a spontaneous and “sentimental” tendency toward what is morally 
good. The disposition of benevolence and self-sacrifice, what Peirce calls the “generalization” of the sentiment, 
“should come about, not merely in man's cognitions, which are but the superficial film of his being, but 
objectively in the deepest emotional springs of his life. In fulfilling this command, man prepares himself for 
transmutation into a new form of life” (CP 1.673). 
 
 
 
1.7. Pluralism as Feature of the Scientific Method and Epistemic Virtue  
 
According to Peirce, the notion of “truth” is an epistemic notion, in the sense that it is first of all a property 
of a proposition, and not a property of reality in itself.22 If understood in its deepest meaning, the truth-relation 
can be understood as the correspondence between a representation and a state of things independent of human 
mind. However, in Peirce's terms, this is a verbal account of truth, which is philosophically satisfying insofar as it 
does not presume to be an ultimate definition. I will deal with the problem of “truth” in relation to action and 
experience in Ch. 5, with particular reference to Dewey's and Peirce's pragmatic approaches to the issue. For 
now, let me just say that the best way to approach the notion of “truth” is to consider the point of view of the process 
of inquiry itself. As Peirce explains: 
 
Truth is that concordance of an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless 
investigation would tend to bring scientific belief … . The truth of the proposition that Caesar crossed 
the Rubicon consists in the fact that the further we push our archaeological and other studies, the more 
strongly will that conclusion force itself on our minds forever – or would do so, if study were to go on 
forever. (CP 5.565) 
 
Therefore, it is evident that the notion of truth is essentially linked to the context of scientific inquiry and to 
the method it adopts, that is the “scientific method.” At the same time, Peirce is neither claiming that what is 
taken by a science to be a settled belief is actually true, nor that only what science discovers can be said true.. 
More interestingly, Peirce is providing an ideal definition of truth in which justification, beliefs, and mind-
independent state of affairs are intertwined in an interesting way. Peirce's definition of truth in relation to inquiry 
must be understood in a counterfactual way.23 It would read in the following way: p is true iff p is the opinion on 
which all the rational inquirers would agree if all the necessary conditions for that agreement C would occur. 
These conditions are of various nature, contextual and contingently epistemic. What Peirce is claiming is that 
there is not obstacle in principle for human beings to develop true beliefs and cognitions about reality. For 
Peirce, experience is transparent. However, Let me defer the discussion of the notion of truth to Chapter 5 and 
focus now on the role played by the scientific method in Peirce's approach to ethics and the NS in general. What 
I want to show is that, contrary to some interpretations, Peirce is a cognitivist in morality and esthetics, just like 
he is against hedonistic and psychologist arguments in logic.24 This will also cast light on the idea that the NS are 
positive sciences, in the sense that they aim at giving an overall description and evaluation of the most important 
“facts” of human self-controlled behavior. What I want to stress here is that the “scientific method,” or the 
experimental method, can be used (and ought to be used) in inquiries into ethical and aesthetical matters only 
because it implies a broad and deep notion of experience, which cannot be limited to the physical experience, or 
to the action of an external world upon us. As Peirce spells out,  
 
different sciences have deal with different kinds of truth; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical 
                                                            
22 It can be considered a property of “reality” as a transcendental notion, see CP 5.572. 
23 The following passage is clearly against the idea of “convergence” as something that will happen no matter what, although in a remote 
future: “We cannot be quite sure that the community ever will be settle down to an unalterable conclusion upon any given situation. 
Even if they do for the most part, we have no reason to think the unanimity will be quite complete, nor can we rationally presume 
that any overwhelming consensus of opinion will be reached upon every question” (CP 6.610) 
24  See the section on moral realism.  
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truth is another, the actually existing state of the universe a third; but all these different conceptions 
have in common something very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific inquiries in 
which we are severally engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established conclusion, 
which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure. Agreement with that ultimate 
proposition that we look forward to, – agreement with that, whatever it may turn to be, is the 
scientific truth. (EP2: 87; see also CP 7.181, 1901) 
 
Interpreting Peirce's account of the “scientific method” as it were built on a narrow conception of 
experience, you might say “physical experience,” would be a serious mistake. In its general meaning, experience 
is indeed “the enforced element in the history of our lives” (EP2: 47). It can also be widely defined as “the sum 
of ideas which have been irresistibly borne in upon us, overwhelming all free-play of thought, by the tenor of our 
lives. The authority of experience consists in the fact that its power cannot be resisted; it is a flood against which 
nothing can stand” (CP 7.437). For Peirce, philosophy, NS included, doesn't require any specialized observation 
on facts, but merely strives to learn “what can be learned from that experience which presses in upon every one 
of us daily and hourly,” that is our “common experience” (EP2: 196).25 If we take this statement seriously, we already 
have some important clues of the fact that Peirce’s idea of experience is a rich one, definitely irreducible to 
human beings' sense-organ perception of the external reality. 
In another passage, Peirce explains that the fundamental feature of experience is “compulsion”, which is 
almost a pure Secondness (EP2: 271), independently from the fact that the force of this compulsion on us is due 
to an external physical object, somehow pressing on our organism, or to something else. The common sense 
usually distinguishes between an “Internal World”, the psychological dimension of human life made of fancy and 
of freely constructed imaginations, and an “External World” (EP2: 268), whose distinctive characters would be 
the constraining force of its objects played on our bodies, and the limited capacity of our muscles in determining 
changes in them. However, Peirce says, compulsion is not a suitable criterion of distinction between the Internal 
World and the External World, since also the non-external and non-physical dimension of human life has certain 
limitations and undergoes the action of some compelling forces: 
   
We naturally make all our distinctions too absolute. We are accustomed to speak of an external 
universe and an inner world of thought. But they are merely vicinities with no real boundary line between 
them. It comes to this: there are some ideas, – objects, be it remembered, – which will have their own 
way, and we cannot swerve them much … . They make up or indicate the outward world. There are other 
ideas which seem very docile, they are just as we think they ought to be. They form the inner world. Yet it 
will be found that the inner world has its surprises for us, sometimes. It isn't so exactly as we would have 
it as we fancy. It is rather our wishes which conform to it, Mahomet that repairs to the mountain. Neither 
is the moderate amount of control which we exercise upon the world of ideas nearly so direct as we fancy 
it to be. We go about instinctively, and without being aware how circuitously we proceed to change the 
current of thought. (CP 7.438; see also EP2: 369-370) 
 
Cheryl Misak has thoroughly pointed out that Peirce's notion of human experience is manifold and 
comprehends different modalities, irreducible to each other (e.g. 1994b; see also Aydin 2009: 431-432; 438). 
Peirce never accepted an empiricist idea of experience. For instance, he writes: “If Mill wishes me to admit that 
experience is the only source of any kind of knowledge, I grant it at once, provided only that by experience he 
means personal history, life. But if he wants me to admit that inner experience is nothing, and that nothing of 
moment is found in diagrams, he asks what cannot be granted” (CP 4.91). Experience is a “teacher” (e.g. EP2: 
194; EP2: 454) and performs this function in many different ways.26 There are at least two different kinds of 
experience beyond the mere interaction of the human being's organism with a physical world, which are the 
mathematical experience and the moral-affective experience. Peirce acknowledges indeed that experiments and 
observations can actually take place as “real” or outward operations, like the ones that are in chemical and 
physical research, or as “ideal” or inward experiments, like in the case of the operations of the mathematician 
                                                            
25 Cf. “Nor again is Normative Science a special science, that is, one of those sciences that discover new phenomena. It is not even aided 
in any appreciable degree by any such science, and let me say that it is no more by psychology than by any other special science” (EP 
2: 198). 
26 In a letter to William James, January 23rd, 1905, Peirce writes that experience is “the effect which life has produced upon habits” and 
not a mere question of “feelings,” like in James's theory of “pure experience.” 
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upon his imaginary diagrams or on his drawing a deductive conclusion from a pure hypothesis. Thus, 
“experience is double”, since “there is an outward and an inward experience. Under the latter head ought particularly 
to be reckoned a mathematical experience, not usually so called, which has compelled the development of pure 
thought to take a determinate course” (CP 7.440). However, inner experience does not concern only the 
compulsions of thinking in its pure abstractness, but has also an important affective implication. As Peirce writes 
in a striking passage, 
 
there is also an emotional experience, which has all the authority of any experience, provided it is 
equally irresistible. But experience and its irresistibility has a public character, which we shall study in 
another chapter. (CP 7.441) 
 
As we can easily see, the fact that there is an affective experience, and that the emotional dimension of 
human life is susceptible of an intersubjective control, allows the ethical and aesthetical values to be studied 
through the “scientific method.”27 Hence, the affective experience meets the condition (i) of the above sketch of 
the notion of truth, and, as a consequence, it becomes clear how the assessments on ethical and aesthetical 
matters can be truth-apt.  
The main point to stress at this point is that, if the “scientific method” is the method that simply warrants a 
certain belief on the basis of what experience constrains us to think, then, one of the resulting consequences is 
that the scientific method, to be fully sound, has to be sensible to the differences among the different possible 
objects of interest of the scientific research. This means, first of all, that in one field of inquiry, the criterion of 
the warranted acceptability of a belief will be of one sort, and that in another field the criterion will be of a 
different sort. To be explicit, Peirce's account of the way in which science has to proceed implies what I shall call 
methodological pluralism, that is, it requires that the justification of an ethical or an aesthetical assessment ought to 
be tested on the basis of affective experience and not, for example, on the base of a physical experience, just like 
chemical and physical inquiries ought to appeal to their proper criteria of research and acceptability. In this sense, 
even though within the same framework of the scientific method, there are different criteria of inquiry and of 
acceptability of a belief in relation to the different objects of study. As a consequence, another important 
component in the list of epistemic virtues is the capability to distinguish different experiential criteria of 
assessment in different fields of inquiry. It is evident, then, that methodological pluralism has to be listed as one 
of the most fundamental among the other epistemic virtues. 
Thus, on Peirce's view, 
 
just as conduct controlled by ethical reason tends toward fixing certain habits of conduct, the nature of 
which (as to illustrate the meaning, peaceable habits and not quarrelsome habits) does not depend upon 
any accidental circumstances, and in that sense, may be said to be destined; so, thought, controlled by rational 
experimental logic, tends to the fixation of certain opinions, equally destined, the nature of which will be 
the same in the end, however the perversity of thought of whole generations may cause the 
postponement of the ultimate fixation. (EP 2: 342) 
 
Hence, Peirce states that the correct method in questions concerning values is only “self-questioning” (CP 
1.579) since consciousness is “the only witness there is” in this matters, even though sometimes it seems to be 
“one of the most mendacious witnesses that ever was questioned” (CP 1.580). The method of experience teaches 
us to put the criterion of what is good in moral life in the wisdom of sentiment. As a matter of fact, “on vitally 
important topics reasoning is out of place”, and it is the scientific method itself and its indications that “furnish 
us conclusive reasons for limiting the applicability of reasoning to unimportant matters” (CP 1.652). In 
                                                            
27  Peirce's scientific method is against the a priori method in ethics, consisting in the acceptance of a value on the basis of its accordance 
with a previously defined “human nature”. It is in this spirit that Peirce considers if the “simple satisfactions of the moment” can be 
embraced as the ultimate end of life: “Men might easily argue – indeed, do argue – that there can be no other good than the 
satisfaction of the moment's desire. But the moment I hear that word can used, where nothing in the world is pertinent but 
observations of what is, I cast the judgment aside as worthless. For “cannot be” means “not in accordance with a hypothetical 
construction” intended, this time, to represent human nature. But I do not care about hypothetical constructions. I just want to know 
whether a man does ever find any other satisfaction than the simple satisfaction of the moment” (CP 1.582). 
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particular, Peirce sees the spring of the moral life and the need of self-criticism, self-regulation, and inquiry into 
what is really good and admirable for one's life in the experience of dissatisfaction for the purposes, ideal, and 
experiences we already have.28 Peirce observes that “what most influences men to self-government is intense 
disgust with one kind of life and warm admiration for another. Careful observation of men will show this; and 
those who desire to further the practice of self-government ought to shape their teachings accordingly” (EP2: 
460). There is an “aesthetic understanding” (EP1: 283) that is not reducible to any different modality of 
experience. In this light, experiential criteria developed by human beings in order to assess their moral lives are 
something very different from what experience could tell them about physical reality. As Peirce clearly puts it, 
“different sciences are observational in … radically different way” (CP 1.238). This point is even more important 
if we think that some scholars have interpreted Peirce as a non-cognitivist because of his insistence on the role of 
“sentiment” (see chapter 3) and affective experiences of fulfillment in aesthetics and ethics (Parret 1994; de Waal 
2012; Stuhr 1994).29 
 
 
 
1.8. “Aesthetics” and the Esthetic Virtues  
 
Finally, we find Peirce's characterization of the aesthetic virtues. These are: 
 
(i) The habits of feeling or taste oriented towards what is admirable in itself, Reason, prior to all differentiations. 
Reason is an idea, subsistent in itself (EP2: 254), and, at the same time, a practical ideal for all human beings 
(EP2: 202). In the latter sense, Reason is the development of concrete reason, or the ultimate ideal of human 
conduct.30 
 
(ii) The virtue of Firstness, namely, the acquired disposition of feeling what is fine in itself, the development of 
concrete reason, in the spontaneity of immediate experience (being beyond the necessity of self-correction) and 
throughout the constant novelties of life.    
 
Peirce says that the development of reasonableness requires, among all the other things, “all the coloring of 
all qualities of feeling, including pleasure in its proper place among the rest” (EP2: 255). A conspicuous part of 
the human ideal, then, is to own the right “quality of feeling” for certain types of action, actual or imagined, 
which are the “object of the feeling” (EP2: 377). In the same way, “if conduct is to be thoroughly deliberate, the 
ideal must be a habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of self-criticisms and of 
heterocriticisms” (EP2: 377-378). It is a “taste” or a “deep and earnest emotion” for what is truly admirable 
(EP2: 378). “Esthetic good and evil”, Peirce continues, “are closely akin to pleasure and pain; they are what would be 
pleasure or pain to the fully developed superman” (EP2: 379). It means that “the good is the attractive – not to 
everybody, but to the sufficiently matured agent” (EP2: 379). As a consequence, “the righteous man is the man 
who controls his passions, and makes them conform to such ends as he is prepared deliberately to adopt as 
ultimate” (EP2: 200). 
But the fullness of esthetical virtue also requires pure spontaneity and immediacy. Thus, “the question of 
esthetics is, what is the one quality that is, in its immediate presence, kalos” (CP 2.199; see also EP1: 248). The 
aesthetic virtue, in its purity, excludes “all consideration of effort, but all consideration of action and reaction” 
(CP 2.199). Then, “immediate feeling is the consciousness of the first” (CP 382), and “the esthetic state of mind 
                                                            
28 See on this Colapietro (1989: 111). Also MS 980: 31. 
29 On the contrary, Krois 1994 gets Peirce's cognitivism exactly right.  
30  “This development of Reason consists … in embodiment, that is, in manifestation” (EP2: 255); “Under this conception, the ideal of 
conduct will be to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by giving a hand toward rendering the world more 
reasonable whenever, as the slang is, it is “up to us” to do so” (EP2: 255); “ … the pragmaticist does not make the summum bonum to 
consist in action, but makes it to consist in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those 
generals which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable” (EP2: 343); “[...] the 
continual increase of the embodiment of the idea-potentiality is the summum bonum” (EP2: 388); since, the creation is an on-going 
process, the summum bonum of human life is “to be fulfilling our appropriate offices in the work of creation” (letter 14 July 1905). Cf. 
also EP2: 3. 
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is purest when perfectly naive without any critical pronouncement, and that the esthetic critic founds his 
judgments upon the result of throwing himself back into such a pure naive state – and the best critic is the man 
who has trained himself to do this the most perfectly” (EP2: 189). 
There are some formal aspects that Peirce recognizes to be essential features of the ultimate ideal. One of the 
most important components of Peirce's justification of his conception of the admirable – the development of 
concrete reason – consists in the fact that some of the human exigencies are met only if the ultimate ideal presents 
certain formal characters. These two normative features of the ultimate ideal are generality and unity in practical 
life. This is expressed by Peirce when he says that “the man can, or if you please is compelled, to make his life more 
reasonable” (EP2: 248; see also EP1: 239-240).31 First, as Peirce explains, the ultimate ideal “should accord with 
a free development of the agent's own esthetic quality” (EP 2: 202) and should be “capable of being pursued in 
an indefinitely prolonged course of action” (EP2: 202). In this sense, the ideal of the development of the 
concrete reason is the most general aim that man can conceive, and, therefore, it is the only option that meets 
the human exigency of axiological variety and of personal predilection. In other words, the development of concrete 
reason is the overarching ideal par excellence, and for this reason is the only one that can cover all the objects of 
human action, interest and desire, preventing that one determinate object of activity and desire can be made 
absolute and exclusive. At the same time, it is also broad enough to welcome within itself the different selective 
sub-ideals in which each man can put his personal aspiration and tasks. It also fits the normative ethical values of 
benevolence and self-sacrifice, since “no narrow or selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory” (EP2: 253).32 
Second, since the development of concrete reason is the most comprehensive ideal, it is also able to provide 
unity to the practical life of man. As a matter of fact, Peirce contends that “the identity of a man consists in the 
consistency of what he does and thinks” (EP1: 54), and that “inconsistence is odious” to man (EP2: 246). In this 
light we can also interpret Peirce's claim that “an aim which cannot be adopted and consistently pursued is a bad 
aim. It cannot properly be called an ultimate aim at all. The only moral evil is not to have an ultimate aim” (EP2: 
202). The most serious mistake in moral life (“the only moral evil”), says Peirce, is to embrace an inconsistent 
ultimate ideal, namely an ideal that lacks the capacity of creating order among the different dimensions of life – 
cognitive, practical and affective –, for it produces inevitably damaging effects upon the different habits of man. 
Peirce's clearest reflection on the human need of unity is found in his 1908 “Neglected Argument for the Reality 
of God,” in which he explains that one of the best criteria for the “Probation” of the hypothesis of God is the 
human exigency of practical unity and consistency in action (EP2: 446, 1908). Peirce's argument echoes Josiah 
Royce's claim that the “service” and “loyalty” to one consistent ideal is an unavoidable practical need of the 
human life (Royce 1995 [1908]: 56). Peirce's argument could be summed up in the following way: (i) the actual 
condition of every man is the contextual presence of contradictory purposes, desires, dispositions, and so on; (ii) 
the fundamental exigency of human life, which emerges in experience, is to get rid of the existential contradiction of 
incompossible purposes and desires; (iii) the normative ultimate ideal is that ideal that overcomes this 
contradiction.  In this way, the “idea of God” and the ideal of concrete reasonableness share the same condition 
of being found adorable. 
As it should be already clear, Peirce's “proof” of his theory of the admirable in itself is not a formal 
demonstration. Rather, it is instead a proof pursued on the basis of human common experience, and, in particular, of 
human experience of what can be desired beyond any reasons:33  
 
I do not mean to put this forward as a demonstration; because, like all demonstrations about such 
matters [moral values and, in general, what is admirable in itself], it would be a mere quibble, a sheaf of 
fallacies. I maintain simply that it is an experiential truth. (EP2: 60) 
                                                            
31 Hookway (2000: 242) interprets the need for unity in human conduct as the vocation of the self “to function as a rational integrated 
unity.” 
32  “The only ethically sound motive is the most general one; and the motive that actually inspires the man of science, if not quite that, is 
very near to it, – nearer, I venture to believe, than that of any other equally common type of humanity” (EP2: 60); “... no narrow or 
selfish aim can ever prove satisfactory, that the only satisfactory aim is the broadest, highest, and most general possible aim” (EP2: 
253). 
33  The ultimate ideal is “what is to be sought, not for a reason, but back of every reason” (CP 1.576); or “what it is that we can be 
content to wish for independently of any ulterior result” (CP 1.579); “the sole ultimate good independently of any ulterior result, and 
if not, whether it can be considered to be in itself a good at all, irrespective of its effects” (CP 1.581); “universally and absolutely 
desirable” (CP 1.586). 
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This proof is anyway an experiential proof. Its method asks for a “personal meditation” (EP2: 248; CP 1.600) 
in reviewing and criticizing the ideals we endorse. This has the form of a kind of “experimentation in the inner 
world” (EP2: 418). Furthermore, according to Peirce “this process is not a job that man sits down to do and 
have done with. The experience of life is continually contributing instances more or less illuminative. These are 
digested first not in the man's consciousness but in depth of his reasonable being” (EP2: 248). Just like any other 
science of discovery, aesthetics proceeds by abduction, deduction, and induction. Therefore, aesthetics puts forth 
the hypothesis that the Summum Bonum of human life is the development of concrete reasonableness and asks for 
a verification of this hypothesis, whose method is based on the method of common human experience, desire, 
and interest. As a consequence, “if … the future development of man's moral nature will only lead to a firmer 
satisfaction with the described ideal, the doctrine is true” (CP 5.566). The fact that the proposed hypothesis, if 
accepted as true, has to be beyond any possible criticism means that the ideal “should not ultimately tend to be 
disturbed by the reactions upon the agent of that outward world” (EP2: 202), namely, it should withstand the 
proof of affective experience. It is in this spirit that Peirce says  
 
if it were in the nature of a man to be perfectly satisfied to make his personal comfort his 
ultimate aim, no more blame would attach to him for doing so than attaches to a hog for 
behaving in the same way (EP2: 200). 
 
Some of Peirce's comments in “Pearson's Grammar of Science” turn out to be helpful here. Peirce furnishes a 
long list of different hypothetical “ultimate aims” (EP2: 59-60). The crux of his analysis in the type of proof to 
which he appeals in order to warrant the admirability of the ideal of concrete reasonableness. Peirce's 
demonstration, here, consists in pointing out that “all motives that are directed toward pleasure or self-
satisfaction, of however high type, will be pronounced by every experienced person to be inevitably destined to 
miss the satisfaction at which they aim” (EP2: 60). Hence, “the only desirable object which is quite satisfactory in 
itself without any ulterior reason for desiring it, is the reasonable itself” (EP2: 60, emphasis added). In the same way, 
Peirce wonders if the ultimate end might be “gratification, pleasure and bliss”, or “the unrestrained gratification of a 
desire, regardless of what the nature of that desire may be”? He explains that this possibility is respectable at least 
in a sense, since the admirable, the ultimate ideal, is something that is satisfied with itself, and “pleasure is the 
only conceivable result that is perfectly self-satisfied” (EP2: 253-254). However, at a closer consideration and 
under the surveys of the experiential method, this can’t be an option, for it doesn't take into account the higher 
dimensions of our life, as “love and reason” (EP2: 254). The ideal of the development of concrete 
reasonableness is what the human being's critical self-assessment finds to be convenient to its own nature upon 
reflection. The ultimate ideal grows in the human life as that ultimate end “attracts” the person “upon review,” 
through an “almost purely passive liking” (EP2: 377-378). Although Dewey’s position on the matter will be 
presented in Chapter 5, it is important to see that Peirce’s and Dewey’s positions are not too distant on this issue. 
With the words of James Rachel (1977: 169), we can formulate Dewey’s account of the moral good in the 
following way: X is morally good iff “X is such that it would not be desired by someone who had considered, 
intelligently and without prejudice, X’s nature and consequences.” As we see, the end that an agent recognizes 
“upon review” as the genuine ultimate end of human life is the same end that can be identified through Dewey’s 
account of the moral good. 
What Peirce also stresses in his reflections on esthetic as a normative science is the fact that there seems to be 
an aesthetic mediation between a pure act of self-acknowledgment and of an act of self-prescription. In this 
reflective act, rationality acknowledges its nature (a semiotic nature characterized by a unlimited interest for 
3rdness) and its convenient end as that nature (developing concrete reasonableness) and, at the same time, it 
prescribes that end in its formality (the principle “you ought to develop the concrete reasonableness) and the 
vague, practical specification that follow from it as theorems (you ought to pursue practical unity, you ought to 
pick a general end, you ought to pick an end that is susceptible of aesthetical development). These formal 
prescriptions and the prescriptions about the epistemic, ethical and aesthetical virtues are the different and 
ordered parts and specification of Peirce’s vague appeal to the “development of concrete reasonableness” in the 
world. 
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We have also seen in the first chapter that the human being's nature, grasped as “rational instinct,” has a 
developmental teleological structure. In other words, the human mind has a metaphysical vocation to 
“reasonableness.” The ideal of reasonableness is the most “powerful” one (CP 5.520) and attracts human beings 
to reshape their practices in a new and originally reasonable order. Before this reasonable order is invented, 
articulated in a linguistic or diagrammatic form, or produced in our practice, the attraction performed by the 
ideal is a vague, yet powerful one. We face here a twofold process, both top-down and bottom-up: (1) in the case 
of the process seen as a top-down process, it is the ideal of reasonableness that attracts all the “material” of 
human life to a new, original, and personal order. Until this order is not produced, the attraction of the ideal at 
its fundamental level is more like a “feeling” for what is admirable rather than a determined cognition of what 
“it's up to us” to do; (2) in the case of the process seen as a bottom-up process, the knowledge of what we ought 
to do, of what reasonable order we should produce in own life, is always related to the “material” of our life, our 
present desires, purposes, dispositions, and circumstances. These are the signs that eventually grow into a clearer 
ideal of life. Now, if the “logical causation” of the ideal has the most fundamental role in orienting the human 
life (even when we cannot determine its vagueness through the articulation of purposes, plans of actions, 
determined desires, etc.), it also has a “logos-influence” on every aspect of life. This “influence” expresses itself 
as a vocation to reasonableness. The consequence is that every habit in the human being, although not fully 
reasonable, has however in itself a germ of rationality, i.e., a potential capability of being developed in a fully 
rational way.34 As a consequence, we can make sense of Peirce’s account of the work of moral self-criticism as a 
work of “creative love” (see Hausman 1975). This means that rationality, in the form of moral self-criticism, 
gradually acknowledges in certain types of conduct (“normative facts”) the convenient, rational 
realization/improvement of those germs of rationality already present in their practices and gradually brings 
them to the mature status of an ordered and consistent whole of life. Peirce writes in this sense that “the 
movement of love is circular, at one and the same impulse projecting creations into independency and drawing 
them into harmony” (EP1: 353-354). The “reason operative in experience to which our own can approximate” 
(EP2: 212) shows here its importance in the moral life. There are two points to stress here. First, if human habits 
were lacking of an at least implicit vocation to be developed in a rational way, then they would never “ask” for a 
rational development. Second, it is rationality itself, in the form of moral self-criticism and sentimental aspiration 
to what is admirable, that tries to determine what is really normative for the human person and what are 
tendencies and signs that need to be developed. In a striking passage in “The Law of Mind,” Peirce explains this 
dynamic: 
 
growth comes only from love, from – I will not say self-sacrifice, but from the impulse to fulfill 
another's highest impulse. Suppose, for example, that I have an idea that interests me. It is my 
creature; for as shown in last July's Monist, it is a little person. I love it; and I will sink myself in 
perfecting it. It is not by dealing out cold justice to the circle of my ideas that I can make them grow, 
but by cherishing and tending them as I would the flowers in my garden. The philosophy we draw 
from John's gospel is that this is the way mind develops … . Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in 
the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely. (EP1: 354)35 
 
We can now answer the question about the link between aesthetics as science of the normative habits of 
feeling and aesthetics as the science of the Summum Bonum. The top-down action attractive dynamic of the 
reasonable ideal is experienced in its vagueness in an affective way. However, according to Peirce, this is a 
genuine cognition as well, insofar it brings in itself the power of 3rdness and aspires to further acknowledgments 
and determinations in other cognitions. Peirce writes that the three categories “appear under their forms of 
                                                            
34 Ahti-Veikko 2012 has given an interpretation of Peirce's norms in the light of a game-theoretic semantics. Although insightful, this 
interpretation is subject to a dangerous ambiguity. If Ahti-Veikko means that for Peirce the “rules” or “norms” developed in the NS 
are only “defining rules” and “strategic rules,” then Ahyi-Veikko is wrong. A GTS is mainly formal. On the contrary, Peirce's NS are 
not a formal analysis of the structure of a norm, but they rather establish what ought to be done in human conduct (“norms”). As a 
matter of fact, there can be different rule-governed semantic games. Peirce's four different methods of fixing a belief clearly exemplify 
this fact. The simple appeal to GTS is taken by Ahti-Veikko as an exhaustive account of Peirce's thesis that “ethics provides grounds 
or support for logic.” However, Ahti-Veikko's view is too narrow if it aims to be a complete account of Peirce's stance. 
35 See also Peirce's claim that the Agapastic dynamic of evolution functions through the mediation of an “aesthetic experience”, EP1: 
363-364; 369. See on this Ventimiglia 2003, who analyzes the abductive structure of the developmental teleology of the human being 
once it becomes self-controlled agency.  
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Thirdness in the ideas of Signs of Firstness, or Feeling, i.e., things of beauty; Signs of Secondness, or Action, i.e., 
modes of conduct; and signs of Thirdness, or Thought, i.e., forms of thought” (EP2: 272). The first fashion in 
which the ideal of reasonableness operates in the life of human beings is as a feeling of beauty, whose aspiration 
is to grow into a more determined life made of good actions and true beliefs.36 However, according to Peirce, the 
first steps of the development of a personal rational ideal are more or less of the nature of an affective 
meditation. He writes, “a man will from time to time review his ideals. This process is not a job that man sits 
down and to do and have done with. The experience of life is continually contributing instances more or less 
illuminative. These are digested first not in the man's consciousness but in the depths of his reasonable being. 
The results come to consciousness later. But meditation seems to agitate a mass of tendencies and allow them 
more quickly to settle down so as to be really more conformed to what is fit for the man” (EP2: 248).37 
 
 
 
1.9. The Unity of NS Virtues Resulting from the Reference to the Ultimate Ideal 
 
The esthetical virtues, due to their common reference to the ultimate ideal, give unity to all human conduct 
and experience, and also cast some light on the claim that the normative facts developed by the NS have to be 
understood as a system. It is the ultimate ideal that has the ultimate architectonic function and, as a consequence, 
that shapes every manifestation of the life of an individual. Thus, Peirce writes that 
 
if a man's whole life is animated by a desire …, there is a general character in all his actions, which is 
not caused by, but it's formative of, his behaviour. (EP2: 72) 
 
It is for this reason that according to Peirce aesthetics, the theory of the admirable in itself, is the core of the 
NS (EP2: 379). Peirce's claim, then, can be interpreted in continuity with the traditional doctrine of virtue, 
according to which the different virtues cannot be understood (and developed) in isolation, but rather are the 
various facets of the same human flourishing. In tis way, the ultimate ideal is a composite whole, which includes 
cognitive, affective, and in general practical “reasonable” dispositions (e.g. CP 5.132; MS310, 1903). I would 
interpret in this sense the complex passage in which Peirce tries to define the nature of the “esthetically good” – 
namely, the ultimate end –, in the light of the category of Firstness. He argues “an object, to be esthetically good, 
must have a multitude of parts so related to one another as to impart a positive simple immediate quality to their 
totality” (EP2: 201; see also 379). Peirce also adds that the ideal “may be a complicated state of things. But it 
must be a single ideal; it must have unity” (EP 2: 253). Obviously, the aesthetic, self-sufficient character of the 
ultimate ideal branches out into every aspect of human activity. 
 
 
 
                                                            
36 In a passage about the nature of “pleasure and pain” in the “Neglected Argument,” Peirce shows how this teleological approach is 
fundamental to his view of human being's life. He asks whether pleasure and pain “are … mere qualities of feeling,” or “rather motor 
instincts attracting us to some feelings and repelling others” (EP2: 438). Peirce believes that this question produces a shit from a mere 
psychological viewpoint to a more broadly metaphysical one. In other words: if we realize through experimental observation that 
“pleasure” and “pain” are not mere brutal reaction to a state of affair, but show instead a general tendency of response to certain 
objects, we are led to pose a metaphysical question: does this empirical fact mean that affective response is governed by a general final 
cause? What is the nature of this final cause? Does this teleological phenomenon imply the operation of a rational power throughout 
mind and reality? Does it have a vocation to a more reasonable development? A feeling of “pleasure” can be therefore the sign which, 
if undergoes the adequate growth, can become the mark of a greater good. Peirce also says that not only conventional signs are 
legisigns, that is, signs capable of being developed into general habits. He writes: “Every conventional sign is a legisign, [but not 
conversely]” (CP 2.246). This is another strong clue of the fact that according to Peirce the circular movement of love in 
“anticipating” the ideal through an affective cognition and developing it into more determinate cognitions is not the product of 
conventions but is regulated by a metaphysical teleology. 
37  In his review of Pearson's Grammar of Science (EP2: 57-66) in 1901, Peirce produces an interesting classification of the human ends. In 
1903, Peirce reconsiders this classification “An Attempted Classification of Ends” (CP 1.586-88), that constitutes a reworking of the 
piece of 1901. Lizska (2012: 60-61) classifies these ends dividing them in “iconic” (based on repetition of similar actions), “indexical” 
(based on response to a command of some sort), and “symbolic” (critical and generalizable standards). The teleological nature of the 
emergence of good ends that I have tried to show belongs to Lizska's third class of ends.  
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2. The Pragmatic Maxim and the Normative Sciences: Peirce’s Problematical Fourth Grade of 
Clarity 
The aim of this section is to show that Peirce maintained a twofold attitude toward his “pragmatic maxim.” I 
call this twofold approach problematical not because it is the origin of inconsistencies in Peirce’s thought, but only 
because the collocation and use of the pragmatic maxim constituted a genuine “problem” on which Peirce 
continued to reflect over the years. My general claim is that Peirce, from the first clear statement of the 
pragmatic maxim in 1878 to its later formulations, assumed two different approaches about the use and the task 
of the pragmatic maxim. According to the first approach, Peirce through the maxim is pursuing a pragmatic-
explicating task (PET), while the second approach corresponds to the use of the maxim for a pragmatic-normative 
task (PNT). Generally speaking, PET coincides with using the pragmatic maxim as a mere tool of semantic 
disambiguation of a proposition whatsoever in its “third” level of clarity. On the other hand, PNT coincides with 
the use of the pragmatic maxim as a tool for obtaining the pragmatic meanings of only those propositions that fit 
the normative ideal of the “development of concrete reasonableness.” Peirce refers to this latter case as a grade 
of clarity higher than the third grade. Hence, I call this grade of clarity the fourth grade of clarity, following 
Krolikowki 1964. While PET aims to bring about the semantic disambiguation of every proposition, PNT 
intends to produce only true propositions and unconditioned prescriptions.  
As I will show, the point of passage from the first approach to the second approach is marked by the role and 
weight that Peirce attributes to the connection between the pragmatic maxim and the “Normative Sciences” 
(NS). Among Peirce scholars, Vincent G. Potter has clearly spelled out this connection when he asked in 1967: 
“Just how did Peirce’s speculation concerning the normative sciences modify his thinking about the meaning of 
his 1878 statement” of the pragmatic maxim (Potter 1967:53)? Many other interpreters have acknowledged the 
development of the maxim as a “principle of logic” and, therefore, as a normative methodological principle in 
scientific inquiry once logic became clearly for Peirce the first of the Normative Sciences. I would mention here 
in particular Richard S. Robin’s 1997 challenging reconstruction of the development of Peirce’s conception of 
pragmatism, which is somehow paradigmatic of the best Peirce scholarship on this point: 
Apart from the reversal of the justificatory roles of logic and psychology, what basis was there in 
psychology for thinking that all human beings ever want are sensible or practical results? Doesn’t 
science in the pure practice of it aim at something else? Doesn’t ethics demand a loftier ideal? […] 
Precisely this kind of questioning forced the reconsideration that eventually led Peirce to a 
reformulation of pragmatism. Originally, the pragmatic maxim was a logical rule for the clarification of 
concepts in terms of conceivable practical bearings … . The new formulation mentions a higher grade 
of clarity [the fourth level of clarity]. This reformulation of the original maxim avoided earlier 
psychologizing, […] and articulated a higher ideal for human motivation than personal satisfaction. 
Peirce effectively transformed pragmatism into pragmaticism … . (1997: 141)38 
Although insightful because of the acknowledgment of the role played by the Normative Sciences in Peirce’s 
understanding of the pragmatic maxim, I think there is evidence against the idea of a sharp passage from an early 
conception of the maxim (“the pragmatic maxim was a logic rule for the clarification of concepts,” emphasis 
added) to a later, normative one (“the new formulation mentions a higher grade of clarity,” emphasis added). 
Rather, I believe that PET and PNT are two souls or approaches to the maxim that Peirce develops over time 
without annihilating their mutual tension. In particular, I find three flaws in the usual readings of the link 
between the pragmatic maxim and the normative sciences, including Robin’s. (i) First, the link between the 
maxim and the normative is usually considered only external, in the sense that it is limited to the fact that the 
maxim attains the clear role of a normative principle of logic as a tool of semantic disambiguation, PET (Misak 
1995: 92; Brunning 1997: 9; Hookway 2002: 60). On the contrary, I claim that Peirce’s mature use of the maxim 
                                                            
38 See also Conway (2008: 290): “The derivation of the Normative Sciences is an irresistible question. Vincent Potter discovers twin 
sources: (1) Peirce’s cosmological speculations of the 1880’s and 1890’s and (2) his continual refining of the Pragmatic Maxim, i.e., 
that the meaning of a concept consists of its practical consequences. The results of these were (1) the Normative Sciences in 1903, 
and (2) a new brand of pragmatism in 1905, i.e., “pragmaticism,” which additionally incorporated: thought considered as action; a 
summum bonum of concrete reasonableness and an instinctive belief in God, both developed from the esthetic activity of Musement; 
and a requisite emphasis on the “rational purport” or teleology of humans.” 
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tends to include also an internal link to normativity, as it is displayed by PNT and the fourth level of clarity, in the 
sense that the normative use of the maxim becomes a tool for obtaining the pragmatic meanings of only those 
propositions that fit the normative ideal of the “development of concrete reasonableness.” (ii) Second, it is 
usually claimed either that there has always been a mix of normative and explicating approach in Peirce’s 
understanding of the maxim (Sorensen 2009: 178-179; Olshewsky 1983: 200, Parker 1998: 196; Shapiro 1995: 
305; Apel 1981: 72; Apel 1995: 383), or that at least after 1902 Peirce takes a normative turn that represents a 
radical novelty in respect to his earlier understanding of the maxim (Robin 1997; Conway 2009: 290; Potter 1967: 
54-55).39 On the contrary, I claim that there is evidence to claim that also after 1902 Peirce after does not want 
the main task of the maxim to become PTN, but remains faithful to the “purity” of PET. Why is that? Why is 
Peirce interested in maintaining the priority in pragmaticism of the pragmatic-explicating task of the maxim? As I 
will show, I believe that the reason is the following: while PNT aims to clarify potentially all the pragmatic 
meanings of exclusively those representations which further the development of concrete reasonableness, it is only 
PET that is potentially able to unpack all the possible meanings of all the possible representations of reality 
(including the false ones). In other words, since it is from the dissatisfactory character of a bad interpretation of a 
sign that the good interpretations of that sign can eventually emerge, Peirce remains faithful to a semantic 
perspective which guarantees the clarification of all the possibilities of meaning of all signs, including those 
representations that are bad representations. (iii) This brings me to the third flaw of the traditional interpretation, 
which is in my opinion more a partiality than a serious flaw, moreover justified by the philosophical temper of 
the twentieth century. What Peirce scholarship has usually stressed is the difference between Peirce’s pragmatic 
maxim and the verificationism of logical positivism. In this light, Peirce would be a “fallibilist,” not a 
“verificationist” of the type of logical positivism, as claimed by A. J. Ayer in his 1968 interpretation (1968: 44; 
49). The natural consequence of this concern has been to stress the fact that what mainly distinguishes Peirce 
from the logical positivists is his modal ontology articulated as “scholastic realism,” with particular reference to 
the reality of “universals,” in the sense of laws and general dispositions (Fitzgerald 1966: 96; Misak 1995: 91; 104; 
Moore 1971; Shapiro 1973: 25; Smyth 1977). Peirce himself laments as early as 1893 the “materialistic” tendency 
of his 1878 formulation of the maxim (see 5.402, n.2) and will explicitly reject its nominalistic flavor in mature 
texts such as “Issue of Pragmaticism” (EP2: 346-359, 1905). Although this is a most important aspect of Peirce’s 
pragmatism, this interpretative tendency has caused that the importance of possibility has been overlooked in 
understanding what the pragmatic maxim brings about. In fact, possibility is not synonym of generality. I would 
say that possibility is dependent upon generality. It is true that Peirce’s maxim defines meaning in terms of 
subjunctive conditionals and therefore counterfactuals. It is also true that, since counterfactuals are also 
possibilities, it might sound false that the importance of possibility has been usually overlooked. However, what I 
claim is that for Peirce the class of possibility includes both what could happen if C occurred and what ought to happen 
unconditionally, and that of course the two subclasses do not coincide. While PET highlights the former subclass 
of possibility, PNT brings to light the second one. I proceed as follows. 
 
 
 
2.1. The Pragmatic-Explicating Task of the Maxim and Its Two Formulations 
 
In its more basic use, the pragmatic maxim is a tool of semantic disambiguation of a proposition p. This is 
what I call the use of the maxim for a pragmatic-explicating task (PET). Peirce writes that “pragmatism” is “a 
mere maxim of logic instead of a sublime principle of speculative philosophy” (EP2: 125, 1903). As a tool for the 
identification of the meaning of a proposition, PET aims to distinguish meaningless propositions, which are 
simply “metaphysical rubbish” or “gibberish,” from meaningful propositions, which are provided with a “plain, 
practical definition” (CP 8.191; see also “meaningless gibberish – one word being defined by other words, and 
they by still others, without any real conception ever being reached”, CP EP2: 338-339; CP 5.423, 1905). In order 
to explain this point, I will mainly draw on two different formulations of the maxim, the first contained in 1878 
“How to Make Our ideas Clear,” the second written in 1903 “The Maxim of Pragmatism,” the first of the 
                                                            
39  I take Potter’s view to be of particular interest not only for its insightfulness, but also for a mistake that it contains, i.e. the merging of 
the notion of “generality” governing individuals and “normativity.” See in particular Potter (1967: 54-55; 58; 60-63). 
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Harvard Lectures of the same year. The first formulation is the conditional-mood formulation, while the second is the 
imperative-mood formulation. Let us start with the conditional-mood formulation. As it is known, the 1878 
formulation of the pragmatic maxim reads: “Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical 
bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole 
of our conception of the object” (EP1: 132). We can harmlessly extend the notion of “conception” to the idea of 
a proposition, taking it to mean a representation of an object. Therefore, Peirce points out as early as 1878 that a 
proposition p can be comprehended at different grades of clarity. The application of the maxim allows the 
interpreter to have access to the “third” grade of clarity, the pragmatic meaning of p, when the same interpreter 
already understands p at a lower level of clarity. The first two levels of clarity described in “How to Make Our 
Ideas Clear” are the “familiarity” with p and the capacity of “logical analysis” of p. In other words, in order to 
grasp the meaning of a proposition at the first grade of clarity, an interpreter must be able to (1) pick out at least 
one instance of the object signified by that proposition (“familiarity,” EP1: 124-125; 136), while to know p at a 
second level of clarity, she must be able to (2) give a verbal definition of the content of the same proposition 
(“logical analysis,” EP1: 125-126; 136). The application of the maxim manifests the third level of clarity, the 
“pragmatic” understanding of p (EP1: 132; see also CP 3.457, 1897). Peirce's own understanding of the maxim 
develops over time. As early as 1893, Peirce voices his perplexities about the “materialistic” and nominalistic 
tendencies of his first formulation, which are explicitly corrected in the following years, up to the last 
formulation of the maxim in 1913 “An Essay toward Improving Our Reasoning in Security and Uberty” (EP2: 
463-474). I would synthesize the tenets of Peirce’s correction of his early formulation in the following three 
points. First, the “practical bearings” of a proposition and “what is tangible and practical” (EP1: 131) are not 
limited to instances of empiricistically understood sense-data and observation (see Quine’s interpretation), but 
include a very broad notion of “experience,” which admits also mathematical, aesthetic, moral, and religious 
“perceptions.” Second, the practical bearings should not be understood as mere instances of action, or 
2ndnesses, but as general dispositions of agency, or 3rdnesses (e.g. EP2: 341; 347, 1905). Third, the maxim, once 
explicated in its logical nature of a subjunctive conditional, covers counterfactual reality: in other words, it does 
not refer only to the actual interpretations of a sign that will take place in the future (“will-be”), but also to the 
possible interpretations of a sign of an object (“may-be” or “might-be”) that would follow from the general 
dispositions of that object (“would-be”) if counterfactual conditions C occurred (EP2: 401-402, 1907, CP 5.467; 
EP2: 354). 
Although the tenets of Peirce’s mature understanding of the maxim become clearer over the years, Peirce was 
already cultivating them in 1878. A single quotations displays all of them: “To develop its meaning, we have, 
therefore, simply to determine what habits it produces, for what a thing means is simply what habits it involves. 
Now, the identity of a habit depends on how it might lead us to act, not merely under such circumstances as are 
like to arise, but under such as might possibly occur, no matter how improbable they may be” (EP1: 131, 1878). 
Given this historical reconstruction, I would render the conditional-mood formulation of the pragmatic maxim 
in the following way: 
 
Given all the possibilities of an object O, which depend upon its general dispositions, (P1) if an agent 
assumed as true in a belief B a representation p of O (Bp), and (P2) if the same agent pursued one of all the 
possibilities of purpose that she could endorse, (C) then the meaning of p coincides with that specific disposition 
to act that the agent would have in this context. 
 
There are two aspects of Peirce’s understanding of the maxim that this formulation makes explicit. The first 
one is the fact that the “belief” in p, genuine or merely artificial, is a necessary condition of possibility for the 
application of the maxim to p, as it is displayed in P1. Simply put, if p is neither believed nor assumed as true by 
an agent, there can be no “practical bearing” of p on that agent. Peirce clarifies this point when he points out the 
difference between two different propositional states or acts, apprehending p and believing p (on this, see 
Hookway 1985: 128 ff.; Hookway 2002: 62 ff.; Maddalena 2009: 121-132). The nature of a belief, i.e. Bp, is a 
disposition to act, or readiness to act upon p when the right circumstances occur, so that p performs the function 
of a “maxim of conduct” (EP2: 139, 1903). In Peirce’s terms, what a belief is traces back to the “act of 
judgment,” which is in turn essentially connected to the act of “assertion” of p (EP2: 140) or “acceptance” of p. 
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We read that: “a judgment is an act of a formation of a mental proposition combined with an adoption of it or 
act of assent to it” (EP2: 191, 1903). Judgments of assent or adoption imply an operation of self-control and 
therefore an acceptance of p in the light of epistemic, ethical, and ultimately aesthetical standards. Asserting that 
p has the form of an “affidavit” or a “bet” on the truth of p (EP2: 140; see also EP2: 200, 1903) and is therefore 
different from the mere apprehending p, in which no commitment to the consequences of p is present. From the 
context in which the distinction between asserting p and apprehending p is formulated in “The Pragmatic 
Maxim” (EP2: 140, 1903), it seems clear that while in the case of apprehension of p all the possibilities of 
meaning should be considered (also when p is false), the assertion of p implies, at least tentatively, the bet on p 
because he thinks that p is true and the contextual distinction of the truth of p from the falsity of non-p. While 
apprehension includes the meaning of all the possible propositions, assertion establishes a difference between 
what is considered true and what is not; it refers only to the meaning of true propositions, and therefore to a 
subclass of the meanings potentially disclosed by apprehension. 
The second aspect that the conditional-mood formulation manages to display is present in P2 and is the 
purposeful nature of the semeiotic process. As Short has made clear, interpretation of “intellectual concepts” 
(EP2: 402), such as a proposition, is a teleological process, at least in the sense that the interpreter is always 
guided by a specific goal in interpreting a sign (1981: 213). Although I believe that according to Peirce the 
teleological nature of semeiosis cannot be reduced to the goals of the interpreter, it is also true that this is a 
fundamental aspect in order to understand Peirce’s account of the maxim. 
Before moving to the imperative-mood formulation of the maxim, it is important to stress a further point. 
The revolutionary import of the pragmatic maxim relies in the tenet that the pragmatic unpacking of the 
meaning of p is not an enhanced verbal definition of p in which the only concepts allowed are concepts 
semantically related to the dimension of human practice. As Kelly Parker underscores, the “third” level of clarity 
of a concept is not provided by a “super-dictionary” in which objects are described in practical concepts (1998: 
182). On the contrary, the pragmatic maxim brings to light the fact that when an interpreter commits herself to 
p, the consequence is a fundamental “readiness” to behave is a certain determinate way, of which the ability of 
picking out instances of p and articulating verbal definitions of p are only sectorial cases. This point is also 
supported by the development of Peirce's semeiotic, with particular reference to the classification of the 
interpretants. Peirce came to the conclusion that the “ultimate” meaning or interpretant of a sign is not a further 
sign but is a habit of interpretation (e.g. EP 2: 430). When he talks about the “living definition” of a sign, Peirce 
refers to the habits of interpretation that a sufficient consideration of that sign would produce in the interpreter. 
As late as 1908, Peirce writes that the third level of clarity in the interpretation of a sign is its “living 
comprehension” (EP2: 448), i.e., an interpreter whose semeiotic dispositions allow her to correctly interpret that 
sign every time the occasion to do so occurs. Therefore, the third level of clarity of a proposition brought about 
by the maxim is not a super-definition of that proposition obtained through a special class of concepts (i.e. 
concepts referring to human agency), but it coincides rather with the semeiotic habits themselves developed by 
the interpreter, which include dispositions of affection, thought, and conduct in general. The 1903 formulation 
of the pragmatic maxim highlights this point in a clearer way. It reads: 
 
Pragmatism is the principle that every theoretical judgment expressible in a sentence in the 
indicative mood is a confused form of thought whose only meaning, if it has any, lies in its tendency 
to enforce a corresponding practical maxim expressible as a conditional sentence having its apodosis 
in the imperative mood. (EP 2: 135) 
 
The prescriptive language used by Peirce in the imperative-mood formulation of the maxim, although 
rigorous, can be misleading. Does the apodosis of the conditional represent a norm, such as the ones elaborated 
in the NS? I do not think so. In this formulation of the maxim, Peirce makes use of a prescriptive language only 
to show that being ready to act in a determinate way given C (disposition of action) implies that in C the 
interpreter would coincide with an agent who has a certain type of purpose, X. In other words, the pragmatic 
meaning of a proposition can be expressed in the language of practical knowledge, which is prescriptive in 
nature. Once highlighted in its fundamental connection to human agency, the meaning of a proposition is what 
orients the agent's deeds, aims to guide her actions and therefore “prescribes.” This is the typical logical structure 
of every practical judgment, also of those practical judgments that are not good from the viewpoint of the NS. 
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Also other authors who have stressed the importance of practical knowledge, from Immanuel Kant to John 
Searle, have recurred to the same “prescriptive” language. Therefore, when Peirce wants to analyze the 
intellectual meaning of p in relations to what an agent “means” to do, he appeals to the imperative-mood 
formulation. The ought-to formulation has the advantage over the former formulation insofar as it spells out that 
the “third” level of clarity of a proposition is not an enhanced verbal definition (in which instead of concepts of 
“objects” appear concepts of “human actions”) but is the real readiness to act in such and such a way when the 
opportune circumstances occur (this readiness is real also if it is not expressed in verbal definitions). I would 
express the imperative-mood formulation of the maxim in the following way: 
 
Given all the possibilities of an object O, which depend upon its general dispositions, (P1) if you assume a 
representation p of O in a belief (Bp), and (P2) if you pursue an end E, where E is one of all the possible 
possibilities of purpose you could pursue, (C) then you ought to do X. X is the meaning of p in this context. 
 
It is fundamental to stress the fact here that the imperative-mood formulation is still a rendition of the 
pragmatic maxim understood as a mere tool of semantic disambiguation. Therefore, it coincides with the 
pragmatic-explicating use of the maxim. This formulation not only allows for an explication of the action-guiding 
function of the meaning of p when it is revealed in its import for practical knowledge, but also for the purposive 
nature of semeiotic processes. The two formulations are equivalent in content and change only in the way in 
which they highlight the nature of the pragmatic meaning. 
 
 
 
2.2. The Tension between the Pragmatic-Explicating Task and the Pragmatic-Normative Task of 
the Maxim 
 
An account of the maxim as a mere pragmatic-explicating tool is subject to an internal tension toward a more 
specific task, which I call the pragmatic-normative task (PNT). This internal instability is well expressed in a 1907 
passage, in which Peirce writes: 
 
Suffice it to say once more that pragmatism is, in itself, no doctrine of metaphysics, no attempt to 
determine any truth of things. It is merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and 
of abstract concepts. All pragmatists of whatsoever stripe will cordially assent to that statement. As to 
the ulterior and indirect effects of practicing the pragmatistic method, that is quite another affair. All 
pragmatists will further agree that their method of ascertaining the meanings of words and concepts is 
no other than that experimental method by which all the successful sciences (in which number 
nobody in his senses would include metaphysics) have reached the degrees of certainty that are 
severally proper to them today; – this experimental method being itself nothing but a particular 
application of an older logical rule, “By their fruits ye shall know them.” (EP 2: 400-401)  
 
Peirce apparently introduces here the distinction between (1) the pragmatic maxim in itself, understood as a 
semantic device for a pragmatic-explicating task, and (2) the practice of the “pragmatistic method,” that is 
something “ulterior and indirect” if confronted to PET. Peirce adds that the pragmatistic method corresponds to 
the experimental method and that the experimental method is a type of verificationism in which the 
consequences of a hypothesis should be tested through “experience.” This appeal to experience, called by Peirce 
“scientific method” in 1878, has as its typical characteristic the task of producing “true” beliefs and ascertain 
what is “real” (EP1: 120-123) and it is normatively defined by this alethic aim. It seems clear from the passage 
that the maxim is a part of the scientific method, although science goes beyond the mere use of the maxim. The 
question is therefore: when used in the context of the scientific inquiry, is the maxim only used in a pragmatic-
explicating fashion or tends to a further, normative application? Moreover, if the maxim tends to a normative 
application, does it produce a new level of clarity in the meaning of a proposition? 
I take the pragmatic-normative task of the maxim to mean something very precise. As we have seen, Peirce 
presents the pragmatic maxim also in the form of a prescription. However, this is not enough for having PNT. 
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As a matter of fact, it is possible to formulate PET in the form of a conditional in which the apodosis has 
prescriptive form. On the contrary, the necessary and sufficient condition for PNT is that a “norm” appears as 
one of the conditions expressed in the protasis. “Norm” means one of the ethically good and aesthetically 
admirable purposes established in the normative sciences. The Summum Bonum, which Peirce identifies with the 
purpose of development of the concrete reasonableness, is unconditionally normative for the human agency, and 
as a consequence also the more specific purposes covered by it (such as the pursuit of truth in inquiry) share the 
same normative condition. In the light of these considerations, PNT is formulable in the conditional-mood and 
in the imperative-mood. The conditional-mood formulation reads as follows: 
 
Given all the possibilities of an object O, which depend upon its general dispositions, (P1) if an agent 
believed p, where p is a representation of O (Bp), and (P2) if the same agent pursued one of the good purposes 
established in the NS, then (C) the meaning of p coincides with that specific resolution to act X that the agent 
would have in that context. 
 
While formulated in the imperative-mood, PNT is: 
 
Given all the possibilities of an object O, which depend upon its general dispositions, (P1) if you believe p, 
where p is a representation of O (Bp), (P2) since you ought to pursue E, where E is one of the normative 
possibilities of purpose you could pursue established in the NS, (C) then you ought to do X. In this context, X is 
the meaning of p. 
Peirce’s two approaches to the pragmatic maxim are therefore determined by the relevance of normative 
concerns in the use of the pragmatic maxim. I am not only referring to the fact that the use of the maxim is 
claimed to be normative for scientific inquiry. As I mentioned, normativity relates to the pragmatic maxim in two 
ways: (1) in an external way, if the use of the maxim, also simply as PET, is normative; (2) in an internal way, if 
normativity appears as a logical component of the maxim, so that PTN requires the occurrence of a norm in the 
protasis. In the latter case, PNT, the role of normativity does not relate only to the use of the maxim, but also to 
its formulation. In the former case, PET, the pragmatic maxim does not admit normative concerns among its 
conditions. We have therefore: 
(1) PET does not put any limit to the conditions under which the meaning of p is made explicit 
While, on the contrary, 
(2) PNT puts some restraints to the conditions under which the meaning of p is made explicit.  
In particular, the essential restraint in PNT is a practical tie: the purposes of the agent involved in the 
hypothetical conduct upon Bp cannot be all the possible purposes that an agent can endorse, but only “good” 
ends from a normative viewpoint.  
Let us think about the following example. Peirce claims sometimes that the genuine man of science is not 
guided in his inquiry by practical or applicative concerns.40 What we see here is not a pragmatic clarification of 
the idea of “science” through PET (what a given conception of “science” means at its third level of clarity), but 
an unpacking of the same notion through PNT (what the notion of “science” ought to mean in its third level of 
clarity). If we were to formulate in an extended form the idea of “science” through PNT, the “norm” that would 
occur in the protasis would be “you simply ought to pursue the truth” (indeed, refusing the goal of the pursuit of 
truth turns the practice of inquiry into something totally different from “science”) and the apodosis would be a 
contextual application of the prescription “you ought not to be mainly concerned with applicative concerns.”41 
                                                            
40 See e.g. “the investigator who does not stand aloof from all intent to make practical applications, will not only obstruct the advance of 
the pure science, but what is infinitely worse, he will endanger his own moral integrity and that of his readers” (EP2: 29, 1898). 
41 Some interpreters read Peirce's statements as a declaration of the absolute independence of scientific experimentation from any ethical 
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Only PNT can disclose to the agent a use of the maxim that can serve human agency without contradicting 
the epistemic, ethical, and aesthetical norms of conduct. The Kantian distinction between a hypothetical practical 
maxim and the categorical imperative can work here as a clarification. Interestingly, Peirce remarks that “the 
instant that an esthetic ideal is proposed as an ultimate end of action, at that instant a categorical imperative 
pronounces for or against it” (EP2: 202). If PET translates into a hypothetical imperative, only PNT corresponds 
to a categorical imperative. As a matter of fact, only if a norm occurs in the protasis, the prescription that is 
produced in the apodosis is an unconditioned, “categorical,” prescription.   The shift from PET to PNT is not 
only in the conditions (a good purpose must appear among C), but also in the “result,” that is, in the nature of 
what is prescribed in the apodosis: in the former case, it is any purpose whatsoever, expressed in a prescriptive 
language, would result from C if we believe p; in the latter case, it is only the good and admirable purpose, always 
expressed in a prescriptive language, that would result from C if we believe p. 
What is more important here is to clarify my initial claim that PET is subject to an internal instability, or 
tension toward PNT.42 I believe that the second approach naturally emerges from the first approach, or that it is 
already implicit, although in a germinal way, in the first approach. I find at least three reasons for which I claim 
that Peirce's PET has a natural inclination toward PNT. (1) First, since the general condition of possibility for 
the application of the maxim to p is that Bp is genuinely given or assumed, the context to which the maxim can 
be applied entails a self-controlled act of acceptance that develops and applies standards of acceptance. (2) 
Second, semeiosis is a purposeful process and purposes tend naturally to become subject to self-criticism and a 
normative viewpoint. (3) Third, the justification of the pragmatic maxim as a normative principle of logic, i.e. the 
external relation between pragmatic maxim and normativity, tends to transform the maxim from PET to PNT. 
In fact, since the use of the maxim is normative because it better realizes the normative goal of the pursuit of 
truth, the application of the maxim entails the acceptance of the unconditioned normativity of the end “you 
ought to pursue the truth,” which becomes part of the protasis of the application of the maxim. 
Let us consider the three reasons in order. (1) In the first place, as we have seen, the only general condition of 
possibility for the application of the maxim to p is that p is the content of a belief, genuine or made-up. In fact, if 
p were not taken to be the content of a belief, than it would not be possible to analyze what the “practical 
consequences” of p would be. Since Bp requires an act of acceptance, if the belief is genuine, the act of 
acceptance presupposes an “inquiry”, or “consideration,” in the plausibility of p. This act of acceptance is an 
“assertion” of a proposition, which involves “the deliberate exercise, in uttering a proposition, of a force tending 
to determine a belief in it in the mind of the interpreter” (NEM4: 248-249; see also CP 5.546, 1908). A genuine 
“judgment” implies to take a stance in relation to the proposition that is judged and its consequences (CP 5.547). 
That is, a genuine Bp implies the production/assumption of standards of acceptability and the act of acceptance 
of what conforms to these standards, in this case, p. In other words, a genuine belief essentially requires self-
control, and self-controlled acts are performed in the light of “norms.” The issue of belief leads to the problem 
of self-control and normative standpoint. Assertion entails “taking responsibility” in the proposition accepted by 
the mind (CP 2.315; 5.546-547). In 1906 “Prolegomena to an Apology of Pragmaticism,” Peirce writes: “it is self-
control which makes any other than the normal course of thought possible, just as anything else makes any other 
than the normal course of action possible; and just as it is precisely that that gives room for an ought-to-be of 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
concern. Although some passages can lead to such a conclusion, I think that that is neither Peirce's conclusion, nor what logically 
follows from his claims. Peirce's claims are methodological considerations about the specific formal object of each NS. That “logic” 
ought to be governed by the “pursuit of truth” and nothing else is the (verbal) definition of inquiry in terms of practical 
consequences. Peirce is establishing the ultimate goal of conduct in inquiry, not the ultimate goal of conduct in general. Since inquiry 
also reveals moral and aesthetic truths (“truths” about moral and aesthetic reality), and since the human being is never only a scientific 
inquirer, the actual practice of scientific inquiry will also be subject to the normative authority of broader ethical and aesthetical 
norms.  
42  See Colapietro (1997a: 264); Poggiani 2012; also Pihlstrom (2012: 18-19). However, I do not find in Pihlstrom an argument for 
clarifying these two aspects. I take the only clarification that is found in Pihlstrom to be wrong and somehow anti-Peircean: “In turn, 
modal realism, again pragmatically articulated … may have a crucial moral motivation [so far, so good because ambiguous]. Thus, a 
modal metaphysics, by articulating a categorical scheme needed in ethics, may ultimately be in the service of the good life, and this fact 
may, reflexively, count as an ethical consideration in its favor [wrong]”.” How should we understand the “ethical relevance of our 
metaphysical commitments”? How should we take the pragmatic “deep entanglement of metaphysics and ethics”? The present 
section is also aimed to improve/correct the perplexities/mistakes contained in the following statement: “The metaphysics of 
modality can, and of course usually is, conducted in abstraction from any ethical concerns, and probably most modal metaphysicians 
would find the introduction of such concerns in this context absurd. The pragmatist, however, views the matter quite differently. Any 
metaphysical commitments we make are ethically grounded, especially in Jamesian (if not so clearly in Peircean) pragmatism.” 
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conduct, I mean Morality, so it equally gives room for an ought-to-be of thought, which is Right Reason; and 
where there is no self-control, nothing but the normal is possible” (CP 4.540, 1906). Since PET explicates 
propositions believed to be true, the pragmatic-explicating use carries within itself a natural vocation to a 
normative perspective. “Belief,” being the deliberate, mental act through which we aim to distinguish what is true 
from what is false, cannot be fully accounted just through an unpacking/analysis of what is the meaning of the 
proposition believed; rather, a full consideration of the act of belief and of the proposition believed has to deal with the 
normative dimension of human conduct; as a consequence, in order to fix the true meaning of an object, we 
cannot just ask what we are prepared to do (actual belief), but rather what we ought to be prepared to do 
(normative belief). 
(2) In the second place, according to Peirce, all the purposes hold by agents tend to become subject to a 
developmental process of normativity. Since semeiotic processes are purposeful processes, and since the 
application of the maxim requires the interpreter’s purpose among its condition, it follows that PET tends to 
turn into PNT. Although there is a great deal of evidence for this point in Peirce’s treatment of the normative 
sciences, I find the most striking example of this developmental emergence of a normative perspective from a 
pre-normative one in 1877 “The Fixation of Belief.” I have already analyzed this text, so there is no need to 
repeat myself in this section. It is only important here to stress that at an inchoate level of development, the 
establishment of what is normative does not have the systematic and fully deliberate character resulting from the 
NS (the pragmatic maxim as a deliberate tool of inquiry, or leading principle), since we are assuming that at this 
time the pragmatic maxim has not reached yet a full-fledged formulation. The use of a logical strategy later 
described as “pragmatic maxim” would be the outcome, in the mind of the inquirer, of the end of pursuing the 
truth. Of course, at this level the normativity of the pursuit of truth would be established without analyzing such 
a concept at its third level of clarity. 
(3) In the third place, PET tends to become PNT because the unconditional normativity of the “pursuit of 
truth,” which is the ground for the normativity of the use of the maxim as a tool of inquiry, tends to become one 
of the conditions of the application of the maxim itself. By talking about the normative sciences, a branch of his 
philosophy very close to the “secret of pragmatism” (EP2: 200), Peirce observes: “Now it will be admitted to be, 
at least, very likely that in order to correct or to vindicate the maxim of pragmatism, we must find out precisely 
what the logically good consists in; and it would appear from what has been said that in order to analyze the 
nature of the logically good we must first gain clear apprehension of the nature of the esthetically good and 
especially of that of the morally good” (EP2: 201; also EP2: 142). Furthermore, notice that also the reflective 
acknowledgement-establishment of the fact that the pragmatic maxim (both PET and PNT) is a norm that ought 
to be followed in inquiry is something that is found through inquiry. The same considerations for the 
development of the scientific method prove to be good for the maxim: “each chief step in science has been a 
lesson in logic” (CP 3.243, 1877); “But the method of science is itself a scientific result” (CP6.428, 1893). The 
movement is typically pragmatist: from the imprecise, unreflective explication of the meaning in pragmatic terms, 
to the reflective acknowledgment of the pragmatic meaning and the formulation of the maxim, to the 
acknowledgment of its normative value for inquiry, to the self-controlled use of the maxim at a superior level as 
a normative methodological principle. Only at this last stage of development the maxim becomes part of the 
third branch of logic, “methodeutic” (beyond “Speculative Grammar” and “Critical Logic”). The argument 
proceeds as follows: (i) if you justify the maxim because it furthers the development of concrete reasonableness, 
you accept the unconditioned value of the development of the concrete reasonableness; (ii) the application of the 
maxim is a purposeful process, just like any other semeiotic process; (iii) since you accepted the absolute value of 
the development of the concrete reasonableness in justifying the maxim, you should also accept it in each and 
every application of the maxim. In other words, the normativity of the Summum Bonum tends to slide into the 
conditions of the maxim, so that the PET is naturally inclined to develop into PNT. 
I think that there are passages in which Peirce displays such a tension. In what follows, I consider five of 
these passages, which I take to be good examples of the point I am trying to make (there might be other, such as 
CP 1.251). 
Ex. 1. “Since pragmaticism makes the purport [of a concept] to consist in a conditional proposition 
concerning conduct, a sufficiently deliberate consideration of that purport will reflect that the conditional 
conduct ought to be regulated by an ethical principle, which by further self-criticism may be made to accord with 
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an esthetical ideal” (CP 5.535, “Pragmaticism and Critical Common-Sensism”). This is the clear example of the 
tension within the pragmatic maxim. In this quotation Peirce gestures to the process through which from the 
mere apprehension of certain rules of conduct resulting from a representation the mind is teleologically led to 
assess these rules and develop “normative” criteria. A “sufficiently deliberate consideration” is the condition 
under which the agent gradually “grows” an ideal, which is at the same time ethical and esthetical. The shift from 
the mere explication of a purpose to the identification of the purposes that we ought to follow marks the 
insertion of a normative perspective.  
Ex. 2. There is an essential difference between how a sign could be translated and how a sign ought to be 
translated. This distinction is expressed in another passage, in which Peirce appeals to both the wings of the 
translatability of a sign without stressing the shift from an explicating paradigm to a normative one. “[If] the 
meaning of a symbol consists in how it might cause us to act, it is plain that this “how” cannot refer to the 
description of mechanical motions that it might cause, but must intend to refer to a description of the action as 
having this or that aim. In order to understand pragmatism, therefore, well enough to subject it to intelligent 
criticism, it is incumbent upon us to inquire what an ultimate aim, capable of being pursued in an indefinitely 
prolonged course of action, can be” (EP2: 202). The same undeclared shift is displayed in the following passage: 
“[I]f, as pragmatism teaches us, what we think is to be interpreted in terms of what we are prepared to do, then 
surely logic, or the doctrine of what we ought to think, must be an application of the doctrine of what we 
deliberately choose to do, which is Ethics” (EP2: 142). In particular, there is a difference between the habits that 
could spring out of a sign in human mind or those that ought to be developed, namely, the “ultimate” logical 
interpretants (not merely because of a truly “general description,” that is, habits, (see CP 5.3, 1902), but because 
they are the realization of the “immediate interpretants” of a sign, of its correct interpretability. This is displayed 
by the two uses of the maxim. 
Ex. 3. In “Issues of Pragamticism” (1905), we read that “Pragmaticism makes thinking to consist in the living 
inferential metaboly of symbols whose purport lies in conditional general resolutions to act” (CP 5.403, n.3). 
Then Peirce quotes the “aesthetic ideal” (“the share which God permits him to have in the work of creation”) 
and the way in which the “vir is begotten”, showing the tension again. 
Ex. 4. The problematical aspect of Peirce’s approach is displayed also in the following passage, where Peirce 
explains that the pragmatic meaning “consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which … 
would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol” (EP2: 346, Issues, CP 5.438). The problematical aspect relies in 
how to interpret the meaning of “rational.” The notion of “rational” can be taken in a the basic sense of a 
general disposition or in the more specific sense of what is normative and good: 
(1) If the meaning is what is obtained through the pragmatic-explicating use of the maxim, “rational” means 
all the general modes of conduct resulting from a deliberate acceptance of the symbol. It is obviously possible 
that the representation we have is false, so that the consequence of its acceptance is, yes, a general resolution to 
act, but a bad one. If it is bad, it is not “rational” in a normative way. If “rational” is meant to be a normative 
concept, the pragmatic-explicating use of the maxim cannot account for it. 
(2) If the meaning is what is obtained through the pragmatic-normative use of the maxim, “rational” means 
all the normative and good general modes of action resulting from the deliberate acceptance of the symbol. 
 
Ex. 5. “If the reader will turn to the original maxim of pragmaticism … he will see that the question is, not 
what did happen, but whether it would have been well to engage in any line of conduct whose successful issue 
depended upon whether that diamond would resist an attempt to scratch it, or whether all other logical means of 
determining how it ought to be classed would lead to the conclusion which, to quote the very words of that 
article, would be “the belief which alone could be the result of investigation carried sufficiently far” (it should be 
in “Issues of Pragmaticism”, CP 5.453). This is the passage in which Peirce corrects the nominalist outcomes of 
his 1878 formulation of the pragmatic maxim. The passage is also instructive since it makes clear that the maxim 
is applied in its normative and metaphysical use (although he mentions “all other logical means of determining 
how it ought to be classed …”). 
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2.3. The Pragmatic Maxim, the Normative Sciences and the Fourth Level of Clarity 
 
In the 1902 definition of “Pragmatic and Pragmatism” written for Baldwin’s Dictionary of Philosophy and 
Psychology,  
Peirce comments the use of the maxim presents a fourth level of clarity: 
 
We would venture to suggest that it [the Pragmatic Maxim] should always be put into practice 
with conscientious thoroughness, but that, when that has been done, a still higher grade of clearness 
of thought can be attained by remembering that the only ultimate good which the practical facts to 
which it directs attention can subserve is to further the development of concrete reasonableness; so 
that the meaning of the concept does not lie in any individual reactions at all, but in the manner in 
which those reactions contribute to that development. (CP 5.3, 1902) 
 
We find in this passage the seeming dichotomy previously highlighted between the use of the maxim in its 
purity (which would coincide with PET) and the method of discovery of true beliefs, here individuated in those 
beliefs and those practical ends that contribute to the development of concrete reasonableness. What is clear is 
that only true propositions and ethically good/aesthetically admirable beliefs and purposes can attain the fourth 
level of clarity.  
However, the dichotomy between PET and PNT is untenable. I have provided in the previous section some 
examples of comments on the maxim in which the internal tension of PET toward PNT is clearly displayed. In 
addition, it is clear that also the fourth level of clarity is obtained through the application of the maxim. If it is 
the pragmatic maxim that reveals the fact that the pragmatic meaning of p is of the nature of a habit, then also 
the fourth level of clarity is revealed by the maxim. As a matter of fact, the realities that contribute to the 
development of concrete reasonableness are ultimately “habits” and general dispositions and it is the pragmatic 
maxim that makes clear that the meaning of p is a habit. The only difference is that in this case the application of 
the maxim is “bounded.” The only conditions are that the protasis contains at least one unconditioned norm. 
According to the reading I have put forth, the fourth level of clarity is obtained through a procedure that is not 
foreign to the maxim, but through a particular use of the maxim, PNT. I have also claimed that PNT is a natural 
development of the mere pragmatic-explicating use because all the conditions of the application of the maxim 
(belief and purposes) have a normative vocation, and because the normativity of use of the maxim as a logical 
principle tend to become part of its applications.  
To make this point clearer, I would formulate the PNT in order to display two different levels in obtaining the 
fourth level of clarity of p. In order to display the first level of the fourth level of clarity, the needed formulation 
is the simple formulation of PNT that I have already provided. It reads: given all the possibilities of an object O, 
which depend upon its general dispositions, (P1) if you believe p, where p is a representation of O (Bp), (P2) 
since you ought to pursue E, where E is one of the normative possibilities of purpose you could pursue 
established in the NS, (C) then you ought to do X. In this context, X is the meaning of p. I call this the first level 
of the attainment of the fourth grade of clarity because the attainment of the fourth grade of clarity is only 
partial. Consider the case in which p is a false proposition. Even though p is false, if the premises of the maxim 
are genuine scientific attitudes (such as the task of knowing the truth), the apodosis of the conditional will be a 
contextual prescription in which X is genuinely good and admirable for that agent in that context. In other 
words: even though p is false, if the agent in a particular context acts at the best of her epistemic, moral, and 
aesthetical beliefs, the prescriptive outcome of the application of the maxim will be at the same time contextually 
good and admirable. It will be the “necessary, intermediate step” in order to get at a full realization of the 
development of concrete reasonableness (in which also p must be true). As Peirce stated over and over again, an 
authentic scientific service to the cause of truth is not made only of achievements and successes. The “third” 
level of clarity corresponds to the pragmatic-explicating use of the maxim and its concern is expressible in the 
question: “does Bp have a pragmatic meaning?”. The “fourth” level of clarity corresponds to the pragmatic-
normative use of the maxim and its concern is in turn: “does Bp fit in the “development of concrete 
Reasonableness”?”. As it is clear, the passage from PET to PNT shows a normative shift in the problem 
addressed. Being an instance of the development of concrete reasonableness, the “drama of creation,” as Peirce 
sometimes calls it, is what makes of p (and of its various interpretants) something epistemically true, and of Bp 
 74  
something ethically good and aesthetically admirable. If among the conditions C of the pragmatic-normative use 
of the maxim, all the conditions were fulfilled (not only the condition of having a good norm in the protasis but 
also the other, contextual “necessary” conditions; think about this: are the “necessary” conditions only epistemic 
conditions of the type: “if the inquiry were pursued far enough”), then the apodosis of the conditional would 
contain a prescription which is ethically good and aesthetically admirable, and its propositional content would 
epistemically true. 
The second level of the fourth level of clarity is obtained through the application of PNT (here taken in its 
imperative-mood formulation) in which a further condition P3 occurs: 
 
Given all the possibilities of an object O, which depend upon its general dispositions, (P1) if you believe p, 
where p is a representation of O (Bp), (P2) since you ought to pursue E, where E is one of the normative 
possibilities of purpose you could pursue established in the NS, (P3) if p is the result of an “investigation carried 
sufficiently far” on O (W3: 274, 1878), (C) then you ought to do X. In this context, X is the meaning of p. 
 
The fact that the necessary conditions are not specified does not mean that they are not specifiable. On the 
contrary, they must be specified in a particular context. Its formality in the formulation we have provided is only 
a limit of universalization and abstraction, not a limit for the application of the maxim. What are the particular 
conditions that are necessary in a certain context so that inquiry can succeed cannot be stated on an abstract level, 
but can only be figured out in that particular context. A concept analyzed in its “fourth” level of clearness adds 
an element that is not contained in the “third” level of clarity, that is, an unconditional normative element. The 
proposition p which is prescribed in the apodosis of the pragmatic-normative use of the maxim is not “rational” 
merely in the sense that it is the general prescription that would follow C (even if p were false and the purposes 
of the agent were evil; here “rationality” = “generality”), but it is “rational” in the sense that it is the ethically 
good and aesthetically admirable purpose of action upon a true proposition in the context of C. 
Peirce’s concern about the “ultimate” meaning of a concept intersects this problem. As we have seen, the 
“ultimate” interpretant of a sign cannot be a sign itself, but has to be something different, namely, a habit. If this 
is true, we also see that the account of the pragmatic maxim at its highest level of clarity becomes: the “ultimate” 
interpretant of a sign is not the habit that an agent would develop if certain conditions C occurred, but that 
“destined” habit in which anthropological destined habits and objectual destined habits come to coincide. The 
interpretant would result from a set of conditions in which p is true and in which the agent is actually adopting 
the development of concrete reasonableness as the ultimate ideal of one’s conduct. 
 
 
 
2.4. Why Is Peirce Committed to the Pragmatic-Explicating Task of the Maxim? Possibility and 
Moral Truth 
 
What is still to be answered is the question: why was Peirce so interested in keeping the pureness of PET 
even when the “secret” of his pragmaticism revealed an essential connection of the pragmatic maxim with the 
normative sciences? I believe that there are at least two reasons here. (1) The first reason is the most important 
and is related to Peirce’s modal metaphysics. The modality of real possibility is broader than real actuality and 
real normativity (what “ought-to be”). The subclass of possibilities that are genuinely normative emerges in the 
field of what is possible in general. As we have seen, PNT limits the range of possibilities in at least two ways: on 
the one hand, the protasis of the conditional cannot be a purpose whatsoever, but must contain one norm; on 
the other hand, the apodosis of the conditional does not produce a purpose whatsoever, but only an 
unconditionally normative purpose, a good and admirable prescription in that context. In other words, PNT 
cannot cover all the possibilities of interpretation of p that could emerge from the application to p of the 
pragmatic maxim. Only PET can describe all the real possibilities, including those possibilities that should not be 
pursued. Only PET has the capacity of clarifying at the third grade of clarity what belongs to the broad 
metaphysical class of what is possible without being at the same time either normative or actual. In 1905 “Issues 
of Pragmaticism,” Peirce claims that one of the most important doctrines entailed by pragmaticism is the reality 
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of “possibilities.” The complete outcome of a modal metaphysics, enlightened by the application of the maxim, 
is not only the acceptance of real generals (beyond the mere existence of real individuals), but also the linked 
reality of “real vagues” and “real possibilities”. Peirce writes that 
 
Another doctrine which is involved in Pragmaticism as an essential consequence of it, but which 
the writer defended (Journal of Speculative Philosophy 1868, and North American Review 1871) 
before he had formulated, even in his own mind, the principle of pragmaticism, is the scholastic 
doctrine of realism. This is usually defined as the opinion that there are real objects that are general, 
among the number being the modes of determination of existent singulars, if, indeed, these be not the 
only such objects. But the belief in this can hardly escape being accompanied by the acknowledgment 
that there are, besides, real vagues, and especially, real possibilities. For possibility being the denial of 
necessity, which is a kind of generality, is vague like any other contradiction of a general. Indeed, it is 
the reality of some possibilities that pragmaticism is most concerned to insist upon. (EP2: 354, 1905) 
 
The reality of “some possibilities” upon which “pragmaticism is most concerned to insist” coincides with the 
pragmatic meaning of a sign displayed by PET (for different types of “possibility” see CP 6.371, “Notes of 
Metaphysics”).43 As it is clear, what is normative is only one subclass of the possibilities of interpretation that a 
sign carries with it. Peirce remains faithful to PET because it displays the semeiotic nature of reality in all its 
breath, while PNT only focuses on a subclass of the possibilities of reality. The “kernel of pragmatism” is PET 
because only the pragmatic-explicating task in the application of the maxim can unpack “the total meaning of the 
predication of an intellectual concept,” or “the whole meaning of an intellectual predicate,” which consists “in 
affirming that, under all conceivable circumstances of a given kind, the subject of the predication would (or 
would not) behave in a certain way, – that is, that it either would, or would not, be true that under given 
experiential circumstances (or under a given proportion of them, taken as they would occur in experience) certain 
facts would exist” (EP2: 402). Peirce also spells out the fact that obtaining the “total meaning” of a proposition 
should leave unbounded the conditions of the protasis as far as human purposes are concerned. He writes that 
for the pragmaticist “the rational meaning of every proposition” is “the form in which the proposition becomes 
applicable to human conduct, not in these or those special circumstances, nor when one entertains this or that 
special design, but that form which is most directly applicable to self-control under every situation, and to every 
purpose” (EP2: 340, 1905; CP 5.427). Similarly, Peirce states that “the entire intellectual purport of any symbol 
consists in the total of all general modes of rational conduct which, conditionally upon all the possible different 
circumstances and desires, would ensue upon the acceptance of the symbol” (EP 2: 346).44 
If it is true that in Peirce’s terms the pragmatic meaning of p is always and essentially tied to the “purpose” of 
an agent/interpreter of p, it follows that the perspective on p can be twofold. (i) The first perspective displays an 
attitude in which p is considered in all its possible “practical bearings,” i.e., all the possible consequences that 
would follow if an unrestrained set of conditions occurred. This is the attitude related to PET. This perspective 
is complete on one side but partial on the other side. On one side, it is complete, insofar as it is concerned with 
all the possible practical bearings of p given all the possible conditions. However, on the other side, PET is 
partial, because it does not consider the aspect of normativity (logical, ethical and aesthetical) that according to 
Peirce is naturally related to the purposes of the semeiosis process. In the light of Peirce’s normativity, only some 
of all the possible purposes are good and ought to be pursued. (ii) The second perspective displays a different 
attitude, more interested in the dimension of normativity. This is the case of PNT. In this perspective, the 
conditions of the application of the maxim are restricted only to the good purposes that an agent ought to 
pursue in her life. Also in this case, the perspective is complete on one side but partial on the other side. It is 
complete insofar as the concern with the ultimate interpretants of p allows for a broad consideration of Bp, 
which does not exclude the normative perspective. However, it is also partial, insofar as from this viewpoint it is 
not possible to make explicit all the possible practical bearings of p, but only those that follow “purposes” which 
are good from the normative viewpoint.    
                                                            
43  It is highly instructive that in this passage Peirce laments that “moral possibility” is not usually taken to mean “something reasonably 
free from extreme improbability,” but rather “morally permissible”, showing that PET perspective on possibility, even in the field of 
human agency, should be left free from normative considerations. 
44  I disagree on this with Poggiani (2012: 42). 
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(2) The second reason is found in the fact that it is in the context of the possibility of the false, the ethically 
bad and aesthetically repugnant that the normativity of what is true, good and admirable comes to light. Hence, 
possibility plays here a fundamental role also because it has a fundamental function in the development of the 
NS: it is in the contrast to all the possible instances of deformity of what is normative (the false, the morally evil, 
the aesthetically repugnant), what Peirce calls sometimes the “perversity of thought” (EP2: 342, 1905; CP 5.430) 
that the possibilities of the development of concrete reasonableness take shape and are perceived. Peirce’s 
argument would proceed as follows: (1) What is normative is found in contrast to what is a deformity of 
concrete reasonableness; (2) What is normative is only a subclass of all the possibilities of meaning of a sign, 
since all the possibilities of meaning of a sign include also what is a deformity of concrete reasonableness. (3) 
Since the discovery of what is normative emerges in the contrast to what is a deformity of concrete 
reasonableness, then the normative sciences require an approach to the pragmatic meaning of a sign that is 
maximally broad. (4) The normative sciences require the pureness of PET. 
 
 
 
3. A Peircean Rejection of Four Dogmas of Contemporary Moral Realism 
 
The aim of this final section is to sketch a Peircean theory of realism about moral facts. In this way, I want to 
show that the type of metaethical realism that can be found in Peirce is different from the proposals of 
contemporary moral realists, such as David O. Brink and Russ Shafer-Landau.45 In this way, I also want to argue 
that Peirce puts forth a sound theory of moral realism that can contribute to overcome certain “dogmas” which I 
find in contemporary moral realism. 
While some Peirce scholars have made clear that Peirce is a moral cognitivist all the way through (so much 
that also moral sentiments are kinds of cognition; see Misak 1994a; Short 2007: 201; 204; 205; 2012; Liska 2005; 
Liszka 2012), some other interpreters have claimed that Peirce’s approach to the NS and metaphysics leaves 
room for a moderate moral realism (Mayorga 2012; less important Pihlstroem 2003). However, I believe that 
further steps need to be done in this direction. My contribution in the reminder of the section is to relate what I 
believe is Peirce’s semeiotic and logic nature of moral judgments to the problem of metaethical realism and to 
show how the notion of “truth” should be taken in the in context of moral issues. In doing so, I will question at 
least one possible interpretation of Misak’s understading of moral judgment as “truth-apt.” 
In order to address the problem of metaethical realism, let me first sum up the central tenets of my 
reconstruction of Peirce’s NS and then introduce the broad framework of what “moral realism” is taken to mean 
in contemporary discussions. As a matter of fact, there are some consequences of these tenets that need to be 
stressed, given the fact that some interpretations of Peirce still accept a too broad notion of “normativity.” Peirce 
claims that (i) the “Normative Sciences” (NS) are theoretical sciences, that (ii) their aim is to account for “moral 
facts,” and that (iii) they establish what “ought to be” in human conduct, which is in principle different from 
what human beings normally or generally do. The common assumptions of (i), (ii), and (iii) is that the object of 
NS is the human conduct and that a normative assessment of human conduct is possible only because human 
conduct is essentially self-controlled and reflective. There is a “gap” between what is and what a rational agent 
judges to be normative for herself as a rational agent. Therefore, it is necessary to pay attention to these 
fundamental points of Peirce’s thought about the type of normativity sketched in NS in order to avoid serious 
misinterpretations of his doctrine. I believe that the most common interpretative mistakes are the following. 
First, “normativity,” according to the broad meaning of this notion, applies not only to human agency, but also 
to the structure of the universe in general. According to this reading, the governing generality of laws in nature is 
already an example of a normative power (“normativity” is taken here to be a synonym of generality). The 
normativity at stake in NS is therefore only a regional realization of the broader normativity of the universe 
(Potter 1966, Potter 1967, Apel 1985). Second, since the universe, at least in some of its dimensions, has a 
                                                            
45  I do not deny that there are substantive differences among contemporary moral realists. However, I think that it is possible to 
identify some fundamental tenets shared by all moral realists. 
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normative structure, it follows that self-control and reflexivity are not the metaphysical conditions of possibility 
for the emergence of the phenomenon of normativity as it is articulated in the NS. I believe that these 
interpretations are mistaken at the bottom because they do not recognize human reflexivity and self-control as 
conditions for the emergence of that type of “normativity” developed in NS.  
Some authors (e.g. Misak 1994a; Short 2012, Liszka 2012, Sullivan 1977, Pihlstroem 2005, Pihlstroem 2012, 
Tiercelin 1997) take Peirce to be a moral cognitivist and realist of some sort. Unfortunately, they do not clarify 
what is their understanding of moral realism.  Mayorga 2012 and Tiercelin 1997 seem to me the best attempts to 
address this problem. Mayorga undertakes the specific goal of unpacking a Peircean notion of moral realism, by 
labeling it “moral realicism,” that is, a Peircean “robust moderate moral realism” (Mayorga 2012: 101). Tiercelin 
makes clear that Peirce's understanding of moral facts and “norms” is neither a theory of Platonic-Fregean 
objects, nor a naturalist approach according to which moral norms are derived from psychological facts 
(Tiercelin 1997: 44).46 Certainly, Short highlights the fact that Peirce's metaphysics, unlike Putnam's, does not 
admit only actual reality and efficient causality, but also possible and general reality and final causality, but he 
does not clarify what is Peirce's conception of moral knowledge and language and what is the specific 
metaphysical status of moral facts. 
But, what is moral realism? If we focus on the latest discussions, it clearly appears that moral realism is one of 
the most important options in contemporary metaethical debates. The label “moral realism” entails in this debate 
a precise understanding of moral knowledge and language and of the metaphysical status of moral facts and 
properties (cf. Brink 1989, Shafer-Landau 2003, FitzPatrick 2009, Sayre-McCord 1988, Cuneo 2007). In my view, 
the common claims of the contemporary versions of moral realism are four. I name them “dogmas” because 
they are taken to be the only theoretical possibilities to grant some form of strong objectivity and non-relativism 
in morality. The four claims are: (a) moral knowledge and language are “assertoric” and “descriptive” in nature; 
(b) the aim of moral knowledge and language is to provide an adequate descriptive account of moral facts and 
properties; (c) the reality of moral facts and properties does not depend upon any function or disposition of the 
human being. In particular, the moral judgment has no “constitutive” function of moral facts and properties, but 
only mirrors them in true judgments. (d) At least some of our moral judgments and claims are “true” in the 
mentioned sense.47 The merit of this approach is to overcome the limits of non-cognitivist positions, in all their 
different forms. However, I believe that there are also some crucial limits to contemporary moral realism, in 
relation in particular to the nature of practical reason and moral knowledge and language. This is so true that in a 
sense contemporary moral realism is somehow problematical if confronted with more traditional forms of 
“realist” about moral facts and properties. As a matter of fact, contemporary moral realism is a highly specific 
version of moral realism, which cannot be extended to all the philosophers who have been traditionally taken to 
be “moral realists.” Also philosophers who are usually considered to be moral realists (e.g., Aquinas and the 
doctrine of “natural moral law”) cannot be considered moral realists in the sense of contemporary metaethics. 
This conception of moral realism is closer to a contemporary variation of Modern jusnaturalism (cf. Locke 
[1676] 1954: 111)48 than to other forms of the theory of the natural moral law. Mayorga (2012: 118 ff.) takes 
Peirce to be such a descriptivist. I disagree with this opinion.49 As Colapietro writes, according to Peirce norms 
                                                            
46  In this sense, Peirce’s moral realism eschews both a Platonic-Fregean understanding of [moral] objects and an idea of objectivity 
without a real objective domain upon which inquires agree (I believe that this second option is Hilary Putnam’s position, at least in 
Putnam 2002: 108-109; 123ss.). 
47  As it is clear, I isolate the main common tenets of moral realism, in such a way that the problem of naturalism or anti-naturalism can 
be left aside. It would be too big of a task to address also this problem in the present section. 
48  “Hence, this law of nature can be described as being the decree if the divine will discernible by the light of nature and indicating what 
is and what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason commanding and prohibiting. It appears to me less 
correctly terms by some people the dictate of reason, since reason does not so much establish and pronounce this law of nature as 
search for it and discover it as a law enacted by a superior power and implanted in our hearts. Neither is reason so much the maker of 
that law as its interpreter, unless, violating the dignity of the supreme legislator, we wish to make reason responsible for that received 
law which it merely investigates; nor indeed can reason give us law, since it is only a faculty of our mind and part of us.” 
49 I see in Mayorga's interpretation a further problem. She writes (Mayorga 2012: 121):  “Peirce's metaphysical “realicism” can account 
for moral properties being real, although they do not exist as natural properties do, and hence cannot be the object of scientific 
inquiry, as natural properties are.” Mayorga defends Peirce's nonnaturalism only by appealing to the difference between 2ndness and 
3rdness. I think that this is a partial interpretation of Peirce's thought on the matter. The mere appeal to 3rdness could still classify 
Peirce as a naturalist … of a Scholastic fashion. The point is that moral 3rdness is specifically different from the 3rdness of natural 
laws. The “laws of morality” are different from the laws of physics because: (1) they are ought-to; the final cause of rationality 
becomes an ought-to be upon reflection, as it is shown by the NS. Furthermore, (2) the ought-to refers to something that is not real 
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“are purely factual and irreducibly deliberative” (Colapietro 2006: 197). If this is true, Peirce's metaethical moral 
realism results more from the prescriptive nature of human self-understanding rather than from a merely 
descriptive approach to moral facts and properties. Hence, normativity and moral knowledge cannot be disjoined 
from deliberative self-constitution. Notice that Dewey and Peirce are closely related also on this point. Dewey’s 
claim that the right approach to moral goodness requires a serious reflection on “deliberation” and “moral 
judgment” does not rule out, but guarantees on the contrary the possibility of a strong epistemic objectivity. In 
addition, Dewey’s formula that the moral goodness is always “constructed” by contextual processes of 
deliberation is fully compatible both with a strong epistemic objectivity and a realist account of moral facts. This 
is the position put forth by Peirce and Dewey.50 
In what follows, I claim that Peirce's account of normativity (including both a conception of moral 
knowledge and language and a metaphysical theory of moral facts and properties) cannot be labeled as “realist” 
in this contemporary sense. In other words, Peirce rejects all the four claims of contemporary moral realism. It is 
my opinion that Peirce is a moral realist, but in a different and more refined sense. In particular, I claim that 
Peirce cannot be considered a moral realist in the sense of contemporary metaethics because of his conception 
of moral knowledge as prescriptive knowledge and because of his metaphysical theory of moral facts as 
dependent on the rational community’s capacity of moral assessment. Contemporary moral realists classify Peirce 
as a non-relativistic moral constructivist (Brink 1989: 16, Shafer-Landau 2013: 14; 17). My claim is that Peirce's 
alleged constructivism constitutes is actually a version of moral realism. To my knowledge, there is only one 
passage in which Peirce explicitly recurs to the phrase “moral realism.” The passage occurs in the context of a 
discussion of Royce's thought. He writes: 
 
Dr. Royce says that different people will … take the position of the “moral realist” and say that 
moral distinctions are founded on some matter of fact (say a decree from Sinai), while others will take 
the position of the “moral idealist” and say that these distinctions are founded on an inward 
sentiment, – an ideal. Two such persons come into collision; they find by mutual criticism that both 
positions are unsatisfactory; external fact can only determine what is, not what ought to be; while 
inward sentiment cannot be a resting-place, because it is only individual caprice and has no authority 
for another man. (EP1: 238)   
 
As it is clear from the passage, Peirce is critical against the notion of “moral realism.” He implicitly defines his 
position a mix of moral realism and moral idealism, insofar as “idealism” is taken to be the only metaphysical 
perspective that admits the real power of “ideas,” “ideals,” or in general final causes and general dispositions. 
However, as we have seen in the first chapter, Peirce inclines to “objective idealism” only because in his view 
that philosophical tradition enables him to develop a broad theory of reality, which includes more than mere 
physical and existent facts. His “extreme scholastic realism” is exactly such a broad metaphysics, in which 
1stness, 2ndness, and 3rdness constitute an irreducible system of modal dimensions of what is real. As a 
consequence, moral ideals can be admitted in Peirce's metaphysics and the label of “moral realist,” if understood 
in a broad sense, fits Peirce's stance on this issue perfectly. Moreover, in the passage Peirce is not excluding 
moral norms from reality, but is making clear that reality understood as mere physical factuality is not a 
hospitable doctrine for moral ideals and aspirations and should be therefore considered unsatisfactory.51 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
(needs development as a 3rd) or not existent (needs embodiment as a 2nd), while natural laws are already real as regulating principles 
of natural events; they are would-bes. Finally, (3) in the perspective of Peirce's evolutionary cosmology, natural laws can be said 
“ought-to” only metaphorically and derivatively, since natural events do not have the capacity of reflection and self-control that on 
the contrary is characteristic of human beings. 
50  In this sense, following the way in which De Caro and Macarthur (2010: 3) characterizes “naturalism,” we can claim that both Peirce 
and Dewey put forth a “naturalistic” account of normative facts: “any form of naturalism will be opposed to Platonism about norms, 
where this is understood as the view that normative facts hold wholly independently of human practices (say, of reason giving) and 
are, as it were, simply there anyway waiting to be discovered. For similar reasons, it will be opposed to a Moorean non-naturalism that 
holds that our access to normative facts is by way of a sui generis epistemic faculty of intuition directed at just this kind of fact. And 
of course it will be opposed to any theistic foundation for normative facts or our access to them.” 
51 Notice that for Peirce logical principles of inference are themselves moral norms and are general “facts.” See EP2: 252. See also on 
the same point the important letter to Cantor, December 23rd 1900, NEM III 2, 772-779. 
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3.1. A Peircean Account of Normative Knowledge and Normative Facts  
 
In 1903, Peirce writes: 
 
The true principle purpose of these sciences [the three NS] is the Classification of the possible 
forms. But this must be founded on a study of the Physiology of those forms, their general elements, 
parts, and mode of action. Thereupon should follow the Classificatory part, including the general 
discussion of what is good and what bad; and this should be followed up by a study of the principles 
that govern the production of such forms. (EP 2: 272) 
 
I take this quotation to be Peirce's declaration of realism in ethics. Peirce also characterizes a “form” as a 
“real general object” (EP2: 343). As we have seen in the first section, Peirce names the subject matter of the NS 
in different ways, but he calls them mainly “positive facts” concerning the good and bad in human agency. Now 
Peirce refers to these facts as “forms” or “real general objects.” He also states that “justice” and “truth” are 
“great facts” in human life (EP2: 343). As we know, Peirce's notion of fact is a broad one, and, when taken as a 
synonym of “real X,” implies a modal metaphysics which includes general dispositions, final causes, ideals, etc.52 
The “forms” are nothing more that the normative dispositions or virtues, with which we have dealt in the first 
section of this chapter. I will use the phrase “normative fact” in order to combine Peirce's two claims about the 
“forms” studied by the NS (“normative” = concerning what is good; “fact” = real as far as the destined, 
teleological development of the human being is concerned).  
Let me now consider Peirce's three tenets about NS in relation to the problem of moral realism. Point (i) 
means that normative theories (about thought, action in general and feeling) are cognitive theories, in the sense 
that they are departments of scientific inquiry relying on experience and that they aim somehow to know what 
moral beliefs imply real facts and what do not. 
Point (ii) refers to that fact that normative knowledge is genuine knowledge about some real X, and that it is 
neither the expression of certain emotions and sentiments (cf. Russell 19387, Ayer 1952, Stevenson 1941), nor 
the mere prescription resulting from previous commitment to a set of norms (cf. Hare 1952, Gibbard 1990). 
That normative knowledge is a cognitive endeavor about some real X does not mean that this X is an existent 
moral fact and that the essential function of moral knowledge and language is to describe the universe of existent 
moral facts in an appropriate way, as contemporary moral realism seems to imply. In the department of human 
agency, “normative fact” means first and foremost 3rdness, moral norm or law. In addition, according to Peirce, 
moral facts are objective. “Objectivity” has to be predicated primarily of the scientific method of inquiry, and 
secondly of the propositions obtained through this method and of the objects or facts represented in these 
propositions (Short 2012: 315). In Peirce’s terms, an “objective fact” is the content of a proposition on which all 
the rational minds would agree if all the necessary contextual conditions for the agreement occurred. Therefore, 
an “objective fact” can be an existent physical object, a particular event, a general metaphysical law, or even a 
moral prescription. 
There is however a difference between moral facts and the other types of facts above mentioned. Indeed, the 
reality of moral facts as objective general norms (3rdness) or as existent instantiations of those norms (2ndness) 
is somehow dependent on the reality of a being like the human being. Without human beings and their vocation 
to normativity, based on the developmental teleology characteristic of their “rational instinct,” the 3rdness or 
2ndness of moral facts would both be real. Yet, moral facts would have a type of reality, a possibility of coming 
to light in aspirations, norms, and deeds, in the case in which something like human beings existed. At this level, 
accepting the consequence of Peirce’s pragmaticism concerning his modal metaphysics is crucial. In 1905 “Issues 
of Pragmaticism,” Peirce writes: 
 
Pragmaticism makes the ultimate intellectual purport of what you please to consist in conceived 
conditional resolutions, or their substance; and therefore, the conditional propositions, with their 
hypothetical antecedents, in which such resolutions consist, being of the ultimate nature of meaning, 
must be capable of being true, that is, of expressing whatever there be which is such as the 
proposition express, independently of being thought to be so in any judgment, or being represented to 
                                                            
52 See the two meanings of “general” in EP2: 342. Peirce's idea of “norm” is somewhere in between the two. 
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be so in any other symbol of any man or men. But that amounts to saying that possibility is sometimes 
of a real kind” (EP2: 354, 1905) 
 
 
If something like a “human being” were not existent, the reality of moral facts would only be possible 
(1rstness), excluding the other two modalities of reality. The reality of moral facts, at least as 3rdnesses and 
2ndnesses, is dependent upon the reality of something like a human being.53 Moreover, as it is probably clear 
from our presentation of the NS, not every prescription is a good one, not every end is admirable for the human 
life. As a consequence, a moral fact is not only dependent upon the existence of the human mind and its 
normative vocation, but it can come to light as a genuine norm only through the refinement of the human 
capacity of judgment and assessment on the basis of moral experience.54 This marks a difference between the 
non-moral world and the moral world: while physical objects and their general laws are real even on the 
hypothesis that human beings did not exist, moral facts and properties would not be real as 3rdnesses or 
2ndnesses on that hypothesis, even though they would still be real as 1rstnesses (a kind of vocation of the 
“universe” to become moral through the life of human beings). Therefore, a moral fact can be defined as a good 
general prescription in the following way: 
 
1. If there is something like a rational agent, endowed with a normative vocation and capable of assessment 
of her experience, and if all the other necessary conditions C occurred, a moral fact is the type of action that that 
rational agent would prescribe in a certain situation (ought-to be). 
 
2. If there were not something like a rational agent, there would be no moral facts, as we take moral fact to 
mean a norm such as one of the norms developed by the NS (3rdness) or the concrete actions that instantiate 
them (2ndness). “Reality” would only have the general possibility to develop something like human beings and 
therefore moral values. 
 
An alternative characterization of moral facts could be: 
 
1a. (i) Given the present constitution of the world, (ii) given the existence in this world of deliberative agents, 
and (iii) given the fact that there is something like an adequately rational moral agent in this world, a moral fact is 
the value/normative claim that the adequately rational moral agent expresses in his moral life. What if the second 
and the third conditions were not be satisfied? We would have: 
 
2b. (i) Given the present constitution of the world, (ii) and given that in this world we do not find something 
like a deliberative agent, and therefore (iii) given that we do not even find something like an adequately rational 
                                                            
53 See e.g. Wiggins 1998 and McDowell 1998, for whom human “sensibility” is the condition of possibility of the moral value 
(dispositional theories).  
54 In this sense, a “moral fact” is the recta ratio agibilium of Aristotle's and Aquinas's philosophies. See Korsgaard and her distinction 
between “substantial realism” and “procedural realism” (1996: 33-35; 44-48; 205-208; 245-246). Peirce’s moral realism cannot be 
reduced neither to the former, nor to the latter. Why isn’t it a procedural realism? Because (1) the objectivity of a good prescription is 
not produced neither by a procedure, nor by the experimental method; instead, the experimental method is the only method that 
allows an inquirer to find and formulate objectively good prescription (which are “there” neither as already existent facts – 2ndness –, 
nor as already endorsed “norms” – 3rdness –, but as the possible norms toward which all rational minds would converge); (2) the reality 
of the “moral fact,” that is, of a good prescription, is dependent on a rational agent’s capacity of moral assessment and on her actual 
moral judgments insofar as it is the logical form of a prescription and, in this sense, it is the expression of a legislator. However, the 
content of a prescription and its being a good prescription do not depend in their validity on the fact that they are produced by a 
rational agent, capable of moral assessment; on the contrary, they depend on the obstinacy of experience and reality that the rational 
moral agent has to interpret and on the basis of which she has to formulate her prescriptions. In other words, a “moral fact” (that 
includes prescriptions about human agency and everything that might be linked to it: motives and ends, principles of thinking, habits 
of action, habits of feeling, thoughts, actions and feelings, consequences of agency, other human beings, other living beings and the 
environment in general, factual conditions in different moral situations) is the result of an interaction between a rational agent, who is 
able to express a normative viewpoint in her judgments, and the teleological structure of human nature and cosmos, which in itself is 
just a non-moral fact with certain tendencies and exigencies. In other words, without a rational agent, capable of moral assessment 
and of normative viewpoint, an objective moral fact (the stress is on “moral”) would be a non-sense; without the obstinacy of 
experience and of reality, an objective moral fact (the stress is here on “objective” and on “fact”) would be impossible. Although the 
prescriptive form of a moral judgment is the expression of a rational agent, its objectivity and factuality are not produced at all by her. 
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deliberative agent, a moral fact is the value/normative claim that an adequately rational moral agent would express 
if something like an adequately rational deliberative agent existed. According to Peirce, therefore, a normative 
fact is the coincidence of one's action (as 3rdness or as 2ndness) with the general ideal under which all rational 
agents would agree to act in a certain context. Peirce writes that the indispensable element for making “any 
action rational (action that can't be considered in the long run, since a decision has to be taken here and now) is 
to appeal to a criterion that, in the long run, will produce what it best for the humanity” (EP1: 90). 
Moral knowledge and language are not aimed to describe independent and external moral facts and 
properties, but are better conceived as the attempt to guide one’s actions through prescriptions on the basis of a 
self-understanding of human nature. Normative knowledge is not a descriptive knowledge about mind-
independent facts, but is closer to a self-understanding of the deliberative agent's conduct and to a self-
assessment and self-correction of this conduct. It coincides with a normative assessment of how the deliberative 
agent ought-to control her conduct according to certain norms, standard or “leading principles” (cf. Liszka 2012: 
66). This means that the reality of the normative leading principle (in its possibility previous to a concrete action, 
in its actuality in the concrete action, in its tendency to reproduce itself as an established habit) can be 
independent from an individual deliberative agent and her understanding of the normative exigency of her 
experience, but cannot be independent from the viewpoint of a (fully) rational deliberative agent. In this sense, 
the dimension of moral facts is the expression of the (fully) rational deliberative agent, although on the basis of 
experience and scientific method of inquiry, which both imply intersubjectivity. However, there is a way in which 
moral facts can be said to be external in Peirce's terms. As early as 1871, Peirce writes that his metaphysical 
stance 
 
is also highly favorable to a belief in external realities. It will, to be sure, deny that there is any 
reality which is absolutely incognizable in itself, so that it cannot be taken into the mind. But 
observing that “the external” means simply that which is independent of what phenomenon is 
immediately present, that is of how we may think or feel … . (EP1: 90)  
 
The “externality” of what is real means here not independent in principle from a rational mind, but its 
irreducibility to what is apprehended in an isolated instance of semeiosis (see also EP1: 120; EP2: 359). The 
externality belongs to the phenomenon itself insofar as it has in itself the power to correct, if inquiry is 
conducted far enough, the interpretants of human beings. Externality is therefore the power of experience in 
correcting human beings' beliefs, not the Kantian idea of an incognizable noumenon. According to Peirce, reality 
and cognizability are synonyms (W2: 208).55 
Point (iii) means that moral knowledge and language is prescriptive in nature. This means that its essential 
function is an action-guiding function, not a description of what there is. This is true for at least two reasons: 
 
(1) First, the imperative-mood formulation of the pragmatic maxim (EP2: 135), also in its PET version, 
makes clear that for Peirce the best linguistic rendition of a “purpose” is the ought-to formulation. This clearly 
shows that “prescription” is the linguistic or logical structure of purposeful agency and even more so of 
normative purposeful agency. 
(2) Second, Peirce’s comments on the nature and interpretability of commands show his view on the type of 
knowledge that has the specific function of guiding human beings' concrete agency. For instance, Peirce points 
out that a command can have different interpretants, among which, however, the more appropriate is the 
                                                            
55 Cf. Peirce's position with Bernard Williams's complex position on this issue, resulting from a mix of metaphysical materialism, 
metaethical antirealism and epistemic objectivism, as it is expressed e.g. in Williams (1978: 247). It seems to me that in Williams's 
position there is a problematic account of ontology (what is there?), metaphysics (what is the general structure of what there is?) and 
the property of intelligibility. If human beings reason about norms and standards of conduct (values) and sometimes achieve 
“objective” and intersubjective agreement on them, this means that human agency and its need of moral regulation is somehow 
intelligible. However, at the same time, Williams excludes the dimension of value from his metaphysics. In fact, he seems to attribute 
to values some type of intelligibility (values are somehow part of what there is, since we reason about them and we also achieve 
objective, although contextual, agreements on them) but not a metaphysical consistence (since the structure of reality is limited to 
material objects and properties). Since values seem not to be reducible to a material structure, they are not included in the domain of 
metaphysics. Metaphysical intelligibility seems to be limited to material objects studied by physics and described by physical theories in 
the long run. The “absolute conception of the world” is identified with the “adequate physics.” The domain of value and norms, 
although acknowledged, is kept outside the domain of reality. 
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concrete action that responds to that command. The immediate interpretant of a command (its interpretability) is 
determined by the connection between the command as a representamen and its dynamic object (ground). Now, 
the dynamic object is, as Peirce says, the “will” of the utterer, that is, the final cause that is guiding the utterer (or 
quasi-utterer). The dynamic object can be different from the immediate object. If I am late and my friend shouts 
“Marco!,” the immediate object of “Marco” as a representamen is, let us say, that human individual that I am, 
but the dynamic object is the will of my friend who wants me to get going. The “commanded” outcome 
includes: an emotion (maybe “shame” for being always late), a judgment (deliberation about what is the best 
course of action to get going in a fast way); a physical action (me moving toward the door and join him). If we 
exclude the emotion, the other two interpretants are both deliberate actions, even though one is “logical” 
(requires a deliberate mediation M to go from A to B in the form of linguistic inferences), while the other is 
“energetic” (the “energetic” is the somehow mysterious moment in which from a general plan of action a 
concrete action is produced). The important point to stress is therefore that rationality has a practical, 
deliberative nature (Colapietro 1999 has made this clear), also when “logical” interpretants are at stake. The 
formal consequence for Peirce’s semeiotic is that the archetypical, “immediate” interpretant of thinking is a good 
response, in the form of a judgment, reasoning, and propositions (logical interpretant), in the form of a physic 
outer action (energetic interpretant), and even in the form of an appropriate emotion (emotional interpretant). 
The series command-response is therefore the basic unity of thinking. Since the viewpoint of reason is always 
practical, the problem is never how to move from “is” to “ought” (an ought is always implied), but how to 
extend the ought from the mere epistemic normativity to an ethical and aesthetical normativity.  
This point is surprisingly misunderstood or neglected by Peirce scholars. Peirce's understanding of moral 
knowledge and language as prescriptive meets “Hume's practicality requirement” in moral knowledge (cf. Foot 
2001), but does not commit itself to a form of non-cognitivism. The primary and fundamental form of a moral 
proposition is “you ought to do X.” Peirce's exemplification of a series of commands and interpretants can be 
soundly taken as a viable version of a practical syllogism, in which at least a premise is prescriptive in nature. As 
we have seen, a situation in which a command-execution occurs presents all the elements of a semeiotic process. 
I use the notion of command because it is the notion presented by Peirce. However, I would rather appeal to the 
idea of a rational activity of persuasion to a good and admirable line of conduct that an “old” self performs over 
an emerging one. The claim that moral knowledge is prescriptive does not imply non-cognitivism, but it only 
means that 1. moral knowledge aims to direct human conduct rather than describe values etc.; 2. the objects of 
moral knowledge are not independent from human rationality. This set of theses does not even entail that the 
facts of the non-moral world (human nature, environmental circumstances, established social standards, etc.) 
play no role in moral knowledge. On the contrary, they are the subject matter of every possible moral 
consideration. However, moral knowledge organizes this manifold subject-matter in prescribing plans of action. 
The prescriptive nature of moral knowledge in Peirce's terms casts also some light on the conception that 
moral judgments are truth-apt.56 A prescription is primarily and fundamentally good or bad, not true or false. 
This fits with the categorical framework displayed in the reconstruction of the NS. Thus, a normative 
proposition in logic is good iff it prescribes a leading principle that is conducive to the general aim “knowledge 
of truth”; a normative proposition in ethics is good iff it prescribes a pattern of any kind of deliberate conduct 
that is conducive to a given general aim; a normative proposition in aesthetics is good iff it prescribes a type of 
habit of feeling that is conform to the requirements of the ultimate aim of human agency, the development of 
concrete reasonableness. All the norms that are developed or could be developed in the framework of NS are 
specification of the first and architectonic normative principle, which is the precept of developing the concrete 
reasonableness in the world. 
However, at the same time, Peirce's theory of truth allows for a theory of prescriptions as truth-apt 
judgments. Although we consider prescriptions not to be truth-apt in themselves, the proposition that affirms 
the goodness of a prescription is always either true or false. Therefore, we have: 
 
(a) If “truth” refers to the unquestioned agreement on a proposition by the community of all rational agents 
                                                            
56  This claim goes against the interpretation of moral judgments are truth-apt given by Misak 1994a. Lizska (2012: 66) seems to agree on 
this. 
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in “ideal” conditions,57 the agreement can apply to both a declarative and a normative judgment, so that it also 
applies to a prescription. In this sense, a prescription is true.58 
 
(b) If we take prescriptions to be originally and fundamentally either good or bad, then “truth” applies to a 
declarative proposition whose content is a good prescription. In this case, the truth-maker of a true moral 
proposition expressed in declarative form would be a good moral prescription. In this way, it is possible to retain 
contemporary moral realists' intuitive insight that moral knowledge is not relativistic without committing 
ourselves to their dogmas of description and stance-independence. In this way, Peirce writes that “good morals is 
the kind of human behavior that would come to be approved if studies of right behavior were carried sufficiently 
far” (R673, 1911). 
 
In what sense is Peirce a moral realist in a more refined way than contemporary metaethicists? Peirce's modal 
realism, including moral realism as one of its declinations, results from his phaneroscopy, his theory of 
experience and his theory of scientific inquiry. In this sense, the category of “objective fact” can include the 
physical reality, the general structure of reality (would-bes and must-bes) and also the type of normativity 
developed in NS (ought-to-bes), that is, the world of logical, ethical and aesthetical prescriptions. Moreover, this 
approach to moral realism does not rule out the relationship to the rational agent's capacity of moral assessment. 
In this sense, Peirce is a moral realist without being committed only to the world of existent and general facts 
independent from human rationality and to an understanding of moral knowledge and language as essentially 
descriptive, as on the contrary contemporary metaethicists are. The judgment about the moral goodness of an 
action (in a similar way to the judgment about the truth of a proposition) depends both on the human capacity of 
a moral (and alethic) viewpoint and on the intelligibility of “reality.”   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
57 “Ideal” means here not meta-contextual, but fully adequate to the individual context in which the agent is implicated. “Ideal” = if all 
the necessary conditions C for acknowledging X occurred. See Putnam (1992: vii-viii). Although Putnam’s tenet is sound, his 
interpretation of Peirce’s conception of truth is wrong. 
58 As I will show in the next chapters, I believe that Dewey holds the same conception of truth and prescription. 
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Chapter 3 
“Vir .” Peirce on Deliberation and Moral Sentimentalism 
 
 
 
Although some scholars have interpreted Peirce as a moral non-cognitivist (Parret 1994; de Waal 2012; Stuhr 
1994), Thomas L. Short has rightly claimed that “Peirce’s semeiotic runs counter the modern notion that any 
value – aesthetic, moral, political, or cognitive – is subjective” (1997:206). In what follows I further this 
interpretative insight, with particular attention to some of Peirce’s claims in which he seems to advocate for a 
non-cognitivist position in ethics. This is an important task insofar as what we have said about the reality of 
“normative facts” in Chapter 2 would collapse if the non-cognitivist interpretation of Peirce’s sentimentalism 
proved to be correct. I proceed as follows. In the first part of the chapter (§§ 1., 1.1., 1.2., 1.3.), I show that 
according to Peirce “sentiments” are semeiotic interpretants and therefore cognitive acts. In addition, I show 
how from a Peircean viewpoint instinctive sentiments are in communication with rational deliberation and are 
therefore open to the normative claims of NS. In the second part (§§ 2., 2.1.) I put Peirce’s moral sentimentalism 
in the context of his “critical common-sensism,” aiming to show what is the justification provided by Peirce for 
his insistence on the centrality of sentiment in what he calls “vitally important topics.” In the third part (§§ 3., 
3.1., 3.2.) I conclude with some remarks about the relationship between Peirce’s evolutionist perspective and 
ethical opinions, claiming that in Peirce’s view the evolutionist perspective does not threaten moral normativity, 
insofar as “evolution” is taken in a sufficiently broad sense. 
 
 
 
1. Propositions, Mental Acts and Sentiments 
  
As we have seen, some scholars take Peirce to be a moral non-cognitivist (Parret 1994; deWaal 2012; Stuhr 
1994). The evidence adduced in support of this interpretation is found in some of Peirce’s statements about the 
ineffectiveness of rationality in establishing what we ought to do in “vitally important matters” (VIM). In VIM, 
says Peirce, sentiment ought to have some kind of authority over reason (EP2: 32; see Calcaterra 2003: 77-83). 
On the contrary, I have tried to show in the second chapter that taking Peirce to be a non-cognitivist in ethics 
constitutes a serious mistake, given that ethics and aesthetics share with logic the status of normative sciences. In 
addition, Roberto Frega (2012) has recently criticized Peirce’s approach to ethics by pointing out some 
difficulties in his thought. In particular, he argues that although Peirce articulated a pragmatist theory of inquiry 
for the first time, he was not able to extend this logical model to the field of morality. In addition, he says, Peirce 
gives a cognitivist account of general moral judgments, but renounces to consider the same cognitive processes 
relevant for particular practical situations. It would be Dewey the pragmatist who finally extended in the most 
articulated way the model of “inquiry” to practical reasoning (see Chapter 5). Although some commentators (see 
in particular Misak 1994; Short 2007: 201; 204; 205; 2012; Liska 2005; Liszka 2012; Mayorga 2012) have 
corrected the interpretation of Peirce as a non-cognitivist in ethics, the import of Peirce’s “sentimentalism” has 
still to be delved into. Colapietro 1992 at al. (see e.g. Misak 2004; EP2: 30; 505 endnote 15) have stressed the fact 
that Peirce’s sentimentalist claims are gathered mainly in “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,” a lecture in 
which Peirce voices his polemical answer to William James, who has begged him to speak about some vital issues 
rather than logic. Although insightful and historically pertinent, I believe that this reading is partial if taken as a 
comprehensive account of Peirce on the real role of moral sentiment in building a philosophical approach to 
ethics. Therefore, in what follows I articulate Peirce’s conception of moral sentimentalism in relation to three 
questions: (1) why does Peirce say that “rational deliberation” is misplaced in vitally important matters and 
urgent issues, while sentiment is not? Does this count as a commitment to non-cognitivism in ethics? (2) Is 
Peirce’s moral sentimentalism compatible with a rational and normative approach to ethics? (3) Since Peirce 
believes that moral sentiments are instincts evolved over generations, what is the relationship between evolution 
and ethics? In particular, what is the role that normativity plays within the evolutive framework?  
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Before tackling the problem related to the first question, it is necessary to sketch Peirce’s conception of 
“sentiment.” Some important work has been done in trying to unpack Peirce’s understanding of the semeiotic 
structure of sentiments (in particular, Savan 1981; see also Calcaterra 2003: 22-41; Stephens 1981; 1985; Beeson 
2008; Short 2007), so that it is not necessary to repeat here what has been said elsewhere. However, it is 
important to mention that the analysis of sentiments and emotions1 as semeiotic processes already shows that 
Peirce cannot be taken to be a non-cognitivist in ethics. On the contrary, Peirce could be almost considered a 
hypercognitivist, insofar as his semeiotic theory of mental activity grants to sentiment the status of a non-
linguistic propositional state.2 Peirce writes that 
 
every emotion has a subject. If a man is angry, he is saying to himself that this or that is vile and 
outrageous. If he is in joy, he is saying “this is delicious.” If he is wondering, he is saying “this is 
strange.” In short, whenever a man feels, he is thinking of something. Even those passions which have 
no definite object – as melancholy – only come to consciousness through tinging the objects of thought. 
(EP1: 43)  
 
It should be clear that sentiment has the same logical structure of perception, including its categorical 
elements. This is also shown by the analysis of sentiment as a hypothetical or abductive inference, in which a 
predicate (3rdness) is tentatively attributed to the present instantiation (2ndness), in the form of a “feeling,” of a 
mere possibility of interaction (1stness). To be sure, with his distinction between propositions and mental acts, 
Peirce anticipated the work of some more recent speech-act theorists (Austin, Searle; see Thibaud 1997). 
According to Peirce, the same proposition can be articulated in a variety of illocutory acts and mental operations. 
He writes that the same proposition can be affirmed, denied, judged, doubted, inwardly inquired into, 
questioned, wished for, asked for, commanded, taught, and merely expressed (see EP2: 312). Similarly, he claims 
that “the act of asserting is an act of totally different nature from the act of apprehending the meaning of a 
proposition” (CP 5.30), insofar as the act of assertion implies the utterer’s “self-subjection to penalties” in the 
event that the propositions asserted turn out to be false. In its performative nature, therefore, an assertion or 
statement is “an act of an utterer of a proposition to an interpreter, and consists, in the first place, in the 
deliberate exercise, in uttering the proposition, of a force tending to determine a belief in it in the mind of the 
interpreter” (EP2: 312-313). Moreover, while a mental act is of course an actual phenomenon, the reality of a 
proposition has a further, independent reality, because it does not depend upon any actual mental act in order to 
have some sort of metaphysical status. As Peirce claims, a proposition “need not be asserted or judged. It may be 
contemplated as a sign capable of being asserted or denied. The sign itself retains its full meaning whether it be 
actually asserted or not” (EP2: 292-293). In other words, a proposition is a sign “that might be assented to and 
asserted” (R478: 58-59). What is important to stress here is that perceptions and sentiments are themselves 
propositional mental acts, even though they lack, in being spontaneous occurrences, the mediation of 
deliberation and assent.3 As we have read, the semeiotic structure of sentiments is the attribution of a predicate 
to the object that represents the target of the sentiment. In its semeiotic structure, a sentiment is a thought in 
germ, whose propositional content is highly vague and highly tentative, since it has the logical status of an 
uncontrolled hypothesis (EP1: 43). 
The cognitive status of sentiments is also witnessed by another element of Peirce’s semeiotic approach to 
mental activity. In one of his classifications of the interpretants, Peirce distinguishes among three types of 
                                                            
1 Peirce does not seem to distinguish between “emotions,” “passions” and “sentiments.” 
2 It would be odd for Peirce to be a non-cognitivist in ethics, not only for his approach to normative issues but also because of his 
understanding of “thought” and “mind” in a cosmological perspective. Peirce maintains that “thought is not necessarily connected 
with a brain. It appears in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world. … Not only is thought in the 
organic world, but it develops there” (CP 4.551). Although I cannot dwell upon the details of Peirce’s cosmology, I just want to point 
out that his seemingly “panpsychism” is at odds with a non-cognitivist position in ethics. Peirce’s hypercognitivist sentimentalism 
should be considered a regional instantiation of his panpsychism. Therefore, at least at a merely interpretative level, Peirce’s claims 
about the contrast between sentiment and rationality in VIM should not be taken as a declaration of non-cognitivism in ethics. 
3 See Maddalena (2009: 121-132). In this sense, Peirce states that a sentiment “is not one determined by reason …, but is of an arbitrary 
nature” (EP1: 43). However, this does not mean that there is no relation between self-control and sentiment (or perception). On the 
contrary, as we have seen, sentiments ought to be developed according to the regulative criterion of the development of concrete 
reasonableness and are therefore characterized by a normative vocation, just as any other component of human mind. 
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interpretants, namely the emotional, the energetic and the logical. As early as 1904, Peirce includes sentiments 
within the determinations that a sign can produce on an interpreter (CP 4.536; see Short 2007: 52). Peirce’s 
favorite examples are the sentimental interpretation of a piece of music (e.g. CP 5.475) and the sentimental 
“instinctive” judgments about certain possible lines of conduct or state of affairs, such as the moral disgust for 
incest (e.g. W6: 387). 
As a consequence, it should be clear right from this point that Peirce’s claims about the priority of 
“sentiments” over rationality in vitally important matters should not be taken as a declaration of non-
cognitivism. Rather, they are the mark of a complex and articulated metaethical and ethical cognitivism in which 
sentiment plays a pivotal role in certain occasions. 
 
 
 
1.1. First Order and Second Order Dispositions 
 
The first question we want to answer about Peirce’s alleged moral sentimentalism is: (1) why does Peirce say 
that “rational deliberation” is misplaced in vitally important matters and urgent issues, while sentiment is not? In 
particular, we want to know whether these claims commit Peirce to a form of non-cognitivism in ethics. As it is 
well known, Peirce assigns to sentiments and instincts a key role in the definition of the ethical conduct in what 
he calls “vitally important matters” (VIM). Even though I will dwell on this issue in a later section, I can already 
mention that Peirce's claim for the trustfulness of ethical sentiments in VIM is not an exhortation to an 
indiscriminate spontaneism, which would align him with ethical emotivists and relativists. Rather, his moral 
sentimentalism is a specific theory of normative ethics and moral epistemology (metaethics), in which the pivotal 
role of instinctual, moral sentiments does not rule out the fundamental function of a responsible, rational self-
criticism and self-control. The aim of this section is to take a first step toward the comprehension of Peirce's 
moral sentimentalism and to introduce his understanding of self-control and deliberation in ethical matters by 
drawing the central distinction between first and second order dispositions in human conduct. This will show that 
sentimental instincts and critical self-control are not mutually excluding features of human agency, but rather 
coessential ingredients of the same ethical and metaethical position. This will cast hopefully some light on 
Peirce's troublesome claim that “rationality” is totally out of place in VIM. Moreover, as we will see throughout 
this chapter, Peirce's moral sentimentalism is the implication in the field of ethics of what he calls “critical 
common-sensism” (CCS), which is in turn an essential component of his pragmaticism (EP2: 356-359).  
Sometimes it seems that Peirce associates “rationality” with the realm of science and “instinct” with the realm 
of “practice” (CP 1.634; 7.606). However, Peirce complicates the picture by saying that rationality is itself 
instinctual in its roots (e.g. R1114; see Ayim 1974; Maddalena 2003) and that the continuous progress of 
scientific inquiry is dependent upon the human inquirers’ capacity of abducting good hypotheses (e.g. CP 1.630). 
Peirce also concludes that we know scientifically only what instinct allowed us to have access to so far (CP 1.118; 
7.378).4 
But what does “instinct” mean here? As it is known, one of the essential features of CCS is that there are 
indubitable propositions and that these propositions are of the nature of instincts. Propositions such as “fire 
burns” are taken by Peirce to be indubitable within certain limits and instinctual in character. Accordingly, 
instincts are pervasive dispositions of activity in an individual person, which are in great part shared with other 
people and are the result of the cumulative experience of the previous generations (see EP2: 32, 1898). 
                                                            
4 According to Peirce’s classification, rationality and theoretical sciences developed from “social instincts,” while practical sciences 
developed from “selfish instincts” (CP 7.378; 7.383). In any case, I think that rationality means here a capacity for abstract symbolic 
activity, the type of activity needed in theoretical science. Moreover, if we take “rational instinct” to mean “il lume naturale”, i.e, the 
extraordinary capacity of guessing right making an explanatory hypothesis, we have again an instance of a narrow conception of 
rationality, which is a product as well of a certain development of social instincts. However, Reason in the sense of 3rdness is also at 
the origin of the process of evolution of the human being, not only at the end. In other words, social instincts and “rationality” in the 
narrow sense are the “working out” of the original final cause, 3rdness itself, which characterizes the human being in its specificity. 
On a different note, it is also interesting to stress how sociality (in the form of the activities dependent upon the social instincts) plays 
a fundamental role in the maturation and growth of rationality in its scientific sense. On the classification of the instincts, see Ayim 
(1982: 23-25). 
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Moreover, instincts are transmitted through education and childhood experience within community. In this 
sense, instincts are the outcome of conscious and prolonged experience if we consider them from the point of view of 
their genesis over generations of humans, and at the same time they are almost inborn dispositions if our standpoint 
is the life of the single man who acquires those dispositions as instincts through birth and upbringing (CP 2.170). 
The “originality” or “naturality” of human instincts, then, is not an ahistorical set of structures but instead the 
outcome of an ancient and long-lasting biological and cultural evolution.  
But what are the conditions that must be met in order for a disposition to be classified as an instinct? I think 
that for Peirce there are at least three conditions that a disposition must meet in order to be a human instinct. 
For Peirce, instincts: (i) function spontaneously at a certain level of human experience (the spontaneity condition), 
(ii) retain a degree of indubitability even after a serious critical assessment (the contextual indubitability condition), 
and (iii) are attuned to primordial (or non-specialized) human experiences (the non-specialized experience condition).  
First, the relation between instinctive dispositions and spontaneity appears in the characterization of 
instinctive dispositions as essentially acritical (CP 2.175). An acritical inference is an inference in which we know 
that the conclusion of the inference is determined by certain premises but we are unaware of the general principle 
that has led us to the conclusion. It is possible to elaborate Peirce’s understanding of acriticality by showing that 
instinct operates mostly in a spontaneous and uncontrolled way, at least at a certain level of human experience. Similar 
to perceptual judgments (EP2: 92, 1901), there are certain types of judgments which are not deliberately 
performed at first, but to which instead every person is spontaneously led, e.g. “fire burns x” and the sentimental 
assessment of incest as an object worthy of “moral horror.” However, while the instinctive, non-deliberate 
acceptance of p is limited to the level of spontaneous and uncontrolled interpretation of an object, such 
judgments can be overridden by personal initiative and self-control. As Peirce claims about the case of incest, 
some “rationalistic brother and sister” could marry and thereby go against their instincts (i.e., the wisdom of their 
sentimental judgment about the immorality of incest), but they “would find that the conviction of horrible guilt 
could not be shaken off” (EP2: 350, 1905). I would take this statement not as a description of what would 
necessarily happen in a similar case, but as an indication of what an instinct is and at what levels of experience it 
could show its effects. 
Second, although instincts function spontaneously, they can become an object of critical consideration and 
assessment. The need for critical reflection upon an alleged “instinctive belief” is one of the most important 
features of Peirce’s revision of Reid’s common-sensism. Indeed, as Peirce writes, “if we are to admit that some 
propositions are beyond our powers of doubt, we must not admit any specified proposition to be of this nature 
without severe criticism” (EP2: 432-433, 1908). In other words, the content of the belief has to pass the test of 
genuine critical doubting before it can be considered a genuine “instinctive belief.” Thus, mere spontaneity is not 
enough to consider a habit an instinctive one for since instinctive dispositions and the spontaneous 
interpretations resulting from them affirm something about reality, their content has to be tested through 
criticism and not simply falsified by experience. That is, criticism is needed to determine which part of the 
instinctive belief is seemingly being falsified. The status of Peircean instinct implies a reflective component of evaluation 
and justified acceptance of the propositional content of the instinct itself. If the belief with its content passes the test 
and so deserves the label of indubitability, then it can be provisionally included within the list of “instinctive 
beliefs.” For our purpose, however, it is only necessary to underline the fact that the method of the real doubt, as 
opposed to “paper” doubt, entails that we genuinely doubt p not if we have any reason to question p, but only if 
we have a good reason to do so.5 Peirce’s conclusion is then a general epistemic stance he calls “true 
conservatism,” according to which an instinctive attitude towards p, if it is a genuine instinct, is usually found to 
be indubitable by a sound rational assessment, since it is the product of many generations of experience 
(CP1.661). For these reasons, instinct “seldom errs,” at least in certain domains (EP2: 349, 1905). 
The third, and last, condition of instincts is that they concern, as Peirce says, “affairs that resemble those of a 
primitive mode of life” (EP2: 349, 1905). In other words, the propositional content of an instinctive attitude 
refers to a non-specialized form of human experience and of human interaction with the world. For instance, the 
                                                            
5 Cf. Agler 2012, which contains a good analysis of the difference between a “paper” doubt and a “skeptical doubt”. 
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instinctive belief fire burns the flesh does not cover many artificial or specialized situations in which an agent can 
actually test whether or not fire burns x. This claim has of course further consequences, among which there are 
normative implications. Indeed, since the content of an instinctual belief is a general fact about non-specialized 
conditions of life, it follows that the (contextual) infallibility and indubitability of instinct is limited to these 
regions of human experience and activity. This is again a distinctive feature of CCS, as the Scottish school of 
common-sensism seemed not to be fully aware of the “limitations of indubitability and the consequent 
limitations of the jurisdiction of original belief” (EP2: 350, 1905). As a consequence, the alethic value of an 
instinctive belief has always to be placed within the limits of the vagueness of its propositional content and of the 
non-specialization of the context in which the same proposition is true. 
We have explained in which sense, according to Peirce, we have “acritical” sentiments and instincts, and that 
these acritical mental acts – that is, mental acts we cannot help acting upon – provide us with cognitions which 
are the factual starting point of our further inferences, inquiries and activities in general. This is true even for 
some principles of basic reasoning, that is, some “natural judgments” and habits of inference “of the very 
simplest kind,” which are the resultant of inborn dispositions and maybe of some infant and semi-conscious 
experiences (CP 2.170). They constitute, then, what would “normally” happen in the majority of cases of the 
mental activity of men (CP 4.540). It is important to stress the fact that the instinctual behavior itself is 
nevertheless partially subject to the influence of reflective mental acts, which imply critical self-control. 
According to Peirce's description of “instinct,”   
 
An animal instinct is a natural disposition, or inborn determination of the individual's Nature (his 
“nature” being that within him which causes his behaviour to be such as it is), manifested by a certain 
unity of quasi-purpose in his behaviour. In man, at least, this behaviour is always conscious, and not 
purely spasmodic. More than that, unless he is under some extraordinary stress, the behaviour is always 
partially controlled by the deliberate exercise of imagination and reflexion; so much so that to the man 
himself his action appears to be entirely rational, so far is it from being merely sensori-motor. General 
analogy and many special phenomena warrant the presumption that the same thing is true of the lower 
animals, though they are undoubtedly far less reflective than men. Yet the adaptation of the behaviour to 
its quasi-purpose in some definite part overleaps all control. (CP 7.49 n.1) 
 
As a consequence, “instinctual” agency attains in human beings that specific level of interaction in which 
almost every occasion of activity is accompanied by awareness and partial control, in virtue of the high level of 
development of imaginative and reflective powers that characterizes human animality. What is worth noticing 
here is that, according to Peirce, human instinctive conduct is characterized by three essential features, that is: “it 
is conscious, is determined to a quasi-purpose, and that in definite respects it escapes all control.” Thus, the 
attunement of an instinct to a “quasi-purpose,” that is, to a general end that is not deliberate, is partly 
uncontrolled, even though under certain respects it is subject to rational determination. We will discuss 
throughout the next sections the place and the extension of this capacity of control, including its normative 
implications in ethics. The last sentence of the quotation will be also discussed in detail, by putting it in the 
context of Peirce's understanding of evolutionary theories, since it seems to represent a key claim about what 
Peirce thinks to be the nature and function of instincts in the life of man. However, according to Peirce, there is 
a constant and constitutive circularity in man between instinctive dispositions and critical thought, since even the instincts “have 
been so often furbished up and painted over by reflection upon the nature of things that they are, in mature life, 
mostly ordinary habits,” that is, dispositions acquired through one's individual experience (CP 2.170). Thus, 
human capacity of reflection and of acquiring new knowledge on facts (even “normative facts”) influences in a 
more or less conscious way our original dispositions. This is the pattern of functioning of the “natural reason of 
man” (EP2: 78). Indeed, “balancing reasons pro and con is the natural procedure of every man,” and “no man can 
avoid doing so continually” (EP2: 78)6, especially as far as deliberative processes about the future conduct are 
concerned. Although Peirce is here referring directly to the principles of rational inferences, his stance about the 
spontaneous, critical consideration of our instinctual beliefs and inferences by a reflexive activity can be 
                                                            
6 And Peirce continues: “and if he could, he would only have trained himself to the observance of rules having no foundation in reason. 
For reason is nothing but man's natural way of thinking, carefully and consistently observed” (EP2: 78). 
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rigorously extended to any other dispositions of human character, such as ethical and aesthetical dispositions. In 
other words, it seems that according to Peirce not only instinct is already characterized by some type of 
generality, but also it is naturally entangled with self-control. 
This mutual entanglement of instinct and controlling consciousness opens to the epistemological level of 
moral knowledge and its characteristic normativity. As we have seen in the chapter on the “Normative Science, 
self-control is the formal condition for the appearance of something like “normativity”. Peirce writes: 
 
I entirely agree, in opposition to distinguished logicians, that normality can be no criterion for what I 
call rationalistic reasoning, such as alone is admissible in science, yet it is precisely the criterion of 
instinctive or common-sense reasoning, which, within its own field, is much more trustworthy than 
rationalistic reasoning. In my opinion, it is self-control which makes any other than the normal course of 
thought possible, just as nothing else makes any other than the normal course of action possible; and just 
as it is precisely that that gives room for an ought-to-be of conduct, I mean Morality, so it equally gives 
room for an ought-to-be of thought, which is Right Reason; and where there is no self-control, nothing 
but the normal is possible (CP 4.540, “Prolegomena,” 1906). 
 
Now, a habit of affective response, a type of “sentiment,” which goes under the category of instinct, can be 
understood as a first order disposition. I would interpret a first order disposition as a propositional content that we 
cannot help acting upon at first – something like a perceptual judgment. However, Peirce contends that it is 
possible to make these original dispositions the object of consideration in further mental acts and to transform 
them into reflexive beliefs through the mediation of deliberate acts of assent. In this sense, human beliefs might 
be called second order dispositions (which are “acquired habits”). In this way, human moral make-up presents: 
 
1. Spontaneous habits of moral sentimental judgment: first order dispositions, or instincts (“natural” or 
“normal” level of human agency).  
2. Reflective, self-controlled habits of feeling and conduct: second order dispositions, or beliefs (normative 
level of human agency).7 
 
Instinctive sentiment is a kind of knowing or thinking, that is, a cognitive state. However, it is neither an 
explicit way of providing linguistic formulation of propositions (linguistic expression), nor of articulating reasons 
(deliberate reasoning). That is, it is not one of the ways in which human beings perform self-controlled 
operations of reasoning about things. It is a sentimental judgment resulting from certain hereditary affective 
dispositions, that is, a first order disposition. At the same time, this does not mean that human self-control does 
not relate, although indirectly, to our instinctual beliefs, among whom the sentimental judgments seem to be the 
most important element in VIM. Our “instincts” are always to be criticized if we want to assume them within 
our acquired habits of conduct, which are second order dispositions or beliefs. So, instinctive habits of sentiment 
are not the product of deliberate self-cultivation, but, at the same time, they are somehow related and subject to 
self-control, insofar as (1) these sentiments might provide an indication of what we should deliberately do, and as 
a consequence of how we should develop our beliefs. Moreover, (2) since instinctive sentiments are items of 
CCS, they are at the same time object of a methodic critical assessment, and can be eventually confirmed or 
modified. 
 
 
 
1.2. Judgments, Beliefs and Deliberation 
 
The aim of this section is to show at what level of human conduct Peirce considers the role of critical 
assessment of purposes to be fundamental. In other words, what is, in Peirce's terms, the role of deliberative 
rationality in conduct? This analysis is a necessary step in order to understand, in the next sections, the place of 
“instinctual sentiments” within deliberative conduct. Peirce writes that “in the ordinary conduct of everyday 
                                                            
7 Notice that the human “virtues” studies by NS are in this sense second order dispositions. 
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affairs, men really do act from instinct; and their opinions are founded on instinct in the broad sense … . A small 
dose of reasoning is necessary to connect the instinct with the occasion: but the gist and character of their 
conduct is due to instinct” (CP 2.176). This claim describes the real role and the place of self-control within 
human agency. In Peirce's terms, self-control and deliberative processes in their fundamental function are not 
relevant in urgent practical situation, but rather in the preparation of good habits of action, previously to any 
urgent practical situation. Of course, the formation of a habit requires itself a series of self-controlled actions (the 
repetition of external actions or the construction of imaginative diagrams about hypothetical practical situations 
in the future, see e.g. EP1: 47; EP2: 413). However, Peirce theory seems to be that the more substantial use of 
the self-control we endeavor in is not in the deliberation of what is the good action to do in a specific situation, 
but rather is the deliberation of what is the best habit according to which our moral character should be 
developed. We could say that the primary aim of rational deliberation is not to decide for a particular action in a 
certain urgent situation, but to direct the self-cultivation of one's “moral character” before the occurrence of any 
practical urgency. This position can be read as a Peircean insistence on the importance of the “moral” character 
and of its formation, in the same way in which this feature are central in the ethical doctrine of Aristotle, and of 
more recent authors such as Hume (1995: 399 ff.) and Dewey (e.g. LW3: 92-114). 
However, the full picture of Peirce's conception of deliberation requires that we clarify that rationality also 
has an important, though less fundamental, role within urgent, practical situations. The only function of rational 
self-control in these cases is to find a suitable way of applying the general dispositions and rules of actions 
endorsed by one’s moral character to the particular circumstances in which the concrete action is required. Thus, 
we could say that there is a twofold possible use of “critical” or “rational” self-control in Peirce's view, a more 
substantive one and a more applicative one. The more substantive one concerns the assessment and eventual 
development of certain habits, while the more applicative one implies that the critical effort of rationality is 
limited to adjusting the general axiological indication of the “rule” to the particular exigencies of a given 
situation. Peirce describes these processes of deliberation as an internal dialogue in which the previous “ego” 
appeals “to the reasonableness of the ego of the succeeding moment for his critical assent” (EP2: 402). Thus, 
this twofold model of the deliberative process can be formulated in the following way: 
 
I. (a) “Critical” or “rational” self-control performs a function of committing the agent to the “moral facts,” 
“norms” and “ideal” that are found to be good. I would name this level axiological self-control. At this level, 
self-control can intervene to review standards of technical operation.8 More deeply, it intervenes at the level of 
the agent's moral character, that is, of the fundamental value commitments of the agent. The deliberative process 
described in  “What Makes a Reasoning Sound?” is all about this, insofar as it shows how self-control operates 
from the choice of technical patterns of behavior to the commitment to an ultimate, aesthetical ideal. (b) The 
concrete action in an urgent practical situation results most of the time almost spontaneously from the moral make-
up of the agent, or requires a subsidiary and merely “applicative” use of self-control. In any case, it is only at this 
level that the axiological commitments of the agent are directly assessed and evaluated. Moreover, axiological 
deliberation is always subsequent to the act, it is a retrospective assessment of a previous act and the general 
dispositions that underpinned it. Moreover, it is clear from Peirce’s sketches of self-control that the genesis of 
the assessment of ideals emerges or grows out of the consideration of more basic “moral rules” and “principles” 
(CP 5.533). In other words, the “control” of an action by a “moral rule” entails at some point the need of 
controlling the moral rule by a higher-order “principle”; similarly, the moral principle asks for a further 
justification or control by an “esthetic ideal.” 
II. In addition, “critical” or “rational” self-control performs an applicative function. At this level, human self-
                                                            
8 See e.g. “Now a purpose is only the special character (and what is, strictly speaking, special, as contradistinguished from individual, is 
essentially general) of this or that self-controlled habit. Thus, if a man has a general purpose to render the decorations of a house he is 
building beautiful, without yet having determined more precisely what they shall be, the normal way in which the purpose was 
developed, of which all other ways are probably inessential variations, was that he actually made decorations in his inner world, and 
on attention to the results, in some cases experienced feelings which stimulated him to endeavors to reproduce them, while in other 
cases the feelings consequent upon contemplation of the results excited efforts to avoid or modify them, and by these exercises a 
habit was produced, which would, we know, affect not only his actions in the world of imagination, but also his actions in the world 
of experience; and this habit being self-controlled, and therefore recognized, his conception of its character joined to his self-
recognition, or adoption, of it, constitute what we call his purpose” (EP2: 430). 
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control intervenes only for adjusting the generality of the rule of action to the needs of a particular situation. 
Sometimes this level of deliberation is not required and the action springs almost spontaneously from the set of 
beliefs and commitments that constitute the moral character of each agent. When applicative deliberation takes 
place, it is always prior to the act.  
Peirce clearly draws the difference between the two uses of self-control in the following passage:  
 
It has been a great, but frequent, error of writers on ethics to confound an ideal of conduct with a 
motive to action. The truth is that these two objects belong to different categories. Every action has a 
motive; but an ideal only belongs to a line [of] conduct which is deliberate. To say that conduct is 
deliberate implies that each action, or each important action, is reviewed by the actor and that his 
judgment is passed upon it, as to whether he wishes his future conduct to be like that or not. His ideal is 
the kind of conduct which attracts him upon review. His self-criticism, followed by a more or less 
conscious resolution that in its turn excites a determination of his habit, will, with the aid of the sequelæ, 
modify a future action; but it will not generally be a moving cause to action. (EP2: 377-378) 
 
In this passage, the distinction between the two modalities of deliberation is traced back by Peirce to the two 
different categories of “ideal of conduct” and “motive of action.” On this account, the ideals of conduct are the 
object and the product of the axiological deliberation, which takes place only in limited occasions, when the 
agent reviews one “important action,” that is, an instance of conduct in which his value commitments are more 
clearly at stake. Thus, axiological assessment is performed only in determinate circumstances and is not 
concerned with the ideation of a determinate action, but rather with the evaluation of past instances of action 
and of the moral dispositions implicit in them. Peirce reminds us that VIM imply sometimes “urgency” and 
require “immediacy” of action (Ayim 1981: 48-49; Savan 1965: 41 ff.). On the contrary, a “motive” is the 
determinate content and the direction of a future or actual action. Most of the time, the motive results almost 
spontaneously from the moral character of an agent, or however is the product of a secondary and only 
applicative process of decision-making. 
The axiological process of self-control implies the formation of what Peirce calls the “resolution” and the 
“determination,” besides the critical assessment of the ultimate ideal itself of our conduct. Although Peirce states 
that this process of deliberation is not always available for the agent, since the imaginative capacity of 
anticipating future occasions of action cannot cover all the likely possibilities,9 he believes at the same time that it 
is the most important way of getting to control our own conduct. The structure of this fundamental process of 
deliberation is then: (1) reflecting upon a past action; (2) assessing it on the basis of one's ideals, rules of action 
and axiological commitments; (3) imagining the adequate consequences of one's ideals, rules of action and 
axiological commitments; that is, imagining good “resolutions” (or “plans,” or “diagrams”) of how the future 
conduct ought to be, and how, as a consequence, our past conduct ought to be corrected. Moreover, (4) self-
control and self-assessment can concern also the ideals themselves. It is at this level that the axiological process 
of deliberation exercises its full evaluative power. However, the destiny and the efficacy of a “resolution,” that is 
in itself a mere “mental formula,” is somehow dependent on the formation of a correspondent belief and 
disposition, that is, of an efficient agency in the inward nature” of the agent (EP2: 250).10 
                                                            
9 See e.g.: “a man does not always have an opportunity to form a definite resolution beforehand” (EP2: 246); “I have thus endeavored 
to describe fully the typical phenomena of controlled action. They are not every one present in every case” (EP2: 248); “The 
formation of habit under imaginary action (see the paper of January 1878) is one of the most essential ingredients of both; but in the 
logical process the imagination takes far wider flights, proportioned to the generality of the field of inquiry, being bounded in pure 
mathematics solely by the limits of its own powers, while in the moral process we consider only situations that may be apprehended 
or anticipated” (EP2: 347). “In the formation of habits of deliberate action, we may imagine the occurrence of the stimulus, and think 
out what the results of different actions will be. … The result will be that when a similar occasion actually arises for the first time it 
will be found that the habit of really reacting in that way is already established. I remember that one day at my father's table, my 
mother spilled some burning spirits on her skirt. Instantly, before the rest of us had had time to think what to do, my brother, 
Herbert, who was a small boy, had snatched up the rug and smothered the fire. We were astonished at his promptitude, which, as he 
grew up, proved to be characteristic. I asked him how he came to think of it so quickly. He said, “I had considered on a previous day 
what I would do in case such an accident should occur. This act of stamping with approval, “endorsing” as one's own, an imaginary 
line of conduct so that it shall give a general shape to our actual future conduct is what we call a resolve. It is not at all essential to the 
practical belief, but only a somewhat frequent attachment” (CP 2.583). 
10 According to Peirce, the notions of “special character,” “nature,” and “soul” are all synonyms of what we call moral character or 
moral make-up of the agent (EP2: 247). 
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Being nothing more than an idea, this resolution does not necessarily influence his conduct. But now 
he sits down and goes through a process similar to that of impressing a lesson upon his memory, the 
result of which is that the resolution, or mental formula, is converted into a determination, by which I mean a 
really efficient agency, such that if one knows what its special character is, one can forecast the man's 
conduct on a special occasion. One cannot make forecasts that will come true in the majority of trials of 
them by means of any figment. It must be by means of something true and real. We do not know by what 
machinery the conversion of a resolution into a determination is brought about. … Suffice it to say that 
the determination, or efficient agency, is something hidden in the depth of our nature. (EP2: 246) 
 
Peirce’s geography of deliberative processes is clear. The way in which an agent can exert a radical “measure 
of self control over his future actions” is not the applicative moment of thinking that immediately precedes the 
actual action, on the basis of which we certainly are not able to impart to our actions “any arbitrarily assignable 
character”; on the contrary, it is the previous “process of self-preparation” that tends to “impart to action (when 
the occasion shall arise) one fixed character” (EP2: 337). In other words, new beliefs develop through the agent's 
labor of imaginary or concrete trials and errors of different lines of conduct, and to the eventual “deliberate 
stamp of approval” that some of them might obtain, giving as a consequence a general shape to his actual future 
conduct (CP 2.583). Then, in this sense, the first type of deliberation coincides with the process of moral self-
cultivation of the agent, through which he assigns to his moral character specific “acquired habits” and 
“specializations” (CP 2.583). Peirce's notion of self-control and deliberation, as we can see, is not action-centered 
but, rather, habit-centered. If it is maybe possible that we do not act under the guise of good, the only possibility 
for the deliberate cultivation of our moral character is to judge under the guise of good, for our self-assessment 
and self-preparation require the positive axiological approval of certain past lines of conduct and certain 
standards of action (and complementary disapproval of others).  
Placing deliberation in the right place is also important insofar as Peirce attributes to “self-control” (in which 
we should include the knowledge developed in NS and the personal development of rules, rules of rules, rules of 
rules of rules etc.) a key role in the development of human individuality. As Peirce says, “vir is begotten” through 
a repeated exercise of the self-control upon itself (CP 5.402 n.3; see Krolikowski 1964). Since self-control is a 
type of knowledge, it would be odd if Peirce denied once and for all the role of rational deliberation in ethics, 
committing himself to a form of sentimental non-cognitivism. 
In the second chapter, we saw that one of the formal exigencies of human conduct is unity. It is clear that it is 
at the fundamental, axiological level of reflection and self-criticism that the agent must work in order to give 
rational unity to his conduct. “Rational unity” here means that the cognitive, practical and affective dispositions 
of the agent's moral character tend to realize a perfect embodiment of “reason.” Hence, the regulative role of the 
ideals and the axiological commitments becomes pervasive and flawlessly effective in human conduct, resolving 
in this way axiological and practical incompatibilities.11 This means that the obstinacy of instincts and tendencies 
conflicting with her critical beliefs is reduced to the minimum, or rather completely conquered. Peirce often 
describes the vocation of human conduct to “rational unity” as the struggle towards a “fully deliberate” conduct 
and towards “full liberty” (see e.g. EP2: 246). So, the continuous process of corrective reflection subsequent to 
our actual conduct is the essential spring of the “self-preparation for action” on the next occasion, which tends 
to “approximate indefinitely toward perfection of the fixed character” of a belief and will be marked by “entire 
absence of self reproach” (EP2: 337).12 I might call this normative end the perfection of deliberative agency. Peirce 
                                                            
11 “If conduct is to be thoroughly deliberate, the ideal must be a habit of feeling which has grown up under the influence of a course of 
self-criticisms and of hetero-criticisms; and the theory of the deliberate formation of such habits of feeling is what ought to be meant 
by esthetics” (EP2: 377-378). 
12 The criterion of the “absence of self-reproach” could be subject to the following objection: provided that the agent has a certain set 
of believes and desires (no matter what those beliefs and desires are), then the agent would judge her actions in relations to that set. 
However, we can imagine a case in which the agent manages to conform her deeds to the exigencies of her beliefs and desires, 
although her beliefs and desires are evil ones. In this case, following the objection, the agent would not experience any self-reproach, 
but would be at the same time an immoral agent. However, Peirce's cognitive theory of moral judgments meets this objection. Indeed, 
the absence of self-reproach has to be taken not only in a factual sense, but in an ideal and counter-factual one. The agent would be a 
moral and “free” agent only if her basic commitments and actions would not be object of criticism in the long run. Therefore, if the 
agent does not experience any self-reproach at the present time because her deeds are adequate to her basic commitments, and if her 
basic commitments are evil at the same time (even though she does not know or accept it), she would not be a “free” agent.  
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explains that “a habit of which we are not aware, or with which we are not deliberately satisfied, is not a belief” 
(EP2: 12). This statement means that, even though we have judged a proposition to be practically good and we 
are willing to endorse it as our rule of action in every suitable circumstances, we are still struggling to make of 
that newly born belief a fully “practical belief,” that is, an effective purpose in every circumstance we have judged 
it to be a suitable principle of action. If this does not happen yet, it means that conflicting and uncontrolled 
tendencies instinctively act against our fundamental commitments.  
 
A Belief is a state of mind of the nature of a habit, of which the person is aware, and which, if he acts 
deliberately on a suitable occasion, would induce him to act in a way different from what he might act in 
the absence of such habit. … If a man really believes that alcohol is injurious to him, and does not choose 
to injure himself, but still drinks for the sake of the momentary satisfaction, then he is not acting 
deliberately. [that is, not according to what he “beliefs,” that is, what he has deliberately accepted] (EP2: 
12) 
 
Human capacity of reflection proves to be fundamental because of the inertial force of the agent's original, 
behavioral dispositions to become controlled and rationalized. In a passage, Peirce even states paradoxically that 
“reflection” is not, properly speaking, an indispensable component of perfect rationality, or, in a more general 
sense, of fully intelligent conduct.13 According to this opinion, the essential conditions of a fully intelligent 
conduct for man would be (a) the unity of “cognitions,” that is, a set of non-conflicting beliefs, and (b) the fact 
that “our actions should proceed from the entirety of our knowledge,” that is, again, from our deliberate beliefs 
(EP1: 222-223). Thus, it is “because our thought is only imperfectly brought to unity,” that “it requires effort to 
collect it,” and that “it requires a watchful eye to be directed to the imperfections of this unity.” Indeed, “were 
we so happily constituted that we should always without reflection completely assimilate everything we learned, 
so as to take due account of it in every act, we might well be spared the trouble of reflecting; and we should be 
only the more rational if we could thus behave with intelligence by the first intention of the mind, without 
reflection” (EP1: 222-223). As we have said, then, it is the axiological deliberation that carries out this unifying 
function of our beliefs. 
However, the role of deliberation within particular practical situations is important as well. As we have 
glimpsed before, the knowledge of the rule of conduct cannot be immediately effective, since a maxim, in its 
generality, is not able to provide all the necessary information to act in the suitable way in a particular 
circumstance. So, what is the real effectiveness or power of this second level of deliberation? Has it just an 
instrumental or limited applicative role or, on the contrary, is it able to autonomously determine in the agent's 
imminent behavior an unpredictable and fully new line of conduct? Sometimes Peirce seems to think that a 
certain concrete action would inevitably result if a specific moral make-up happened to interact with certain 
conditions (cf. Hume and the compatibilist approaches to the problem of free will that results from his theory). 
He seems to imply this conclusion when he says that the “determination” produced in the moral character is an 
“efficient agency, such that if one knows what its special character is, one can forecast the man's conduct on a 
special occasion” (EP2: 246).14 Similarly, he explains that 
 
the necessitarians tell us that when we act, we act under a necessity that we cannot control. I am 
inclined to think that this is substantially so. We certainly cannot control our past actions, and I fancy it is 
too late to control what is happening at the very instant present. You cannot prevent what already is. If 
this be true, it is true that when we act, we do act under necessity that we cannot control. But our future 
actions we can determine in a great measure; can we not? To deny that were mere gabble and word-
twisting. … The point is that our future actions will be controlled by present endeavors. That is sufficient. 
But let us describe the all-familiar phenomena of self-control. (EP2: 245)  
 
It is apparent that the last appeal to “self control” in the quotation refers to the axiological deliberation, not 
to the applicative one. Does this really mean that the applicative thinking only has an instrumental function, in a 
                                                            
13 Cf. “There is no reason why “thought,” in what has just been said, should be taken in that narrow sense in which silence and darkness 
are favorable to thought. It should rather be understood as covering all rational life, so that an experiment shall be an operation of 
thought” (EP2: 337). 
14 “One cannot make forecasts that will come true in the majority of trials of them by means of any figment” (EP2: 246). 
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way that, if we had a perfect knowledge of all the relevant facts of a particular practical situation (both 
concerning the moral character of the agent and the conditions of the external world) we could almost unerringly 
predict the agent's action? 
The answer is no. Indeed, these statements cannot be read as an affirmation of radical psychological 
determinism in action for at least two reasons. The first point to stress is the psychological and moral insight that 
the moral character of an agent has always a definite and effective practical weight in orienting and determining 
within certain limits the concrete actions of an agent. Indeed, as Peirce remarks, moral habits are characterized 
by a particular “obstinacy” and “persistency,” which are not found, for example, in the principles of scientific 
reasoning (CP 2.160). The second point is the meaning of the expression “fully deliberate line of action.” When 
is our action fully deliberate? For sure, it is when the first type of deliberation has fully taken rational possession 
of our uncontrolled and contrasting instincts and tendencies, letting our spontaneous, actual conduct to be a 
perfect mirror of our conscious beliefs and purposes. As Peirce remarks, this is the real meaning of human 
“liberty”.15 However, a fully deliberate conduct also requires a repeated decision of relying on what we have 
previously judged to be the good patterns of behavior and, then, a contextual re-confirmation of our beliefs. For 
instance, Peirce says that “to say that a man believes anthracite to be a convenient fuel is to say no more nor less 
than that if he needs fuel, and no other seems particularly preferable, then, if he acts deliberately, bearing in mind 
his experiences, considering what he is doing, and exercising self-control, he will often use anthracite.” 
Deliberation in action entails then “attention to memories of past experience and to one's present purpose, 
together with self-control” (CP 2.583). This means that the high probability of the occurrence of an action, given 
a set of circumstances C, includes within C a contextual, deliberate act of acceptance of our old beliefs and of 
their contextual operativeness. Thus, the occurrence of an act is describable by the following conditional 
according to which, (i) any time certain occasions will arise (external circumstances and subjective circumstances, 
as beliefs and desires) and (ii) any time we will act “deliberately,” then (iii) a certain type of action will follow. 
“Deliberately” has here a precise meaning: an agent acts “deliberately” at t1 if he acts (1) according to the 
propositions he believed in at t2, (2) without any change in his beliefs (follows from 1.), that is, without the 
endorsement of a new purpose, and (3) without external constriction. It is quite clear that (1) and (2) requires an 
act of decision and self-control. 
It is convenient to develop schematically the two previous cases presented by Peirce in order to understand 
the specific role that self-control has respectively at the level of axiological and applicative deliberation in making 
human conduct perfect from the point of view of deliberative power. Indeed, “to say that any thinking is 
deliberate is to imply that it is controlled with a view to making it conform to a purpose or ideal” (CP 1.573).  
 
I. 
P1. I believe that p (I have a deliberately developed habit whose purpose is p). Ex.: I believe that alcohol is 
always unhealthy; the following practical maxim is “I will not drink alcohol in any circumstances.” 
P2. I wish to do A and I don't have a rival wish (instinct, desire, uncontrolled tendency). Ex.: “I wish to drink 
water instead of alcohol now.” 
P3. Option 1. I accept my belief that p and my wish to do A (self-control). Option 2. I do not express any 
explicit act of acceptance. 
C. I do A. I actually drink water here and now. 
 
II. 
P1. I believe that p.  
P2. I also have an uncontrolled inclination for non-p. The implicit line of action required by this inclination is 
“I will drink alcohol in certain circumstances.” 
P2. According to my deliberate belief that p, I wish to do A. However, I also have a further tendency to do 
non-A. “I wish to drink alcohol now in order to please my momentary satisfaction.” 
P3. Option 1. Even though I accept my belief that p and my wish to do A, my habit and my decision are not 
                                                            
15 Cf. again: “the man can, or if you please is compelled, to make his life more reasonable. What other distinct idea than that, I should be glad to 
know, can be attached to the world liberty?” (EP2: 248). 
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strong enough to overcome my uncontrolled inclination to non-A. The wish to do non-A gets the upper hand. 
Option 2. I do not express any explicit act of acceptance. The wish to do non-A gets the upper hand. 
C. I do non-A. I actually drink alcohol here and now. 
 
According to Peirce's definition, (II) displays a practical case in which the agent does not act “deliberately.” 
This is an interesting formulation of the ancient problem of akrasìa, or weakness of the will. As we can see, 
Peirce does not deny that an act of acceptance can have an important role also at the level of applicative 
thinking, although it seems to argue that this function is not performed any time a man expresses an action. 
However, Peirce's tenet is that the chore of self-control in producing a whole disposition to integrated, rational 
conduct is not found at the level of applicative deliberation, but at the most fundamental level of axiological 
reflection. 
 
 
 
1.3. Theoretical and Practical Knowledge 
 
A further step in understanding Peirce’s account of moral sentimentalism and deliberation concerns the 
distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. In 1904 ca., Peirce writes 
 
Of the two great tasks of humanity, Theory and Practice, the former sets out from a sign of a real object 
with which it is acquainted, passing from this, as its matter, to successive interpretants embodying more and 
more fully its form, wishing ultimately to reach a direct perception of the entelechy; while the latter, setting 
out from a sign signifying a character of which it has an idea, passes from this, as its form, to successive 
interpretants realizing more and more precisely its matter, hoping ultimately to be able to make a direct 
effort, producing the entelechy. (EP2: 304)16 
 
The aim of this section is to point out that the chore of Peirce's declarations about the complex relationship 
between “theory” and “practice,” “science” and extra-scientific conduct concerns the different nature of two 
modalities of human knowledge, that is, the theoretical and the practical knowledge. As we will see, Peirce’s attributes 
to theoretical and practical knowledge two different function and therefore different epistemic features and 
criteria of justification. Moral sentimentalism itself proves to be one of the most important features of practical 
knowledge, at least as far as certain specific practical issues are concerned.  
First, it seems to be necessary to study Peirce's notion of “belief” in some of its different facets, starting from 
a controversial statement often found in his writings. Many passages seem to imply that a “belief is out of place 
in pure theoretical science” (EP2: 156; also EP2: 33; 85). It is clear, however, that this claim has to be interpreted 
in a nuanced way, since its literal meaning is evidently at odds with a basic understanding of the scientific activity. 
Indeed, since a belief in its general meaning is a deliberate tendency to act upon a proposition in certain 
circumstances, it easily follows that the scientific activity requires many “beliefs,” if we are to make sense of the 
different procedures and operations implied by scientific inquiries. Peirce admits this point when he says that a 
sound principle of a given science, that is, an accepted opinion or a methodological rule, can be a belief in a 
limited sense, that is, “a sound maxim of scientific procedure” (EP2: 156,). That is to say, “belief” also plays a role in 
scientific inquiry, even though in the limited sense relative to the activity of designing theories and explanatory 
hypotheses and of experimentally testing those hypotheses. “Activity,” then, should be taken here in a very broad 
sense, and should comprehend also diagrammatic and imaginative activity, like in mathematics,17 besides the 
external and public operations of experimentation required by certain sciences. There are then genuine “purely 
theoretical beliefs” (CP 2.583). However, how should we make sense of Peirce's claim that beliefs do not play a 
                                                            
16 This distinction has been recently restated in the form of the different “direction of fit” of practical knowledge and theoretical 
knowledge. See e.g. Searle 2001.  
17 Cf. “… to believe the concept in question is applicable to anything is to be prepared under certain circumstances, and when actuated 
by given motives, to act in a certain way. This is quite clearly the case with all mathematical concepts. To say that a collection consists 
of seventeen single members involves, if thought out to its ultimate meaning, the act of counting in the imagination, and, of course, 
the action must be generalized into a habit connected with the predication seventeen” (EP 2: 432). 
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fundamental role in scientific inquiries? 
One way is to consider Peirce’s different definitions of “belief.” Peirce distinguishes among a “practical 
belief,” a “full belief” and a “living belief.” We have then: 
 
(a) Practical belief. Most of the time, “practical belief” is merely a synonym of “belief.” In other words, it refers 
to every proposition that we have deliberately established in us as a habitual rule of action in certain 
circumstances C. However, it is also true that the notion of “practice” is sometimes treated by Peirce in a more 
technical sense. In these specific contexts, the Peircean idea of “practice” means only the systems of conduct – 
including first of all ends and goals implied in them – that belong to the extra-scientific conduct. Indeed, Peirce’s 
statements about this topic also imply the simple fact that in “purely theoretical sciences” a practical belief is out 
of place in the sense that no relevant action for the extra-scientific activity would follow from purely theoretical 
hypotheses. Similarly, a “stout belief” is what is a proposition we have the habit to act upon in “real practical 
concerns” and can really help those situations (EP2: 156). In this sense Peirce states that a “practical belief, such 
as that anthracite is a convenient fuel,” is different from a “purely theoretical belief, such as that the pole of the 
earth describes an oval of a few rods' diameter, or that there is an imaginary circle which is twice cut by every real 
circle” (CP 2.583). Some important considerations are implied by the distinction between “practical” and 
“theoretical” activity, i.e. practical beliefs (1) usually represent “universal concerns,” while the concerns of 
science are specific and selective; (2) their ends and goals do not have – and do not need to have – the scientific 
level of clarity. Hence, these ends are usually vague, and as ends of human, common “practice,” they are 
perfectly fine in their vagueness. Within the world of practice, we find the systems of conduct linked to VIM, 
that is, practical urgent situations related to general ends like self-preservation, sexual behavior and preservation 
of the stock etc., which include, as a consequence, also the “vital crises.”18 VIM also comprises practical 
situations characterized by “urgency” and the need of “immediate” response. The definition of this category of 
systems of practice and goals is not always clear. It also comprehends those “instinctive” beliefs upon which the 
common-sensical mind “risks” its choices in the world of practice. These systems of practice have a further 
fundamental character, that is, (3) they are essentially characterized by deep sentimental responses. The nature of 
the link between vitally important systems of practices and corresponding sentiments will be deepened later. 
However, it is clear that when Peirce states that the scientific beliefs, that sometimes he calls “opinions,” are only 
relevant “in relatively insignificant affairs,” he means that those systems of conduct and their constitutive goals 
are highly specialized ones, and that they are endorsed only by some specialists within artificial contexts, like 
those of scientific experimentation (EP2: 349-350). Moreover, compared to the convictions and opinions of the 
particular sciences, which in principle can be rejected and substituted with another from one day to the other 
without producing any change in the “practical” systems of conduct of the non-specialist, the beliefs implied in 
human, common conduct seem to have a greater stability and a higher grade of improbability of being replaced 
in a short time (EP2: 33). 
(b) Full belief. It is a proposition that we deliberately established in us as a habitual rule of action in those 
specific conditions C that are “vital crises” and VIM. So, says Peirce, “full belief is willingness to act upon the 
proposition in vital crises, opinion is willingness to act upon in relatively insignificant affairs” (EP2: 33).19 In this 
sense, the fact that certain propositions gain the status of premises in scientific inquiry is not enough for them to 
be “beliefs” in this sense. Their meaningfulness covers too a narrow field and their status is much more 
                                                            
18 “But in vital matters, it is quite otherwise. We must act in such matters; and the principle upon which we are willing to act is a belief. 
Thus, pure theoretical knowledge, or science, has nothing directly to say concerning practical matters, and nothing even applicable at 
all to vital crises. Theory is applicable to minor practical affairs; but matters of vital importance must be left to sentiment, that is, to 
instinct” (EP2: 33). 
19 Peirce continues: “But pure science has nothing at all to do with action. The propositions it accepts, it merely writes in the list of 
premises it proposes to use. Nothing is vital for science; nothing can be. Its accepted propositions, therefore, are but opinions at most; 
and the whole list is provisional. The scientific man is not in the least wedded to his conclusions. He risks nothing upon them. He 
stands ready to abandon one or all as soon as experience opposes them. Some of them, I grant, he is in the habit of calling established 
truths; but that merely means propositions to which no competent man today demurs. It seems probable that any given proposition of 
that sort will remain for a long time upon the list of propositions to be admitted. Still, it may be refuted tomorrow; and if so, the 
scientific man will be glad to have got rid of an error. There is thus no proposition at all in science which answers to the conception 
of belief” (EP2: 33). 
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uncertain that certain beliefs that have continuously been acted upon by generations of human beings. 
(c) Living belief. It is a proposition that we have deliberately established in us as a habitual rule of action in 
certain conditions C and that is not overcome by some conflicting tendencies in relevant occasions. That is, it is a 
belief that is actually operative in every circumstance that has been judged pertinent by the agent. It is a 
synonym, then, of a belief operating in a “fully deliberate” conduct.20 In this case, the characterization of the 
belief is not taken from what the belief is about, its subject-matter (e.g. a “full belief” is about VIM while a 
scientific “opinion” is about highly specific fields of application), but from the psychological strength of the 
belief in relation to uncontrolled and conflicting inclinations. Hence, both “practical” and “full beliefs” can be 
living beliefs. 
(d) Theoretical belief. It is a proposition that we deliberately established in us as a habitual rule of action in 
certain conditions C, limited to the system of practices required by the scientific activity. 
 
Thus, one of the possible answer to our question is that, since a belief, in its most important meaning, refers 
to the notions of “practical” and “full” belief (that is, to the sphere of the common and non-specialized conduct 
of man), the “theoretical” and “scientific” beliefs, because of their extremely circumscribed application, are just a 
secondary instance of the human being's deliberate habits and moral character. However, it seems that Peirce's 
stance has further implications, which show that his claim involves a further, normative claim. The normative 
meaning of the statement “belief is out of place in pure theoretical science” can be understood both as a feature 
of the sound development of scientific and theoretical inquiry and, more interestingly, as a key-point about the 
difference of theoretical and practical knowledge. The first implication of the normative principle is that, since the 
function of theoretical knowledge is only to discover the truth, every consideration about utilities and suitable applications 
of theories and discoveries ought to be kept away from the internal criteria through which a theoretical science 
develops and tests its contents. Of course, Peirce says, there are sciences, like physiology, engineering and 
chemistry that have almost immediate possibilities of application and technologic effects, useful for improving 
concrete situations of human life.21 However, if the aim of a particular science becomes the discovery of useful 
applications for resolving practical problems, then that science loses its theoretical nature and turns into a 
technical or poietical knowledge. These considerations are closely related to Peirce's insistence on a genuine and 
uncontaminated “theoretical interest” as a necessary epistemic virtue for the man of science, including the 
philosopher.22 In a clear passage, Peirce spells out his stance on this matter: 
 
Logic, then, is a theory. The end of any theory is to furnish a rational account of its object. . . . A 
theory directly aims at nothing but knowing. Maybe, if it be sound, it is likely, some day, to prove useful. 
Still, fairness forbids our making utility the criterion of the excellence of the theory. (CP 2.1, emphasis 
added) 
 
Then, the criteria for the acceptance of a theoretical opinion are not factors of practical utilities, but are instead 
internal, specific standards of acceptability and of experimental evidence, which are different for every theoretical 
                                                            
20 Cf. “Speaking strictly, Belief is out of place in pure theoretical science, which has nothing nearer to it then the establishment of 
doctrines, and only the provisional establishment of them, at that. Compared with living Belief it is nothing but a ghost” (EP 2: 156). 
Cf. also, “the most intense and living determination (Bestimmung) of the soul toward shaping” the “whole conduct into conformity 
with the hypothesis that God is Real and very near; and such a determination of the soul in regard to any proposition is the very 
essence of a living Belief in such proposition” (EP2: 446). And cf. also, “a living, practical belief,” and “not merely a scientific belief, 
which is always provisional” (EP2: 449). 
21 Cf. “Even if a science be useful – like engineering or surgery – yet if it is useful only in an insignificant degree as those sciences are, it 
still has a divine spark in which its petty practicality must be forgotten and forgiven” (CP 1.671). “There are sciences, of course, many 
of whose results are almost immediately applicable to human life, such as physiology and chemistry. But the true scientific investigator 
completely loses sight of the utility of what he is about. It never enters his mind. Do you think that the physiologist who cuts up a dog 
reflects, while doing so, that he may be saving a human life? Nonsense. If he did, it would spoil him for a scientific man; and then the 
vivisection would become a crime. However, in physiology and in chemistry, the man whose brain is occupied with utilities, though 
he will not do much for science, may do a great deal for human life. But in philosophy, touching as it does upon matters which are, or 
ought to be, sacred to us, the investigator who does not stand aloof from all intent to make practical applications, will not only 
obstruct the advance of the pure science, but what is infinitely worse, he will endanger his own moral integrity and that of his readers” 
(EP2: 29). Then, “the two masters, theory and practice, you cannot serve” (EP2: 34). 
22 Cf. “I stand before you an Aristotelian and a scientific man, condemning with the whole strength of conviction the Hellenic tendency 
to mingle Philosophy and Practice” (EP2: 29). 
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science. Theoretical knowledge, then, should not admit within itself the criterion of utility.23 
The second implication of the normative principle concerns the difference between theoretical and practical 
knowledge. The first thing to say is that, if theoretical knowledge categorically excludes any appeal to applicability 
among its ways of developing discoveries and settling beliefs, practical knowledge finds in the criterion of 
applicability its fundamental feature. As we have already glimpsed, what practical knowledge aims at is the 
settlement of a belief on the basis of criteria of convenient, contextual applicability and practicability, and, 
eventually, the determination of a concrete action. The character itself of the convenience and of applicability of 
a practical belief does range from the aesthetical and ethical criteria of evaluation to the purely instrumental and 
technical ones. However, the point here is that practical knowledge, especially in the form of axiological 
deliberation, weights different, conflicting considerations and reasons not for the aim of fixing a theoretical belief, but for 
establishing a practical belief, that is, a convenient habit of action, which can be either an aesthetical and ethical ideal, 
or a more technical resolution.24 In other words, if the acceptance of a proposition as a belief obeys the criteria of 
practical goodness (from an ethical or an instrumental point of view), the establishment of a good scientific 
hypothesis on the contrary obeys the scientific principle of being the best explanation available of a 
phenomenon. The aim of practical knowledge, then, is the establishment of a justified practical belief, while the 
aim of the theoretical knowledge is the establishment of a justified explanation as a new scientific opinion. 
At this point, it is important to prevent two possible misunderstandings about the link between “reasoning” 
and practice, on the one hand, and between meaning and practice, on the other hand. First, the epistemic gap 
between theoretical and practical knowledge does not deny that from an ontological point of view the theoretical 
knowledge is a type of deliberative performance. The distinction only aims to underline that “accepting” a 
proposition explicitly because of its nature of rule of action, i.e., because of its practical content, is a defining 
property of practical knowledge, and ought to be excluded from the way in which a theoretical opinion is settled. 
Second, the claim that, according to the pragmatic maxim, the semantic content of every proposition and mental 
act, in its third level of clarity, corresponds to a maxim of conduct, does not imply that every belief has to be 
settled on the basis of its utility and practical effects for human conduct. 
With respect to practical knowledge, we have seen that Peirce admits scientific and theoretical beliefs, that is, 
procedural principles required by the practical operations of each science. Thus, the general issue of what belief 
we ought to embrace has to be specified through an explicit reference to the nature – scientific or extra-scientific 
– of the context of conduct. Whether the conversion of a mere proposition into a belief (by induction) is justified 
or not cannot be established in general terms, but only in relation to the context of its application. As Peirce says 
 
a practical belief is what a man proposes to go upon. What ought it to be? That must depend upon 
what the purpose of his action is. What, then, is the purpose of a man? That is the question of pure ethics, 
a very great question which must be disposed of before the logic of practical belief can be entered upon 
to any good effect. With science it is entirely different. A problem started today may not reach any 
scientific solution for generations. … Really the word “belief” is out of place in the vocabulary of science. 
If an engineer or other practical man takes scientific result, and makes it the basis for action, it is he who 
converts it into a belief. In pure science, it is merely the formula reached in the existing state of scientific 
progress. The question of what rules scientific inference ought to follow in order to accelerate the 
progress of science to the utmost is a comparatively simple one, and may be treated by itself. The 
question of how a given man, with no much time to give to the subject, had best proceed to form his 
hasty decision, involves other very serious difficulties, which make it a distinct inquiry. (EP2: 85) 
 
This is the epistemic framework within which the role of sentiment in Peirce’s ethics and metaethics should 
be studied. As it is clear, there is nothing in what we have said to far that leads to think that Peirce made a 
mockery of a philosophical approach to ethics. The NS establish that the theoretical discovery of moral facts is 
not sufficient to infuse the aesthetically beautiful virtues in the human being. At the same time, Peirce observes 
that in VIM rational deliberation is not effective. In these cases, moral sentiments should be followed instead. 
                                                            
23 Cf. e.g. CP 7.186, in which Peirce argues against Pearson’s tenet that the end of science is the “stability of society.” 
24 Cf. “A fundamental question like this [the issue of the beautiful in itself], however practical the issues of it may be, differs entirely 
from any ordinary practical question, in that whatever is accepted as good in itself must be accepted without compromise. In deciding 
any special question of conduct it is often quite right to allow weight to different conflicting considerations and calculate their 
resultant. But it is quite different in regard to that which is to be the aim of all endeavor” (EP2: 253). 
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Why is that? We can now move to the next question we want to address, which is: (2) Is Peirce’s moral 
sentimentalism compatible with a rational and normative approach to ethics? 
 
 
 
2. Peirce's Moral Sentimentalism and Critical-Common Sensism 
 
The aim of this section is to take a further step in offering an account of Peirce’s moral sentimentalism, this 
time in the light of what he calls “sentimental conservatism” (CP 1.661). This doctrine maintains that “great 
respect should be paid to the natural judgment of the sensible heart” (EP1: 356). Moral sentimentalism is that 
component of Peirce's “critical common-sensism” (CCS) which concerns ethical issues, above all good conduct 
in “vitally important matters” (VIM). A preliminary definition of VIM might be helpful. The expression covers a 
wide set of practical questions, from the reality of God (EP2: 434-450; cf. Raposa 1989) and the choice of the 
personal conception of the good life (the “free development of the agent's own esthetic quality,” EP2: 202), to 
more prosaic matters of daily life. Regarding such questions, our instinctive logica utens and sentiments possess 
greater epistemic and practical authority than “theory” (EP2: 30). This category also refers to pressing practical 
problems or sudden “crises” (EP2: 33), as in the case of a shipwreck (EP2: 156). On this occasion, however, I 
will focus on one particular claim related to VIM, that (a) there are moral values of “universal concern” (CP 5.522) and 
that (b) these values are recognized on the basis of our affective dispositions, like in the universal experience of 
“horror” for incest.25 
I want to show that according to Peirce there is a universal moral experience based on sentiment and that this 
experience implies a twofold normative doctrine about human conduct in VIM. In fact, it entails both an epistemic 
claim about the sound moral knowledge of vitally important values (“semeiotic,” or metaethical level) and an 
ethical claim about the virtuous development of man's character in this field of experience (“ethical” level).26 
Furthermore, I contend that moral sentimentalism is a component of the broader doctrine of CCS and that it is 
within this doctrine that it is possible to find Peirce's vindication of his normative claims about human conduct 
in VIM.  
As we have already mentioned, Peirce's sentimentalism can be fully grasped only in the light of the continuity 
between sentiment and rationality. Peirce’s “semeiosis” includes different modes in which cognition can be 
articulated, not only in linguistic way. First, the role that he accords to sentiments does not entail a rejection of 
reason, though it does demand a reconceptualization of what reasonableness means. Just as sentiments and even 
emotions have a cognitive nature, so reason itself has an affective dimension. As David Savan has pointed out, 
Peirce is a “cognitivist in emotion theory,” which means that emotions are identical with cognitive or evaluative 
                                                            
25 As far as I know, only Cheryl Misak has directly addressed the issue of what a VIM is (2004: 150-174). Beeson 2008, Hookway 2002 
and Short 2001 indirectly address the problems related to “vital important matters,” but they do not provide a definition of what a 
vital important matter is in Peirce's terms. As Misak (2004: 172) puts it, “(1) a vital matter, for Peirce, is any urgent question about 
what we ought to do. (2) The category of the vital is wider than the category of the ethical.” I agree with the first part of the 
definition, but not with the second. As far as the first part is concerned, it is true that a vital matter is an “urgent” practical issue. The 
only problem with this definition is the ambiguity of the category of “urgent.” Does this category only refer to those sudden “crises” 
(EP2: 33) in which we must act and “we need to reach a definite conclusion promptly” (2004: 151) or also to something else? I argue 
that, in Peirce's view, “vital” and “urgent” do not describe only pressing practical situations like sudden crises, but also a universal level 
of human moral experience and the values implied in it. As far as the second part of the definition is concerned, it is important to remember 
that ethics studies every form of voluntary, self-controlled conduct of man, including deliberate thinking. However, according to 
Peirce, formal and systematic reasoning is usually excluded from the set of VIM (CP 1.663). Therefore, the “vital,” far from being 
wider than the category of the “ethical,” is rather a sub-category of the latter. 
26 It is necessary to point out that moral sentimentalism is only a limited case of the prescriptive doctrine contained in Peirce's 
Normative Sciences (see Chapter 2), since it does not deal with the entire range of self-controlled practices, but only with the conduct 
related to VIM. For instance, although scientific reasoning is a type of deliberate activity and is studied by that particular normative 
science that is logic, sentiment, in the particular form of “feeling of logicality,” is never the criterion for establishing the truth of a 
proposition or the reliability of a statement (EP2: 32-33; 244). Peirce's criticism of the German theory of Logisches Gefühl does not 
mean that “sentiments” and “instincts” have no role in the activity of reasoning. Rather, Peirce's view of logic includes two important 
epistemic figures, which are the “logical sentiments” and the “rational instinct.” However, we cannot dwell on these topics here. Cf. 
Maddalena 2002 and Poggiani 2012. Ethical issues are not coextensive with VIM, since the latter are just a sub-set of the former. 
Therefore, the claims of this paper about moral sentimentalism have to be understood within the limits of the VIM and of what I 
have called moral values of universal concern. 
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judgments (1976: 320) and have therefore an implicit propositional content (W2: 206-207; 228-229). The 
cognitive and semeiotic nature of sentiment means that Peirce's anti-rationalism should not be interpreted as a 
rejection of reason (Peirce is not Humean), but part of the pragmatist call for a radical reconstruction of our 
inherited conceptions of human rationality. Peirce puts forth an understanding of the human “mind” as a power 
of different semeiotic operations, which also includes instinctive and affective inferences in their own right (CP 
2.475).27 
Second, although moral sentimental judgments result from instinctive, uncritical dispositions,28 the two 
normative claims of Peirce’s moral sentimentalism (the logical and the ethical claims) are a consequence of the 
agent's critical, self-controlled activity of judgment and acceptance of his own dispositions. It is “reason” itself 
that acknowledges its own impotence in VIM and that establishes the epistemic and ethical normativity of 
instinctive, sentimental judgments in this context (EP2: 32-33). Thus, while Peirce provokingly denies any 
authority to rationality in VIM (EP2: 32), at the same time he attributes to critical self-control a constitutive 
function in establishing the normativity of building our deliberate beliefs about VIM on our instinctive moral 
sentiments. 
There are some passages in which Peirce explicitly stands for an anti-rationalistic position about what man 
ought to follow in VIM.29 For instance, he explains that “conservatism, true conservatism, which is sentimental 
conservatism, … means not trusting to reasonings about questions of vital importance but rather to hereditary 
instincts and traditional sentiments” (CP 1.661; cf. also CP 1.50). Peirce's declaration that “hereditary instincts 
and traditional sentiments” are “safer guides than … feeble ratiocination” has to be interpreted first of all as an 
epistemic claim about moral knowledge. Thus, the doctrine that Peirce displays in his reference to metaethical 
sentimentalism is an account of human moral knowledge, when human beings come to cope with VIM. Peirce's 
moral sentimentalism, then, is first of all a metaethical, epistemic theory of vitally important values, and could be 
compared to Hutcheson's ethics of the “moral sense” rather than to Hume's sentimentalism, provided that we 
pay attention at least to the essential evolutionist component of Peirce's philosophy that is missing in 
Hutcheson's.30 Most of the time, in facing moral dilemmas and issues about VIM, we should appeal to the 
insight conveyed by our affective states rather than to formal reasoning or systematic reflection, which can easily 
lead us to self-deception. It follows that Peirce's metaethical sentimentalism is not tied to a Humean theory of 
practical motivation (moral psychology), according to which only an object of sentiment can motivate the agent 
to act in a certain way while reason is completely impotent in activating the agent upon a certain line of 
conduct.31 Peirce somehow hints at this when he explains that the only unthinkable element in human conduct is 
the “determination of man's nature,” and not the aspiration to pleasure, where determination means “an efficient 
agency prepared previously to the act.” Even if the agent's “very nerve of pleasure were cut so that the man were 
perfectly insensible to pleasure and pain,” he would nonetheless pursue the line of conduct upon which he is 
intentionally directed (EP2: 249).32  
But what does Peirce's refusal of rationality mean? At this juncture, it is important to stress that Peirce’s 
conception of human mind does not imply the structural opposition between “sentiment” and “reason” typical 
of certain models of mind of the Modern Age, as it is apparent at least in Hobbes, Hume, and, in a more 
                                                            
27 The fact that Peirce maintains a broad conception of “rationality” as including affective semeiotic processes as well as conscious and 
controlled logical operations does not deny that according to him the linked notions of “rationality,” “reason” and “reasoning” refer 
in their narrower and more precise meaning only to conscious and controlled logical operations. Indeed, Peirce explains that in this 
narrower meaning “rational means essentially self-criticizing, self-controlling and self-controlled” (CP 7.777). For the essential co-
implication of deliberation and rationality see Colapietro 1999. 
28 I cannot develop this point here. 
29 Besides the personal quarrel with James that generates Peirce's polemical attitude in “Philosophy and the Conduct of Life,” it is not 
clear who is the butt of Peirce's harsh criticism. Relying on textual evidence (EP2: 189), I might guess that Peirce's polemical target in 
dealing with the role of rationality and sentiment in ethical matters concerns both Whewell and Kant. 
30 Cf. e.g. Hutcheson (2004: 89-100). 
31 Cf. e.g. Hume (1978: 413-418). 
32 Hookway (2002: 235) seems to claim that according to Peirce (1) sentimental beliefs are necessary in order to “mimic” an epistemic 
foundationalism (the basic beliefs with which scientific inquiry is enabled to start are not scientific conclusions, but rather common-
sense beliefs); (2) sentiments are necessary in order to make a basic belief motivationally effective. The first thesis concerns epistemic 
issues, the second one belongs to a specific way – we might say, Humean – of conceiving human psychology of motivation. I agree 
with (1), but I reject (2). 
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problematic way, in Kant.33 According to Peirce, the endeavor of human rationality (in its broad sense) coincides 
with an expansive array of human activities of interpretation of reality (semeiosis). The different possibilities of a 
sound interpretation of reality entail not only linguistic interpretants but also sentimental interpretants in their 
own right. Indeed, according to Peirce's semeiotics, certain aspects of an object can be truly and soundly 
interpreted only by the agent's proper affective responses. In one of his classifications of the meanings of a sign, 
Peirce claims that there are at least three types of interpretants, i.e. the “emotional,” the “energetic” and the 
“logical” interpretant (EP2: 409). The “sense of beauty” and the “moral sense” share in this case the same 
condition of being the suitable habits of the emotional interpretation of two different but interwoven dimensions 
of an object, that is, the aesthetical and ethical admirability (W2: 206-207). This means that the opposition 
between moral sentimental judgment and rationality, according to Peirce, does not entail the anthropological and 
semeiotic conception of a dualism between sentiment and rationality. In this dualism, the moral sentiment would 
be an a-logical, anarchic response to a given situation, in principle at odds with the other types of interpretant 
and beyond the endeavor of semeiosis. This is so true that, as we have mentioned, for Peirce sentiments have the 
structure of a hypothetical inference (W3: 337). Indeed, Peirce's refusal of “rationalism” in dealing with VIM is, 
at the same time, a declaration of trust34 on the cognitive power of our moral sentimental judgments, which has 
its root in the same semeiotic attitude of the linguistic interpretants.  
Allow me a word regarding our moral judgments as sentimental judgments. As Peirce says, both human 
beings and animals possess “ideas” and expectations about how the events of their respective physical and social 
environment will occur. The two sets of “ideas” are “kinds of performances” and have respectively developed in 
relation to instincts of “feeding and food getting” and of “reproductive instincts” probably according to a 
Darwinian process of evolution (CP 7.378; 7.379, 7.384). Thus, human beings and lower animals share, although 
at a different title, the same condition of being “applied physicists” and “applied psychologists” in their non-
reflective practices (CP 5.586). However, in addition to that, man is endowed with an inborn “moral sense,” a 
specificity of his natural constitution that is not present in lower animals. “Consciousness” is the human 
structure from which the moral distinction between “right” and “wrong” in VIM springs (CP 1.56). According to 
this stock of inborn moral tendencies, human beings not only usually refuse or embrace certain lines of conduct, 
but most of the time experience “irresistibly” (CP 7.441) a sentiment of horror towards the first ones, and a 
sentiment of admiration for the second. This folk morality, that broadens the set of inborn habits labeled as “folk 
physics” and “folk psychology,” is a set of “instinctive ideas about human nature,” and is a spontaneous, 
affective knowledge of certain types of conduct which are found by every human being to be convenient to her 
(CP 2.753). Human instinct is in Peirce's terms an “inherited disposition” but, at the same time, is not opposed 
to educability, since it includes both inborn habits and dispositions “due to infantile training and tradition” (CP 
2.160; 2.170). 
In order to understand the actual meaning of Peirce's reservation about our reliance on “reason” in this 
context, it is necessary to disambiguate this term. Above all else, three points need to be made. The first element 
of Peirce's criticism of rationalism in VIM is the broad remark, valid for any type of inquiry and conduct, about 
the impossibility of ruling out at once the beliefs that we already have and that constitute our basic 
comprehension of a certain subject-matter. Reason is, contra the dominant tendency in the modern epoch, not 
to be defined in opposition to tradition (EP2: 336). Rather, our traditional beliefs, including theoretical and 
axiological beliefs, are the standards we originally trust in our experience and which we cannot help but act upon 
at first. The problems that emerge within our experience and the epistemic strategies we arrange in order to solve 
them are originally framed according to our background convictions. This is the historically situated starting point 
of any human undertaking. As a consequence, Peirce’s anti-rationalism maintains that, if rationality meant a total 
lack of background beliefs in our critical activities—i.e., a radical holistic criticism—that concept of rationality 
                                                            
33 Of course, this claim should be detailed and justified on the basis of textual evidence and of general interpretation of the moral 
philosophy of the three authors, but I cannot develop this topic here. Cf. Hobbes (1994: 22-35), Hume (1978: 413-418) and Kant 
(2012: 36-37). 
34 Cf. the fundamental epistemic role of “self-trust” in Hookway's account of Peirce's theory of instincts and sentiments (2002: 256-271). 
Peirce talks about the “trustworthiness” of the abductive inference (R692), including in it by extension also sentiments. 
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would be totally abstract, naïve and ultimately self-contradictory.35 As Vincent Colapietro (1997b: 17; 32-33) 
explains, Peirce's anti-rationalism is an instance of his general opposition to a conception of reason as an 
“uprooted” power of criticism and knowledge that disowns its traditional background. Therefore, moral 
sentimentalism can be considered as an instance of Peirce's general opposition to the rationalistic faith in a 
disincarnate reason.  
The second, more specific implication of Peirce's moral sentimentalism is that rationality is misplaced in VIM 
if it is conceived as formal reasoning and systematic inquiry. He maintains that a deliberate inquiry in vitally 
important values cannot be the original and pivotal method for knowing what line of conduct would actually 
benefit the general goals of VIM (EP2: 33). Among those values, we find moral admiration for certain “mental 
qualities” or natural virtues, like “the maiden's delicacy, the mother's devotion, manly courage, and other 
inheritances that have come to us from the biped who did not yet speak” (EP2: 31). These so-called natural 
virtues, which are spontaneously and universally perceived as such through an affective act of interpretation, 
exceed the mere biological dimension, although they are anyway means for the preservation of the stock (EP2: 
33-34). Peirce's point here is that human beings would overrate their logical powers if they believed that it is in 
virtue of arguments or even deliberate inferences (abduction, deduction, induction, cf. EP2: 31-32) on ethical 
matters that they could get in touch with vitally important values. The chief source of knowledge in this field of 
moral values is not a deliberate knowledge, but is instead an affective and instinctive grasping of the “heart” (CP 
1.654). Then, it would be idle and conceited to pretend that a deliberate activity of weighing reasons can lead us to 
understand that the type of conduct X is rather than Y a genuine vitally important value, and to believe that that 
critical method is more effective than our uncritical and universal tendency to embrace X rather than Y through our 
emotional interpretants (CP 7.777). The sentimental grasping and acceptance of a moral proposition about vitally 
important values is the result of an instinctive and uncritical inference, in which the deliberate process of 
considering conflicting reasons before coming to a conclusion is not performed. Sentiment can be considered as 
an “intuition,” or an “instinctive uncritical process” (CP 2.129). According to Peirce, the category of “instinct” 
includes the “instinctive ways of forming opinions” and “all habits of which we are not prepared to render an 
account” (CP 2.175). Peirce makes this point when he distinguishes between the “natural judgments [on] what is 
good reasoning” and the sentimental “judgments … of conscience” on vitally important values. While the 
former are “accompanied by a sense of evidence” for what is considered a good pattern of reasoning, the latter 
are “simply felt, without any accompanying sense of evidence” (CP 1. 171). This distinction has to be read in 
relation to what Peirce states about the epistemic features of an emotional interpretant. The emotional 
interpretant is understood as the “feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we comprehend the 
proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight” (CP 5.475). Therefore, 
moral sentimental judgment is an instance of the emotional interpretant in relation to vitally important values. 
This implies that the poverty of reasons typical of the emotional interpretant corresponds to an absence of 
epistemic foundation, or lack of evident reasons, in the moral sentimental judgment (CP 1.661).36 The only 
available evidence, in this case, seems to be the force and universality of the sentiment itself, rather than a logical 
evidence of reasons (EP1: 357; CP 7.441).37 Let me give some more textual evidence of this point. As in the case 
                                                            
35 Since every mental operation has the nature of an inference, rational activity essentially requires premises and leading principles. 
Traditional background beliefs can be considered the starting assumptions of every rational activity.  
36 “Place before the conservative arguments to which he can find no adequate reply and which go, let us say, to demonstrate that 
wisdom and virtue call upon him to offer to marry his own sister, and though he be unable to answer the arguments, he will not act 
upon their conclusion, because he believes that tradition and the feelings that tradition and custom have developed in him are safer 
guides than his own feeble ratiocination. Thus, true conservatism is sentimentalism.” Cf. also CP 1.50. 
37 I disagree with Stephens (1981: 134), who contends that Peirce's cognitive theory of emotions is a “reductivist project” which aims at 
reducing every mental activity to a cognitive process. According to him, on the one hand, Peirce fails in recognizing the difference 
between an emotion and a thought when he affirms that emotions have a cognitive nature. On the other hand, his project also fails 
when he recognizes that the analogy between emotions and hypothetic inferences is inaccurate and opts for a theory of emotions 
based upon man's “emotional constitution” and no longer upon thoughts and cognitions. In my view, this interpretation neglects 
Peirce's broad conception of “cognition” as a semeiotic process, which includes also the emotional interpretant. At the same time, it 
doesn't pay attention to the fact that an emotion, although having the logical structure of an inference, is not a thought, insofar as it 
lacks deliberate control and epistemic foundation. In this sense, Peirce's cognitive theory of emotions (1) makes sense of emotions as 
cognitive operations and propositional attitudes and, at the same time, (2) does not imply a reductivist confusion between emotions 
and thoughts.   
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of the cognitive dimension of a perception, also in the case of moral sentiment “the interpretation is forced upon 
us but no reason for it can be given” (CP 7.677) while the perceptual interpretation is performed.  Furthermore, 
in R692, Peirce explains how this feature is related to the abductive logical structure of sentiment. As such, it is 
characterized by “groundlessness.” It “needs no reason,” because it does not make any claim to certainty in itself 
but “merely suggests that something may be” (CP 5.171). Peirce's characterizes his critical common-sense stance 
as a mix of “credibilism” and “fallibilism” (CP 5.451). In Robin's words, “as credibilist, he affirms that some 
propositions are presently free from genuine doubt; as fallibilist, he denies that there can be absolute immunity 
against such doubt” (1964:273). 
There is also a third, complementary element that clarifies in which sense a sentimental judgment has a non-
rational character. Rationality and reasoning, in their precise meaning of self-controlled logical activity, usually 
imply a deliberate effort of the agent in passing from a moment of pure reverie to a condition of controlled 
inference and argumentation, and in directing her thoughts according to different epistemic standards and goals 
(EP2: 22; 250). On the contrary, sentiment is an uncritical, spontaneous judgment of the mind, which suddenly 
occurs in certain conditions without the deliberate acceptance of the agent (W2: 206-207). The confirmation of 
this distinction is found in the different phaneroscopic properties of the “emotional” and the “energetic” 
interpretant. In fact, the emotional interpretant is characterized by a phenomenological passivity, while producing 
a dynamic interpretant takes the agent a voluntary effort and activity, muscular or mental (see CP 7.433), which 
belongs to a totally different phaneroscopic category. 
However, what I said about Peirce's moral sentimentalism and its anti-rationalism does not imply that in the 
case of human conduct in VIM the exercise of self-control is totally out of place. On the contrary, Peirce's 
metaethical and ethical position is a twofold normative claim, which requires, as any other normative 
commitment, the constitutive play of self-control (CP 4.540). Peirce even argues that in a certain sense “logic” 
itself can be considered “scientific and yet vitally important,” since it is logic “which demonstrates in the clearest 
manner that reasoning itself testifies to its own ultimate subordination to sentiment” (CP 1.672). On the one 
side, the metaethical component of moral sentimentalism argues that sentimental moral judgment is the soundest 
method of knowing vitally important values. It is, as any other sound “logical” or “epistemic” claim, a normative 
doctrine. On the other side, the properly ethical component affirms that the agent, in order to shape his moral 
character in relation to VIM, ought to rely on the insight conveyed by the sentimental moral judgments. We find 
here an instance of the distinction between a first order disposition (e.g. an inborn habit of sentimental 
judgment) and a second order disposition (a deliberate belief). Also the claim that the constitution of our ethical 
beliefs about vitally important values has to follow the rule of the “natural” or “normal judgment of the sensible 
heart” (EP1: 356-357) is an explicit normative claim (“ought-to-be”), which essentially requires the constitutive 
mediation of self-control and reflection (CP 4.540).  
Thus, the two normative claims – epistemic and ethical – require the constitutive role of a critical assessment 
of the sentimental judgments. They can be formulated in the following way: (i) we usually have good reasons to 
deliberately rely on our sentimental moral judgments rather than on alternative sources of knowledge about vitally 
important values (metaethical claim). Instinctive sentimental judgments are the way in which man originally 
interprets certain dimensions of his moral constitution and gets to know some practical values and disvalues. As 
a consequence, (ii) we ought to develop our deliberate beliefs and conduct according to those sentimental judgments (ethical 
claim). So, even if we do not know the reasons that justify each vitally important value in its specificity and 
determination, at the metaethical level we have good reasons to believe that trusting the epistemic insight of our 
instinctual and sentimental make-up is the best way of discovering vitally important values. Man's sentimental 
judgments are then what Peirce sometimes call “simple” or “incomplex thoughts,” that is, they are extreme cases 
of cognition in which the justifying reasons for the validity of that cognitive content are not available (W2: 230-
231). The epistemic attitude of the wise man is now clear (CP 1.661): the wise agent sentimentally judges that the 
type of action X is admirable from the point of view of what is vitally important, he recognizes that he cannot 
show specific reasons for why X is such a morally admirable type of conduct, but at the same time he knows that 
he has good, general reasons to rely on his sentimental judgments in dealing with these kinds of values.  
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2.1. The “Experiential” Basis of Moral Sentimentalism   
 
Having addressed the two normative claims of moral sentimentalism, it is now time to consider Peirce's 
theory of “critical common-sensism” (CCS) and the essential link that moral sentimentalism has with it. As some 
scholars have pointed out (Buchler 1939: 2-92; Feibleman 1946: 302-319; Short 2001; Hookway 2002), CCS is a 
wide topic in Peirce's thought, involving many fundamental elements of his late pragmatism (e.g. EP2: 339; 347-
359). However, the goal of this section is only to articulate the relationship between moral sentimentalism and 
CCS. This involves describing Peirce's vindication of the normative relevance of moral sentimentalism and 
clarifying a component of CCS that can be called conservatism in matter of practice. 
Before reconstructing Peirce's argument in favor of conservatism in matters of practice, it is useful to provide 
a schematic summing-up of his position about the relationship between instinctive, sentimental judgments and 
critical reflection. It might be phrased in the following way: 
 
(a) We do not have a reasoned, scientific knowledge of many propositions about certain moral facts, as the case 
of vitally important values shows. Rather, we have a sentimental, instinctive knowledge of vitally important 
values and disvalues, such as the type of action “incest”. Strictly speaking, at the moment we cannot provide 
reasons for the fact that they are considered to be the morally right or the morally wrong lines of conduct. 
(b) However, we do have a critical, rational assessment of the general claim that our sentiment is the best 
source of knowledge we have about vitally important cases. 
 
Keeping in mind this reconstruction of moral sentimentalism, I contend that this doctrine is a component of 
Peirce's CCS. In particular, (a) is a description of a state of affairs, while (b) is a normative claim that requires a 
justification. In the next few lines I show that Peirce's justifying strategy for (b) appeals to the same argument 
present in his general vindication of CCS.    
Peirce states that “pragmatism is a species of prope-positivism” (EP2: 339). However, one of the features that 
distinguishes pragmatism from other forms of “positivism” is its critical common-sensistic component, or, as 
Peirce says, “its full acceptance of the main body of our instinctive beliefs,” at least in a provisional way and in 
their vague formulation (EP2: 339). He further claims that these beliefs “concern matters within the purview of 
the primitive man” (CP 5.498; CP 5.511), which also include our dispositions for sentimental judgments about 
vitally important values. Thus, CCS involves a commitment to indubitable propositions, which Peirce contends 
are of the nature of instincts. These instinctive beliefs include sentimental judgments. It follows that moral 
sentimentalism is a component, or a case, of the broader theory of CCS. One of the essential understandings of 
CCS is the evolutive nature of the “instinctive beliefs” and the experiential basis of their genesis and development. 
Peirce states that instinctive beliefs are the “result of human experience” and rest “on the total everyday 
experience of many generations of multitudinous population” (CP 5.522).38 Peirce continuous explaining that 
 
Such experience is worthless for distinctively scientific purposes, because it does not make the 
minute distinctions with which science is chiefly concerned; nor does it relate to the recondite subjects 
of science, although all science, without being aware of it, virtually supposes the truth of the vague 
results of uncontrolled thought upon such experiences, cannot help doing so, and would have to shut 
up shop if she should manage to escape accepting them. No “wisdom” could ever have discovered 
argon; yet within its proper sphere, which embraces objects of universal concern, the instinctive result 
of human experience ought to have so vastly more weight than any scientific result, that to make 
laboratory experiments to ascertain, for example, whether there be any uniformity in nature or no, 
would vie with adding a teaspoonful of saccharine to the ocean in order to sweeten it. (CP 5.522) 
 
The same is true of vitally important sentimental instincts, which as Peirce says “embrace objects of universal 
concern” (CP 5.522). For instance, Peirce says that “the regnant system of sexual rules is an instinctive or 
sentimental induction summarizing the experience of all our race” (EP2: 32). As it is already clear in the early 
essay “The Fixation of Belief,” the best, general method for the confirmation of a theory or a belief is the 
                                                            
38 Cf. also CP 1.654; 2.754. 
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“scientific method,” that is the method of intersubjective experience (W3: 253-257). According to Cheryl Misak's 
formulation of this methodological stance, p is true (i) if it is the conclusion of a “scientific” (public and 
experimental) inquiry, and (ii) if this conclusion can face the further questionings and verifications by an 
indefinitely prolonged “scientific” inquiry (see 1991:187; see however Chapter 5 for clarifications of this point). 
“Scientific” has to be taken here in a broad sense, implying essentially the resort to a public and experiential test 
of a belief. In this case, the category of “science” covers both the systematic inquiry of positive sciences and the 
traditional knowledge acquired over generations by a community. Thus, sentimental moral experience and its 
claims are themselves somehow related to the scientific process of inquiry (see Misak1994). Just as the instinctive 
beliefs are the outcome of a multi-generational cumulative experience, they can also develop over time under the 
force of further experience and the individual's “critical” assessment, which is an essential component of Peirce's 
version of common-sensistic philosophy. In fact, the acknowledgment of our historical situatedness and cultural 
inheritance does not preclude the transformation or transcendence of the tradition into which we have been born. As 
Peirce puts it, instinctive beliefs can slightly change from generation to generation (EP2: 349). Although 
conservatism and reformism are the two sides of the same CCS, the remainder of the chapter is devoted only to 
the vindication of the former. 
It is now possible to formulate Peirce's argument for conservatism in matter of practice, and its coessential 
metaethical and ethical component with respect to VIM (moral sentimentalism): 
 
(i) Instinctive beliefs are practically “undoubtable” in the sense that we cannot help but act upon them. In this 
case, “undoubtable” describes the practical impossibility for an instinctive belief of being not acted upon, at least 
at a first, unreflective level. At this level, stating that we doubt these beliefs would be a case of “paper doubt.” 
(ii) Instinctive beliefs are also epistemically “undoubtable” in the sense that we cannot really doubt them, i.e., it 
doesn't occur to us to doubt them and we do not have at the moment good reasons to doubt them. In this case, 
“indubitability” requires a more detached and reflective attitude towards the belief. “Indubitable” stands here for 
the epistemic claim that we should accept an instinctive belief if it is a “genuine” one, in so far we don’t have any 
good reasons to question it. At this level, pretending to doubt an instinctive belief would be a case of self-
deception and of “skeptic doubt” (CP 5.498; EP2: 336-337). 
(iii) The genesis of these instinctive beliefs lies in a multigenerational experience, compared to which the 
experience acquired by the individual man in his lifetime is far less reliable. 
(iv) The method of experience is the only suitable method for establishing a true belief (W3: 253-257). 
(v) As a consequence, it would be foolish not to develop or further the content of our instinctual habits in 
our second-order dispositions, that is, in our beliefs. 
(vi) Therefore, since moral sentimental judgments are a particular sub-genus of instinctive beliefs, it follows 
that the agent ought to appeal to sentimental judgments as the most reliable method for acquiring knowledge 
about vitally important values (metaethical norm), and that he ought to shape his moral character according to 
the same sentimental judgments as far as vitally important values are concerned (ethical norm).  
 
The general conclusion of CCS, at least within the limits of the present analysis, is the twofold normative 
claim according to which relying on our genuine instincts and sentimental judgments is usually the more rational 
conduct we can keep in VIM. There is a remarkable disproportion between the amount and the quality of the 
experience gained by a whole tradition over generations and the experience acquired by a single human being 
during her short lifetime. In this sense, instincts and sentimental judgments in VIM are characterized by the 
property of “practical infallibility” for the individual. As Peirce explains, CCS does not maintain that a sentimental 
judgment is “abstractly and absolutely infallible,” but only that is, most of the time, “practically infallible for the 
individual,” (“which is the only clear sense the word “infallibility” will bear”), so that “he ought to obey it and 
not his individual reason” (EP2: 32; CP 1.661). In other words, moral sentimentalism can be understood in the 
following way: 1. it does not claim that sentimental judgments about VIM are definitively true, since they might 
be reformed and corrected over time through further semi-conscious experience, conscious experience and 
critical reflection (EP2: 349). 2. At the same time, it entails the prudential rule according to which the same 
sentimental judgments should be considered by the individual agent, at least at first, the most reliable source of 
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knowledge about vitally important values. The metaethical and ethical principles of moral sentimentalism are 
prudential rules rather than categorical imperatives (CP 1.661), and as a consequence admit exceptions and require 
critical vigilance. Peirce's moral sentimentalism and CCS should be understood as one of the best examples of 
the human need for critical awareness in assessing the richness and the shortcomings of a tradition. Traditional 
awareness and sensitivity for moral reform are the two sides of the ongoing challenge, both theoretical and vital, 
of being historical beings. 
 
 
 
3. Moral Sentimentalism, Evolution, and Moral Civilization 
 
Let us now turn to the last question we want to address about Peirce’s moral sentimentalism. Given that 
“moral sentiments” are of the nature of instincts, what is the link between moral sentiments and evolution? This 
question also entails a related one: what is the place of normativity in the context of Peirce’s framework, 
according to which moral sentiments are evolutive instincts? We are led to the topic of evolutionism since Peirce 
explicitly attributes to CCS “instinctive beliefs” the property of being slowly mutable over time, marking in this 
way an essential difference between Reid's common-sensistic philosophy and his own CCS.39 
As it is known, evolution is a somewhat ambiguous term, insofar as it can refer to different models of the 
development of the biological world (such as Darwin’s and Lamarck’s) or to a broader, metaphysical scenario. 
Moreover, evolution has been recently associated to the traditional problem of knowledge and theories 
development in a new attempt to naturalize epistemology. The question I want to address in this final section is 
related to what is today called the “evolutionary epistemology of theories” (Bradie 1986), according to which the 
genetic and explanatory models used in evolutionary biology are taken to be a paradigm in order to account for 
the evolution (i.e., transformation and improvement) of theories, concepts, beliefs, etc. I will show that Peirce 
displays a highly critical perspective on this possibility, by claiming that the emergence of self-control in human 
experience marks a crucial gap between biological and non-deliberative forms of evolution and deliberative ones. 
A full-fledged study of Peirce’s appraisal of Darwinian and Lamarckian theories would lead us astray, since 
our focus is in elucidating my thesis that Peirce’s moral sentimentalism is a deep form of moral cognitivism. 
Therefore, it is enough to remind that, as some scholars have shown (Short 2007; Skagestad 1979), Peirce's 
position on Darwinian evolutionism is a controversial one. Indeed, he is not totally confident about the scientific 
plausibility of the Darwinian version of biological evolutionism. He considers it just a likely explanatory 
hypothesis, and, if true, a partial one. To be sure, however, he does not believe that the cultural evolution, that 
might also be called a process of moral civilization, follows the same dynamic displayed by Darwinism (see 
Goudge 1964: 330 ff.). According to Peirce, evolution undergoes a radical and qualitative turn when it becomes 
self-controlled. The moment in which cosmic evolution becomes self-controlled coincides with the appearance 
of the human race on Earth. This fact represents a turning point in evolution, as long as “at its higher stage,” 
says Peirce, “evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control” (EP2: 343). The reason of this 
breakthrough is that cultural evolution and civilization are self-controlled processes, which are subject to deliberate criticism 
and normative constraints. Therefore, Peirce's moral sentimentalism and its coessential evolutionism can only be 
understood within the framework of the NS (see Chapter 2).40 Thus, I will show in which sense the moral 
sentimental judgments can evolve over time. Moreover, I will contend that according to Peirce the epistemic gap 
between the unconscious and the critical, self-controlled evolutionary process leads to two fundamental 
                                                            
39 Cf. “I do not remember that any of the old Scotch philosophers ever undertook to draw up a complete list of the original beliefs, but 
they certainly thought it a feasible thing, and that the list would hold good for the minds of all men from Adam down. … Before any 
waft of the air of evolution had reached those coasts how could they think otherwise? When I first wrote, we were hardly oriented  in 
the new ideas, and my impression was that the indubitable propositions changed with a thinking man from year to year. … it has been 
only during the last two years that I have completed a provisional inquiry which shows me that the changes are so slight from 
generation to generation, though not imperceptible even in that short period, that I thought to own my adhesion, under inevitable 
modification, to the opinion of that subtle but well-balanced intellect, Thomas Reid, in the matter of Common Sense” (EP 2: 349). 
40 In this sense, Wells (1964: 309-310) is wrong when he says that “Peirce’s philosophy includes a version of the Is-Ought identity.” 
Although continuous, for Peirce “is” and “ought” are not identical (not even in the long run, see Chapter 2). As a consequence, 
Wells’s claim that Peirce is somehow compelled to accept some form of Darwinian philosophy and ethics is misplaced.  
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consequences: first, the limitation of a mechanical evolution to the unconscious development of VIM values; and 
second, the functionalization of the VIM values, as any other type of ethical value, to the architectonic ideal of 
“development of concrete reasonableness.”  
First of all, it is important to make clear that, as clearly appears in Evolutionary Love, Peirce's notion of 
“evolution” is a metaphysical one, instead of a merely biological one. “Metaphysical” here means that, according 
to Peirce, evolution tends to describe the developmental character of the entire reality, including the physical, the 
biological and even the cultural world. The laws of the physical world are as well the outcome of a history of 
evolution of the cosmos (EP1: 218-224). Hence, we might say that the biological evolution is for Peirce a 
regional case of a general cosmological doctrine. The notion of evolution applies to different contexts not in a 
univocal way, but in an analogical one. Moreover, Peirce clearly links his understanding of evolution to his theory 
of final causes. In this sense, he claims that “evolution is nothing more nor less than the working out of a 
definite end. A final cause may be conceived to operate without having been the purpose of any mind: that 
supposed phenomenon goes by the name of fate” (CP 1.204). Now, the “working out,” or gradual realization of 
the general and vague reality of a final cause can concern both an unpurposeful end (which goes by the label of 
“fated” process) and a purposeful end, that is, a deliberate ideal. As we have seen in the first chapter, final causation 
is an operative force within the entire universe and does not limit to the purposefulness of human agency. The 
important point here is that, even though final causality and growth belong to both non-human and human 
reality, it does not follow that the modality of evolution and growth itself occurs according to the same structure 
at every level or region of reality. Although the non-human biological world and the biological make-up of 
human beings are the product of a Darwinian evolutionism, this explanatory hypothesis (1) neither entails that 
every reality that is susceptible of growth is subject to a Darwinian process of evolution, (2) nor that it ought to 
be subject to a Darwinian goal as its regulative criterion. Thus, the analogical meaning of the notion of evolution 
refers then to the different structures of the process of growing in different regions of reality, and in particular (i) 
to the different ends of the process of evolution in different regions of reality, and (ii) to the different modalities in 
which the process of actualization of a general end is brought about in different contexts.  
I will focus now on Peirce's account of VIM values. Peirce's tenet that CCS instinctive dispositions are 
subject to evolution needs some clarifications. Limiting the issue to VIM “instinctive beliefs,” the question 
sounds like this: what does “evolution” mean in relation to sentimental judgments and to its related moral 
knowledge? First, it is necessary to point out the fact that Peirce considers that the process of evolution of VIM 
sentimental judgments have been subject to two different although interwoven processes, the one that is 
unconscious and unintentional, and another that is conscious and deliberate. This is what Peirce states in the following 
passage: 
 
Conclusions men reach they know not how are better than those fortified by unscientific logic. By 
logic Aquinas, if not Calvin, persuaded himself that one of the chief joys of the blest will be to peer over 
heaven's parapet and watch the damned writhing in torments and rage below: by instinct, or half-
conscious inference, a poor peasant girl will inwardly reject the doctrine, for all revered pastor may say. 
No moral sentiment more universally violent than reprobation of intermarriage of near relatives. Assassin 
will shudder at thought of incest. But had a man to depend upon conscious reasoning to instruct 
conscience in this matter, while he might be led to condemn the act, he would be unlikely to regard it with 
the extreme horror in which actually all share. Generation after generation has, in almost unconscious mode, 
taken measure of ordinary experiences about family relationships, has transmitted its impression to the 
next, partly by tradition, partly, one guesses, by congenital bequest, this next has made its observations and 
discussions, has modified in some insensible degree the sentiment it derived from its fathers, and so at last 
our strong feeling has been developed. That races tolerating occasional incest have died out and that so 
horror of it has been bred, there is scant room to believe. (CP 6.570, emphasis added) 
 
It is worth noticing that all the dispositions related to VIM, either they have been developed through an 
unconscious Darwinian process or through a sort of critical reflection over generations, have been selected 
(mechanically or deliberately) on the basis of the same criterion, that is the efficiency in realizing the general end 
of “reinforcing the stock.” Therefore, there is a high probability that the genetic make-up of the human beings 
has developed specific biological tendencies directed to the goal of the reinforcement of the stock. However, the 
selected habits related to VIM, which are the outcome of the history of human race, also include non-biological 
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dispositions, like patterns of non-biological behavior. These virtuous dispositions, which can be considered 
“natural virtues,” are also suitable means of realization of the general end “reinforcing the stock” and have been 
selected on the basis of that general end.  
However, it is also clear that the second modality of evolution of sentimental judgments, the one that results 
from “debate and criticism,” constitutes a case in which deliberate inquiry plays the fundamental role. Hence, at 
this level, evolution raises as such the problem of normativity, that is, the problem of how the further development 
of VIM sentimental judgments ought to be considered. Moral development requires genuine processes of 
knowledge and entails deliberate commitment to certain conclusions, so that the problem of the elaboration and 
choice of a “moral” leading principle becomes crucial. Indeed, once the process of evolution enters the space of 
human self-control and deliberation, the development of our “instinctive beliefs” becomes subject to the 
reflective activity of weighing reasons and of reasoned acceptance of a conclusion. Peirce's position on VIM “instinctive 
beliefs” seems therefore to outline the following scenario: some of the VIM “instincts” have been developed 
through a mechanical process of selection, some others through a partially conscious and deliberate cultural 
selection, although both the processes have been regulated by the same general end of the “reinforcement of the 
stock.” 
In a general sense, then, both processes can be generally labeled as Darwinian fashioned patterns of 
evolution, paying attention to the fact that one occurs in an unconscious way, while the other is led by self-
control and implies normativity. Moreover, in this sense, the general goal of the “reinforcement of the stock” can 
also represent an aspect of a self-controlled Lamarckian process of evolution. 
However, there is a fundamental difference between the two instances of the Darwinian evolution (the 
biological and the cultural), which concerns both (i) the status of the end of the process and (ii) the modality in which 
the process itself is brought about. This difference essentially results from the fact that the biological evolution is 
a mechanical process, while the cultural one is a deliberate one. As we have seen, Peirce repeats that all the 
natural processes that are not the outcome of self-controlled operations are not subject to the “normative 
distinction” between good and bad, and in this sense are not human values of any types. On the contrary, a 
traditional norm of behavior, for example, can be said “good” only because it has been assessed and judged to be 
ethically good. Only through this process of evaluation a “norm” has been retained and passed on to the 
following generations as a vital bequest. A corollary of this framework is that only a process that is capable of 
self-control and reflective commitment can produce or recognize “moral facts,” that is values, which are the 
contents of the moral reflective commitment. On the contrary, a process that develops without self-control and 
reflective commitment is outside the domain of moral values and disvalues, and it can just produce factual 
tendencies, dispositional properties of a certain sort. In this way, if a specific end or a specific type of mean is 
selected, it is not because of a mechanical chain of events, but in virtue of a critical assessment of both the end-
means and a deliberate choice for them. This means that, in the case of the cultural instance of Darwinian evolution, 
the general ends of the adaptation to the environment and of the reinforcement of the stock are assessed as good ends 
and obtain therefore the status of moral values. An interesting consequence of this framework is that the same 
structure of the Darwinian evolution – selection of well-suited means for the general end of “reinforcement of 
the stock” – undergoes a deep transformation once it enters the world of human culture. Peirce writes that 
 
The instincts of those animals whose instincts are remarkable present the character of being chiefly, if 
not altogether, directed to the preservation of the stock and of benefiting the individual very little, if at all, 
except so far as he may happen as a possible procreator to be a potential public functionary. Such, 
therefore, is the description of instinct that we ought to expect to find in man, in regard to vital matters; 
and so we do. It is not necessary to enumerate the facts of human life which show this, because it is too 
plain. It is to be remarked, however, that individuals who have passed the reproductive period, are more 
useful to the propagation of the human race than to any other. For they amass wealth, and teach 
prudence, they keep the peace, they are friends of the little ones, and they inculcate all the sexual duties 
and virtues. Such instinct does, as a matter of course, prompt us, in all vital crises, to look upon our 
individual lives as small matters. It is no extraordinary pitch of virtue to do so; it is the character of every 
man or woman that is not despicable (EP 2: 33-34). 
 
As we can see, then, the means which have been selected through the critical reflection of a tradition upon its 
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VIM practices go over the mere biological world, within which the best way of reinforcing the stock is the 
selection of the best fitted exemplars for sexual reproduction.  
 
 
 
3.1. The NS beyond the General Ends of Darwinian Evolution 
 
At this point, it is worth trying to draw the most fundamental implication of the link between moral 
sentimentalism and the NS. Indeed, as I have shown, moral sentimentalism is a metaethical and ethical doctrine 
according to which the individual agent most of the time ought to follow his instinctive sentimental judgments in 
dealing with VIM. Thus, the epistemic authority of moral, sentimental judgments is limited to VIM. We have 
also pointed out the fact that the development of moral, sentimental judgments occurs according to the structure 
of Darwinian evolution, where the phenomenon is the overall outcome of the cooperation of mechanical events 
and cultural processes of assessing and refining standards of practice. This implies that the conscious dimension 
of the Darwinian evolution acknowledges that the general end of “adaptation,” or “reinforcement of the stock,” 
is a morally good end for human being's deliberate conduct in VIM, that is, a good ethical value. However, does 
it imply that the general end of the Darwinian evolution ought to be the ultimate, architectural end of human 
conduct? Is it, then, the ultimate, aesthetical ideal? 
According to Peirce, the answer must be negative. It is worth considering the case of knowledge and of 
scientific discovery, which represents the “logical” aspect of deliberate conduct. Peirce addresses the issue of the 
role of a Darwinian pattern of conduct in inquiry in two different ways. The first place, Peirce details what shape 
inquiry would take according to the Darwinian hypothesis in epistemology. He writes: 
 
In the evolution of science, a Darwinian mode of evolution might, for example, consist in this, 
that at every recall of a judgment to the mind – say, for example, a judgment in regard to some such 
delicate question as the marriage of the clergy – a slight fortuitous modification of the judgment might 
take place; the modified judgment would cause a corresponding modification of the belief-habit, so 
that the next recall would be influenced by this fortuitous modification, though it would depart more 
or less from it by a new fortuitous modification. If, however, by such summation of modifications an 
opinion quite untenable were reached, it would either be violently changed or would be associationally 
weak and not apt to be recalled. The effect of this would be in the long run that belief would move 
away from such untenable positions. It is possible that such a mode of influence may affect our 
instinctive feelings; but there can be nothing of this sort in science, which is controlled and exact. (CP 
1.107) 
 
The conclusion of the quotation is highly instructive not only because it stresses again the possibility that 
“instinctive feelings” (among which, moral sentiments) can be the product of a Darwinian evolution, but also 
because it shows Peirce’s rejection that “chance” operating in conjunction with a Darwinian mechanism can be 
the crucial aspect of “science.” In particular, the evidence is the fact that inquiry is “controlled,” so that with the 
appearance of self-control evolution undergoes a normative turn.  
In the second place, Peirce claims that the process of development in inquiry ought not to follow a biological 
and mechanical chain of adaptive events. Rather, it is assigned to the individual and collective responsibility in 
distinguishing what is true from what is false. This doctrine is the result of Peirce's struggles against a 
psychologistic and a behavioral account of the settlement of the belief, as it is shown in The Fixation. As we have 
seen, although the early essay displays a tension between an adaptive and an alethic criterion for fixing a belief, it 
is already clear in it that there is an essential difference between fixing a belief because it is biologically or socially 
adaptive and because it appears to be true on the basis of an experiential method of verification. As a 
consequence, the epistemic criteria of acceptance of a conclusion, then, are broader than the mere standards of 
biological and social adaptation, so that in the context of scientific inquiry the adaptive criteria prove eventually 
to be misplaced. Also Peirce’s insistence that the category of “utility” and the scientific endeavor are essentially 
incompatible should be read in this light. 
 110  
This is so true that even the discovery of the values and virtues elaborated in NS cannot appeal to the 
criterion of “adaptation” to the environment as its only epistemic criterion. If the standard of adaptation to an 
environment is the regulative principle of human deliberation in VIM, it does not follow that the same standard 
ought to govern our judgments and assessments about what is the ultimate, ideal rule of human conduct. As we 
have seen, the inquiry around what is “admirable in itself” has different standards of recognition and of 
acceptance. Let us take the example of the three “logical sentiments” (…). Are they “moral norms” because of 
their adaptive capacity? The answer must be negative again. Instead, they are logical norms only because they 
favor the epistemic practices that lead to the general normative end “pursuing the truth.” And this general end in 
turn is normative not because of its adaptive capacity to human environment, but because (1) the pursuit of truth 
has a value in itself, regardless to the utilities that could result from it, including the adaptive capacity, that 
belongs to the category of utility. More specifically, it is normative because (2) the reflective agent judges that it is 
one of the structural components of the aesthetic ideal of human life. However, in the long run, Peirce would 
say, the discovery of truth and the linked habits will guarantee in the long run an effective adaptation of man to 
the constitution of reality. But the adaptation is here, I might say, a consequence, or a by-product, of an end that 
is a “normative” because is assessed as the ultimate, aesthetical ideal of human conduct, and not because of its 
utility.  
Peirce's doctrine about the relationship between adaptive criteria and scientific development can be 
schematized in the following way:  
 
(1) Each step of scientific inquiry does not have to follow a biological or sociological adaptive pattern.  
(2) The criterion on the basis of which human beings shape their logical, ethical and aesthetical beliefs is not 
given by the pattern of biological or social adaptivity, but is instead the scientific method of experience.  
(3) However, this does not mean that, in the long run, the results of the discovery of truth will not help a full 
adaptation of men to their environment. 
 
All the purposive effort of human agency and its coessential critical activity have an intrinsic normative 
vocation, which ultimately aims to define and make operative the aesthetic ideal of the Summum Bonum. 
Therefore, the phenomenon of “evolution” becomes itself involved within the critical activity of human 
reflection on what the ultimate aim of human life ought to be. Indeed, pragmaticism makes the normative crux 
of human conduct to consist   
 
in that process of evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to embody those generals 
which were just now said to be destined, which is what we strive to express in calling them reasonable. In its 
higher stages, evolution takes place more and more largely through self-control. (EP 2: 343) 
 
The fact that the instincts themselves are involved into the self-controlled realization of the normative ideal 
of the “development of concrete reasonableness” casts more light on the relation of the “instinct” as a first order 
disposition and the “belief” as a second order disposition. We can attempt the following sketch of Peirce’s view 
on the relationship among moral instinctual sentiments, evolution and normativity: 
  
1a. Some instincts are oriented to the “quasi-purpose” of the reinforcement of the stock. For instance, 
consider the case of the sentimental judgment of “horror” about incest. 
1b. It is extremely likely that these instincts have been selected through a process of natural selection. 
1c. Within certain limits – “in some definite part” (CP 7.49 n.1) – the instincts are absolutely beyond the 
domain of self-control. That these instincts are absolutely beyond the domain of self-control just implies that, at 
first, we cannot help but acting upon them (ex. experiencing certain sexual sentiments, being inclined toward 
certain types of actions rather than others). This means that the human being has certain inborn dispositions 
(first order dispositions) and that, at first, his responses to a given “object” of interest – the particular “acts” of 
those dispositions – are somehow unavoidable. However, this position doesn't imply that those dispositions and 
acts cannot be included within deliberate dispositions (second order dispositions – beliefs), which are essentially 
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able to direct those inborn dispositions towards broader and deliberate ends. 
2. Hence, since human conduct is deliberate and self-controlled, that is, since the agent always establishes her 
own purposes, which become the fundamental axiological commitments of his moral character, the non-
purposive aim is assumed within human self-controlled conduct and assigned to the human responsibility of re-
orienting it towards superior goals and ideals by including it within fully purposive aim. 
3a. Then, it is true that, in VIM – for instance, for the “quasi-purpose” of preserving the stock – we ought to 
rely on sentiments and instincts (first order dispositions) rather than on ratiocination in building our beliefs 
(second order dispositions). 
3b. However, it is also true that the “quasi-purposes” of VIM are always included within deliberate ends, 
subject to the analysis of the NS. For instance, it is apparent that the same sexual instinct can be oriented 
towards extremely different general goals and global conception of the good life.  
 
 
 
3.2. Moral Epistemology, Evolutionism and Rationality. Final Remarks 
 
The evolution of CCS instinctive beliefs, then, can be considered in a twofold way. On the one hand, it can 
be the evolution in the content of the instinctive, sentimental judgments, in the sense that, over generations, the 
propositional content of our instinctive judgments concerning VIM values can undergo radical changes. On the 
other hand, the evolution entailed by CCS can also mean, in a secondary sense, the development of the type of 
knowledge toward the same proposition about VIM values. 
The first case displays the scenario in which human beings realize, at a certain point in their cultural 
development, that they have good reasons to doubt some of those beliefs they have previously considered to be 
“instinctive,” and to endeavor into a new process of inquiry in order to settle new beliefs. This is the case in 
which human beings move from the acceptance of a proposition as “instinctive” and “indubitable” to the 
rejection of its indubitability and eventually to the belief that that proposition as false. Once new beliefs are 
fixed, then, a certain tradition would instill new instinctive beliefs in the following generations, through the 
upbringing of the young people, or through a parallel although slower process, that is, a thousand-year 
succession of confirmed beliefs, which would bring about in the human race inborn habits of response to the 
human environment. On the contrary, the second case, that is the case of evolution in the type of knowledge 
towards the same proposition, shows a situation in which human beings, on the basis of further generational 
experience and reflection, find new good reasons in support of the same values that in a previous stage were just 
apprehended through sentimental judgments. 
As we have seen talking about the NS, some moral facts are nowadays rationally known. For instance, we can 
show good reasons in favor of the thesis that the aesthetical ideal of human life is what development of concrete 
reasonableness rather than hedonism. In Peirce’s terms, the affective experience of a life devoted to pleasure 
ultimately leads to dissatisfaction. On the ground of this experience, we understand that there are other 
aspirations in human life, such as the scientific understanding of the world, which cannot be ruled out nor 
satisfied by the hedonist ideal. Moreover, reflecting on our affective experience of dissatisfaction, we realize that 
the hedonistic ideal brings into human life an existential fragmentation that contradicts human aspiration. As a 
consequence, the agent realizes, in a more or less explicit way, that the ideal of human conduct, whatever it can 
be, has to possess at least the properties of capacity of full fulfillment and of practical unity. This means that the 
affective experience of dissatisfaction is further illuminated by the discovery of these reasons. 
However, other values, like VIM values, are apprehended through sentimental judgments and therefore 
acritically. Peirce's evolutionary position entails that it is possible and likely that at least some aspects of the 
sentimental-instinctive knowledge will evolve into a critical and rational knowledge. This does not mean that the 
“sentiment” itself is necessarily a transitory aspect of human experience, or a primordial method for ethical 
inquiry destined to be overcome by more rationalistic ones. This is because Peirce explicitly points out that the 
essential character of moral experience in VIM is a sentiment. He writes on this point: 
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If I am persuaded that incest will have deplorable effects upon off-spring, I feel a distinctly duplex 
condemnation of the practice, the one of a cool, almost sceptical kind, the other peremptory and without 
apology. There are some questions about which I, and I suppose it is the same with every thinking man, 
find these two voices quite at odds, my reason temperately but decidedly asserting that I ought to act in 
one way, my instincts, whether hereditary or conventional I cannot tell, most emphatically and 
peremptorily, though with no pretence to rationality, giving reason the lie (CP 2.172). 
 
More generally, sentiment and affectivity have in human life an irreducible, semeiotic autonomy. As stated 
previously, sentiment extends to the entire sphere of human experience in the form of affective responses to a 
given “objects.” Indeed, there are certain dimensions of reality that can only be grasped and interpreted by 
emotional interpretants.41 Just like in the case of the critical understanding of the ideal, it is likely to suppose a 
rational development of the instinctive judgments about VIM values. This means that the function of sentiment 
as the exclusive modality through which we get to know certain moral facts shall be improved by a further reasoned 
and critical awareness of practical reasons for acting according to those moral facts. Thus, the sentimental 
knowledge will be improved and supported by a dialectical one, but not overcome by it. 
According to what I have said so far, it seems that rationality has a threefold relation with the sentimental 
judgments about VIM values: (1) it represents the reflective mediation though which instinctive, sentimental 
beliefs gain a normative status for human conduct and deliberation; (2) it is the way in which the vague content 
of a sentimental judgment can be made precise and applied to particular situations; (3) it is the way through 
which sentimental beliefs are subject to rational criticism, which in the long run might produce a revision of the 
content of the beliefs themselves.  
However, it is important to restate the broader role of critical thinking and deliberation within human life, in 
particular in relation to the issue of the aesthetical ideal of conduct. Indeed, rational reflection, even in the 
narrow sense sometimes used by Peirce, is crucial to the aim of understanding which are the genuine moral 
values for men. One of the important features of rational knowledge is that we can provide arguments and 
reasons for the plausibility of what we claim to know, or that we can also perform deliberate inferences. In this 
sense, it is possible to deduce from a moral hypothesis its conceivable, practical consequences. As we have 
previously seen, Peirce's doctrine of the ultimate aim of conduct affirms that the development of concrete 
reasonableness is the only plausible Summun Bonum because its capacity to meet certain formal requirements 
(unity, greatest generality, continuity, full-fulfillment capacity). A hypothetical scenario provides an 
exemplification of the effective role of rational reflection at this level. Consider the possibility that my affective, 
moral experience at time T suggested me that the pursuit of pleasure is an adequate, fully fulfilling ultimate end; 
even though my affective experience at time T suggested me that the pursuit of pleasure is the most convenient 
ultimate end of life, I could rationally know, at the same time, that that end is not a good one from an aesthetical 
and ethical point of view, simply because it would not meet the formal requirement of the greatest generality. 
That the ultimate ideal needs to possess necessarily the property of the greatest generality means that from the 
description of the ultimate ideal it is possible to infer that property. The sketched demonstration shows that the 
property “greatest generality” cannot be deduced by the ultimate aim “pursuing pleasure,” and then, being that 
property a necessary property of the normative ultimate aim, the pursuit of pleasure has to be rejected. Thus, 
rationality plays within certain limits a fundamental role in the definition of the moral good, even though its 
subject-matter is the result of the “affective” or “moral” experience of satisfaction gained by the human subjects. 
There is then what we might call a positive, epistemological circularity between sentiment and rationality in ethical 
                                                            
41 Cf. “Now the problem of what the “meaning” of an intellectual concept is can only be solved by the study of the interpretants, or 
proper significate effects, of signs. These we find to be of three general classes with some important subdivisions. The first proper 
significate effect of a sign is a feeling produced by it. There is almost always a feeling which we come to interpret as evidence that we 
comprehend the proper effect of the sign, although the foundation of truth in this is frequently very slight. This “emotional 
interpretant,” as I call it, may amount to much more than that feeling of recognition; and in some cases, it is the only proper 
significate effect that the sign produces. Thus, the performance of a piece of concerted music is a sign. It conveys, and is intended to 
convey, the composer's musical ideas; but these usually consist merely in a series of feelings. If a sign produces any further proper 
significate effect, it will do so through the mediation of the emotional interpretant, and such further effect will always involve an 
effort. I call it the energetic interpretant. The effort may be a muscular one, as it is in the case of the command to ground arms; but it 
is much more usually an exertion upon the Inner World, a mental effort. It never can be the meaning of an intellectual concept, since 
it is a single act, [while] such a concept is of a general nature. But what further kind of effect can there be?” (CP 5.475). 
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matters, according to which the immediately “felt” moral goods are subject to critical reflection, in order to 
figure out whether or not they match the necessary requirements of the genuine normative ideal of human 
conduct. In this sense, the role of rationality is not only required as the critical tool through which, over 
generations and with extreme slowness, the instinctive judgments about VIM will be eventually corrected. Its 
function is not even limited to the constant supervision of critical sense in CCS, in which the rational reflection 
on the contents of instincts and CS beliefs consists. Rather, the circularity of sentiment and reason is practiced 
by the agent in evaluating her moral character on the basis of the normative standard of the development of 
concrete reasonableness. 
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Chapter 4 
“Action is the Heart of Ideas.” A New Look at Dewey’s Conception of Experience: 
Indexical Existence, Semantics, and Truth  
 
 
 
Jaime J. Marcio has claimed that “action must be one of the key elements in both logic and epistemology” 
(2001: 99). In this chapter, I develop the topic of action in relation to Dewey's understanding of the semeiotic 
nature of experience, meaning and truth. More precisely, I aim to show the manifold implication of the notion of 
indexical existence, which, although absent as a literal expression in Dewey's texts, is however well suited to 
grasp many aspects of his theory of semantics and metaphysics which have been systematically overlooked (§§ 1., 
1.1., 1.2., 1.2.1., 2.). According to Dewey's approach, semantics is the threshold of metaphysics and a right 
understanding of semantics is the key to solve or dissolve metaphysical problems. Dewey's approach to 
semantics, metaphysics and truth cannot be understood if not in relation to the semeiotic nature of experience 
and its nature as agency. Therefore, I address the problem of “substance,” (§§ 3., 3.1.), the relation between 
“common sense objects” and “scientific objects” (§§ 3.2., 3.3., 3.3.) and the Deweyan theory of truth (§§ 4., 4.1. 
and 4.2.) in relation to Peirce’s. 
 
 
 
1. Appearances, Indexical Existence and Semeiotic Properties 
 
I have shown in the previous chapters how the notion of “experience” plays a fundamental role in Peirce’s 
philosophy. However, it is not surprising that the notion of “experience” is usually associated with John Dewey 
rather than Peirce when pragmatism is considered. Why? What is experience for Dewey? Although the Deweyan 
notion of experience has been largely developed by the pragmatist scholarship (e.g. Bernstein 1961, Bausola 
1955, Deledalle 1967; Frega 2006a; 2006b; Frisina 1989, Jung 2010; Kahn 1948; Maddalena 2004; Stuhr 1976; 
1992; Tiles 2010), it is surprising that its semeiotic structure has been mainly overlooked. The aim of this first 
section is to introduce an appreciation of Dewey's semeiotic understanding of experience through the key notion 
of indexical existence. I believe that Dewey’s theory of experience as “interaction” or “transaction” (LW16: 4-
294). Although this notion is not explicitly present in Dewey's texts, it can grasp what Dewey is trying to develop 
in his theory of experience. In particular, if we take the problems of semantics, metaphysics and truth as relevant 
for a Deweyan understanding of experience (against e.g. Rorty 1977), the notion of indexical existence proves to 
be not only heuristically fruitful, but also theoretically indispensable in order to make sense of a series of theses 
present in Dewey's work. 
A possible justification for the use of the composed expression “indexical existence” can be found in the 
essay “Appearing and Appearance” (LW3: 55-72). In this essay, Dewey, in order to clarify the purport of his 
theory of experience, aims to distinguish and clarify three different notions of “appearance.” As a consequence, 
this text is fundamental for an adequate understanding of his approach to semantics and ontology. The three 
notions of appearance analyzed by Dewey are the following: 
 
(1) Appearance1, a mere physical existential interaction between the perceptual apparatus of the human 
organism and environing conditions. Dewey calls this modality of appearance “appearing” or “coming into view” 
(LW3: 56). 
(2) Appearance2, a sign settled in its semeiotic capacity. Dewey calls this modality of appearance 
“manifestation,” “exhibition,” “revelation,” “representation” (LW3: 58), “display” or “expression” (LW3: 70). 
(3) Appearance3, or indexical existence, that is, an existential interaction which is no more a mere physical 
existential interaction and not yet a sign settled in its specific semeiotic function. Dewey refers to it as an “index” 
subject to inquiry (LW3: 62-63; 70). 
 
The first meaning of the notion of appearance simply refers to the event of interaction between the organic 
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perceptual structures of an agent and her environing conditions at a moment in time t (LW3: 56-57). Let us call 
this first type of appearance “appearance1”. Appearance1 is a temporal event that has the form of an existential 
interaction between perceptual organic structures and extra-organic conditions due to which something becomes 
“emphatically realized” in the organic perceptive capacity of an organism. At this level, a purely physical 
description is suitable to account for the nature of the phenomenon. The first point to stress here is that this 
existential interaction does not have the nature of a “mental,” “intentional” or “epistemic” relation between a 
subject and an object, taking “mental” and “epistemic” to mean in a first approximation something somewhat 
related to activities of inquiry and knowledge (LW3: 57). With regard to this point, some scholars have addressed 
the problem of Dewey's consideration of realism and idealism (Boisvert 1988; Tiles 1988: 130-153; Tiles 1995). 
In a more recent work, Hildebrand 2003 deals both from a historical and theoretical viewpoint with Dewey's 
“pragmatic realism,” “naïve realism” (MW6: 105 ff.; LW14: 81), “technology” (LW15: 88) and his mature 
rejection of New Realism and Critical Realism on one side, and of idealism on the other side. What is important 
to stress here is that according to Dewey, since the epistemological philosophies, including the forms of realism 
and idealism he criticizes, take appearance to be immediately dependent upon a “mind” or a “consciousness,” 
appearance is uncritically interpreted as a mental state or as an external reality modified by the mind. On the 
contrary, Dewey says, an appearance in the sense of appearance1 only refers to the actual existence of something 
in the external environment in relation to the perceptual apparatus of the human organism, so that this relation is 
“physical” and not cognitive. As such, appearance1 is not an instance of knowledge (taking knowledge to mean 
both a present process of inquiry or the beliefs acquired through past inquiries) but only the condition for 
knowledge. 
The fact that appearance1 is only the physical existential interaction of perceptual organic and extra-organic 
conditions is very important from Dewey's viewpoint, since it rules out many mistakes that have characterized 
“epistemological” philosophies (LW3: 69). More precisely, it rules out mistakes relative in general to the 
“ubiquity” of the knowing relation, and in particular to the nature of the self as a knowing mind (see MW6: 112 
ff.). As such, appearance1 does not require a knower or a mind, but only an organism endowed with certain 
perceptual structures and environing conditions whose potentialities become actualized together in an existential 
interaction here and now (LW3: 56-57). Something comes into “actualized presence,” namely, something 
becomes part of one's situation or experience (LW3: 70). “Existences are immediately given in experience; that is 
what experience primarily is” (LW12: 514). According to this statement, appearance1 is for Dewey already a 
dimension of experience, although a primitive and undeveloped one. Appearance1, however, is already “entering 
into more complex relationships” (LW3: 57) than the relationships that constitute a phenomenon as a mere 
physical interaction. This means that the mere appearance1 as a physical phenomenon can become an object of 
intellectual interest and inquiry (LW3: 60). As such, the existential interaction is susceptible of becoming 
“problematic” and can be intellectually “challenged” by the agent. When appearance1 becomes an object of such 
an intellectual interest, the existential interaction becomes a potential sign, the potential evidential basis for 
something else. In this sense, it is an indexical existence (LW3: 70). It is neither a mere physical existential 
interaction anymore (appearance1), nor a settled sign (appearance2). At that moment, it is still something “to be 
known” (LW3: 57) instead of something already known. The task of inquiry is turning “final” physical existences 
into “means” for grounded inferences, that is, into settled signs. In this sense, a settled sign, the object of the 
warranted conclusion of an inquiry into X, is an appearance2. Any appearance1 is as real as every other and 
stands on the same level as every other, since its ontological nature is that of an interaction among physical 
conditions. Therefore, the problem is not establishing which one among different appearances1 is more real, but 
distinguishing among them on the basis of the different semeiotic and evidential functions they perform (“what 
is the better sign of … ?”, LW3: 69-70). A certain appearance1 is a better sign for a certain inference, while a 
different appearance1 of the same existent can be a better sign for a different inference. It is at this level of 
experience or in this intellectual context that the question of truth and falsity emerges as the problem of the right 
or wrong inferences that can be performed on the basis of X (LW3: 59-60). Let us call this new type of 
appearance “appearance3”. When appearance1 becomes a problematic presence and is intellectually 
“challenged,” it becomes a potential sign, i.e. X as an indexical existence in experience. It is not a mere existence 
anymore, since it is now an object of intellectual attention and has the possibility of acquiring a determinate 
semeiotic property of being the sign of something else. X, the indexical existence, is a sign in the making. 
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Although it is not a settled sign yet, X has acquired nevertheless a property “additive” to the mere physical 
existence as a consequence of the “reflexive relationship” it now has to the inquirer (LW3: 62). As such, X “sets 
a problem to be inquired to” (LW3: 70) rather than an existent with a settled semeiotic capacity. Dewey writes: 
 
The nub of the whole matter turns upon the nature of the reflexive relationship, the relation which 
an appearing object in its intrinsic qualities [appearance1] bears to the properties that capacitate it to 
be a sign of something else. That the appearing object is in evidence is a truism; the statement is 
tautologous. But of what is it evidence? The latter question introduces a distinction within the thing 
used as a sign, a reflexive relation. That the relation to something else involved in being a sign of it is 
reflected into the appearing object itself is obvious from the fact that we take things as signs when we 
do not know of what they are signs. This happens in every inquiry, since inquiry implies first that some 
appearing object is a sign, and secondly that we do not as yet know of what it is a sign or evidence. 
This mode of taking would be impossible unless there were a distinction and relation set up with the 
appearing object between itself in its primary qualities and itself in its signifying office. … 
Relationships react into the thing used as symbol to redetermine its prior estate. (LW3: 62-63) 
 
This shift in the function of the appearance, from mere physical existential interaction in appearance1 to 
indexical existence in appearance3, is expressed by the possibility of labeling X with an indexical term, such as 
proper names and demonstrative terms.1 It is Dewey's conviction that a purely denotative term does not occur in 
discourse (LW12: 240-242), so that, using Peirce’s jargon, rhematic indexical legisigns are not possible. X is still 
an empty sign, a mere “this pointing at …” with a blank space. However, denotative terms and propositions with 
no descriptive content at all do not occur in discourse. Denotative terms always have a minimum of descriptive 
content, even only as a consequence of a hypothetical and extremely vague classification. The logical theories 
that claim that “this” can be purely denotative assume a perspective that abstracts from specific inquiries and that 
overlooks the fact that in a real inquiry the singular referred to by the demonstrative is always the product of a 
“selective discrimination” (see LW12: 363-364). Although X is still a sign in the making and does not allow a 
highly specific classification, X, as an actual object of inquiry, is at least classifiable as a possibility of future 
highly specific classification. Continuity of experience and inquiry makes almost impossible the presence of a 
mere denotative reference. At least in the sense of the possibility of classification that eventually results from an 
inquiry, every denotative term has a minimum of descriptive content. 
The result of inquiry is “knowledge” in its honorific sense (LW12: 146), “belief” or “warranted assertibility” 
(see LW12: 14-15) about X. These three expressions are synonyms for Dewey. The conclusion of an inquiry 
takes the form of a classification of X as a certain “kind,” that is, the transformation of X as indexical existence 
into a manifestation or appearance2. Its semeiotic function is settled, so that X has become a “sign of Z” and is 
classified more or less immediately as an object A. This classification of X is more or less circumscribed in its 
spatio-temporal conditions and more or less certain according to the level of justification of the conclusion. At 
this point, Dewey's distinction between the logical notions of “quality,” “characteristic” and “property” is 
fundamental (LW12: 291-292). The same statement “X is generous” can be interpreted in many different ways 
according to the different logical force it can have in different contexts of experience. Limiting our analysis to 
the case of the propositions produced within a process of inquiry, “X is generous” can mean X is acting in a 
generous way here and now, or X acted in a generous way at some point in the past, or X will act in a generous 
way at some point in the future. In this case, the proposition is a particular proposition and the predicate is a 
quality, that is, the observation of a particular change of X as an isolated event. The predicate does not stand for 
a kind. However, the same statement can have a different logical force, on the basis not only of how we are using 
this proposition but also of our experience about X. X, as enabling “reasonably safe” inferences about certain 
consequences if certain conditions C occur, can be determined as “generous” and this predicate can stand for a 
characteristic descriptive of a kind. In this case, the proposition is a singular proposition: X is a specimen of a 
kind and the predicate stands for a general disposition or way of behaving instead of a simple punctual change. 
Further experience and knowledge about X provide the statement “X is generous” with further logical force. The 
predicate “generous” becomes a property when it is determined by implicit (but which can be made explicit) 
knowledge about both the positive and the negative conditions on which certain consequences would follow 
                                                            
1  In this sense, the idea of indexical existence as denoted by indices is close to Peirce’s notions of “substance,” “IT,” or “present in 
general” in “On a New List of Categories.” 
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from X. In this case, the proposition is always singular but the predicate has a stronger logical force, since it 
stands for the possibility of better and more precise inferences about X. Only in this last case does the predicate 
denote a “universal” (LW12: 351; see “abstraction” in LW1: 106; LW4: 191). 
Sometimes Dewey, in speaking about the content of a belief, refers to “objects” as distinct from “events” 
(LW1: 132; 244-246; see also “things” and “characters” as distinct from mere “entities,” MW3: 83).2 In this 
sense, an object is an appearance2, while an event is an appearance1 (this does not exclude the fact that there are 
events in the existent world which are not part of human experience). It is necessary to remark upon this notion 
in Dewey's later works, because fundamental studies in this topic (Boisvert 1988: 85; Dicker 1972: 152-153; 158; 
Dicker 1973; Gale 2010a: 127; Ryan 1994)3 do not provide a sufficiently subtle account of the notion. I will deal 
more deeply with this topic in a further section on substance, since the two notions are almost synonymous. 
However, it is important to anticipate in this section something about Dewey's understanding of the notion of 
“object” in order to rule out as much as possible any source of misinterpretation. According to Dewey, X has 
become an “object” insofar as X is a more or less settled sign established through past inquiries. As such, X has 
acquired a semeiotic and semantic structure and has undergone therefore a real change. It is an X classified as this 
or that kind when this classification is the content of a “grounded” judgment. In the section on substance, I will 
show that the semeiotic property of X “being a sign of Y” is a real property that “accrues” to X as any other 
property in consequence of certain events, in this case, a successful inquiry. No “object of knowledge” can be pre-
existent to a successful inquiry (LW1: 124-125). What is “antecedent” to inquiry is not the object of knowledge, 
but the conditions of the object of knowledge, since inquiry necessarily “transforms” those antecedent 
conditions (LW14: 62). In other words, what is pre-existent to the institution of an appearance1 as a settled sign 
is the natural event appearance2, which has the possibility (i) of becoming a sign in general, that is, of developing 
a semeiotic property. This potentiality is a potentiality of every existent as such and is named by Dewey 
“transition toward experience” (see “Reality as Experience”). (ii) Moreover, what is pre-existent also has the 
potentiality of becoming this type of sign, a “sign of Y.” When X is instituted as a sign with a specific referent, 
this new semeiotic function becomes as real as any other artifact (e.g., LW1: 108; 147). What is artificial here, 
namely, what is dependent on human intervention, is not the given condition that X has the potentiality of 
becoming a “sign of Y” but the fact that X at a certain point actually becomes a “sign of Y” in the field of 
human practices and by virtue of human inquiry. An “object” is always a social object, a human institution, not 
because it is constructed as such but because its capacity of acquiring a semeiotic property is only actualized 
through social practices of organization. The acquisition of this new semeiotic property by X “marks a stage in 
the history of [the existential interaction X] … owing to varied relations to other things” (LW3: 57), in particular 
to the inquirer. It is now clear that for Dewey a semeiotic function is a new property that really accrues to an 
existential interaction: it becomes part of the existential interaction's ontological constitution, and not something 
psychic or mentalistic.  
This is the crux of what Dewey calls the “incorporation of the physical environment in the cultural” (LW12: 
48-49). This incorporation is at the heart of the dynamic of recognition (see next section). “When the inference is 
completed in the categorical assertion of an object, both the appearing (perceived) thing which has been 
employed as a sign and the inferred (intelligible) object lose the isolation they possess during the process of 
inquiry and delayed inference. They both become members of an interrelated inclusive whole, so that the 
category of “manifestation” becomes applicable (LW3: 66-67). X is part of a “whole” not as a member is part of 
a class, but as an individual is a specimen of a kind, a “this” which is a case or representative of a kind (LW12: 
292). In recognition, X is almost immediately classified as a kind, where immediately means that the classification 
is substantially a-problematic and does not require a process of inquiry. 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
2  For a different notion of “event,” see LW12: 222. The move from index to “object” is restated in Dewey’s link between “objects” 
and “data” (LW4: 79-80). For Dewey’s account of the passage from an “event” to an “object,” see LW1: 244-245. 
3  Notice that Gale’s claim (“the nature of objects is determined by what they are experienced as”) is ambiguous and wrong if it is not 
clarified.  
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1.1. Inquiry, Acquaintance and Indexical Residuum 
 
According to Dewey, the “problematic” character of a situation and the intellectual character of an 
experience is proportional to the “focal” role that an indexical existence has for the inquirer. Although all Dewey 
scholars have dwelt more or less explicitly with the issue of inquiry (see e.g. Alexander 1992; Boisvert 1988; 
Burke 1994; Burke-Hester-Talisse 2002; Frega2006a; 2006b; Dewey 1977: 1-51; 110-118; 142-163; Gale 2006; 
Gale 2010a: 29-42; 61-87; Hickman 1990a; 1990b; Levi 2010; Lu 1970; Margolis 1977; Pratt 1998; Rogers 2007; 
Sleeper 1986), this aspect has not received sufficient attention. The crux of Dewey's theory of inquiry is 
expressed in the definition found in Logic and in many other texts. It reads: “Inquiry is the controlled or directed 
transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and 
relations as to convert the elements of the original situation into a unified whole” (LW12: 108). A common 
criticism addressed to this theory is that it reduces the process of thinking to a process deterministically or 
causally initiated by external environmental conditions. This criticism is sometimes parallel to criticisms of 
Peirce's theory regarding the origin of inquiry and the fixation of belief, as the “need” to remove the irritation of 
doubt expressed in “The Fixation” would prove. Far from being a mark of hetero-determinism, such a 
conception of inquiry is part of Dewey's tenet, which aims to highlight, in particular, the fact that thinking is not 
intrinsically separated from non-linguistic and non-conceptual modalities of experience and behavior. 
Furthermore, the inquisitive process is not identifiable with psychical events but is essentially related to processes 
of concrete experimentation, manipulation and direction of the environing conditions, starting from organic 
perception (e.g. LW4, Ch.4; LW12: 41). A “naturalistic” theory of thinking implies that no occult power of 
knowledge, in principle inaccessible to public consideration, can be admitted as a legitimate part of the theory 
(LW12: 26). However, this interpretation requires to be completed by the active and purposive role of the 
inquirer in this process. The stress of the purposive role of the inquirer goes together with Dewey’s struggle to 
uproot the general picture of “epistemological” philosophies that the knower is a mirroring passive mind of a 
ready-made world. The importance of this point is that the purposive activity of the inquirer can choose to focus 
on existential phenomena that have not been intellectually challenged yet, or aspects of the “objects” of 
experience that still have to be studied. This is a large part of the activity of scientific research. Dewey says: 
 
The remarkable difference between the attitude which accepts the objects of ordinary perception, 
use and enjoyment as final, as culmination of natural processes and that which takes them as starting 
points for reflection and investigation, is one which reaches far beyond the technicalities of science. It 
marks a revolution in the whole spirit of life, in the entire attitude taken toward whatever is found in 
existence. When the things which exist around us, which we touch, see, hear and taste are regarded as 
interrogations for which an answer must be sought (and must be sought by means of deliberate 
introduction of changes till they are reshaped into something different), nature as it already exists 
ceases to be something which must be accepted and submitted to, endured or enjoyed, just as it is. It 
is now something to be modified, to be intentionally controlled. It is material to act upon so as to 
transform it into new objects which better answer our needs. Nature as it exists at any particular time 
is a challenge, rather then a completion; it provides possible starting points and opportunities rather 
than final ends. (LW4: 80-81) 
  
The point is that the “problem” which originates within a situation and around which inquiry develops is 
always constituted by the presence in experience of an indexical existence. The condition of this presence is not 
sometimes there and sometimes not. As the quotation on scientific activity and the many passages on purposive 
experimentation in The Quest for Certainty show, reality can always become an object of study, inquiry and 
discovery, so that it can always become problematic. It is true that there are dimensions of experience (or 
different individual experiences) where the overarching quality is not determining a full inquiry. However, this fact 
only shows that there is a gradation in experience that ranges from contexts in which the focus is entirely about 
inquiry and contexts in which inquiry or intellectual activity are extremely limited and only functional to practical 
and volitional uses. When the focus is on the indexical existence X as such, then we have a genuine problematic 
situation, whereas when the focus on indexical aspects of what “appears” in experience (in the sense of 
appearance2) is overlooked for the most part, the intellectual aspect of activity becomes secondary and 
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subordinated. The purposive mediation of the inquirer does not rule out the fact that in a certain sense the 
“problem” characterizing a situation is given in an individual quality and that it teleologically regulates the 
development of inquiry. On the contrary, it only means that reflection is always a matter of “selective emphasis” 
(LW1: 31). 
There are modalities of experience different from those of inquiry in a strict sense. These are: 
 
(1) “Recognition” (LW1: 154-155; 247) or “apprehension” (LW12: 146-147) or “identification” or educated 
perception of X (LW1: 144). 
(2) Practical and volitional use of X. 
(3) Affective focal experience of X. 
(4) Esthetic fruition of a meaning (theoretical contemplation).4 
 
These modalities of experience are usually taken to be cases of “immediate knowledge” (LW1: 35; LW12: 
142-143; 154, LW14: 12). On the contrary, according to Dewey, these are all “non-cognitive” modalities of 
experience, resulting from past successful experiences and inquiries. It is important to stress that the term “non-
cognitive” in Dewey's vocabulary does not have the same meaning it has assumed in contemporary metaethical 
debates, in which cognitive and non-cognitive ethics are distinguished according to the epistemic status of moral 
judgments and the ontological status of moral values. It does not even refer to Quine’s understanding of non-
physical languages as non-cognitive. For Dewey, a modality of experience is non-cognitive insofar as it is 
different from “inquiry,” “reflection” and “intelligence” properly taken. (1), (2), (3) and (4) are all forms of 
“acquaintances” with the objects of the world and not stages in experience in which the overarching quality is 
asking for or directing the solution of a problem (LW1: 154; 248-249). In general, acquaintance means “knowing 
how to make appropriate active responses to an event” (LW15: 31). It means “intimate connection with emotion 
and ability to act” (LW12: 154). Therefore, the property “ … is non-cognitive” refers to a modality of experience 
in which the focus is not at all or is only minimally about an indexical existent. These types of experiences and 
their objects, “immediate empirical things,” are always the “endings of natural histories” (LW1: 110). In the case 
of appearances1, these histories are only physical and physiological events that eventually become indexes, or 
appearances3 when they are intellectually challenged. In the case of appearances2, or “objects,” which are the 
result of past experiences, the histories involved are not only conditioned by physical events, but they are also 
already histories of past successful inquiries, judgments and semantic syntheses. In the former case, we have 
something like a pure indexical existence, while in the latter case we have structured objects characterized by 
what we might call indexical residuum. As some scholars have pointed out (Pappas 2008: 35; Hildebrand 2003; 
Shusterman 1999), the main difference between Deweyan pragmatism and contemporary neopragmatism is the 
fact that for Dewey experience is not linguistic all the way through and that no matter how the organism is 
developed in its habits and functions in grasping “objects,” there is always more in experience then our 
classification and semantic skills, linguistic or not. This becomes philosophically poignant when this experiential 
phenomenon is traced back to the ontological and semeiotic nature of the indexical existence in experience, in 
both the forms of a pure indexicality or of an indexical residuum. 
The reality of an indexical residuum is shown in Dewey's understanding of the “intension” of a demonstrative 
term (or a proper name and in general an indexical expression). Dewey claims that proper names, pronouns, 
demonstrative and indexical terms in general are “inexhaustible in their meaning in intension.” (LW12: 364) I 
have already shown that according to Dewey a pure demonstrative term is impossible, since in the continuity of 
experience and inquiry a demonstrative term always has a minimum of descriptive content. In dealing with the 
intension of a demonstrative, Dewey writes: 
 
What is demonstratively denoted by a proper name is inexhaustible in its meaning in intension, 
instead of being lacking in all such meaning. Take London, England, for example, as a conventional 
mark enabling a singular object to be the subject of discourse and inquiry. Its meaning in intension is 
first of all topographical, but it extends far beyond physical location and area. Its meaning in intension 
is historic, political, cultural; it includes a past, a present and potentialities not yet realized. What is true 
                                                            
4  E.g. LW1: 102; 249 ff.; LW12: 64.  
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of its intension is that it cannot be completely circumscribed at any given time by any set of 
descriptive qualifications; i.e., its meaning in intension is inexhaustible. The same statement holds in 
principle of any singular term, for such a term denotes a spatio-temporal career. (LW12: 364) 
 
The notion of intension can only be understood in relation to the notions of extension and comprehension, 
insofar as intension refers to the property of a term in denoting a singular or an individual, while extension and 
comprehension denote or designate kinds (LW12: 357-360; 364). The “extension” of a term is the property of a 
term that refers to kinds instead of singulars and designates all the kinds that are included or might be included 
in that term. In the case of the term “ship,” “the extension is simply and strictly the kinds of ship that exist or 
have existed or will exist.” The comprehension of a term is the necessary conceptual content of an “abstract 
universal” once it becomes more determinate, so that it coincides with the “definition” of that term. In the case 
of the term triangle, its comprehension is e.g. “right-angled,” “scalene” and “isosceles.” The notion of intension 
instead refers to the property of a term as denoting a singular or individual indexical existent in all its possible 
meanings, classifications or kinds, already developed or yet to be developed. In this sense, a proper name, a 
pronoun, a demonstrative and in general all the other indices (like “here” and “now”) in denoting a singular or 
individual existential indexical are “inexhaustible in their meaning in intension.” This means that the same X not 
only is susceptible at present to different classifications, but also that it can always be developed into new 
classifications on the basis of new inquiries. In other words, the same X can support different “kinds,” “objects” 
and semeiotic properties. The classification of an X through a “kind” and reference to it through a demonstrative 
term can be both delimitating and widening in different respects (LW12: 292). Insofar as the potential 
meaningfulness of X is at stake, the intension of a demonstrative term is the “full qualitative existence,” namely, 
X in all its potentiality as an object or a sign, so that its intension is more ample than any actual classification as 
this or that kind. In this respect, intension represents widening while classification represents limitation. 
However, as a mere indexical existent, X is not an object or a sign yet. In this sense, its semeiotic and logical 
force or functionality is only potential and ineffective. The “determination of a singular as one of a kind involves 
a limitation of this,” but at the same time establishes the effective power of drawing from X certain inferences. In 
this respect, intension represents limitation while classification represents widening.  
If it is true that a demonstrative reference is inexhaustible in its meaning in intension (although it is not such 
in its extension and in its comprehension), it follows that every modality of experience, including (1), (2), (3) and 
(4), always includes an indexical residuum which can demand a certain amount of intellectual activity, although 
minimum. “A singular as a mere this,” says Dewey, “always sets a problem” (LW12: 249). In Experience and Nature 
(LW1: 233; 261) Dewey addresses the issue of intellectual activity in establishing a connection between reflection 
and “redirection of meanings.” The points in experience in which a redirection of meanings is required are 
different instances of focal “conscious” activity. “Consciousness, an idea, is that phase of a system of meanings 
which at a given time is undergoing re-direction, transitive transformation” (LW1: 233). “Consciousness” is 
taken here as a logical notion rather than a mere psychological or physiological notion. Although the moment of 
maximum focal consciousness is represented by an inquiry, it is true that (1), (2), (3) and (4) represent instances 
of conscious activity in their own right, distributed along a scale or gradation. This is to say, conscious activity in 
“acquaintance” ranges from (a) focal consciousness as educated perception of “objects” (minimum of intellectual 
activity, intellectual properties (like explicit signification, LW1: 237) and problems), (b) through all the other 
different non-cognitive modalities of experience (see LW1: 240), to (c) focal consciousness in inquiry (maximum 
of intellectual activity, intellectual properties and problems).5 The point is that all these forms of experience, (1), 
(2), (3) and (4), are forms of contextual inferences and new semantic synthesis, although these operations are not 
comparable to implication and rational discourse (LW1: 250) and have more the nature of a contextual 
application (LW12: 375) of old regulative semantic commitments rather than of the judgment that brings a new 
problem to a conclusion. What characterizes the first three cases of acquaintance is a minimum of intellectual or 
cognitive activity. In these cases, intellectual activity is given by the need for application of different regulative 
semantic commitments to Xs, in which case a minimum of semantic synthesis, or “redirection of meaning,” is 
needed. This dynamic is well expressed in the following passage: 
 
                                                            
5  See LW1: 230 ff. 
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“This,” whatever this may be, always implies a system of meanings focused at a point of stress, 
uncertainty, and need of regulation. It sums up history, and at the same time opens a new page; it is 
record and promise in one; a fulfillment and an opportunity. It is a fruition of what has happened and 
a transitive agency of what is to happen. It is a comment written by natural events on their own 
direction and tendency, and a surmise of whither they are leading. Every perception or awareness, 
marks a “this,” and every “this” being a consummation involves retention, and hence contains the 
capacity of remembering. Every “this” is transitive, momentarily becoming a “that.” In its movement 
it is, therefore, conditioning of what is to come; it presents the potentiality of foresight and prediction. 
(LW1: 264-265) 
 
However, in the case of (4), “contemplation” (LW1: 249 ff.; 262) seems to have a different status. It seems 
that it is the form in which intellectual activity is almost absent. This is because in theoretical contemplation the 
role of the indexical is completely isolated, or excluded, while in the first three cases of acquaintance its function, 
although mostly latent and not prominent, is nevertheless not completely absent. In the case of contemplation, 
semantic synthesis is the mere repetition of past meanings and associations, while no indexical element is allowed 
into the process. It is an intellectual and repetitive manipulation of “self-sufficient objects” (LW1: 118). In the 
context of a theoretical contemplation as such, no genuine intellectual “problem” can arise. This possibility is on 
the contrary present in the first three cases of acquaintance.  
According to Dewey, an existence cannot be reduced to a singular or to a finite multitude of objects. “The 
same existential events are capable of an infinite number of meanings” (LW1: 240). In the metaphysical 
constitution of reality, the indexical, given residuum implicit in every object and the constructive nature of every 
object are the two wings of the same pragmatic naïve realism that are overlooked by both idealism and 
presentative realism (LW1: 234-235; 241-242; 245). In particular, on the one hand, some of Dewey's arguments 
against idealism rely on his rejection of the thesis that an event is ultimately a bundle of meaning which lacks 
indexical residuum. In this sense, Dewey is much closer to Peirce’s reclamation of the role of 2ndness in 
experience against an orthodox Hegelian understanding of it, in which the presence of 3rdess becomes 
overwhelming. On the other hand, Dewey's refusal of presentative realism consists in rejecting the thesis that 
perception is intrinsically and immediately cognition of “objects,” which would have therefore an “antecedent” 
reality previous to any form of inquiry. 
While there is continuity among the different modalities of experience, there is not a sharp distinction or 
dichotomy between dimensions of experience that play different functions. This is well exemplified in the 
Deweyan distinction between “primary” and “reflective” experience (e.g., LW1: 15-16). All Dewey scholars have 
virtually dealt with this distinction in Dewey's theory of experience, although only a few in my opinion have 
grasped its functional import (Douglas Browning has done this, see Browning 1998:71-72 in particular). 
“Primary” understood in a functional sense refers first to (i) the dimension of experience that might result in an 
inquiry and that is prior to an inquiry, and to (ii) the dimension of experience that constitutes the background of 
an inquiry. As such, it is “had” (LW1: 111; 113). What is important here is (i) something can be “had” as a mere 
physical interaction (appearance1), as an indexical existence (appearance3), or as a semantic structure or “object” 
(appearance2). In the third case, “immediately had” means one of the non-cognitive modalities of experience 
(see 1, 2, 3 and 4), in which the indexical existence or indexical residuum X does not constitute the focus and is 
at most the focus of operations of application, while it tends almost to disappear in (4). In the case of (1), (2), (3), 
the imperfect reference of regulative semantic commitments to the indexical existence X (appearance3) is 
relevant, so that, on the one side, they represent borderline cases of intellectual, conscious activity and, on the 
other side, they can perform the function of “primary” experience and be the starting point of a new process of 
inquiry, in which intellectual and conscious activity is furthered and becomes maximal (LW1: 264-265). In 
describing his theory of primary and reflective experience, Dewey also characterizes (1), (2), and (3) respectively 
in relation to their “objects” (LW1: 15-16). While primary experience is characterized by a “gross, macroscopic, 
crude subject-matter,” reflective experience is characterized by “refined, derived objects of reflection.” Again, 
these two functional dimensions of experience have to be taken prospectively and can be better understood in 
relation to the notion of indexical residuum. As a matter of fact, the same “object” can be considered a case of a 
gross, macroscopic subject-matter G, or as a refined, derived object R. As an R, the object is the result of past, 
successful inquiries; as a G, it is the starting point of new inquiries. However, even as a G, the object is not 
absolutely “gross,” except for the borderline case of an appearance1. This means that the object of primary 
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experience G is a refined object (appearance2) in the function of becoming the subject-matter of an inquiry 
because of its indexical residuum (so that it is at the same time an appearance1, although not pure). Although G 
is already an object with a semantic structure, it can be considered “gross” because of its indexical residuum and 
in relation to the further inquires which will reflectively shape G into more refined objects (LW1: 262). 
Therefore, indexicality plays different functions in experience between primary and reflective phases of it: (i) a 
mere physical event is the potentiality of an indexical existence and of signs (appearance1 as a potentiality of 
appearance3 and appearance2); (ii) an indexical existent is the possibility of different developed signs 
(appearance1 as the potentiality of different appearances2); (iii) a sign is the possibility of further signs because of 
its indexical residuum (appearance2 is the potentiality of further and different appearances2 because of its 
indexical residuum).  
 
 
 
1.2. Sensa 
 
Another important point related to the distinction among types of appearances and to the function of 
indexicality in experience is Dewey's approach to the problem of sensa, sense-data and sensational perceptions 
(hereafter, sensa). In a further section, I will deal with Dewey's understanding of the epistemic status of what 
Murray Murphy calls “S statements” (Murphy 2003:287). However, at this point it is important to stress the 
significance of the distinction between appearance1 and appearance2 in order to understand Dewey's view on 
sensa. As a matter of fact, sensa can be understood as mere appearance1, namely, as physical existential 
interactions between a human perceptual apparatus and the environing conditions. However, sensa can be taken 
to be the result of cognitive activities of inquiry and discrimination when a sensa as appearance1 is found to be a 
reliable sign for something else, an appearance2, and not a merely psycho-physical event. In Experience and Nature 
(LW1: 198-200; 226; 250-255), Dewey makes clear that sensa can be taken: (1) as “qualities of organic action,” as 
mere “feelings” or products of “sentiency”; in this sense, sensa are appearances1 (a-noetic factors) and should be 
called “sensa” or “stimuli” for action only proleptically (they are only the product of “sensory excitation,” LW4: 
91); (2) as “meanings of events,” or “sensations,” or “sensory-perceptual meanings,” they are appearances2, they 
are noetic and can be called sensa or significations. As appearances2, sensa are: 
 
(1) Instances of inference and semantic synthesis in the form of recognition. This thesis goes against the idea 
that they are unmediated, direct and simple knowledge of external environmental conditions. The classical 
realistic objection to Dewey's tenet is that, given a pragmatic account of the statement “this is red,” all of the 
content of the perceptual experience is going to be dissolved in something that depends on the semantic 
capabilities of the utterer, which is absurd, since the awareness of an observer of the sensa “red” does not 
depend on her semantic skills but only on the integrity of her perceptual faculties. It is the same objection that 
might be addressed to Peirce’s conception of perception as inferential in nature. This objection relies on the 
ambiguity of the different meanings of the notion “appearance.” The sensa, understood as mere feelings or 
appearances1, are physical realities resulting from the interaction of environmental and organic conditions, and 
are as such independent from the observer's habits of semantic interpretation. Dewey's point is that when the 
feeling “red” becomes cognitively or logically relevant (a “universal,” in classical terms), it depends on the agent's 
semantic capabilities of discrimination and inference. “Red” means then an X that would behave in this and that 
way if certain conditions C occurred and is the conclusion of an inference (LW1: 250). 
(2) In particular, they are not “the original form of elementary awareness from which other forms of 
cognitive consciousness develop. On the contrary sensory-perceptual meanings are specifically discriminated 
objects of awareness” (LW1: 254-255). From a logical standpoint, Dewey does not deny that propositions about 
sensa play a function, but rejects the view that these propositions play a somewhat fundamental role in 
knowledge and that their logical status (their logical “force”) can be decided in isolation from the context of an 
inquiry (LW12: 151-152). Sensa might be primitive in the physical or psychological sense of appearances1, but as 
“observations” endowed with logical power they are appearances2 or appearances3 and are not primitive at all 
(LW12: 153). “Red” as a sense-datum, as an “object” and not as a mere physical interaction is the content of a 
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belief, the conclusion of an inquiry and purposeful discrimination. As often happens, Dewey draws his example 
from the observation of child development. He points out that the capacity of discriminating “red” as a sense-
datum is developed in the child as a highly specialized cognitive activity. “Red” as a sign is discriminated insofar 
as it points at an object of common use or of importance, such as a toy or a dress. In this case, therefore, the 
discrimination of the object “toy” or “dress” is a prerequisite of the discrimination of the sense-datum “red” in 
its semeiotic function, which is therefore more refined (not logically more fundamental) than the object “toy” or 
“dress.” The process of discrimination of the sensa as characterized by a semeiotic properties requires the 
semantic priority of a different “object,” in this case the “toy” or the “dress.” A different example is found in the 
reconstruction of our present common belief that e.g. the sense-datum “red” is the content of a “proposition of 
sense perception” (LW12: 290). Dewey would subscribe this belief, but he would firmly deny its logically 
fundamental character for any other beliefs about red objects. His point is that the notion of sensation is a highly 
specialized one, since it presupposes not only the knowledge of something that is red (like in the example of 
child development) but also the knowledge of the perceptual apparatus of the human organism and the fact that 
its interactions with environing conditions cause something of the nature of a feeling that is later called “red.”  
 
The fallacy in the theory of logically original complete and self-sufficient atomic propositions is 
thus an instance of the same fallacy that has been repeatedly noted: the conversion of a function in 
inquiry into an independent structure. It is an admitted fact that ideally, or in theory, propositions 
about irreducible qualities are necessary in order adequately to ground judgment having existential 
reference. What is denied is that such propositions have complete and self-sufficient logical character 
in isolation. … The doctrine under criticism rules out the context in which such propositions occur 
and the logical end for which and logical ground upon which they are instituted. This may be verified 
by anyone who calls to mind a case in which, either in common sense or science, such propositions 
are present and have weight. As to their ground, I call attention to the fact that there is no this which 
is merely and exclusively red or any other single quality and that, therefore, there must be some 
ground for selection of one quality as predicate rather than another. … The material towards which 
behavior is directly impelled is but the focal aspect of an environing field. The kind of behavior which 
occurs must, in order to be adaptive and responsive, vary with the kind of field of which the 
immediate object is focal. (LW12:152) 
 
These reflections about the sense-datum “red” show that red, as an appearance1, can develop into many 
different objects or signs, that is, several different appearances2. In other words, an indexical existence has 
almost an indefinite semeiotic potentiality, which can only be furthered and developed through human inquiry 
and experimentation. The same appearance1 red can be classified as “toy” or, at a higher level of reflection and 
sophistication, as “sensation resulting from the interaction of … with …”. “Only functional position in a 
contextual situation can discriminate an actual this from an indefinite number of potential thises” (LW12: 241). In 
other words, the X classified in a certain way has at the same time an indexical residuum that allows the object to 
be further interrogated, as connected with new events and established in new semeiotic properties. 
 
 
 
1.3. “Existential Reference” and Indexicality 
 
The aim of this section is to show that the locus in which an indexical existence is at work in human 
experience is what Dewey calls “existential reference.” Before dealing with the relationships between “existential 
reference” and indexicality, it is important to make a few distinctions relative to the notion of “existential 
reference.” It is sometimes hard to grasp some distinctions implicit in Dewey's text. Among the possible 
examples, see the following passage in Logic: 
 
Consider … propositions of mathematical physics. (1) As propositions they form a system of 
related symbol-meanings that may be considered and developed as such. (2) But as propositions of 
physics, not of mere mathematics, they have reference to existence which is realized in operations of 
application. (3) The final test of valid reference or applicability resides in the connections that exist among 
things. Existential involvement of things with one another alone warrants inference so as to enable 
further connections among things themselves to be discovered. (LW12: 61) 
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Let me point out four introductory remarks. In the first place, “existence” can refer to an event in its 
interactions in isolation from man, or to an existent event as the result of a human interaction with the 
environment. In this latter case, only human experience has an “existential reference.” I will focus on this latter 
case.  
In the second place, existential reference can be potential or actual, linguistic or operational and extra-
linguistic (LW12: 61). “Particular,” “singular” and “general” are the logical properties of propositions and terms 
that have an “existential reference” (LW12: 283; 289-300; 351-352). In this case, “existential reference” is defined 
in relation to the existential use of a proposition or a term and in opposition to the merely attributive or 
conceptual use of a proposition and a term. It can also be defined in relation to “denotation” and in opposition 
to “designation” (LW12: 357). However, in the case of language, “existential reference” is only potential. It 
should be called “demonstrative reference” rather than full existential reference (LW12: 356-357). It is only a 
potential existential reference and not an actual one. The distinction between potential and actual existential 
reference corresponds to the distinction between propositions and judgments, since on the one hand the 
existential reference in propositions is only potential and operations are performed only on symbols, while on 
the other hand the existential reference in judgments is actual since it coincides with the operation itself (LW12: 
283-287). It is only the actualization in action of the conclusion of inquiry that fixes the existential referent of a 
proposition in its ultimate determination (LW12: 356-357). In this sense, “inventions, plans and intensions prior 
to execution” have not reached their final completion yet and do not have “demonstrative application” (LW12: 
356-357). At this stage, they are without “determinate demonstrative reference” but are the plans or rules that 
can make an actual demonstrative reference possible. Since a proposition or in general a piece of communication 
is only a rule for a possible operation, it is the operation itself in its actuality that realizes the existential reference 
of ideal factors to environing conditions which was only potential at the level of language. The existential 
referent is ultimately fixed only in an actual operation on X and not in language. Similarly, Dewey states that 
“without the intervention of a specific kind of existential operation they cannot indicate or discriminate the objects 
to which they refer” (LW12: 60). I focus mainly on existential reference in its actual and ultra-linguistic 
realization, since according to Dewey it is this actual realization that constitutes the analogatum princeps of the 
notion of existential reference. 
In the third place, existential reference in its actual and ultra-linguistic realization can have a descriptive use or 
a eulogistic use in inquiry (LW4: 189; LW12: 135; 302; 374-375; 499). On the one hand, a belief has an existential 
reference in a purely descriptive sense when it is somehow applied here and now in a context. Existential 
reference means in this case “application … a matter of existential operations executed upon existential materials” 
(LW12: 375). In this sense, “inferences” have existential reference, while “implications” do not (LW12: 345-346). 
Moreover, according to this sense, not only settled beliefs, but also tentative and hypothetical experimental 
propositions (operations, observations) have existential reference, while the propositions issued by rational 
discourse do not. Therefore, both “assertions” and “affirmations” can have existential reference (excluding the 
assertions which are issued by rational discourse and are not part yet of experimental operations, LW12: 123-
125). This sense of existential reference as application also clarifies Dewey's interpretation of the traditional 
distinction between “sensitive” and “rational knowledge” (LW15: 90-91). As Dewey claims, the real import of 
the traditional distinction between “sensitive knowledge” and “rational knowledge” is the distinction between 
knowledge of the individual and knowledge of the general. Therefore, the distinction is not between two separate 
modalities or faculties of knowledge, but between two logical functions of knowledge in inquiry. In particular, 
“sensitive knowledge” is the phase of inquiry that is characterized by application, namely, by existential reference 
to the environment through actual interaction, while “rational knowledge” is the phase of inquiry in which 
existential reference is only potential. On the other hand, a belief has existential reference in its eulogistic sense 
when it is not only applied, but also verified in this application. In this sense, existential reference is defined in 
relation to verification or warranted assertion or successful application and in opposition to hypothetical 
propositions, issued both from experimentation and rational discourse. I will focus on existential reference in 
both the descriptive and the eulogistic sense, making clear which sense I am referring to as needed.  
In the fourth place, actual existential reference can be non-focal or focal. As Dewey states, 
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In actual experience, there is never any such isolated singular object or event; an object or event is 
always a special part, phase, or aspect, of an environing experienced world – a situation. The singular 
object stands out conspicuously because of its especially focal and crucial position at a given time in 
determination of some problem of use of enjoyment which the total complex environment presents. 
There is always a field in which observation of this or that object or event occurs. (LW12: 72-73; see 
also 351-352) 
 
Actual existential reference can be therefore the contact with an “individual” situation as a whole in a feeling, 
or the contact with a focal “singular” object in an operation (including observation, LW12: 125-126). In the first 
case, the existential reference is not focal and is about a situation as a whole. It corresponds to the overarching 
quality of a situation or an experience, where its “controlling presence” regulates the focal operations that are 
performed within that situation. In the second case, the existential reference is focal and is about this or that 
object. It is “an ordering and organizing of responses in a focused way” (LW4: 189-190). It corresponds to 
operations of acquaintance, experimentation and judgment in inquiry understood as the various modes of 
“application” of theories and beliefs. The non-focal existential reference of a situation is the “universe of 
experience” which constitutes the precondition of focal operations, which in in the context of inquiry becomes a 
“universe of discourse” (LW12: 74). 
Given these four introductory points, it is now possible to highlight the connections between actual 
existential reference and indexicality, and in particular to elucidate the thesis that the locus in which an indexical 
existence is at work in human experience is what Dewey calls “existential reference.” If what we have said in the 
previous sections is true, there is an indexical residuum in both the individual situation and the individual focal 
operation. (A) In the case of an individual situation, the indexical residuum is more or less latent in the form of 
an aproblematic individual quality that regulates a situation. In this sense, the indexical residuum is revealed in 
the capacity of the individual quality to regulate the new operations on further focal individual objects. It 
manifests itself when the individual quality becomes problematical and gives rise to a new inquiry. As we have 
seen, an indexical existence, appearance3, is a sign in the making because of its problematic character; it is an X 
which is no longer an appearance1 anymore and not yet an appearance2. The problematic individual quality of a 
situation is the first step in the shift of an event from an appearance1 to an appearance3. The emergence of a 
problematic individual quality marks the experience of a situation in which something is emerging as problematical 
and is already somehow pointing to a solution yet to be found, even though at this level of vagueness the X 
which is problematical cannot even be isolated yet with a demonstrative term “this.” As we have seen, Dewey 
claims that a demonstrative is “inexhaustible in its meaning in intension.” Bearing this in mind, it is clear that 
given the level of vagueness in the emergence of a problematic quality, the indexical existence is given in the 
form of a “feeling” and not yet in the form of discourse. Dewey claims that the situation “as a qualitative whole 
is sensed or felt. … Such an expression is … valuable only as it is taken negatively to indicate that it is not, as 
such, an object of discourse” (LW12: 73-74). Similarly, the situation as an “individual whole … is not anything that 
can be expressed in words for it is something that must be had” (LW12: 75). Speaking proleptically, it is possible 
to say that its referent at this stage of experience is so rich in meaning and possibilities that it cannot be pointed 
to with a demonstrative term, nor can it even be used in its inexhaustible intension. This is the semeiotic reason 
that an experience in its individual quality can only be had and felt instead of been represented in language. The 
further logical steps would be (1) use of the term “this” in its inexhaustible logical intension; (2) use of the term 
“this” as guiding inquiry as a demonstrative term with at least a minimum of descriptive content, that is, as a 
tentative classification (particular proposition or singular proposition). 
(B) In the case of an individual object, the indexical residuum is more or less latent in the form of operations 
of acquaintance (in which however a certain degree of “application” is always required), while it is manifest in the 
tentative and focal operations of experimentation (manipulation, observation, etc.) within the process of inquiry 
and in the judgment. As far as rational discourse or reasoning is strictly concerned, indexicality is limited to the 
clash between ideas in the free play of ideas (LW12: 347), in deductive synthesis in rational discourse (LW1: 152; 
LW12: 313-314), or in diagrammatic experimentation, and to the presence of linguistic expression as proper 
names, demonstratives etc. (indexical terms). These are, as I showed, only the linguistic mark of a possible 
eventual actualization of an existential reference and do not constitute an existential reference in themselves. In 
 126  
this case, it is more appropriate to speak of “relations” among symbols-meanings rather than “reference” to 
existents (LW12: 61; 289 ff.). The case of “causal proposition” is interesting because it marks the logical status of 
existential propositions in the phase in which they are about to produce and acquire actual existential reference 
through being acted upon (LW12: 454-456). In this function, a causal proposition shares the same logical status 
and function of a “sentence,” (LW12: 124-125) since a sentence is a proposition that is distinct from the other 
propositions issued in the inquiry “in that it takes overt effect in operations which construct a new qualitative 
situation.” It is the individuality of the field (or situation, or experience) which determines the teleological or 
regulative criterion of the selection of the subject-matter of an inquiry. The indexicality given in a “feeling” or 
“quality” of a situation, although too vague and rich in meaning in intension to be determined through discourse 
and focal operations, has at the same time a directive logical power. This directive logical power is given by its 
teleological or regulative function within an inquiry, even in its immediate phases of determination of the 
problem at hand and selection of the “facts” and of the “ideas” of the case. Dewey writes that “discourse that is 
not controlled by reference to a situation is not discourse, but a meaningless jumble” (LW12: 74). This is so true 
that without the controlling presence of a “universe of experience” it would be impossible to determine the 
“relevancy, weight or coherence of any distinction and relation” with regard to a given inquiry. This means that 
the non-focal existential reference and indexicality given in feeling is the precondition of the focal existential 
reference and indexicality realized in localized operations. This is evidenced by the fact that “quality” of a 
situation performs the same function also in relation to the propositions issued in rational discourse. Among the 
indefinite possible meanings of an object that could emerge from its indexical residuum, only some of them are 
“valid” and appropriate in a situation, and are determined by the indexicality of the situation as a qualitative 
whole given in feeling. The distinction between “validity” and “formal correctness” in arguments is instructive.6 
According to Dewey, (1) validity-invalidity is the property of a proposition, and not of an argument; a 
proposition is a “means” in the construction of the final judgment; therefore, it is useful or non-useful in giving 
the appropriate direction to the individual inquiry that is at stake in leading to the construction of a true final 
judgment; (2) the formal correctness pertains to an argument (what is usually called “validity”); (3) the syllogism 
“all the satellites are made of bread, the moon is a satellite, therefore the moon is made of bread” is a formally 
correct syllogism, but it is invalid. This is the case not only because the premises are “materially false,” but also 
because the propositions do not promote inquiry and would instead mislead the inquirer if taken up and used. 
This analysis of the connected role of existential reference and indexicality in experience is confirmed by a 
later text, “Peirce's Theory of Linguistic Signs, Thought, and Meaning” (LW15). The combined analysis of 
Dewey's theory of existential reference and Dewey's interpretation of Peirce's semeiotics and doctrine of the 
categories shows that Dewey understood his theory in continuity with Peirce's. According to his reading of 
Peirce's semeiotics and categories, 
 
To connect things with indexical signs is, in Peirce's position, a way of denying that they are 
connected with linguistic signs, with words, or anything he calls a symbol. For an indexical sign is a case 
of what Peirce calls Secondness, while a linguistic sign is a case of Thirdness. (LW15: 146) … This 
perceptual-manipulative behavioral event determines the indexical sign which brings “us” into 
connection with “things,” something it is impossible, according to Peirce, for symbols, linguistic signs 
… to do. (LW15: 148) 
 
For both Peirce and Dewey, existential reference takes place “when and only when, there is a conjunction of 
the “Secondness” of an indexical sign with the movement of linguistic signs, or “Thirdness.” The “perceptual-
manipulative behavioral event” referred to here corresponds to the instances of individual experiences as a whole 
and focal existential reference specified above. The focal operations can be cases of appearances3, namely, pure 
indexical existences, cases of appearances2, both in the fashion of mere acquaintances, or operations where the 
focus is on the indexical residuum of previously constituted objects. In addition to this, Dewey displays the 
original centrality of the “feeling” as the locus in which an appearance1 is in the process of becoming an 
appearance3 but because of its vagueness and inexhaustible meaning in intension it cannot be determined 
through discourse yet. 
                                                            
6 See Burke (1994: 204-206). 
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1.3.1. The “Is” of the Judgment as Actual Existential Reference 
 
As I will show in Ch. 5, Dewey's account of deliberation, moral propositions and judgment also has a 
revolutionary impact in the conception of the logical function of the copula “is” insofar as the construction of 
judgment and its final outcome are concerned. This new conception of the “copula” is linked not only to the 
structure of a moral judgment, but to the nature and function of judgment qua judgment in its logical function of 
closing a process of inquiry. In particular, the judgment has the logical function of instituting a new and settled 
existential reference. In the judgment, the existential reference is fixed in its ultimate determinate target and 
becomes actual in the enactment of the proposition produced through inquiry. Let us rephrase Dewey's 
understanding of the copula and see how the existential reference is instituted through it. Dewey formally agrees 
with the traditional conception that the standard form of the proposition is the connection of a subject and a 
predicate through the copula “is.”7 However, he reinterprets the meaning of this logical structure showing how 
human agency and semantics are thoroughly entangled. Dewey points out that etymologically the word “is” 
indicates to stay or to change, to remain or to endure, that is, a “mode of action” (LW12: 137; 307). The copula 
can be used as a mere connection of abstract characters outside a process of inquiry, as in the case of universal 
propositions, used simply to communicate an informative content or to report someone else's opinion (LW12: 
174; 284) or at a very abstract level of the inquiry. In this case, the copula designates “a non-temporal or strictly 
logical relation between meanings” (LW12: 137). On the contrary, if a proposition is used as a moment in the 
development of the construction of judgment and has a focal existential reference (in the sense of a provisional 
applicative import), the copula has itself an existential reference and therefore a “temporal force” that is lacking 
in the previous case. The subject of a proposition corresponds to the existential material that contains the “facts” 
of the case or the existent conditions on which the possible operation should be performed, while the predicate 
represents this possible operation. In the intermediate propositions, the copula means that in this problematic 
situation this specific existential material (existential reference) could be used in this specific kind of way (type of 
operation), while in the judgment it means that that specific existential material is actually fixed and determined 
in its ultimate and contextual function. The copula “is” in its logical function in the judgment coincides with the 
actual transformation of existential conditions and with the fixation of the existential reference of the subject-
matter. This is clearly stated in Dewey's explanation of the temporality of inquiry (LW12: 137-138), according to 
which only the judgment constitutes the “actual transformation” of the subject-matter of an indeterminate 
situation to a determinate one. This means that the existential reference of the previous phases of inquiry 
becomes fixed, determined and actual only in the enactment of the judgment. Early on, Dewey makes clear that 
 
the connection between fact and meaning is made only by an act in the ordinary physical sense of 
the word act, that is, by experiment involving movement of the body and change in surrounding 
conditions. (MW13: 63)  
 
The “connection between fact and meaning” refers here clearly to the existential reference of a human 
experience. Actual existential reference is realized in an actual operation. In language, the object denoted is 
always “presented as absent, as intended” (MW13: 53). “It is not a case of sheer absence, such as total ignorance 
would imply.” In order to fulfill the semeiotic reference of the sign, the singular signified has to become 
existentially present in action. Rational discourse as a dimension of inquiry aims at the actualization/embodiment 
of the prospected end-in-view. The propositional content of the sequence of affirmations grows until it becomes the 
overt act itself. The symbolic synthesis represented in a proposition is the existential and experiential final 
synthesis in the making. At the end of the process of inquiry there is no more distinction between the 
propositional, representational content about future possible operations, acts of judgment and possible 
existential reference. In the final act, the distinction of “object” and “subject” is partially and momentarily 
overcome and the existential reference is fixed and determined in its ultimate actual realization. The simple 
action upon symbols, operated in the internal phases of deliberation, does not realize this unity, since the use of 
                                                            
7 See Peirce's “On a New List of Categories.” 
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symbols still belongs to the dimension of propositional representation. “As long as the operations are not 
executed, the subject-matter of such propositions is therefore abstract or non-existential” (LW12: 302). 
“Possibility” of operation, that is, the logical function and meaning of every predication, “is existentially 
actualized only when the operation is performed not with or upon symbols but on existence” (LW12: 288-289). 
The consequence is that in the judgment the subject-matter elaborated in the previous moments of inquiry 
coincides with the act itself that the agent is performing here and now on existential conditions which are fixed 
and determined in their new contextual function. The actual existential reference and the application of a 
proposition coincide. 
 
 
 
2. “Intellectual” Properties, Semblance-Propositions and S-Propositions 
 
In the present section I want to address the problem of what Dewey calls “mental” properties and of two 
types of propositions that originate in inquiry and which have those “mental” properties as their subject-matter. 
“Mental” includes both semeiotic properties and intellectual properties (see MW3). When X functions as a sign, 
its activity is not in itself a psychical event (although it has physical and physiological conditions), but it is the 
semeiotic relation on the basis of which something performs the function of being evidence for something else. 
“Intellectual” properties are a sub-category of semeiotic properties. The semeiotic properties of an X are not 
mental in the sense that they belong to the “inner world” of an inquirer but not to the “outer world” of things. 
The acquired function of X of “pointing at …” is a property as real as any other properties of X. It is the 
actualization of a possibility of X produced through successful operations of inquiry on X, where the conclusion 
is the fixation of a new “known” object. Becoming a “sign of … ” is a modification of X as real as a physical 
modification of X is at a less inclusive level of interaction. As I have shown, semantics is a dimension of 
metaphysical development. “Intellectual” properties can be defined as the specific semeiotic properties (“X is a 
sign of …”) that “accrue” to existential conditions in the context of an inquiry. They denote the subject-matter 
of an inquiry as problematic. The context in which Dewey deals with the problem of intellectual properties is 
that of an inquiry in its process: 
 
There are … many cases in which we can not complete an attempted inference; when that is, we 
can not tell just what some thing means although it is undoubted in its existential manifestation. 
(LW3: 65) 
 
The distinction between “semeiotic” and “intellectual” properties is mainly found in LW4. As often happens 
in Dewey's works, the distinction is not always regular from a terminological viewpoint. A different notion of 
“intellectual” is given for example in LW1: 101-105, where semeiotic and intellectual are synonyms, and 
“instrumentality” of thought is taken to mean the fact that thinking is semeiotic all the way through and that a 
sign is an instrument, that is, it plays an evidential function (LW1: 134). However, the terminological 
inconsistency does not overshadow the distinction of the two concepts. The following properties are the forms 
of all the possible “intellectual” properties: 
 
(1) Vagueness or Indeterminacy (VS. adequate definiteness, LW4: 184; 187-188; LW12: 115-116) 
(2) Contradictoriness (VS. consistency, LW4: 184 ff.) 
 
 
It is possible to characterize the intellectual properties in at least two ways. First, the intellectual properties are 
the properties of an indexical existence that does not allow at the moment a safe inference to a determinate 
conclusion. Second, they are the properties that accrue to the subject-matter of an inquiry when the existential 
reference of observations, experimentations and rational discourse is problematic. Following Dewey, let us call the 
propositions in which the intellectual properties occur “Semblance-propositions.” In “Appearing and 
Appearance,” Dewey claims: “Deferred inference, or relation to a missing but signified object, is expressed in 
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such propositions as “This seems to be pure milk (but perhaps it is skimmed milk)” (LW3: 68). On the one hand, 
these intellectual properties are properties that “accrue” to the subject-matter of an inquiry, to antecedent 
existent conditions, when these conditions enter the field of a problematical interaction between a human being 
with environmental conditions. An indexical existence (a mere indexical or the indexical residuum of an object) 
really acquires these intellectual properties when it is turned into the subject-matter of a reflective process and 
during the time it performs such a function. In these cases, “the inferred object … is merely “apparent,” that is 
apparently but not surely signified” (LW3: 68). “Appearing now takes temporarily the form of seeming rather 
than of showing. But “seeming” does not signify that something seems to exist, but that a certain object seems to 
be pointed to: “seeming” denotes an essayed, but temporarily blocked, inference” (LW3: 70). The intellectual 
properties do not have any special mentalistic or psychic status, in the sense in which epistemological 
philosophies take the reality of such properties to be dependent only upon the representing mind of the subject 
and not upon the object represented. What Dewey does not accept is that: (1) there is a metaphysical dichotomy 
between the “mental” and the “extra-mental” or “physical”; (2) that the problematic situation is understood in a 
purely subjective way; (3) that cognitive and non-cognitive experiences are confused; and (4) that the deposit of 
past cognitive experiences in present non-cognitive experiences is overlooked. On the contrary, the “reality” of 
an indexical existence at a certain stage of the inquiry is its problematic or intellectual reality, in its vagueness, 
indeterminacy and contradictoriness. X is a sign too loose for an adequate resolution of the problem (vagueness) 
and simultaneously X is the sign for competing and incompatible inferences (contradictoriness). The reality of an 
X is neither in isolation from a field of interactions, nor is it prior to that particular field of interaction with a 
human organism in which it acquires semeiotic and intellectual properties. Therefore, the indexical existence X 
really is vague and contradictory, at least in one phase of its career. X has the potentiality of being problematical 
and unsettled, and this problematical character is what becomes actualized in inquiry. The reality of X is not 
reduced to its “mental” existence (so that, e.g., X as a physical phenomenon is neither vague nor contradictory), 
but part of its reality includes the problematical subject-matter in which it is articulated in the present inquiry. 
On the other hand, however, the terms that occur in Semblance-propositions and denote intellectual 
properties do not have an existential function, but only a conceptual and attributive one. The recurrence to 
indexical and demonstrative terms does not rule out the fact that operations of experimentation and observation 
are problematic (vague and contradictory) in their existential reference. Moreover, when the existential reference 
is taken in its ultimate actual realization in the judgment, the proposition is now a causal proposition and cannot 
be a Semblance-proposition. In other words, the subject-matter has been transformed through inquiry into a 
conclusive “whole” (a subject and a predicate united by a copula) which can be acted upon and which is 
therefore neither vague, nor indeterminate, nor contradictory. As a matter of fact, the task of a process of inquiry 
is to transform through rational discourse and the other phases of inquiry the subject-matter from a vague 
condition to the definite condition which is not only more determinate than the initial conditional but also 
adequate and pertinent to the problem of the situations. This is what Dewey calls “rigor and productivity” in 
inquiry (see Ch. 5, §4.2). The task of inquiry is, at least in part, to turn a vague, indeterminate and contradictory 
subject-matter into a determinate and operable one.  
One way of pursuing the task of inquiry is to transform Semblance-propositions into S-propositions. I am 
drawing the notion of “S-proposition” from Murray Murphey (2003) but adapting it to Dewey's logic. An S-
proposition is a proposition that is determined at least in relation to the organic structures that are involved in 
the process of inquiry in specific cases of observation, in order to clarify as much as possible the “exact nature of 
the evidence at hand” (LW3: 68; see also LW3: 69; 70). Clearly stated: 
 
… the force of the substitution is to call attention to a specific relation, to that particular part of 
the nervous organism which is involved as a condition, a physical or causal condition, of the 
appearance of the thing which is to serve as a sign. The propositions under discussion make explicit 
the exact nature of the thing to be used as evidence, before it is used. (LW3: 68) 
 
The process of substitution is not different from the one of the scientist who specifies the experimental 
conditions he has employed in producing the phenomena observed. Dewey claims that the inquirer has to guard 
against the ambiguity of terms such as “seems,” “appears” etc. Therefore, “we must specify the respect in which 
[something] appears, to eye, ear, touch, smell.” If I say that “a straight stick rising out of water looks bent 
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(implying relation to the eye) I but state an objective fact, verified by a camera, and explained by well-known 
physical principles” (LW3: 68). To state in the course of an inquiry that something is seen, heard, tasted, felt etc. 
is to formulate S-propositions. In the section on sensa, I made clear that sensa as appearance2 are already 
semeiotic classifications of physical existential interactions or feelings and are therefore fallible. For Murphey, as 
for C. I. Lewis, these S-propositions are classifications of mere sensational inputs in perceptual judgments but are 
at the same time “given” and infallible. The point is to understand that these propositions are something 
different from sensa as appearance1 but are at the same time a partial inference, or an inference performed 
within an inquiry that has not produced a conclusion yet. An S-proposition is “infallible” in the sense that it aims 
to establish the real evidence played by an observation at a certain point of the inquiry with no pretension to 
constitute a conclusion or to draw further inferential consequences from this observation. Saying “this stick looks 
bent” is different from saying “this stick is bent,” in the sense that in the second case the use of the expression is 
existential while in the first case it is only attributive and conceptual and is limited to an adequate formulation of 
the evidential material at hand. The S-proposition is infallible in the sense that the inquirer is suspending any 
further inferential judgment and is limiting herself to the determination of the evidential “facts” of the case 
(LW12: 152). It is true that an S-proposition is already the product of an inferential judgment and a classification 
(it requires the notion of “looking,” etc.) and is therefore the consequence of a highly specialized knowledge, but 
it is at the same time taken to be intermediate and not conclusive in a process of inquiry, which means its 
“material truth” can rely on a minimum of evidence (LW15: 124). As a matter of fact, if the inquirer is not lying, 
the S-proposition is “materially true,” although the problem of truth is strictly speaking related only to the final 
judgment (the conclusion of the inquiry). Therefore, the same proposition, although materially true, can be 
“invalid” for the present inquiry (see Burke 1994: 204-206). “Sense-knowledge,” as distinct from “rational 
knowledge,” is not at all “a special kind of knowledge nor yet a separate component of knowledge” (LW15: 90-
91). On the contrary, it is a function in inquiry, namely, “that aspect of the system of knowledge in and by which 
knowledge extending across an indefinitely extensive spatial and temporal range of facts is anchored and 
focalized in that which is here-and-now.” S-propositions are clearly instances of sense-knowledge, that is, 
observational singular propositions aiming to establish the material evidence, the “facts” of the case, within a 
process of inquiry. The content of S-propositions is therefore “sensory-perceptual meanings” (LW1: 255) and 
not immediate qualities or feelings. This is the same conclusion Dewey comes to when he opposes his 
“naturalistic theory of perception” to the “epistemological” one (LW2: 46 ff.). With his naturalistic approach, 
Dewey rejects the two tenets of the epistemological theory of perception, namely: (1) that sense-knowledge is a 
special kind of knowledge, “consciousness,” and that (2) sensa have a special metaphysical status, a “psychic” or 
“mental” existence, so that the problem of knowledge becomes the epistemological problem of how it is possible 
in general that psychical or mental entities correspond to extra-mental entities. Dewey argues against (1) by 
positing that sense-knowledge is a function within inquiry, not an isolated or autonomous kind of knowledge 
parallel to what is called rational knowledge. Against (2), he argues that sensa as appearances1 are the product of 
a psycho-physical interaction, where the site of existence is the “field” of interaction itself. As appearances2 or 
appearances3, sensa are the indexical reference of an act of recognition or as an act of inquiry, both inferential 
operations in different way and measure. 
In my view, Bernstein 1971 (see also Shusterman 1999) has clarified once for all the nature of Dewey's anti-
foundationalism. Broadening this account of Dewey's thesis, I would say that Dewey is against foundationalism 
as entailing that (1) the ground of knowledge is an “antecedent,” ready-made reality (presentative realism); (2) the 
ground of knowledge is sense-data grasped in self-evident atomic propositions, examples of non-doxastic 
awareness or apprehension (empiricism); (3) the ground of knowledge lies in rational principles grasped through 
intuition (rationalism). I believe that my reconstruction of Dewey’s sensa in relation to the notion of indexical 
existence further clarifies this interpretative line. 
S-propositions are intimately connected to what Dewey called “the postulate of immediate empiricism” 
(MW4). According to the postulate of immediate empiricism, 
 
… things – anything, everything, in the ordinary or non-technical use of the term “thing” – are 
what they are experienced as. Hence, if one whishes to describe anything truly, his task is to tell what 
it is experienced as being. (MW4: 158) 
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Dewey's rhetoric is sometimes excessive in equating ontology with a description of an experience whatsoever. 
For instance, he claims that “this is a different experience – that is a different thing” (MW4: 162). However, an 
example can easily show that what Dewey is claiming is valuable. Let us say that if an inquirer experiences X at t1 
as “frightening,” the inquirer is entitled to state that “X is frightening at t1.” One the one hand, this statement 
can be more cautiously translated into the S-proposition “X looks frightening at t1.” However, if she limits the 
existential use of the predicate to the event of X at t1, she is actually entitled to state that “X is frightening at t1.” 
In this case, the proposition is a particular proposition and not a singular proposition. Moreover, the inquirer 
could study the case of why X looks frightening in all conditions C that are similar to those that occurred at t1, 
and consequently could classify X as a specimen of the kind “frightening” every time similar conditions C take 
place. In this case, “X looks frightening when conditions C similar to the conditions that took place at t1 occur” 
and “X is frightening when conditions C similar to the conditions that took place at t1 occur” would be singular 
rather than particular propositions. Let us also assume that X is a friend and that among the conditions C there is 
an error of recognition of X. If this were the case, the following logical picture would follow: (1) “X looks 
frightening at t1” and “X is frightening at t1” can be both particular propositions, formulated in the middle of an 
inquiry as instruments to determine the problem at stake (LW12: 309). The first case, the S-proposition, should 
be given priority over the other formulation insofar as the reference to one causal condition of the event (“… 
looks … ”) makes it heuristically more effective. Assuming that X is eventually identified as a friend and the S-
proposition is classified as a mistaken observation, it remains true that X looked frightening at t1 and that in this 
sense it was frightening at t1. The mistake would have been to infer from it that X is actually frightening in all 
conditions. (2) “X looks frightening when conditions C similar to the conditions that took place at t1 occur” and 
“X is frightening when conditions C similar to the conditions that took place at t1 occur” can be both singular 
propositions formulated in the middle of an inquiry on the basis of past experiences, where the conclusion that 
X was considered frightening was actually a mistake in consequence of a wrong identification of X. Again, the 
mistake mentioned here is relative to the inference from the S-proposition at t1 to the classification of X as 
frightening also when one essential condition, that is, the wrong identification of X, is removed. I will address in 
a further section the problem of truth in Dewey's terms. For now, it is sufficient to make clear that strictly 
speaking the fact that X looks frightening in conditions C is as real as the fact that X is in different and more 
standard conditions non-frightening. A significant use of conceptual oppositions such as “real” and “apparent,” 
“subjective” and “objective” is to be aware of the fact that these categories apply to the evidential, semeiotic 
function of Xs and not to Xs taken “in their original and innocent occurrence” (LW14: 25-26). 
 
 
 
3. Substance, Existential Conditions and Predication of Kinds 
 
Let me now move to Dewey's notion of “substance.” The notion of substance is important insofar as its 
analysis gives also the possibility to grasp Dewey's understanding of the mechanism of predication of kinds, or 
better, the semantic link between the “kinds” predicated and the properties that these predicates denote. Some 
scholars (Boisvert 1988; Dicker 1972; Black 1962: 515-516; Burke 1994:59; 81-82; 246-247; Burke 2002a: 147; 
Gardner 2000; Garrison 2005: 826; Hildebrand 2003: 81-82; Randall 1957; Randall 1958: 223; 231-235) have 
dwelt on Dewey's theory of substance providing insightful and historically informed analysis of this concept. 
However, these reconstructions, although insightful, are lacking at least as the notion of indexical existence is 
concerned. Therefore, a new consideration of Dewey's claims is needed. 
One of the most explicit series of statements on substance is in Logic (LW12: 130-133). The fundamental 
claim to be unpacked is that “substance” is first and foremost a logical notion and not an ontological one. 
““Substance” represents … a logical, not an ontological, determination” (LW12: 131). “Logical” refers in this 
context to the semeiotic properties acquired by an X when it is settled as this or that sign or set of signs, and 
represents therefore a semeiotic function. “Substance” is therefore a synonym of “object.” “The condition – and 
the sole condition that has to be satisfied in order that there may be substantiality, is that certain qualifications 
hang together as dependable signs that certain consequences will follow when certain interactions take place. 
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This is what is meant when it is said that substantiality is a logical, not a primary ontological determination” 
(LW12: 131-133). A formal definition of “substance” could be:  
 
Def. Substance: a set of existential factors used as a warranted sign for sets of stable inferences, predicaments 
and operations in general; similarly, a set of existential factors that would produce certain consequences if certain 
conditions occurred. 
 
In what follows I explain the different components of this definition in detail. The claim that a substance is 
first and foremost a semeiotic and semantic structure, a consequence of past experiences and inquiries, does not 
deny that this semeiotic structure is “warranted” by the existent conditions that have made inquiries possible and 
successful. The birth certificate of a substance is the construction of a judgment and its conclusive function in 
inquiry. As an abstract substance, its locus is the “assertion” (“subject-matter which has been prepared to be 
final,” LW12: 123), while as an actual substance, it coincides with the “affirmation” or final judgment (LW12: 
123-125). In this sense, substances are not original but are a “happy outcome of a complex history” (LW1: 135; 
see also LW1: 143). In talking about the structure of the judgment, Dewey introduces the notion of logical 
substance as the “coherent whole” structured through inquiry and judgment in a final assertion: 
 
The subject is existential, either a singular this, or a set of singulars. But there are conditions of 
inquiry which must be satisfied by anything taken to be a subject. (1) It must delimit and describe the 
problem in such a way as to indicate a possible solution. (2) It must be such that new data, instituted 
by observational operations directed by the provisional predicate (representing a possible solution), 
will unite with its subject-matter to form a coherent whole; and it is capable of incorporating into 
itself other predicated qualifications until it becomes, as such, a unity of inter-connected distinctions, 
or “properties.” (LW12: 130-131) 
 
The same indexical existent X, here taken in the form of the existential conditions to which the demonstrative 
refers, is something that becomes in the course of different completed experiences and inquiries the evidential 
basis for different inferential predicaments. The experience of different existential consequences following 
different manipulations with X shows that X allows for different inferences. The “properties” that are taken to 
reside, cohere, inhere and be instantiated in an object are in reality the content of conclusions of different 
warranted inferences drawn on X. When I say that the same X is sweet, white, granular etc., I am committing 
myself to the provisional statement that the same X, when experienced in certain conditions C, will produce the 
feeling that is called “sweet”; in other conditions C1, it will produce a certain “quality” commonly labeled as 
“white”, etc. Once established as “unified whole,” X is treated as an object, “sugar”; it is used and enjoyed as 
such in daily practices of life and symbolically represented in language and communication. The more complex 
the interactions in which an X enters and is experienced, the more properties the correspondent substance will 
contain. 
There are at least four reasons why Dewey claims that a substance is first and foremost a logical and not an 
ontological notion: 
(i) First, every substance is selective of what an X is. As it is clear from the study of Dewey's theory of inquiry, 
the “data,” or the manipulation of the subject-matter of an inquiry, are never “given,” but more appropriately 
“taken” (actualized or “produced” through operations and selected for their contextual logical functional force, 
LW12: 127) on the basis of the needs of the situation and the tasks of inquiries. The “selective emphasis” 
implied in the process of construction of a substance refers to the “specified functional way” in which an X is 
settled as consequence of operations of inquiry (LW12: 132; see also LW1: 31; LW4: 191). Selection is due to 
different reasons such as human structural organic conditions and interests. What X is warranted to be when it is 
classified as a “substance” or an “object” is always in a certain sense semantically poorer than what X is also 
outside our organizing practices and furthermore of what X could be as a sign. Dewey claims that “essence is 
never existence, and yet it is the essence, the distilled import, of existence” (LW1: 143). As I have shown, 
according to Dewey, the singular denoted by a demonstrative term is inexhaustible in its meaning in intension, so 
that every classification cannot help but be a semantic demarcation. At the same time, however, a substance 
instituted as a semeiotic structure actualizes some of the potentialities that were unexpressed and latent in X, 
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namely the potentialities of performing this or that semeiotic function. Once an event becomes a substance it 
enters a new phase of its career and in a sense it gains a “double life” (LW1: 132), in such a way that it can be 
object of “ideal experimentation” beyond the “interaction with crude and raw events” which it has as a mere 
existent.  
The fact that substance has a selective dimension based on the organizing practices performed by human 
beings does not mean that the existent conditions have no structure in themselves apart from their semeiotic life. 
On the contrary, Dewey denies that 
  
… there is or can be any such thing as mere existence – phenomenon unqualified as respects 
organization and force, whether such phenomenon may be psychic or cosmic. (MW2: 333; see Sleeper 
1986)  
 
Reflection and institution of semeiotic properties in X are like the “organic growth” of an experience which is 
“already organized” and which keeps sustaining the sign-significance relationships among parts of reality. The 
fact that the existent conditions are already organized, at least as a set of potentialities, and that every singular is 
inexhaustible in meaning in intension further clarifies the reasons why Dewey stresses his theory of the primary 
logical purport of the notion of substance. What he wants to claim in saying that the import of substance is not 
immediately ontological but primarily logical is the fact that, as some other naturalists have made clear (mainly, 
Randall Jr. and Woodbridge), what an X is as an event and can be as a semeiotic structure is never reducible to 
what X is presently taken to be as this or that substance. Add here Dewey's reconstruction of teleology 
(ii) Second, the status of substantiality is not dependent upon long existential duration in time (LW4: 103). A 
fast event such as lightening has the same substantial character as a mountain has. In this sense, Dewey says that 
a substance has first and foremost “logical solidity and endurance” (LW12: 133) and not metaphysical endurance 
in the sense of existential duration in time. A substance is not a durable set of existential conditions, but is the 
stable relation, fixed through inquiry, between a set of existential factors and given conditions whenever they 
occur and for the time they occur, and the consequences that follow. When a “transitory event” becomes 
“subject of scientific judgment,” that is, when it becomes a target of warranted predication, enters the condition 
of substantiality. This is because a substance has primarily a “functional nature.” In other words, it refers to the 
inferential possibility of taking existential conditions as dependable evidential signs of certain consequences, 
independently from the extension of their temporal endurance. Dewey also claims that in this sense substances 
can be taken to be “eternal” (LW1: 119), although only as dialectical and non-existential objects. Although this 
claim might bring Dewey close to a nominalist position, the first implication of such a claim is again that 
substance has first and foremost a logical import and not a direct ontological one. The almost immediate 
existential transitivity of certain existential conditions is not an objection to the possibility of attributing to them 
a comprehensive substantial status, which is first and foremost inferential. The substantive character of 
existential conditions is quite independent from their duration, so that, if an event has a brief existential 
permanence (e.g., a lightening), this “property” of having a brief duration becomes part of the series of 
classifications in which the substantiality of X can be expressed. 
(iii) Third, the existential conditions and the “substances” really grow through development of experience and 
knowledge, in the sense that the semeiotic properties instituted in X are real properties. They are real 
actualization and institutionalization in X of semeiotic functions that were only potential or not even potential 
before. Dewey's tenet is that what grows is not only the agent's set of beliefs and habits about X, but X itself, 
which, as appearance3, is already the growth of appearance1 and which in turn can be institutionalized as this or 
that substance, that is, an appearance2. In their temporal “career,” existential conditions acquire new properties, 
among which are also semeiotic properties. The successive passages (a) from mere existent outside the field of 
interactions with a human organism to the status of an evidential part of one's experience thanks to the organic 
perceptual apparatus appearance1, (b) from the status of appearance1 to the status of indexical existent 
appearance3, and (c) from the status of appearance3 to the status of a dependable evidential set of signs for 
warranted inferences appearance2, all mark real development in the ontology of X. This is because the knowing-
relation, understood as inquiry, implies phases of interaction-experimentation on existential conditions and not 
only produces new phenomena and actualities, but also brings about as its conclusion a final reorganization of 
 134  
these existential conditions into new wholes. “Any predications,” says Dewey, “is a requalification, or operational 
means of instituting a requalification, and so involves a change” (LW12: 239-240). However, the symbolic 
predication marks already in itself the emergence of a new property in X as an actualization of its semeiotic 
potentialities. The new organization produced in the judgment, once verified in the overt action, is not merely 
“mental” or “psychic,” but is the constructive production of a new real artifact at its fundamental level in the 
form of an institutionalized sign or group of signs, that is, a substance. Semeiotic properties are at the same time 
“ideal” (dependent on the constitutive or constructivist agency of man's intelligent behavior) and “real” (they 
become new real properties of X and are grounded in the potentialities of X of acquiring these new semeiotic 
properties). Semantics is the first step in the human contribution to the real development of the universe.8 The 
new substance that emerges from X at t2 is not entirely new, since the inferential consequences which were 
previously operable on X at t1 are still possible. However, the substance at t2 is not the same substance as that of 
t1, although they are both new phases and developmental stages in the career of X. 
Dewey's opposition to presentative realism and idealism relies on the following considerations. According to 
Dewey, “knowing is something that happens to things in the natural course of their career, not the sudden 
introduction of a “unique” non-natural type of relation – that to mind or consciousness” (MW6: 121). In the 
“natural continuity” between existents and knowns, “things in becoming known undergo a specific and detectable 
qualitative change” (MW6: 121). Dewey rejects all the following alternative options. In particular, Dewey denies 
(1) that the knowing-relation is only a presentative relation of transparency and not a relation of construction and 
selection (VS. presentative realism); (2) that the semeiotic properties fixed in a substance are not the product of a 
real change undergone by X on the basis of its potentialities and of real operations of inquiry, but are pre-
existent and actual in X and only manifested by inquiry (VS. presentative realism); (3) that reality is ultimately 
reducible to “objects” and “substances,” with no further existential residuum (VS. idealism). In Logic (LW12: 
137), Dewey makes clear that inquiry and judgment produce a temporal reconstruction of their subject-matter. 
The temporality of inquiry and judgment does not refer to the trivial fact that the act of inquiry and judgment 
takes time, but that at the beginning t1 of the process of inquiry, X does not have certain semeiotic properties 
that it has at the successful conclusion of the process of inquiry t2. 
It is in the light of these considerations that some interpretations of Dewey's constructive side regarding to 
the notion of substance prove to be inadequate (Boisvert 1963:85: 87-88; 171; Dicker 1972). According to these 
interpretations, Dewey's notion of “object” has to be understood only in an epistemological and not in an 
ontological sense. The simplifications of these interpretations does not rely on the fact that a “substance” is the 
semantic structure relative to X, which is the result of a successful inquiry (or series of inquiries) on X, but in the 
assumption that the acquired semantic structure is not something real that has become part of the temporal 
reality, or “career,” of X. A correct interpretation has to pay attention to the fact that Dewey is not only arguing 
for the tautology that since inquiry is a temporal process, the “knowledge of X” as the conclusion of the inquiry 
at t2 was not real at t1. More deeply, his fundamental tenet is that X as known, namely, X as having a newly 
actualized semeiotic property, is the product of a new real substance or the reshaping of an old one. X has 
undergone a real change by virtue to the process of inquiry. 
A last point needs to be made here in relation to an ambiguity in Dewey's characterization of the constitution 
of a substance as the “acquisition of potentialities” (LW12: 132). “Potentiality” can have here two meanings: (1) 
it can mean active potentiality, in the sense of a real power to do something, even when that power is not 
actualized; in this sense, the potential nature of a sign is defined in opposition to the situation in which the sign is 
actually used as a sign. The potentiality does not refer to the susceptibility of a series of existential conditions to 
be reconstructed in the judgment, but to the susceptibility of an organized “substance” to be used as such in 
action, to be acted upon. (2) However, acquisition of potentiality can also have a more fundamental meaning. It 
can refer to the susceptibility of a series of existential conditions to become a new whole or substance through 
inquiry and judgment. In this sense, the potentiality is a passive susceptibility of a series of existential conditions 
to become a new organized whole or substance, susceptibility to be organized in this or in that way. Again, 
“kinds” are dependent upon certain operations (LW12: 385-387). X can be classified as a specimen of the kind 
“food” only when the operations of eating and digesting X are actually performed by an organism (X is food in 
                                                            
8  On Dewey’s evolutionary naturalism as “humanism,” see Gale 2010b. 
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actuality), or when an organism could perform those operations (X is food in potentiality). However, outside the 
possibility of contact with organisms with certain functions, X is potentially “food” only in a weak sense.9  
(iv) Fourth, substantiality is a primary logical and not ontological determination in the sense that certain 
existential conditions have to be “dependable evidential signs” (LW12: 132) in order to be taken as constitutive 
factors of a substance. This thesis does not entail that a substance does not have a strong ontological import. As 
the content of our beliefs, practices and linguistic formulations, a “substance” corresponds to reality when these 
formulations are warranted (see below the notions of truth and correspondence pragmatistically understood). The 
tenet that substance is primarily a logical structure does not mean that it is a structure only with a conceptual 
designation, or that it is an object with a special “mental” or “psychic” reality that does not concern an extra-
mental reality. It does not even mean that a substance is a wild construction or a metaphysical illusion. There is 
no doubt that the “constructive” side is important in Dewey's metaphysics in many ways. For instance, the 
indexical existence X is the result of the interaction of environing conditions with a human perceptual apparatus 
and is in this sense a construction. In its function as a settled sign, the event is constructed again. Moreover, the 
demarcation of an X as this or that type of sign is itself the product of a selection (selective emphasis) and is 
therefore constructed. However, as is often the case in Dewey's work, the opposition between constructivism 
and non-constructivism is reframed once the tacit assumptions of one of the opposing terms are revealed (some 
scholars have dwelt more or less explicitly with the problem of constructivism in Dewey: Burke 2002a: 150-151; 
Clark 1960: 42-43; Dicker 1972:152-153; Hildebrand 2003:60; Hickman-Neubert-Reich 2009; McDermid 2006: 
46; 82-83; Murphy 1951: 205; Piatt 1951: 126; Rosenthal 2003: 46; Ryder 2003: 61; Shook 2002: 101; Shook 2003: 
343; Zedler 1969: 78).10 The interpretation of human experience and knowledge as constructivist of an extra-
mental reality works with the unjustified assumption that reality in its eulogistic sense is the total sum of events 
and connections (let us say, the state of “nature,” N) before N enters in relation with a human organism (see 
“Reality as Experience”). The understanding of reality that is operative behind this approach is therefore: (1) 
reality is what is previous to or isolated from interactions with a human organism and inquiry. (2) A correct 
understanding of what reality is in its eulogistic meaning has to consider the distinction between intrinsic 
properties (the properties that an entity has “in itself”) and extrinsic properties (the properties that an entity has 
because of its relations with other entities). According to this view, only the intrinsic properties would be 
eulogistically real, while the other properties would be mental constructs. Dewey rejects this distinction, or 
accepts it only in a perspectival sense (see Rockwell 2005, Ch. 4). From a general viewpoint, however, Dewey's 
concern is that there is no reason to think that the knowing-relation is a special type of relation, in such a way 
that its products should have an ontological status sui generis, either “psychic” or “mental”. A “substance,” 
explained in its semeiotic structure (existential conditions X which are firmly taken to point to certain 
consequences, which could occur as existents under certain conditions – and consequently are classified as a 
kind), proves to be a set of existential occurrences which are taken as the sign of the occurrence of other 
eventual existents on the basis of a constant relation between the first set of occurrences and the second set. 
Relations here are of three types (see LW12). In any case, all the factors implied in this definition are something 
real, including the semeiotic relation, the property of functioning (actually or potentially) as a sign. 
 
 
 
3.1. Substances and Predication of Kinds: Dewey's Two Souls 
 
The fact that “substance” is first and foremost a logical notion is also related to Dewey's reconstruction of 
the concept of “property.” In particular, this reconstruction refers to a different understanding of the 
mechanisms of predication of kinds and of the semantic link between our true predications and the properties 
that are denoted by them. Although this point has not been discussed in Dewey scholarship (see however 
Browning 2002: 170; Burke 2002b: 229; Gale 2006: 78-79; Gale 2010a: 117-129),11 I take it to be a key step in 
                                                            
9  It is in the light of these reflections that Dewey comes to criticize the notion of “inherent potentiality” in LW1. 
10  My position is close to Piatt’s reading. Also interesting that Sleeper (1986: 6-7) sees in Dewey both an Aristotelian and a Kantian 
legacy.  
11  However, some ambiguities remain unexplained. For instance, Gale (2010a: 122) states that “the generic trait of existence are inquire-
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understanding Dewey’s potion of realism. Dewey displays two different attitudes on this point, almost two 
different souls, one wherein greater weight is given to the reality of singulars over generals, and one wherein 
generals are taken more into account as realities in their own right. Let us call the first approach (i) the non-
transparency approach and the second approach (ii) the distinction between ontological and logical generality approach. The 
non-transparency approach can be briefly introduced by saying that the predicability of the same predicate P to 
two singulars x and y does not depend on the fact that x and y instantiate the same property, although it is 
supported by the respective properties of x and y. This position brings Dewey closer to a nominalist position 
instead of a realist one (LW12: 260-263). In particular, Dewey agrees with a nominalistic position in claiming that 
the logical generality has necessarily the character of a “symbol.” This point can be introduced through the 
following biconditional: 
 
“Px” is true and “Py” is true ↔ P denotes the one and the same property Q instantiated or exemplified by x and 
y, and Q is a metaphysical universal instantiated by x and y 
 
in which x and y denote two singulars or individuals. The biconditional could be made more complex by 
taking into consideration the attribution of the same predicate to the same individual in different moments and 
eventualities (such as “Px” is true at t1 and Px” is true at t2); or even by attributing the same predicate to two 
different individuals in different moments and eventualities. Howeve, this would not change Dewey's point. 
Dewey questions this double implication in the following way: 
 
(1) He does not deny that the predications Px and Py are possible and true 
(2) He does not deny that these predications are true in virtue of the properties of x and y (although he 
reinterprets pragmatically the notion of “correspondence,” see below). 
(3) He does not even deny that Xs have real general ways of behaving 
(4) He denies that the predications are true because x and y instantiate one and the same property.  
 
Dewey writes: 
 
The identification of a sudden light as a flash of lightening, of a noise as the banging of a door, is 
not grounded upon existential qualities which immediately present themselves, but upon the qualities 
with respect to the evidential function or use in inquiry they subserve. What is recurrent, uniform, 
“common,” is the power of immediate qualities to be signs. Immediate qualities in their immediacy are, 
as we have seen, unique, non-recurrent. But in spite of their existential uniqueness, they are capable, in 
the continuum of inquiry, of becoming distinguishing characteristics which mark off (circumscribe) and 
identify kinds of objects or events. As far as qualities are identical in their functional force, as means of 
identification and demarcation of kinds, objects are of the same kind no matter how unlike their 
immediate qualities. … The question, then, concerns the way in which the general form is instituted, it 
being noted that recurrence is connected with inference and not with existences apart from their 
function in inference. (LW12: 248-249; see also LW4: 189-190) 
 
Dewey repeats that his theory “rejects completely the view that a conception represents simply a selection of 
material that is found to be antecedently “common” to a number of singulars” (LW12: 260-263). Dewey's 
rejection depends “(1) upon interpreting the “common” in terms of the function performed by existential 
qualities in inference, and (2) upon the necessity of the abstract universal in order to warrant inferential use of 
qualities in any inquiry. The latter consideration is the more important in that it indicates the logical necessity of 
conceptions that, while suggested by singulars, are not logically derived from them, even from that which is 
common among them” (LW12: 261-262). Dewey's point is that x and y, as mere qualities or existential 
interactions, are unique points. To become a “kind,” the quality must become a sign, and its universality is a logical 
property (the property of a standard use of a sign) instead of an ontological property. The universality coincides 
with the function of predication upon x and y, not with the same metaphysical property instantiated by x and y. 
As a universal, it is first a logical function rather than an ontological property. This universality of the sign 
indicates a constant possibility of classification or operation on X, namely, a warranted predicability. Again, 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
related” with no further substantive explanation.  
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Dewey claims that “qualities are not recurrent in themselves but in their evidential function. As evidential, they 
are characteristics which describe a kind” (LW12: 351; see also LW4: 127; 130; LW10: 219). The notion of 
“property” might be ambiguous given the particular treatment that Dewey accords to it. I have shown that the 
concept of property has first a logical and epistemic sense and only derivatively an ontological import, similar to 
the way in which substance is taken to be first and foremost a logical notion. However, insofar as we interpret 
the notion of universal “property” in a direct realistic sense, as the one and same something instantiated in x and in 
y, then Dewey's position becomes clear. 
The non-transparency thesis is indirectly supported by other claims, such as that “comprehension” and 
“definition” (designing the “kinds” that constitute the analysis of a broader “kind”) have existential reference in 
Aristotelian logic, wherein knowledge is ultimately a vision of the essences, the intellectual grasp of forms, while 
they do not have existential reference in Dewey's theory (LW12: 357). Is “universality” real or it is a mere ens 
rationis? Dewey would say that it is real as ens rationis because it is an ens rationis. “Universality” becomes part of 
reality as a logical or semeiotic property that X acquires by virtue of human inquiry. It is not a “psychological 
accretion – as seems to be implied in logical conceptualism,” but is the logical function performed by an X in 
inquiry. In other words, universality is not part of reality because x and y qua mere existents instantiate one and 
the same universal property denoted by P, but rather because x and y become, through inquiry, the evidential 
basis on which their individual differences can be overlooked and the same predicate can be attributed to them 
(or the same operation can be performed on them). Universality is the property of objects and substances, not of 
events or mere existences (which have, however, their own internal organization and their own general ways of 
behavior). Dewey would say therefore that there are general ways of behavior in events and existences 
independent from semeiotic properties by way of human inquiry, although he would not admit that universal 
“kinds” are real independently from human practices of organization. “Kinds” become real as semeiotic properties. 
At the same time, Dewey displays a different soul, in which a scholastic realism closer to Peirce's plays a 
greater role (LW12: 260-263; LW14: 23; see Boisvert 1988).12 Dewey's claims are allied with scholastic realism in 
that general ways of acting are as real as singulars. “Individually qualified things have some qualities which are 
pervasive, common, stable.” (LW1: 119). The distinction he draws between ontological generality and logical 
generality relies on this truth of scholastic realism. However, he affirms that ontological generality is only a 
necessary condition for logical generality but is not sufficient, since logical generality makes its appearance 
(“accrues” to existential conditions) only when “the existentially general is used as a controlling function” in 
inquiry. Logical generality accrues to existential singulars and ontological generality, but is neither reducible to 
nor deducible from it. It also furthers the potential logical generality present in a habit of expectation that has not 
yet been made explicitly linguistic in a formulation (LW12: 250). In this way, it would be possible to claim that if 
“Px” and “Py” are true, this is because the same ontological generality is instantiated by x and y, even though this 
is only one necessary condition for the predicability of P to x and y. The further needed condition for the truth 
of Px and Py is that the ontological generality instantiated in x and y has been established as a general sign through 
past inquiries (a universal “predicate,” or a symbol with a universal logical force). With regard to this point, 
Dewey's theory differs from nominalism because logical generality “has its ground in existence (and hence is not 
a mere convenient memorandum or notation for a number of singulars)” (LW12: 263; see also LW4: 165), even 
though logical generality does not merely conform to nor reproduce ontological generality, but is rather a use of it 
for the task of inquiry.  
 
 
                                                            
12 See in particular LW 14: 21, in which Dewey replies to Reichenbach’s charge of nominalism (“reduction of abstracta to concreta”) by 
appealing to Peirce’s realism. Peirce’s extreme scholastic realism faces the following question: “whether laws and general types are 
figments of the mind or are real” (CP 1.16, 1903) and answers that laws, types, dispositions are real generals (metaphysical 3rdnesses). 
I take the following claim as sufficiently representative of Peirce's understanding of “kinds”: “All classification, whether artificial or 
natural, is the arrangement of objects according to ideas. A natural classification is the arrangement of them according to those ideas 
from which their existence results. No greater merit can a taxonomist have than that of having his eyes open to the ideas in nature; no 
more deplorable blindness can afflict him than that of not seeing that there are ideas in nature which determine the existence of 
objects” (EP2: 127, 1902). As we have seen, Peirce’s stance about nominalism/realism debate is object of different interpretations. 
However, I agree with interpretations such as Mayorga 2007, Roberts 1970 and Lane 2004 that see also in Peirce’s early writings (i.e., 
also before 1868) a realist metaphysics of generals. For instance, W2: 181 clearly affirms a realistic view of generals. For a more 
constructivist reading of Peirce, see Ishida (2009: 45-46). 
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3.3. Common Sense Objects and Scientific Objects: Semantic Priority and Ontological Parity 
 
The aim of this section is to show how the distinction between indexical existence and objects is at the 
bottom of Dewey's rejection of all theories that claim semantic or ontological incompatibility between “common 
sense objects” and “scientific objects.” This is Dewey’s attempt to overcome allegedly insoluble metaphysical 
oppositions among different types of objects (e.g. LW1: 109). Some scholars have more or less indirectly 
addressed this issue (Burke 2002: 147-148; Gale 2010: 121; Godfrey-Smith 2002, Hildebrand 2003: 48; 
Kannegiesser 1977: 96-109; Margolis 1977: 141-144 is right; Shook 2003: 326; Shook 2009: 106; Shook 2011: 12-
13; Teehan 1996: 85), often in relation to Dewey's version of “naturalism” (on this, see also Bernstein 1959; 
Capps 1996; Delaney 2003; Manicas 2008; Roth 1963; Tiles 1995; Shook 2000; De Caro 2011).13 My claim is that 
according to Dewey there is a twofold relationship between common sense objects and scientific objects. Simply 
stated, Dewey maintains that common sense objects have a semantic priority over scientific objects, and that at the 
same time there is an ontological parity between the two classes of objects.14 In Dewey's terms, this is a 
metaphysical thesis (LW1: 50; LW4: 108; LW14: 80). As I have already briefly suggested, Dewey's approach to 
the notion of “object” does not allow for a purely “logical” or purely “ontological” interpretation: objects, 
substances, classes, kinds, and properties are foremost logical notions with consequential ontological 
implications. Therefore, it would be a mistake to overlook the logical or semeiotic structure of the 
“metaphysical” questions and subject-matter in Dewey's texts. The intermingled nature of logical and ontological 
issues can be displayed in what I call the Deweyan metaphysical question, which is: 
 
Deweyan Metaphysical Question: How should we think about indexical existences Xs? 
 
The normative formulation of the metaphysical question (see in particular LW4: 108) is a unified 
reconstruction of Dewey's different claims regarding metaphysics. Dewey makes at least two important 
statements about metaphysics, in particular in relation to its methodology and its subject-matter status. (1) First, 
an “empirical naturalist” takes metaphysics to mean “the more generalized statements about Nature which he 
finds to be justified” (LW14: 80). (2) Second, while “philosophy” is “love of wisdom,” “metaphysics” as a 
discipline is “cognizance of the generic traits of existence” (LW1: 50). The first claim is a methodological claim 
about the right approach to inquiry in philosophy, that is a “naturalistic” approach; while the second claim 
expresses a distinction internal to philosophy between “wisdom” and “metaphysics.”15 What is common to both 
claims is that (a) metaphysics as a discipline is a cognitive enterprise and that (b) metaphysics as a subject-matter 
deals with the “generic” or general features of what exists. Let me clarify points (a) and (b) in greater detail. First, 
the claim that metaphysics is a cognitive discipline means that Dewey attributes to this discipline the task of 
studying “knowledge-objects” (LW1: 30), or “cognitive objects” (LW1: 31), i.e., objects articulated in linguistic 
representations and beliefs, not existents given in different modalities of experience. Knowledge-objects can be 
both objects of common sense and science (LW14: 18). As a consequence, “affectional and volitional objects” 
(LW1: 30) are excluded from the field of metaphysics, not as possible knowledge-objects but as contents of 
experience different from linguistic representations and beliefs. Where metaphysics deals with esthetic “beauty” 
or moral “goodness,” these two properties constitute a known-subject-matter, represented in beliefs (see LW12: 
292), and not the content of esthetic and moral perceptions. In this sense, metaphysical subject-matter is X as 
known and not X as the content of different types of experience. Insofar as we deal with “metaphysics,” 
philosophy is the description of the general traits of reality with linguistic tools, or the science of “reality” 
understood as the science of different types of known objects with their respective properties. Therefore, 
philosophy does not coincide with wisdom, which is rather the ideal of the experience of reality as distinct from 
linguistic representation. In this sense, “metaphysics” and “wisdom” are the two irreducible polarities of the 
same philosophical organon. Second, the fact that metaphysical subject-matter is the general trait of what exists 
confirms that metaphysics deals with knowledge-objects. These objects are therefore characterized by logical 
                                                            
13  Dallas (2000: 24; 30) seems to provide a contradictory account of Dewey’s theory on this point. 
14 I take the notion of ontological parity from Teehan (1996: 85). 
15 I take Dewey's quotation not to affirm that metaphysics is excluded from philosophy, but only to state that wisdom and metaphysics 
are the two complementary and irreducible tasks of philosophy. 
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generalities and properties. This does not mean that what is grasped through representation is only logical 
generality. On the contrary, knowledge-objects refer to what exists in all the different fashions in which what 
exists presents itself. The distinction between appearances1, 2 and 3 is already a metaphysical organization of 
what exists in its general trait. The threefold distinction of the appearing X is somehow a formal and highly 
general classification of what exists. The considerations developed about the notion of substance are again a 
formal and general characterization of what exists. Third, the distinction among appearance1, 2 and 3 and the 
notion of indexical residuum in every “object” shows that the same indexical existent can be developed into 
different objects: either the same object can acquire new properties over time through further experimentation 
and inquiry, or the same indexical existent X can be classified in different ways at the same time with no 
contradiction.   
The problem of the compatibility between the two “worlds,” the common sense objects world and the 
science objects world, is therefore a problem of compatibility between two “universes of discourse” or 
“symbols-meaning constellations.” It is already clear that since the metaphysical question is “how should we 
think about indexical existences Xs?”, the answer is: we should think about X in all the possible ways which are 
justified and warranted by experience. Different classifications of X do not stand in contrast to one another, but 
are the different classifications of the same indexical existence that are the result of different experimental 
approaches and successful inquiries in X. In presenting his metaphysical stance, Dewey claims: 
 
… the present thesis sticks to the common-sense belief that universals, relations, meanings, are of 
and about existences, not their exhaustive ingredients. The same existential events are capable of an 
infinite number of meanings. Thus an existence identified as “paper,” because the meaning uppermost 
at the moment is “something to be written upon,” has as many other explicit meanings as it has 
important consequences recognized in the various connective interactions into which it enters. Since 
possibilities of conjunction are endless, and since the consequences of any of them may at some time 
be significant, its potential meanings are endless. … And if we say that after all it is “paper” which has 
all these different meanings, we are at bottom but asserting that all the different meanings have a 
common existential reference, converging to the same event. We are virtually asserting that the 
existence whose usual standardized meaning in discourse is paper, also has a multitude of other 
meanings; we are saying in effect that its existence is not exhausted in its being paper, although paper 
is its ordinary meaning for human intercourse. (LW1: 240-241) 
 
There are at least two complementary theses contained in this quotation. (i) First, different objects can have 
the same existential reference. (ii) Second, the same existent can have endless meanings. Thesis (i) can be 
elucidated in this way: different objects can have the same existential reference at the same time if the existential 
reference is understood as possible; different objects have necessarily different existential references if existential 
reference is understood as actual. However, the unambiguous point is that the same indexical existence can be 
warrantedly developed into different objects and semantic structures with no contradiction. The existent, isolated 
and individuated at first as indexical existence, is therefore the common referent of different objects, such as the 
“paper” as “X usually used as something which can be written upon” and the “paper” as “X as displaying typical 
chemical structures and properties.”  Thesis (ii) restates what Dewey claims with regard to the meaning of any 
demonstrative term in intension. An indexical existence is potentially inexhaustible in meaning through the 
development of different objects. The common sense object and the scientific object are legitimate objects that 
refer to the same X. The fact that they display different properties does not show a problem of compatibility in 
principle. 
The inexhaustibility of the meaning in intension of an indexical existence X implies therefore the compatibility 
of different classifications of the same X. At the same time, however, Dewey admits the possibility of contextual 
“incompatibilities” between a common sense object and a scientific object. Dewey reinterprets this 
incompatibility that however takes place only at a semantic level and in isolated cases. The alleged ontological or 
metaphysical incompatibility of the two classes of objects is for Dewey the consequence of a mistake.  
Let us consider the following case. (A) “X is cold” and (B) “X has a certain type of distribution of particles.” 
(1) At the semantic level, the incompatibility between the predicate “ … is cold” and the predicate “ … has a 
certain type of distribution of particles” signifies the incapacity of finding a way to transform A into B via a 
homogeneous medium. “If the word “language” is used not just formally, but to include its content of 
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substantial meanings,” says Dewey, “the difference [between common sense objects and scientific objects] is a 
difference of language” (LW12: 82). As Dewey explains, common sense and science are two different “regulative 
schemes” (LW12: 70) in treating the same indexical references. Similarly, he explains that common sense and 
science are different approaches that develop different but complementary classes of knowledge-objects, i.e. 
different systems of symbols-meanings, which works in our experience as “regulative and normative of specific 
beliefs and judgments” (see LW12: 18-19). 
The highest achievement of modern science is that it has produced this homogeneous medium thanks to a 
purely quantitative approach to what exists and to a methodological exclusion of qualities (LW4: 103; 105; 107; 
173; 192; LW12: 71; 475-477). Different individual existents are therefore treated as “members of a 
comprehensive, homogenous, or non-qualitative system.” When this happens, the subject-matter of specialized 
inquiries “react into the latter in a way that enormously refines, expands and liberates the contents and agencies 
at the disposal of common sense” (LW12: 72). This is why it is possible to state that the same object, the cold X, 
has at the same time a specific type of distribution of particles, or even further that the cold is this typical 
distribution of particles (LW4: 108). In this case, the common reference is the common sense object, not the 
indexical existence. The common sense object identified as “paper” becomes a more complex object through 
scientific inquiries, so that from it new inferences are possible (LW12: 155). However, strictly speaking, the 
common sense object can acquire scientific properties because (i) both the common sense object and the 
scientific object refer to the same indexical existence and (ii) modern science has been able to overcome the 
semantic incompatibility by identifying a homogeneous medium that transforms common sense properties into 
scientific properties. The important point here is that the scientific articulation of the experience and knowledge 
of indexical existents according to “measured quantities” through different techniques and procedures does not 
entail that “this is the way they must be thought, the only valid way of thinking them” (LW4: 108). Its only 
implication is that objects constructed through measured quantities are the best tools for the purpose of 
“generalized, indefinitely extensive translation” (LW4: 108; see also LW4: 109) of one phenomenon to another. 
(2) At the ontological level, the incompatibility only emerges when we turn the object of scientific knowledge 
into an alleged absolutely “real” object or when common sense inquiries are taken to produce the ultimate 
knowledge of reality, often in connection with the thesis that “perception” of the macroscopic world is an 
intrinsically cognitive operation (see MW3: 159; LW4: 176; LW12: 72-73).16 This is more a “social” use of the 
results of science rather than a consequence of scientific knowledge in itself (LW12: 81-82). Taking these 
different meanings (common sense and science) to be “final” ontological commitments results either in one 
instance of the epistemological problem (what is the type of knowledge that gives as the absolute image of 
reality?) or the metaphysical problem (how is it possible that X is at the same time a qualitative object and an 
object of physics?). If we avoid the fallacy perpetuated by the Greeks and by Newton, of taking a knowledge-
object as the representation of reality in its ultimate or most fundamental nature, the ontological problem 
disappears and what remains is only the semantic problem, which is contextual and limited to specific cases. The 
problem of the compatibility lies between two images of the world or two universes of discourse (LW12: 240-
242). At the ontological level, both objects can be real at the same time, as they are different warranted 
classifications of the same X. What changes is the “kind,” the predicate attributed to X, the classification. The 
predicate A “… is cold” and the predicate B “… has a certain distribution of particles” are the result of two 
different “reals of experience” (MW3: 159) or “doings” (LW4: 191; LW14: 28) or “manifestations” (LW1: 27) of 
the same piece of “nature” X. A, as a property of X which results from the sentiency of a human organism, 
refers to a “natural” or “cosmic” event in the same way that B describes a natural event (LW1: 204). Dewey 
writes that 
 
… qualities characteristic of sentiency are qualities of cosmic events. Only because they are such, is 
it possible to establish the one to one correspondence which natural science does establish between 
series of numbers and spatial positions on one hand and the series and spectra of sensory qualities on 
the other. The notion that the universe is split into two separate and disconnected realms of existence, 
one psychical and the other physical, and then that these two realms of being, in spite of their total 
                                                            
16 On the contrary, daily perception becomes cognitive within processes of inquiry in order to keep our activity going, so that the 
“objects” discriminated in daily perception are not the ultimate reality but are settled meanings, habitual and warranted inferences 
relative to the recurrent “problems” of our daily experience. 
 141  
disjunction, specifically and minutely correspond to each other – as a serial order of numbered 
vibrations corresponds to the immediately felt qualities of vision of the prismatic spectrum – presents 
the acme of incredibility. The one-to-one agreement is intelligible only as a correspondence of 
properties and relations in one and the same world which is first taken upon a narrower and more 
external level of interaction, and then upon a more inclusive and intimate level. (LW1: 204-205) 
 
The “one and the same world” is identifiable as an indexical existence or as an indexical residuum. Both A 
and B are potentialities of the same X actualized through different types of inquiries and established in 
predicate/possibilities. Do A and B describe the same phenomenon? The answer depends on the notion of 
phenomenon. If “phenomenon” means the same X, the same indexical existence or indexical residuum 
(appearance1), it is possible to say that A and B describe the same phenomenon. If “phenomenon” means one of 
the two “objects” (appearance2), A and B describe different phenomena. The metaphysical problem (what is real 
in the sense of how we should think about reality) does not include the problem of the incompatibility of two 
different images of the world. Similarly, it does not pursue the task of establishing which is the only image 
adequate to the world. As a consequence, the genuine metaphysical problem concerns the truth or falsity of our 
different beliefs about X, that is, the truth or falsity of the specific modalities of predication about X. In other 
words, what constitutes a problem is not that A and B are more than one predicate, but that A and B can actually 
be incorrect predications. Intellectual, moral, esthetic and broadly speaking physical properties of an X are all 
doings of nature emerging from X in different fields of interaction and in relation to different methods of study. 
The same X can constitute different “problems” and ask for different inquiries, solutions, and classifications 
(LW12: 71; 82; see also LW1: 13-14). 
The thesis regarding the inexhaustibility of the meaning of a demonstrative term in intension is 
complementary to the “technological” and “constructive” conception of knowledge developed by Dewey (see 
also LW4: 168; 195; 476-477; LW15: 88). According to him, a naturalized understanding of inquiry must (i) reject 
the thesis of the archetypal status of the “antecedent” reality and (ii) realize, as experimental science has brought 
to light, that the object of knowledge is always the result of interaction (perceptual and more broadly 
operational). This interaction lies between organic or extra-organic tools on the one side and environing 
conditions on the other, so that both the indexical existent and the object of knowledge are always the product 
of operations of interaction and manipulation. E.g., the indexical existent X would not be actually “red” outside 
the concrete interaction with a human organism, and similarly X would not become the knowledge-object “red 
X” without human experimentation, inquiry and final judgment. What is experienced and known is never an 
antecedent reality, but the result of a present interaction. Dewey says: 
 
the true object of knowledge resides in the consequences of direct action. When we take this point 
of view, if only by way of a hypothesis, the perplexities and difficulties of which we have been 
speaking vanish. For on this basis there will be as many kinds of known objects as there are kinds of 
effectively conducted operations of inquiry which result in the consequences intended. … For if 
consequences are the object of knowing, then an archetypal antecedent reality is not a model to which 
the conclusions of inquiry must conform. (LW4: 157; see also LW4: 172; 191; 194; LW12: 71) 
 
Once we admit that reality is constituted by networks of relations, the fact that what we experience and know 
is in part the product of our operations (that is, of the active relationship between the organisms that we are and 
environing conditions) is not a problem anymore. The “antecedent” reality is only a stage of reality at t1 
antecedent to the interaction with an organism and ontologically poorer than the same reality when it enters at t2 
the new field of interactions with the human organism (LW4: 237). In Dewey's terms, “that there is existence 
antecedent to search and discovery is of course admitted; but it is denied that as such, as other than the 
conclusion of the historical event of inquiry in its connection with other histories, it is already the object of 
knowledge” (LW1: 125). According to the theories that attribute an archetypal value and regulative function in 
inquiry to the antecedent reality, the object of experience and knowledge is the “thing previously complete in 
itself” (LW4: 171). The “thing in itself” can have two interpretations. According to the less extreme 
interpretation, the “thing in itself” is an existent that does not have the properties resulting from its relation to 
our operations. According to the more extreme interpretation, the “thing in itself” is an existent independent 
from other existents, in the sense that its relations to other existents only produce “extrinsic” properties in the 
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“thing in itself.” From Dewey's “technological” approach to knowledge it follows that a “thing in itself” of the 
first type (i) is only the antecedent reality. The belief that (i) has an archetypal ontological status and a regulative 
function in knowledge likely relies on two wrong assumptions: (1) the first assumption is that what counts in the 
definition of an existent is its intrinsic properties, while its extrinsic properties are only a by-product of its 
interactions; (2) the second assumption is that an existent is characterized also by its extrinsic properties, but the 
knowledge-relation is the only extrinsic relation which counterfeits the real nature of the object. Dewey denies 
(1) by rejecting the ontological distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties, and by claiming that every 
property is the result of the interaction of an existent with a set of conditions (LW4: 195). Consequently, he 
rejects (2) because of its inner contradiction. This contradiction lies in the fact that although (2) claims that an 
existent is structured in relation to other existents, the knowing-relation nevertheless carries a special status; this 
means that rather than actualizing further potentialities of X, this relation is taken to counterfeit the nature of the 
existent.  
According to my reading, Dewey’s further tenet is that common sense object has a semantic priority over the 
scientific object. This means that: 
 
(i) The concrete activity of the scientist starts with and goes back, at least ideally, to the world of common 
sense objects (LW1: 114-115; 205; LW4: 192-193; LW12: 71; 75; 150). The semantic priority of common sense 
objects over scientific objects is shown here in the activity of experimentation and verification. 
(ii) At a low level of abstractness, the object of science is semantically dependent on common sense objects 
(LW1: 114-115; LW4: 192; LW12: 75; 150). The semantic priority of common sense objects over scientific 
objects is shown here in the linguistic report of the activities of experimentation and verification. 
(iii) At a high level of abstractness, the object of science is a mere “conceptual” object and functions to 
transform some common sense objects into other common sense objects, or produces the occurrence of a 
common sense object (LW1: 110; 117; LW4: 175; 238; LW14: 12). Due to the instrumentality of scientific objects 
for the mutual translation and manipulation of common sense objects, one can see the semantic priority of 
common sense objects. 
 
Theses (i), (ii) and (iii) neither imply the ontological superiority of common sense objects and properties over 
scientific objects, nor the ontological superiority of scientific objects over common sense ones. Occasionally one 
finds in Dewey claims that might lead one to think that he defends the ontological superiority of the common 
sense objects over the scientific objects. Dewey writes: 
 
The problem which is supposed to exist between two tables, one that of direct perception and use 
and the other that of physics … is thus illusory. The perceived and used table is the only table, for it 
alone has both individuality of form – without which nothing can exist or be perceived – and also 
includes within itself a continuum of relations or interactions brought to a focus. (LW4: 192) 
 
The “only” object mentioned is either the object that first presents itself or eventually tests an hypothesis in 
the context of a concrete scientific activity (therefore, its priority is (i)); or it is the object referred to, at a low 
level of abstraction, by the quantitative aspects of scientific inquiry in reporting the results of scientific analysis 
(therefore, its priority is (ii)). Therefore, the right interpretation of such claims is semantic and not ontological, as 
Dewey explicitly confirms (LW14: 22). Semantic priority does not entail ontological superiority. The semantic 
priority of the common sense object is related to “ecological” reasons, not to ontological ones. 
 
 
 
3.4. Common Sense Objects, Scientific Objects and “Perception” 
 
The problem of the relation between common sense objects and scientific objects intersect with the problem 
of “perception.” Perception has to be taken in the sense of recognition or educated perception (appearance2). 
Sometimes Dewey seems to think that the divide between common sense objects and scientific objects is a 
matter of perception. This position is well exemplified in The Quest for Certainty. As we have seen, perception is a 
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borderline case of knowledge (it is inferential but it is usually an instance of acquaintance with X and not an 
inquiry of X). According to this distinction, only the common sense object, the “table,” is grasped by an act of 
perception. On the contrary, the scientific object is “conceptual,” which means that it cannot be grasped in 
perception but is the result of symbolic transformation of what is perceived (this of course does not mean that is 
wildly constructed). In this case, a scientific object, the “mass” of X, would be the result of a mathematical 
calculus and not an object of focal perception. In this sense, Dewey says, “the perceived and used” object is the 
only object, “for it alone has both individuality of form – without which nothing can exist or be perceived – and 
also includes within itself a continuum of relations or interactions brought to a focus” (LW4: 192). The scientific 
object is only a system of relations obtained through calculation and its function is only to compare qualitatively 
different perceptual objects and to enable a better control of their occurrence. 
This stance, however, presents a problem. Dewey acknowledges this when in Logic he explicitly differentiates 
his “logical” approach to the distinction between common sense objects and scientific objects from the 
“epistemological” or metaphysical” distinction between the two classes (see also LW14: 21). Dewey writes: 
 
The problem of the relation of the domain of common sense to that of science has notoriously 
taken the form of opposition of the qualitative to the non-qualitative; largely, but not exclusively, the 
quantitative. The difference has often been formulated as the difference between perceptual material 
and a system of conceptual constructions. In this form it has constituted, in recent centuries, the chief 
theme of epistemology and metaphysics. From the standpoint that controls the present discussion, 
the problem is not epistemological (save as that the word means the logical) nor is it metaphysical or 
ontological. In saying that it is logical, it is affirmed that the question at issue is that of the relation to 
each other of different kinds of problems, since the difference in the type of problem demands 
different emphases in inquiry. (LW12: 71) 
 
The problem relies in the following considerations. In what sense does the criterion of perception work in 
relation to scientific objects that are not conceptual objects, such as in the case of a molecule? It is true that it 
cannot be the object of perception through merely organic tools of perception. However, it can be perceived 
with extra-organic instruments, e.g. a microscope (LW15: 88). Moreover, even if perception is taken to mean 
only perception through organic structures there is a problem with such a criterion. Everything that becomes 
object of perception, microscopical or macroscopical, has the same qualities: for instance, it has a shape, it has a 
color, and might also have esthetic qualities (e.g., spatial order, symmetry, structure). The beauty of a molecule is 
a common sense property and results from treating the molecule from the viewpoint of common sense. It is 
clear once more that the distinction between common sense objects and scientific objects is first and foremost 
semantic or “logical” rather than ontological. The scientific object “H2O” has an indexical residuum that allows 
for further common sense inquiries in it and for the settlement of esthetic properties in it. It means treating an X 
with certain operations and therefore fixing this X as a “kind,” as the possibility of certain standardized 
operations. Operations of esthetic appreciation (an instance of common sense treatment) can be addressed to 
tables and to molecules, and similarly operations of extended convertibility (an instance of scientific treatment) 
can be addressed to tables and to molecules. 
As a consequence, “perception” (as a form of concrete operation) turns out to be the criterion for 
distinguishing an individual existent from an abstract object, not for distinguishing a common sense object from a 
scientific one. In perception, an object (both commonsensical and scientific) has an actual existential reference. 
Therefore, the compatibility between common sense objects and scientific objects is not provided by the fact 
that the common sense object is the only individual existent, grasped in an act of perception, while the scientific 
object is only conceptual. The compatibility is given by the fact that the two objects are semantically different but 
semantically and ontologically compatible, being the results of different successful inquiries in the same X and 
both understandable in an abstract sense (like when I talk about the table as a “kind,” or the molecule of water as 
a “kind”), or in an individual, existent sense, grasped in an operation or in an act of perception here and now. 
The two alleged incompatible “objects” are simply two predicates and properties (“kinds”, “types”, “substances”, 
etc.), two types of classification of the same indexical existent X. 
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3.3. Denotation, Connotation and Indexicality in Common Sense and Science 
 
The regulative commitments (of both common sense and science) play a twofold function in human 
experience.17 This twofold function is exemplified in Dewey's distinction between the “denotation” and the 
“connotation” of a term. In turn, denotation and connotation can be better understood in relation to the notion 
of indexical existence or residuum. Strictly speaking, only a concrete term denotes, while only an abstract term 
can connote (LW12: 349-351). While “denotation” refers to the singular X described and to the “properties” 
attributed de facto to it, “connotation” refers to the properties which de jure must be attributed to X in order to be 
classified as a specific kind of object. Between “denotation” and “connotation” there is therefore a logical gap, in 
the sense that a denoting term and a connoting term play a different logical function. A denoting term classifies 
an X as a specific kind, while a connoting term expresses what types sub-kinds a kind must have in order to be 
that specific kind. In Logic, Dewey criticizes the confusion, perpetuated by Mill, between “denotation” and 
“connotation” (LW12: 352-354). According to Mill, the same term is denotative and connotative at the same 
time in the following way: the term “ship” is denotative since it refers to the indefinite number of individual 
objects which are ships, while it is connotative since it expresses the meaning of ship, namely, the properties that 
an object must have in order to be considered a ship. According to Dewey, this distinction between the two uses 
of a term does not highlight the difference in logical function between the two uses of a term and does not leave 
room for attributive terms (“shipness” instead of “ship”). While the denotative use is descriptive, the connotative 
use is prescriptive. If “ship” denotes a singular of a certain kind and the traits that are de facto attributed to that 
singular, the term “ship” is performing the one and the same logical function, related the description of the 
singular. On the contrary, “when it is said that connotation determines the applicability of a set of traits to 
describe the kind, inquiry has moved into another logical dimension,” better formulated in an abstract term or 
universal. “If “connotative” means something other than descriptive, then the same term cannot have both 
denotation and connotation” (LW12: 353-354).  
As a consequence, “every denotative term is related to a corresponding or conjugate connotative term as far 
as its denotative capacity is warranted” (LW12: 354). A regulative commitment relative to X can be either applied 
to X in denotation or assessed in its warranted applicability to X in connotation. The distinction between the 
denotative and the connotative use of a term is marked by (1) the critical distance, (2) the more or less implicit act 
of assessment (of the meanings and the predication) present in the connotative use and absent in the denotative 
use and (3) the prescription of certain meanings. I take (1), (2) and (3) to be the content of the distinctively human 
“intelligent” behavior, i.e. inquiry, in which the human being faces the problematic situation “as problematic” 
(LW4: 179). In Dewey's terms, (1), (2) and (3) are not due to an original structure of the self, but to the 
development of symbols within the community of human organisms and their endorsement instead of on 
external environmental conditions (see Colapietro 1999). Critical distance is not an interruption of agency tout-
court but only a modification of the medium on which the agency is performed (on symbols and not on the 
existential conditions; see MW13: 57). The point here is that through a system of linguistic symbols the implicit 
habits that regulate our meaningful practices in the overt world can be made explicit in “formulation” (LW12: 501), 
allowing therefore for a critical distance from X, for a linguistic or conceptual appraisal of the regulative 
commitments relative to X and for the eventual prescription of them and action upon them (LW12: 62-63). The 
pure organic activity does not include this possibility, although the adjustment of “means to consequences” is a 
trait of life in general (LW12: 26). Since the symbols are socially instituted and are therefore public, the 
development of symbolism and symbolic performances essentially imply the assumption of a public, and in this 
sense “relatively general and objective,” standpoint (LW12: 50-52; see also LW12: 58-59). 
The point here is that the logical move from denotation to connotation requires a move from acquaintance to 
inquiry and reflection. As a consequence, the change in situation entails a different functioning of the indexicality 
of the existent. In denotation, the indexicality of X is minimum or latent, in connotation is latent, while in the 
reflective process that leads from denotation to connotation it is maximum. We have therefore: 
                                                            
17  I take the notion of “regulative commitments” from LW12: 24: “To engage in an inquiry is like entering into a contract. It commits 
the inquirer to observance of certain conditions.” The different formulations of these demands “make definite what is involved in a 
demand. Every demand is a request, but not every request is a postulate. For a postulate involves the assumption of responsibilities. 
The responsibilities that are assumed are stated stipulations. They involve readiness to act in certain specified ways.” 
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(i) Denotation (on the basis of certain regulative commitments) = beliefs and habits on the basis of which we 
immediately infer about X. Denotation is the use of a linguistic category in acquaintance. In this case, regulative 
commitments are applied to X and the indexicality of X is only the occasion of a new application and not of a 
consideration of whether or not the regulative commitments are justified. The function of denotation is 
displayed in many instances. As soon as we say something about an X, we display here and now our partial 
regulative commitments about X. As soon as we do something with X, we find ourselves in the same situation. 
This fact shows that there is no meta-perspective inferential context which includes all the possible meanings of 
X, not even all the meanings of X that are already available to us. In different situations, we have different types 
of regulative commitments (in a common sense situation and in a scientific situation). We “apply” these different 
commitments, in a non-deliberate (“feeling” of a qualitative whole of a situation and all the different instances of 
acquaintance) and in a deliberate way (deliberate construction of the judgment and deliberate action). It is the 
situation itself in its individuality that determines which system of regulative commitments is relevant for a 
particular case. The partiality in relation to X required by a situation does not mean that either the common 
sense object or the scientific object is absolute or an ultimate account of reality. It only implies that there are 
different possibilities of classification and re-classification of an existent due to its inexhaustible indexical nature. 
As Dewey reminds us, the common sense object determined by social practices is not less real than the object of 
physics. The classification of X is context-dependent, so that “telling the truth, telling a thing the way it is, means 
designating things in terms that observe the conventions of proper social intercourse. I do not tell the truth to 
the man about town by addressing him in the formulae of higher mathematics” (MW6: 15). The legitimate 
methodological distinction and exclusion among systems of regulative commitments remains methodological and 
does not raise a metaphysical problem of compatibility. 
 
To pass over in science the human meanings of the consequences of natural interactions is 
legitimate; indeed it is indispensable. To ascertain and state meanings in abstraction from social or 
shared situations is the only way in which the latter can be intelligently modified, extended and varied. 
Mathematical symbols have least connection with distinctively human situations and consequences; 
and the finding of such terms, free from esthetic and moral significance, is a necessary part of the 
technique. Indeed, such elimination of ulterior meanings supplies perhaps the best possible empirical 
definition of mathematical relations. … In physical science, the abstraction or liberation is complete. 
Things are defined by means of symbols that convey only their consequences with respect to one 
another. … Water still has the meaning of everyday experience when it becomes the essence H2O, or 
else H20 would be totally meaningless, a mere sound, not an intelligible name. (LW12: 150) 
 
(ii) Connotation (on the basis of certain regulative commitments) = prescription of certain regulative 
commitments. In this case, regulative commitments are not only applied but also prescribed and taken to be 
warranted. The focus is on abstract terms or universals, which are non-existential or attributive terms. Therefore, 
the indexicality of X is overlooked. The prescription included in connotation has the status more of the 
communication of the result of past inquiries than the conclusion of a present inquiry. 
 
(iii) Assessment and Inquiry = the move from (i) to (ii) requires a normative appraisal, actual or potential, of 
the regulative commitments relative to X. When the appraisal is potential, the situation is not a real inquiry. In 
the case in which the appraisal of the term is actual, the situation has become an experimental situation, an 
inquiry. The indexicality of X is the focal center of attention of new operations of inquiry, experimentation and 
verification.   
 
 
 
4. “Where Is the Point of Truth?”. Truth, Operational Isomorphism and Indexicality 
 
Different authors have addressed Dewey’s account of truth (Bernstein 2010, Ch. 5; Burke 1994: 63; 236-245; 
Browning 1998: 89; Dicker 1972: 158-159; Dicker 1973: 213-217; Ezorsky 1963; Kannegiesser 1977: 15-18; 
Kaufman 1959: 826-827; 835; Gale 2006: 87-88; Garrison 2005: 820; Hildebrand 2003: 31-32; 830; Lu 1970: 68; 
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Margolis 1977: 125-129; 132; McDermid 2006: 3460; 156; McDermott 1970: 42; Shook 2003: 339; Sleeper 1986: 
21; 157; 161; Tiles 1988: 104-135).18 However, none of them has stressed the twofold role that the notion of 
index plays in Dewey's account of truth.19 The notion of truth has been traditionally understood in the light of 
the notion of “correspondence.”20 Dewey does not aim to deny the fruitfulness of this approach, but he deepens 
the understanding of the notion of correspondence between “thought” and “existence” by reinterpreting it 
pragmatically (MW6: 5; LW14: 179; LW12: 462). For Dewey, as for Aristotle (but also Peirce and Ramsey), 
“truth” stands for a relation between knowledge and existences, so that a judgment of some sort about 
existences is required in order to introduce the notions of “truth” and “falsity.” I believe that all the pragmatists 
take the notion of “truth” to be an epistemic one (see Pihlström 2004: 52). Mere existences apart from human 
judgment are what they are, “events” to which the notion of truth and falsity do not apply (MW6: 6; 33).  
In this section I aim to defend three claims relative to Dewey's theory of truth which have been overlooked 
by the scholarship, namely, (1) that the notion of correspondence pragmatistically reinterpreted is what I call 
operational isomorphism, (2) that the relation of correspondence or operational isomorphism requires an actual 
existential reference between knowledge and reality and that, as a consequence, (3) the analogatum princeps of 
the notion of truth is a concrete action performed on existential conditions. This means that truth as operational 
isomorphism implies an indexical reference. In MW6: 22 Dewey asks the question: “Where is the point of 
truth?”. It is my claim that the point of truth is an actual operational isomorphism. 
(1) In Dewey's writings it is possible to find at least two types of “isomorphism,” which I will call abstract 
isomorphism and concrete isomorphism. Before addressing these two notions, it is important to remember in 
which context Dewey uses the notion of isomorphism and in relation to what. I will deal at length in Chapter 5 
what a proposition is in Dewey’s terms. Dewey introduces the notion of isomorphism when he describes the 
similarity in function of maps and propositions (Garrison 2005). Both maps and propositions represent some 
existential conditions and some objects, but this representational property is not instrumental to the function of 
copying or reduplicating them in knowledge, but to the function of guiding men's action in an appropriate way 
(MW6: 45-46; LW4: 110). The isomorphism between linguistic expressions (or maps) and the existential factors 
these propositions are about is a matter of correspondence in action. 
 
(i) Abstract isomorphism between propositional knowledge and “kinds” or abstract universals. 
Abstract isomorphism can concern linguistic expressions that are mere pieces of communication or linguistic 
expressions which are genuine propositions in an inquiry. A linguistic expression P can be interpreted in Dewey's 
terms both as a piece of linguistic communication and as a proposition. The difference does not rely on the 
linguistic formulation of P, but on its logical function. P can be the simple linguistic communication of the result 
of past inquiries, or can be the formulation of a proposition within a process of inquiry. In the first case, the 
piece of communication does not have intellectual power, since it is not a factor within an inquiry, it is the result 
of past inquiries and the “memorandum” for further guidance (MW6: 38). In both cases, “truth” has a derivate 
and secondary meaning. In relation to the first case, a piece of communication can be said true only as a 
consequence of past instances of inquiry in which the linguistic content now reported in communication has 
been propositionally elaborated and actually tested. In relation to the second case, a proposition can be said true, 
strictly speaking, only in relation to its “validity” in producing a final judgment that will stand the proof of final 
experimentation. Abstract isomorphism in relation to proposition coincides with the warranted implication 
among propositions. It corresponds to rational discourse and employs propositions with only potential 
existential references.  It is lacking of intellectual power, since it is only the product of past true judgment and 
the “memorandum” for further activities. A proposition has intellectual power since it is a component of an 
inquiry but it is not “true” in itself. As such, it is only hypothetical (MW6: 38; LW12: 264-265). It is a “proposal” 
                                                            
18  For a broader contextualization of the problem, see in particular Kunne (2003: 172). 
19  Mayorga (2012: 112-118) sketches a comparison between Peirce’s and Dewey’s conception of truth. Although I agree that Dewey has 
a (dangerous?) penchant to nominalism, I believe that his account of “existence” and “verification” van be read as a theory close to 
Peirce’s than it has been thought. 
20 According to Dewey, the notion of “truth” has been traditionally explained as “correspondence” or “coherence.” Realists have 
stressed the former notion, while idealists the latter. Although Dewey highlights the positive insights of the notion of coherence in 
truth, he stresses much more the aspect of correspondence. I will focus on this aspect, since it is the most important for a 
reconstruction of a Deweyan theory of truth. 
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of a judgment that could be true but that will not be true until it is tested in an overt action.  
 
… when we are told that the essence of truth is correspondence of an idea (a meaning or 
judgment) with fact, that for example my idea that my friend is in Constantinople is true if he is really 
there, our first inclination may be to exclaim: A Danial come to judgment! But our second, is to note 
that either I am already sure that he is there, in which case the “judgment” is no judgment, but a mere 
putting in words of an established fact, (involving no more “mind” than it is necessary to control the 
organs of speech). Or else I do not know that he is there, and hence to assert as a truth that he is 
there, is a piece of presumption on my part, indicative, not of “truth,” but of my dogmatic attitude 
toward truth. If there is a proposition, intellectually speaking, then the fact is that I have reason to infer 
that he is there, and that I believe that that inference would be borne out if certain further inquiries 
were undertaken, there being legitimate doubt pending their execution. (MW6: 37; see also MW6:43) 
 
Abstract isomorphism is practical and has the nature of a warranted practice of implication among 
propositions relying on the basis of meanings fixed through past inquiries. In both cases, the content of what is 
said true (piece of communication or proposition) is the linguistic articulation of beliefs which have been 
produced in the past through experience and inquiries and their value depends both on the validity of those past 
inquiries or on the validity of further tests. In short, “origin, content, and value” of abstract isomorphism is not 
abstract but relies on a concrete operational isomorphism (MW6: 4).  
 
(ii) Concrete isomorphism between judgment and “this kind” or concrete universal. 
This is the type of isomorphism that I call operational isomorphism and that describes Dewey's pragmatistic 
notion of truth. In this case, the “kind” dealt with has an actual existential reference. It is a concrete X actually 
“perceived” as this or that object or acted upon.  Concrete isomorphism coincides with a “fulfilled” or 
“successful” concrete operation (MW6: 42; 46; LW14:13; 54-57; 59; 169-170; 182-183; LW12:80). “Fulfilled” has 
a logical meaning. It refers to an operation in which the consequences foreseen in deliberation are not falsified by 
the execution. It is a “working hypothesis in action” (LW8: 172; see also MW6: 9). “The success of the meaning 
or judgment in performing this office (which of course is a matter in actu) constitutes the worth or truth of the 
meaning or judgment” (MW6: 46). The existential conditions isolated in the subject of the judgment at t1 and 
acted upon at t2 morphologically coincide with the content of a concrete operation, formulated in the predicate 
of the judgment at t1 and actually performed at t2. In this second case, isomorphism is actualized in a concrete 
operation on environing conditions and not in imagination or in merely symbolic activity. In rational discourse, 
“forms” are always general kinds, or general possibilities of action on X, and never forms instantiated here and 
now. Concrete isomorphism is also practical, as rational discourse is, but in a more fundamental way. It has the 
nature of a “fulfilled” concrete operation and has an existential reference. In this second case, “correspondence” 
has the nature of an operational isomorphism, where “operational” = (relation) localized in concrete, overt 
action, and “isomorphism” = relation in which the same form is functioning. It should be clear that according to 
Dewey (i) is originally grounded in (ii). 
Truth interpreted as operational isomorphism has the advantage of highlighting the essential role of human 
purposes and interests in constructing and testing a judgment, avoiding the mistake of presupposing a ready-
made set of substances and a ready-made set of beliefs and a correspondent “ready-made static property” 
between them (MW6: 8). In order to establish the truth or falsity of our belief in a substance, the substance has 
to be shaped through inquiry and judgment and tested in action. At the same time, however, operational 
isomorphism requires that human judgment “works” in “cooperation with the environmental factors,” and that 
the “coadaptation” of judgment and environmental factors is both ““correspondence” and “satisfaction” (MW6: 
10). Dewey also uses the metaphor of the “interlocking” of the ideal factors and extra-ideal factors (MW6: 6; 7). 
In this interlocking, the ideal, linguistic and purposeful factors coincide operationally with “independent factors” 
(MW6: 45) and the “other efficient conditions involved,” where “independent” and “other” mean not instituted 
by man's action, even though selected and met in it. It is now possible to clarify Dewey's objections against the 
notion of correspondence understood in a non-pragmatistic way. According to Dewey: (a) a non-pragmatistic 
notion of correspondence is an “ultimate and analyzable mystery,” since it does not explain in what the 
correspondence consists in and what its origin is (MW6: 8). Theories that do not tie together “organically” the 
notion of truth and the notion of verification face therefore a serious dead-end. (b) A non-pragmatistic notion of 
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correspondence can be only “defined in iteration” (MW6: 5), in the sense that pieces of communication are said 
true only in relation to other pieces of communication, and propositions are said true only in relation to other 
propositions. To say that a piece of communication or a proposition represents “a thing as it really is” requires a 
“third medium” in which the piece of communication or the proposition and the reality in itself are 
contemplated in their adequacy and coincidence (MW6: 34-35). However, in the case of a non-pragmatistic view 
of correspondence, this third medium can only be a further piece of communication or a further proposition, ad 
infinitum. In this case, we remain in the field of abstract isomorphism. When we say that “P” is true (in L) = P, we 
are still dealing with linguistic symbols. This account of truth is a highly abstract account of truth that relies in 
the best case on symbols-meanings developed in past inquiries. However, the existential reference can be here 
only potential. Only a concrete action makes the existential reference actual and localizes the “truth” relation in 
an operational isomorphism between interlocking ideal factor and extra-ideal factors. 
(2) At the same time, the relation of operational isomorphism requires an actual existential reference between 
knowledge and reality. This point is well clarified by Dewey's claims about the knowledge of the past (MW6: 7; 
41-42; 43; MW13: 41; 46; LW12: 223; 231). Although Dewey's terminology is sometimes contradictory (see e.g. 
MW13: 49), it is clear that his stance is that while the content of a proposition can be about past existents, its 
existential reference is always present (actual operational isomorphism in the present) or future (possible 
operational isomorphism in the future). Dewey states that “the representation has intrinsically and necessarily 
reference to a future” (MW6: 41-42). A proposition can be about past existents and is always generated by past 
existents, but its actual existential reference is always present or future. The role of “antecedent” existents for a 
belief and the propositions that spring from it is clear (LW4: 110): they are the genetical causes of the formation 
of a belief and can be the content of it, what the belief is about. “Ideas … being connected with operations to be 
performed … are tested by the consequences of these operations, not by what exists prior to them” (LW4: 133). 
Julius Caesar existent at t1 in the past is the existent antecedent that produced the belief in his existence and that 
is the “content” of my present belief in his existence in the past. However, the problem of the existential 
reference of a belief comes into play when the issue is not the past fact generating my belief but the problem of 
the “truth” of my belief in the light of the Deweyan understanding of the notion of correspondence. One instant 
after the happening of X as a fact, Julius Caesar existing at t1, that fact is gone and the correspondence with that 
fact has to be found in something that it is continuous about that fact now or in the future, or, as Dewey says, in 
one of its present or future “consequences.” The future existential reference of a belief about the past is one of 
these “consequences” at t2 of the existing fact at t1 and becomes important if we want to make sense of the 
notion of correspondence as actual correspondence. To say “the correspondence exists” even though we do not 
find it, so that it is existent independently from the knower and antecedently to its verification is to take the 
problem of truth independently from the status of a belief, actual or possible. This gives the chance to reflect on 
the different meanings that the notion “true” or “truth” have. We can say that a belief is “true” because that 
belief has been verified in the past. In this case, according to Dewey's understanding, the statement that 
expresses this belief is not a proposition in its logical or cognitive sense, but is more a piece of linguistic 
communication of the result of past inquiries. In this case, the predication of “truth” is parasitic of past inquiries 
and verifications and somehow taken for granted. In its most pregnant sense, then, “true” is the predicate of a 
belief or judgment that results at the end of an inquiry. In this case, the conclusion of the inquiry is the concrete 
enactment upon the proposition elaborated through the previous stages of the inquiry, so that we have again that 
the “true” proposition, belief or judgment is the “ideational” content of this act in its operational isomorphic 
correspondence with extra-ideal factor. 
Once we accept that the problem of truth is not independent from the problem of a belief, we are not far 
from Dewey's understanding of truth. As I will show in the next section, the problem of the “truth” becomes the 
problem of the actual verification or the possible verifiability, if all the necessary conditions C occurred, of a 
belief. In this sense, the belief in the past existence of Julius Caesar is “true” because it gives course to actions 
which fit extra-ideal factors in the present (actual operational isomorphism, verification in the present) or in the 
future (possible operational isomorphism, verification in the future), or which would fit extra-ideal factors in the 
present and in the future if all the necessary conditions C would have occurred. 
(3) If “truth” is first and foremost a matter of operational isomorphism between an ideational factor, or 
belief, in action and extra-ideational conditions, “truth” would apply first and foremost not to the linguistic 
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formulations of such beliefs, but to actions which spring from these beliefs understood as habits of behavior 
(LW12: 128). These habits would be habits of behavior that allow interaction with environing conditions in 
which “problematic” situations do not occur and their indexical residuum can be somehow overlooked. In this 
sense, the first analogatum of the notion of truth, the analogatum princeps, is the concrete action as an operational 
isomorphism between ideal and extra-ideal factors. The second analogatum is the belief as a habit of action that is 
capable of producing actions in which operational isomorphism is actualized. The linguistic formulation of a 
belief or a habit of action is only the third analogatum of the notion of truth, since it only performs the function of 
“communicating” the result of past experiences in which concrete actions have proved to be cases of operational 
isomorphism, or expressing and articulating linguistically the content of a habit. In this sense, “ideas” are only 
“surrogates” of the modes of response that they try to articulate linguistically (MW6:3). In an article devoted to 
“Peirce's Theory of Signs, Thought, and Meaning” (LW15:  148-149), Dewey makes clear that the semeiotic 
nature of the concrete action that localizes and actualizes the operational isomorphism is the nature of an 
indexical. In a passage, Dewey writes: 
 
It is not part of the present paper to go into detail about the way in which linguistic signs interlock 
with indexical signs. It suffices to say that such interpretation takes place and that by and through it 
linguistic signs get that reference to and connection with “things” which by themselves they lack. It is 
also true to say that our scientific knowledge … and those portions of “common sense” knowledge 
which possess generality along with existential reference represent an interlocking of linguistic with 
non-linguistic modes of behavior. (LW15: 148-149) 
 
Dewey repeats here the metaphor of the “interlocking” of ideal and extra-ideal factors and clarifies the fact 
that the “point” in which the correspondence occurs is in the context of an actual existential reference. The 
notion of correspondence pragmatistically intended substitutes the idea of the “brute fact” (mere existences) 
with the notion of “ideas and hypotheses” (mere symbols) verified on given existential conditions (indexical 
existences), (e.g. LW14: 173). 
A last point relates to the notion of “truth-making.” In Dewey's terms, this notion describes the relation 
between the ideal and extra-ideal factors in their operational isomorphism. “Truth-maker” (or “sufficient 
verifier,” LW14: 178) means literally the property of making something true. It is not a causal relation, but a 
mutual operational isomorphism between a judgment with an actual existential reference and existential 
conditions shaped and acted upon in a certain way. It is usually understood as something in virtue of which 
something else is true. According to Dewey's approach, the notion of “truth-maker” is functional and 
perspectival in relation to its reference. This means in particular that, since “truth” in its full realization is the 
relation of operational isomorphism, the non-ideational factor is as much a truth-maker for the ideational one as 
the ideational one is a truth-maker for the non-ideational one. On the one hand, without the isomorphic 
operational coincidence with the non-ideational truth-maker, the ideational factor remains a hypothesis of 
verification, a mere potentiality of truth or a fancy in the worst cases. As a consequence, “true” is the logical 
form or property that “accrues” to (1) judgment (analogatum princeps), (2) beliefs as habits of behavior that 
result from that judgment (second analogatum), and (3) statements which articulate linguistically these beliefs 
(third analogatum). On the other hand, “reason” and “thought” have a “creative, constructive function” in 
relation to what exists previously to human intelligence (LW2: 13). “Nature … supplies potential material for 
embodiment of ideals. Nature … is idealizable” (LW4: 241) through deliberate agency. I take this to be the 
fundamental claim of A Common Faith (LW9: 3-58). Without the human ideation and isomorphic operational 
coincidence with the ideational truth-maker, the non-ideational factors remains a simple event, which is 
metaphysically what it is but which does not have that property of being actualized as “true” in an operation and 
being shaped and developed into “substances”. The “truth property” does not belong to an “idea” or to the 
“things” in advance to verification, but at most the “property of ability to work – an ability revealed by its actual 
working” (MW6: 8; see also MW6: 11; 38-39; 65; 68; LW4: 168; LW2: 303). 
I have already mentioned what is Dewey objection to the different, traditional forms of foundationalism. It is 
possible to further this insight in relation to the notion of truth. According to the thesis of operational 
isomorphism, the ground of true knowledge is not “reality” in itself, but a settled, working operation guided by 
“ideas.” A traditional foundationalist approach to the notion of reality can only lead to a conception of a 
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fundamental reality as ready-made structures (presentative reality), or sense-data as immediate and non-doxastic 
ground of knowledge (empiricism), or rational principles (rationalism). 
 
 
 
4.1. Dewey and Peirce on Truth, Verification and Counterfactuals 
 
“Truth” as operational isomorphism is localized and actualized in a concrete successful operation between an 
“idea” and non-controlled existential conditions. The successful operation is the analogatum princeps of the notion 
of “truth”. The operation or judgment has a propositional content, elaborated through inquiry and eventually 
stated or acted upon. This shows that for Dewey the mistake is not in saying that a proposition is true or that a 
proposition is isomorphic to what it represents, but in denying that this isomorphism between a proposition and 
the represented state of affairs is realized not in discourse but in a concrete action, namely, when a proposition is 
actually giving intelligible content and direction to an operation on existent conditions. 
A further element of Dewey's theory of truth relies in the fact that Dewey rejects the intellectualistic theories 
that do not tie together organically the notion of “truth” and the procedures of “verification” (MW6: 7-8). As I 
have shown, Peirce's theory of truth contemplates the same mutual relation between “truth” and “verification.” 
Peirce's understanding of the notion of “truth” at its third, pragmatistic level of clarity can be exemplified in the 
following biconditional: 
 
Peirce: 
B is true ↔ B is a belief that would be indefeasibly held by a rational inquirer if all the necessary conditions C 
occurred. 
 
Peirce is not saying that truth is the content of our present or future beliefs, but that the problem of truth 
which is not put in relation with a possible or an actual beliefs is just nonsense. This claim is linked to what 
Peirce says when he claims that the conception of a piece of reality that is not intelligible in principle is a 
contradiction.21 In a certain sense, this is the same move Ramsey makes when he says that beyond the problem 
of beliefs there is no problem of truth. According to this definition, a belief can be hypothesized and said to be 
true even if nobody will never discover it, in the sense that it is the belief that rational inquiries would have 
developed if all the necessary conditions C had occurred. As a matter of fact, there are conditions of C which will 
never occur and which will never allow the possibility of developing true beliefs. As a consequence, the “Minima 
Trivialia Objection” misses this point of Peirce's mature theory of truth.22 
Is Dewey's theory of truth dependent only on the actual processes of verification? Sometimes, it seems that 
Dewey is arguing for a strong link between actual verification and truth: 
 
… to be a truth means to have been verified by use under test conditions. (MW6: 46)   
 
Therefore: 
 
Dewey (1): 
B is true ↔ B is a belief that can be actually verified in its operational isomorphism with existential 
conditions, in this moment or in an indefinite moment in the future. 
 
                                                            
21 See Kunne (2003: 393-399) on Peirce's theory of truth. Kunne defines Peirce's theory of truth “alethic anti-realism.” This definition 
cannot be accepted insofar as it gives for granted what realism is, without discussing Peirce's semeiotic and metaphysics which are, on 
the contrary, a strenuous articulation of a non-constructivist stance. An extremely interesting although problematical discussion of 
Peirce’s account of truth is Price 2010. Without being able to discuss the details of Price’s interpretation (which shares with 
pragmatism its alleged anti-metaphysical account of truth but rejects its definitory task and alleged reduction to justification), it seems 
to me that Price misses the subjunctive-conditional nature of Peirce’s formulation of the meaning of truth. 
22 See Kunne (2003: 396). 
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The existential conditions here referred to are what Dewey calls sometimes extra-ideal factors (MW6: 3). The 
operational isomorphism is between “ideal” or “mental” factors and extra-ideal factors. This is a possible 
interpretation of what Dewey implies in the quotation above. (In favor of this interpretation, see MW6: 7; MW6: 
20; MW6: 28; MW6: 46-47; MW6: 56; MW13: 42-43; LW12: 17). In this case, the British objection would work. 
Something “real” would be excluded in principle by the field of truth because of historical circumstances. Even 
admitting that singular propositions about “characteristics” and “properties” could be verified, what about 
particular propositions about “qualities” (LW12: 291-291)? Nevertheless, “reality” would still be a bare existence 
or event, independent in itself from the attempts of true classification performed by men. 
However, this is not the only possible interpretation of Dewey's theory of truth, and probably not the most 
correct and comprehensive. In fact, it is also possible to interpret Dewey's claims as he is saying that a true belief 
is a belief that would have been successfully actualized in a moment of time in an isomorphic operational 
coincidence with an extra-ideal reality if all the necessary conditions had occurred. The definition or description 
of “truth” as the “warranted assertibility” of a belief instead of the warranted assertion as a matter of fact of a 
belief seems to entitle us to think that Dewey would accept the counterfactual. If Dewey accepts the 
counterfactual, his definition of truth would then be: 
 
Dewey (2): 
B is true ↔ X is a belief that could be actually verified in its operational isomorphism with existential 
conditions, in this moment or in an indefinite moment in the future, if all the necessary conditions C occurred. 
 
This interpretation is supported by the following passages, LW2: 11; LW14: 56; LW15: 124. However, further 
claims not directly related to the problem of truth help to support interpretation (2). In MW6: 4 Dewey makes 
clear that the extra-ideal factors to which knowledge should conform, sometimes referred to as “transcendence,” 
can be interpreted in two different ways: first, transcendence can mean the “unexperienceable, unknowable, 
“things in themselves”” (MW6: 4); second, transcendence can mean either something that is actually 
experienced, or something that could be experienced. The pragmatistic approach to reality excludes the first 
possibility and embraces the second. If this is the case, then Dewey's theory of truth claims at least that extra-
ideal conditions, whether they are actually experienced or not, are the conditions to which our belief must 
conform in order to be true beliefs and to which our beliefs could conform if all the necessary conditions C have 
occurred. Two further statements are noteworthy. In these statements, Dewey relates his notion (1) of truth to 
the “denotative” meaning of truth. He writes: “to science, truth denotes verified beliefs, propositions that have 
emerged from a certain procedure of inquiry and testing” (MW6: 28). In a different passage, he adds that “truth, 
denotatively taken as the logician say, designate those beliefs which have been accepted (and, indeed, more or 
less formed) because of a certain critical process of testing: so many truths, so many verifications” (MW6: 56). 
What Dewey is saying here is that “truth” understood as “true beliefs” denotes all the beliefs that have been 
verified so far and are justified. All these beliefs could be falsified in the future, even though the possibility of 
being falsified does not entail the necessity that they will be falsified in the future. At the same time, however, 
truth, as the sum of all the possible objects in which an indexical existents X can be articulated, is indefinitely 
broader than the beliefs which have been verified so far or that will be verified in the future. The true beliefs 
relative to an indexical existence are “inexhaustible” in their meaning in intention. Therefore, the meaning of 
truth in intention covers not only the beliefs that have been verified so far or will be verified in the future, but 
also all the beliefs that could be verified if all the conditions C occurred. In LW14: 56, Dewey affirms that in his 
theory of truth there is a distinction between “validity” and “truth.” “Truth” is not what is verified but what 
would be verified and indefinitely verifiable in the “continuity of inquiry.”  
All these clues lead us to think that Dewey would accept the counterfactual definition of the notion of truth. 
In this case, the Minima Trivialia Objection does not work and Dewey's stance is closer to Peirce's mature theory 
of truth than it has been thought.23  
                                                            
23  Dewey’s references to Peirce on this topic seem to offer some evidence for my interpretation, LW12: 343 footnote; LW15: 148-149. 
The pragmatist scholarship has dwelt with the historical and theoretical problem of figuring out whether the classical pragmatists 
shared a common view on truth. In a remarkable passage, Pihlström (2004: 30-31) writes: “On of the points where James has been 
taken to have distorted Peirce’s pragmatism is the theory of truth. … Peirce mentions James’s doctrine of the “mutability of truth” as 
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If this interpretation is correct, Peirce unpacked stance on truth would be: 
 
(i) B is true ↔  B is a belief that would be indefeasibly held by a rational inquirer if all the necessary conditions 
C occurred. 
(ii) indefeasibility is the property of a belief that would not be falsified in any of its verifications and 
applications. 
(iii) if such an indefeasible belief had ever been obtained by a rational inquirer, it would have never been 
falsified by any of its verifications and applications. Using Dewey's jargon, it would be actualized, in this moment 
or in an indefinite moment in the future (whenever the verification takes place), in an isomorphic operational 
coincidence of “ideal” or “mental” factors and extra-ideal factors (MW6: 3). In this case, Dewey's formulation 
only unpacks what Peirce would claim in (iii). 
 
On the other hand, Dewey's unpacked stance on truth would be: 
 
(i) B is true ↔ B is a belief that could be actually verified in its isomorphic operational correspondence with 
an external reality, in this moment or in an indefinite moment in the future, if all the necessary conditions C 
occurred. 
(ii) if B is a such a belief that could be verified now and then, it is a belief that would not be falsified neither 
now nor then (see 8). In Peirce's jargon, it is an “indefeasible” belief.  
(iii) if such a unlimitedly verifiable belief had ever been obtained by a rational inquirer, it would be actualized, 
in this moment and in an indefinite moment in the future (whenever the verification takes place), in an 
isomorphic operational coincidence with an external reality. 
 
One final problem is to understand the “field” in which according to Dewey the extra-ideal factors on which 
propositions are tested plays its role. In the case of Peirce, it is clear that this field is “experience” in its broad 
meaning and includes different dimensions (physical existences, mathematical imagination, moral desire etc.). 
Dewey agrees implicitly with this idea of experience, when he claims that “existence is existence and facts about 
it are stubborn” (LW12: 265). However, his views about the breadth of experience, or of the levels at which the 
operational isomorphism can be realized, is less clear. I have shown in Ch.4 Dewey conception of ethics and 
moral judgment. It is not the place here to develop Dewey's understanding of mathematics. Some reflections are 
however necessary here. In MW6: 67, he claims that “no truth of mathematics is true as long as it is only a 
mathematical truth.” Dewey states that mathematics does not have “existential reference,” but does not say 
which is the experiential ground on which mathematical statements are verified (LW15: 148). In some passages, 
it is only the rules of symbolic operations and the conditions of satisfaction of mutual transformability among 
symbols that determine the value of mathematical statement (LW1: 223; LW4: 123; LW12:352). In other 
passages, he seems to state that only the link between “mathematical ideas” and “acts performed” are ultimately 
capable of accounting for the origin and the value of mathematical propositions (LW4: 124). In this sense, only 
the applications of mathematics through experimental sciences would be the final test its statement. The 
ambiguity relies in the interpretation of the status of the “act performed”. In a crucial passage in LW4: 128, 
Dewey claims that mathematical ideas are designations of possible operations which are first and foremost 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
one of the “seeds of death” with which his original pragmatism became infected in the hands of later pragmatists (CP 6.485, 1908). 
Yet the pragmatist theory of truth is, according to Haack (1976: 236, 247), a “cosmopolitan” theory, containing both correspondence 
and coherence elements and receiving different emphases in different authors. It need not be a rival of the correspondence theory, 
but it is meaningful to say that there is one single pragmatist theory, differently developed by Peirce, James, Dewey, and others. 
Hookway (2000: 82, 89) also notes that James’s theory of truth, instead of competing with the competing with the correspondence 
theory, was designed to elucidate what agreement with reality means, and so, though differently, was Peirce’s.” Far from being a 
settled answer to the pragmatist account of truth, Pihlström’s following remarks still stress some radical differences between Peirce 
and Dewey on truth: “One of the major differences between Peirce’s and Dewey’s conceptions of inquiry is related to their accounts 
of truth. … Dewey (like James) was more idealistically or constructivistically oriented than Peirce in his quite explicit view that the 
actions of inquirers constitute the objects of knowledge instead of being answerable to pre-existing real things (cf. Dewey 1929; see 
Shook 2000).” I tend to see a greater continuity between Peirce’s and Dewey’s views than Pihlström does. 
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symbolic operations with respect to one another and their test is not found in “performance with respect to 
existence,” but in the “compossibility” or “non-incompatibility” of symbolic operations. However, in the 
following page, “the formal development” of symbolic logic and mathematics “is a specialized offshoot of 
material thinking” (LW4: 129). Dewey wavers between the idea that mathematical propositions, although lacking 
existential reference, can be true or false merely on the basis of symbolic transformability, and the further claim 
that only in their application and thanks to an actual existential reference to existential conditions it can be 
verified and acquire truth. 
 
 
 
4.3. Experiences, Truth and Reality 
 
It is important to draw the consequences from Dewey's account of the fact that the analogatum princeps of 
the notion of “truth” is not a proposition or a representation. Reality in its entirety cannot be represented in a 
indefinite series of sentences and goes beyond what can become a knowledge-object (MW3: 86; 159; LW1: 28). 
It is a metaphysical “dream” to think that reality and objects have “no nature save to be known.” Reality also 
includes “the universe of immediate experience, of action and passion, coming and going” (MW3: 86). One of 
the most important points in Dewey's argument against the epistemological theory of human experience is that 
“knowledge” is neither the only nor the privileged modality of experience and that reality reveals itself only or 
mainly as known. On the contrary, reality is not only the abstract object of knowledge, but an X immediately 
“had” in its individuality as known, as appreciated in its beauty, as loved, etc. (MW3: 160). The “field of 
discourse” is not absolute (LW14: 31). Reality therefore is not limited to the content of a true, indefeasible 
linguistic account of fact, in so far as the representation of an X in a sentence (“Julius Caesar was murdered at 
…”) is different from the immediate cognitive, moral, esthetic etc. experience of X. This immediate moral 
experience is not representable, or in its representation it is transformed from an immediate experience into an 
object of knowledge. Representations and different immediate experiences all refer to the same indexical existent 
X (MW6: 121-122). 
According to Dewey, the mistake of claiming that “reality” in its entirety is what is or could be represented in 
an indefinite number of sentences is due to three prejudices. These three prejudices are: 
 
(1) the “ubiquity of the knowing relation” prejudice , which states that the knowing relation is the only 
modality of human experience. On the contrary, “knowledge” is not the only modality of human experience (e.g. 
MW3: 159; MW6: 112; LW1: 27-28; LW4: 175; 232; LW14: 11-12). 
(2) The “intellectualistic” prejudice, which states that the knowing relations is the only modality of human 
experience in which reality reveals itself for what it is. On the contrary, reality reveals itself also in esthetic 
experience, moral experience, etc. (e.g. MW3: 159; LW1: 27-28; LW4: 175; 232; LW14: 10). 
(3) The “spectatorial” prejudice, which states that reality is what is given to knowledge independently from 
the knower; in this case, the knowing relation itself is not considered part of reality, and is therefore 
systematically excluded. On the contrary, the knowing relation is an event that happens as a part of the world 
and therefore needs to be represented in the belief, if the belief aims at representing reality in its totality (e.g. 
MW6: 140-141; LW4: 232; 236). This task turns out to be impossible. Also assuming that a belief at t2 can 
represent all the reality that happened earlier at t1, it is true that this belief could not represent that new part of 
reality that is the belief as a “had” moment, as a new event. This new event, can be only represented in a 
successive belief, and so on (MW3: 104-105).24 
 
The consequence is therefore that: 
1. “truth” is not first and foremost the property of propositions and representations; it is the property of 
concrete operations (analogatum princeps) and beliefs and habits (second analogatum) 
2. “reality” does not manifest itself only in cognitive representations (objects of knowledge), but also in 
                                                            
24  For a similar argument, see also MW3: 159-160. 
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esthetic, moral, cognitive immediate experiences.  
3. “truth” can be the property of moral and esthetic operations and moral and esthetic beliefs and habits even 
when these operations and habits are not linguistically articulated in statements. 
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Chapter 5 
Synthetic Agency and Contextual Moral Normativity. Dewey on Deliberation and Moral 
Judgment 
 
 
 
Mark Johnson has recently stated that “one of the most underdeveloped areas within the embodied-cognition 
paradigm is the origin and nature of value” (2006: 53). In this chapter, I reconstruct different aspects of Dewey's 
metaethics and ethics showing that the pivotal element of all of them is a conception of moral value as a 
contextual, concrete interaction between a deliberative agent and her environment. In other words, moral value 
is a purposeful experiential synthesis. It is at this concrete level of interaction that moral value finds its realization as 
an embodied function of human agency. In other words, the moral value is the function performed by a concrete 
action here and now in furthering the agent's agency in an appropriate way given her character and contextual 
demands. It is true that Dewey uses the notion of “value” to denote different realities, so that we can say e.g. that 
a habitual disposition is a moral value or that a social institution represents a set of moral values. However, I will 
show that the most important meaning of value is the concrete purposive interaction of an agent with her 
environment and that all the other meanings rely on this concept. 
In the first sections (§§ 1., 1.1., 2. and 3.), which have an introductory function, I present some basic notions 
elaborated by Dewey, like habit, value and problematic situation. In the following sections (§§ 4., 4.1., 4.2., 4.3., 
5., 6. and 8.), I give an interpretation of the different  aspects (logical, qualitative and aesthetic) of deliberation 
and moral judgment, including the continuity of human agency between deliberation and overt action in relation 
to question of normativity. In section 7., I apply the logical notion of “formativity” to Dewey's metaethics, 
developing further the role of aesthetic elements implied in his approach to human conduct. In the final sections 
(§§ 9., 9.1. and 9.2.), I focus on the problem of moral progress and ethical fallibilism, showing how ethical 
fallibilism is required granted the possibility that new values emerge in experience through new syntheses. 
 
 
 
1. Human Agency, Impulses and Habits 
 
In the previous chapter I have mentioned that Dewey uses the notions of “interaction” and “transactions” as 
the standard terms to define what (human) experience is. The implicit idea of this paradigm of experience is that 
the human being is a being in activity, both from the biological and the mental viewpoint. According to Dewey, it 
is a “monstrous” assumption that “man exists naturally in a state of rest so that he requires some external force 
to set him into action.” On the contrary, “man acts anyway, he can’t help acting. In every fundamental sense it is 
false that a man requires a motive to make him do something. To a healthy man inaction is the greatest of woes” 
(MW14: 84). 
But how should we take activity to imply? Let us start from of a vague but challenging definition given by 
Dewey: “Man is a creature of habit, not of reason nor yet of instinct” (MW14: 88). First, habits can be 
considered as the standard modes of behavior learnt by human beings through life in society. Each particular 
bundle of intertwined habits, which corresponds to the individual’s “character”, is determined is Dewey’s view 
by the cultural environment in which that individual finds herself and grows. In other words, human habits are 
mainly determined by the “mind,” that “system of beliefs, desires and purposes which are formed in the 
interaction of biological aptitudes with a social environment” (MW14: 4). As a consequence, habits are the 
subjective dispositions to agency molded on the basis of the dramatic meanings of the different Xs that 
constitute the human world (see Alexander 1993: 384). Therefore, the interactions/transactions that characterize 
human experience take this or that shape on the basis of the different habits developed by an agent. 
Second, habits are also characterized by a certain stability and tendency to reproduce certain types of activity. 
They represent an “inherent tendency to action,” or dispositions with a “projectile power”; they are “demands 
for certain kinds of action” (MW14: 21). Being specific modes of possible activity, habits also determine a 
particular sensitiveness or responsiveness to the environment. This is, roughly speaking, the idea implicit in 
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Dewey’s “The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology,” according to which a certain interaction become a stimulus 
insofar as our “character” is able to grasp it. According to Dewey, it is the habit that substitutes the Kantian 
transcendentals as “natural transcendentals” (MW3: 83-84), in which the gain is not only the continuity with the 
biological world but also the developmental and historical origin of the transcendentals. 
However, human beings are not inactive before developing social standard patterns of behavior. Human 
beings are originally endowed with “impulses” and “instincts”. As Dewey makes clear, “habits as organized 
activities are secondary and acquired, not native and original. They are outgrowth of unlearned activities which 
are part of man’s endowment at birth” (MW14: 65). What is clear, both from Human Nature and Conduct and the 
later “Does Human Nature Change?”, is that Dewey takes human impulses as largely flexible and plastic. Human 
nature is characterized by an “indefinite plasticity” (LW13: 291). The gist of his bio-cultural approach to human 
experience is that organic impulses are the raw material provided by nature for the development of human 
systems of action. In this sense, Dewey says that “the inchoate and scattered impulse of an infant do not 
coordinate into serviceable powers except through social dependencies and companionship. His impulses are 
starting points for assimilation of the knowledge and skill of the more matured beings upon whom he depends. 
They are tentacles sent out to gather that nutrition from customs which will in time render the infant capable of 
independent action” (MW14: 68). Human tradition is the intelligent “designer” through much the material of 
instinct is turned into a mature character. Impulses are in themselves “meaningless” insofar as the meaning of 
any X is given by a cluster of intended anticipated consequences of certain operations on X. Society plays the 
role of the first type of mediation through which a given behavior acquires meaning to the mind of the child. In 
other words, the first mediation and source of meaning for the development of a young mind is not the 
individual experience, but the social patters of behavior shown by the adult members of society. In “Does 
Human Nature Change?”, the discussion about what human impulses are is linked to the problem of human 
nature and its stability. Although Dewey clearly spells out that there are certain impulses and instincts which 
cannot change insofar as the human being has to remain a human being (which therefore represent for Dewey 
something like a set of conditions of identity of the human being at a very general level, see LW13: 286-287), it is 
also true that this fact does not imply the immutability of human nature. Indeed, according to Dewey, “human 
nature does change” (LW13: 286). Dewey seems to believe that since the whole reality of a human being is 
highlighted by her embodied set of habits, it is not possible to limit a description of what a human being is to her 
inborn habits. Since historically and socially developed habits are the specific configuration in which a concrete 
human nature is shaped, Dewey concludes that human nature develops over the lifetime of each individual. In 
fact, we would make a wrong inference if we believed that from human beings’ unchangeable constitution it 
follows that the “manifestation” of instincts is unchangeable as well. On the contrary, the manifestations of 
inborn “needs” change according to both “physical environmental and social custom” (LW13: 288). Also for the 
interest in the political and social implications of a theory of human nature, Peirce questions the assumptions of 
those theorists who merge together “instinct”, “needs” and “social patterns” in which the inborn needs are 
organized (LW13: 288). 
Moreover, not only the impulse can be molded, but needs to be molded. Human beings lack the teleology to a 
somehow pre-designed development of organized activities that characterize the other animals. Human 
development is in a minimal part determined by pre-established patterns that grow out of the initial impulses 
through social and environmental interaction. While animals are characterized by “original instincts which 
manifest themselves in specific acts in one-to-one correspondence” (MW13: 104), this is not the case for human 
beings. In the most part, human behavior is apprehended by a tradition of beliefs and customs not as a 
consequence of a pre-designed teleology of development but because of a previous history of human 
achievements. Moreover, human beings’ behavior compared to animals’ is virtually open to any possibility of 
learning and requires a work of molding, shaping and improving one’s habits, including possibilities unknown to 
the rest of the animals. 
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2. Causal/Casual Values, Reflective Values and Moral Principles 
 
Before tackling the nature of moral deliberation, I have to introduce a second important set of notions, which 
allow us to grasp the background of Dewey’s conception of practical reasoning. These notions are: causal/casual 
values, reflective values and moral principles. Although it is clear that a detailed of these concepts will come 
along with the next sections, it is important to stress right from the outset the fundamental distinction between 
causal/casual values and reflective values. Now, Dewey’s main point is that while we are always “valuing” 
creatures, what we ought to do is to be rationally “evaluating” agents. For Dewey, the dimension of value is 
always present in human experience, so that from a Deweyan viewpoint we could say that the first way to 
determine an ontology is to define objects as systems or cluster of values of different kinds (for instance, 
McDonald’s pragmatist metaphysics goes in this direction, see McDonald 2004).1 However, although reflection 
and thought are not needed on order to enjoy and suffer things and activities, the possibility of a convenient 
(whatever convenient may mean) enjoyment requires a reflection, or, in Dewey’s terms, inquiry. While immediate 
goods “casually occur” (EW4: 304), constant and higher goods require some sort of rational planning. For 
instance, in Logic, Dewey writes: 
 
“to value” is to enjoy and the resulting enjoyment is figuratively called a value. There is neither 
reflection nor inquiry in these cases of enjoyment as far as they occur spontaneously. … On such 
occasions to value means to weigh, appraise, estimate: to evaluate – a distinctively intellectual operation. 
Reasons and grounds one way and the other have to be sought for and formulated. (LW12: 174) 
 
In Dewey’s view, the formulation at a propositional level of what is found in experience is one of the most 
important steps in order to guarantee a convenient flouring of the human being (LW12: 19-22). However, 
inquiry is not the first step in determining what the moral good is, because there is a more immediate, non-
intellectual level in which casual or causal “values” are found in our unreflective dealings with the world 
(including ourselves, of course). The valuing or liking is “an act, if not an overt one, at least a dispositional 
tendency and direction” (LW1: 320). It is “unwitting” selection of X and implies rejection of Y. Although it is 
true that casual/causal values teach not only what human values are but also deceive, there is no easier access to 
the self-understanding of our moral constitution. As Dewey reminds us, his “experimental idealism” (EW4: 264) 
in morals is “the empirical theory of conscience is that individual has no immediate knowledge of right and 
wrong, either has to particular acts or general principles, but that such knowledge is the outgrowth of continued 
experience” (EW4: 309). 
In what follows, I describe why, how, and when reflective moral values emerge out of casual/causal values. In 
other words, I will now deal with the problem of moral deliberation. 
 
 
 
3. The Moral Deliberation in Its Logical Structure and the Moral Judgment as its Aesthetic Telos. 
First Steps 
 
Before addressing the problem of the logical structure of moral deliberation and its ultimate telos, it is 
necessary to restate briefly some important features of Dewey's concept of human experience. As we have seen, 
human experience is for Dewey a qualitative and rhythmic affair. Against empiricist psychology, like Hume's and 
Locke's, he claims that the unities of human experience are not static and isolated “impressions” and “ideas,” but 
composite wholes, in rhythmic alternation or overlapping, individualized by a characteristic overarching quality 
and developing in varying portions of time. An experiential unity is what Dewey calls “an experience” (LW10: 
42). An experiential unity is also characterized by a teleological structure, in the sense that all the factors included 
in it are directed as a whole toward a final achievement, i.e., the consummatory apex of that experience. When a 
subject is having an experience, “the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment” (LW10: 42) and the 
                                                            
1  In this sense, for Dewey the hypotheses of (1) a non-moral viewpoint in experience and (2) metaethical nihilism about values are just 
impossible. See e.g. LW4: 238. 
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successive moments of that experience “run a sense of growing meaning conserved and accumulating toward an 
end that is felt as accomplishment of a process” (LW10: 45). The tensional unity of a set of elements in a whole 
in virtue of an individualizing quality and the teleological structure towards a final consummation are the formal 
properties of every experience that can be called “an” experience. These two basic characters, using the language 
of aesthetics, constitute the formal properties of a “form” (LW10: 142). Form is therefore the formal structure of 
every unity of experience. As Dewey says, “in every integral experience there is form because there is dynamic 
organization. I call the organization dynamic because it takes time to complete it, because it is a growth.” There 
is inception, development, fulfillment” (LW10: 62). 
A moral problematic situation emerges always as impossibility in the realization of an expected teleological 
consummation. According to Dewey’s analysis, it is possible to single out at least three broad types of 
“problematic situations”: (a) the interaction can become problematic when the biological balance between the 
organism and its environment is interrupted; (b) the deliberation on what to do in a certain situation is delayed or 
made harder by the incapacity of applying abstract patterns of behavior to a concrete situation; (c) the 
deliberation on what to do in a certain situation is delayed or made harder not because of the incapacity of 
applying abstract moral schemes, but because there are different “independent factors” that function in the 
situation as legitimate but conflicting criteria for the decision (see the three factors goodness, justice and virtue in 
Three Independent Factors in Morals). However, what is important to stress here is that the overarching value quality 
of immediate experience and some of the factors implied in it are interrupted in their teleological aspiration. The 
agent is therefore faced with two options in this situation. She can either be asked by the problematic moral 
situation to find new instances of old types of means in order to realize the type of consummation prospected 
before the emergence of the problem, or she can be asked to respond to the new objective demands of the new 
situation and, maybe, to revise her moral habits and principles. In the first case, the final new experiential 
synthesis produces a new application of old moral standards. In the second case, the new experiential synthesis 
brings about a new and original moral quality (or characteristic, or property), in general, a new type of value. It 
this second case, the situation might be the beginning of the development of new general moral dispositions. If a 
particular problematic moral situation is the former or the latter depends on the nature of the objective demands 
of the situation and on the “passionate intelligence” of the agent in facing it. In both cases, however, the agent 
has to deliberately produce a new experiential synthesis through a process of moral inquiry. Also a moral 
problematic situation is an experiential unity in development: the present problem is the individualizing quality of 
the situation (the absence of perfect unity is itself the individualizing quality of the present problematic situation), 
while the resolution of the problem vaguely alluded to by the same quality is its aesthetic telos and apex. Dewey 
writes: 
 
It is not possible to divide in vital experience the practical, emotional and intellectual from one 
another and to set the properties of one over against the characteristics of the others. The emotional 
phase binds parts together into a single whole; “intellectual” simply names the fact that the experience 
the fact that the experience has meaning; “practical” indicates that the organism is interacting with 
events and objects which surround it. The most elaborate philosophic or scientific inquiry and the 
most ambitious industrial or political enterprise has, when its different ingredients constitute an 
integral experience, esthetic quality. For then its varied parts are linked to one another, and do not 
merely succeed one another. And the parts through their experienced linkage move toward a 
consummation and close, not merely to cessation in time. This consummation, moreover, does not 
wait in consciousness for the whole undertaking to be finished. It is anticipated throughout and is 
recurrently savored with special intensity. (LW10: 61) 
 
In this section, I show how the “practical, emotional and intellectual” elements of all experiences play a 
fundamental and interconnected role in that specific type of experience that is moral inquiry and deliberation. In 
particular, I show that the whole logical structure and the whole enterprise of moral deliberation aims to the 
intelligent and “grounded” actualization, or embodiment, of the value demanded by the situation. Its task is to 
produce a new intelligent synthesis in experience. It is in this embodiment that Dewey constitutes the aesthetic 
telos, that is, “consummation,”2 of the logical process of moral deliberation. 
                                                            
2 Of course, the final and complete “consummation” is partially anticipated in the intermediate steps and results of the reflective 
process of reconstruction of experience in general, and, therefore, also of the act of deliberation. See e.g. LW10: 62-63. See also LW1: 
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For Dewey, moral deliberation is a type of inquiry. It has, as any other types of inquiry, a well-defined logical 
structure and development. In this dynamic structure, moral inquiry is the reflective process emerging from a 
problematic context and is teleologically oriented to the solution of it. From a general viewpoint, Dewey is 
interested in stressing the nature of moral deliberation as inquiry because “inquiry” highlights the idea that also 
contextual moral knowledge, as any other occasion for knowledge, is potentially a matter of discovery and 
improvement, rather than a mere application of old moral standards and principles. The broad philosophical 
point implied in the idea of “moral deliberation” as moral inquiry is first of all then a conception of the moral life 
lived in experimental attitude. This entails an experimental revolution both in the attitude of the individual moral 
reasoner in facing a particular problem, and in the development of a “systematic moral theory,” since the latter is 
only a systematic and critical development of the former reflective process. In a first approximation, 
“experimental” has the somewhat vague meaning of “adventurous”  (LW10: 149). Before clarifying what this 
means in detail, it is important to stress this comprehensive approach to the issue of moral knowledge and its 
breakthrough in moral philosophy. It is usually claimed that Dewey's ethics continues the scientific approach to 
morality inaugurated by authors like Hume, Bentham and Mill, who saw an opposition between an empirical 
study of the human nature and any form of theological ethics, and took this opposition as a program to develop 
a new moral philosophy (e.g., Welchman 2010: 167; Calcaterra 2011: 100-101; Frega 2006a; 2006b; Frega 2010). 
However, this element of continuity should not eclipse the novelty brought about by Dewey. What is completely 
different in his approach is that, while his “scientific” forerunners saw the possibility to ground a philosophical 
ethics on absolute principles (though developed through induction on the basis of experience), Dewey took this 
task to be impossible. His philosophical ethics not only develops the previous appeal to empirical observations 
of moral phenomena, but also realizes the fallibilist spirit of modern and contemporary natural sciences. 
Therefore, in a certain sense, there are no absolute or definitive moral principles and values. Of course, there are 
moral principles which are the critical standardization of the result of the past moral inquiries and experiences, 
but these principles are never definitive and need always to be considered fallible and susceptible of reform. As 
we will see, this fallibilism in ethics is the consequence of the specific conception of metaphysics put forward by 
Dewey, which implies the possibility of the emergence of new contexts and moral demands. However, in 
approaching Dewey's theory of moral inquiry and deliberation, we should keep in mind that his “systematic 
moral theory” is anything but a system of moral principles and values. Moral epistemic fallibilism goes together 
with the stress of the possibility of real discovery in the process of moral inquiry. 
Although inquiry is the general notion used by Dewey for the genuinely reflective thought, “moral inquiry” 
has a characteristic “emphasis” (LW14: 70). “Inquiry” in morals originates from the “doubt” about what action 
should be done and has the task of producing a grounded “belief” or “knowledge” about what ought to be done 
in a particular situation by the individual agent. Its task is to establish an end-in-view. In other words, the 
“warranted” asserted conclusion of a deliberation is the prescription of an action to do here and now (LW12: 14-
15), that is, an ought-to. Although Dewey stresses the importance of moral deliberation in the formation of 
character as much as Peirce does, it is possible to see in Dewey a stronger confidence in the role of deliberation 
in the context of ongoing practical perplexities. The agent, as subject of immediate experience, withdraws from 
the overt action in the presence of a problem and undertakes a reflective and imaginative process to construct 
the future, new possibility of action (LW12: 142; see also LW4: 178). However, just like in the case of Aristotle's 
practical syllogism, the ultimate conclusion of the process of deliberation is not a mere symbolic synthesis about 
a hypothetical end-in-view but is the actual action in the overt world. The conclusion of the process of 
deliberation is what Dewey calls “moral judgment.” Therefore, the ultimate reality of the moral judgment is not a 
logical act understood as a symbolic synthesis of subject and predicate (propositional content), but is the 
actualization in overt action of the propositional content of that logical act, that is, of the type of operation 
conceived as an abstract object in the process of deliberation. The symbolic moment is therefore “instrumental” 
to the realization of a new set of actual conditions of consummatory experience (LW12: 163-164). Since the telos 
of the process of deliberation is the “close or termination” of the problematic situation, the deliberation itself as 
a reflective moment “terminates in the institution of conditions which remove need for doubt” (LW12: 15). In 
this sense, judgment is the “resulting transformation” and nothing psychological or mental (LW12: 161). 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
30 footnote 5 on the constant presence of a “qualitative” field and background also in inquiry. For a characterization of “quality,” see 
Browning (2010: 172-173). 
 160  
Deliberation originates from the emergence of an obstacle in the development of an immediate experience 
towards the enjoyment of a certain value and is teleologically oriented to the reestablishment of the 
consummatory possibility of a value quality through the production of a new actual interaction. The important 
point to stress here is the difference between the intermediate and developmental stages of deliberation and the 
judgment, its conclusion. The main difference is that while the first have the status of symbolic syntheses, the 
latter becomes concrete as an overt action. Dewey writes that 
 
judgment may be identified as the settled outcome of inquiry. It is concerned with the concluding 
objects that emerge from inquiry in their status of being conclusive. Judgment in this sense is 
distinguished from propositions. The content of the latter is intermediate and and representative and is 
carried by symbols; while judgment, as finally made, has direct existential import. The terms affirmation 
and assertion are employed in current speech interchangeably. But there is a difference, which should 
have linguistic recognition, between the logical status of intermediate subject-matter ands that are 
taken for use in connection with what they may lead to as means, and subject-matter which has been 
prepared to be final. I shall use assertion to designate the latter logical status and affirmation to name the 
former (LW12: 123). 
 
It is true, in a derivate sense, that also the final judgment, or assertion, has a propositional content, but only in 
so far as we understand the logic function of that proposition is to be a “means of instituting the sentence” in 
the world through an overt action (LW12: 125; 165). Similarly, it is true that, since the judgment has a temporal 
structure, the intermediate cognitive acts that lead to the final judgment, that is, the affirmations also share the 
nature of the judgment in so far as they are considered its provisional, tentative and partial “completions,” 
functional to the real completion in the conclusion (LW12: 178). In fact, “judgment as final settlement is 
dependent upon a series of partial settlements” (LW12: 125). This truth about the moral judgment is apparent 
both in the continuity and in the distinction between the symbolic synthesis and the overt action. This aspect is 
also clear when we pay attention to certain terminological inconsistencies in Dewey's terminology in talking 
about what a moral judgment is. Sometimes he uses the notion of judgment as indicating the propositional 
content of an affirmation in which the end-in-view is only symbolically represented (LW12: 131; 134). In other 
cases, just like in the passage quoted above, it is clear that the rigorous notion of judgment refers to the end-in-
view not as a possible action symbolically represented in a proposition, but as actualized/embodied in the overt 
action (LW12: 125; 162; 168; 288-289). In so far as the final aim of deliberation is the actualization/embodiment 
of a value, moral judgment coincides with an “application” of a proposition, since application is “a matter of 
existential operations executed upon existential materials” (LW12: 375). As we have seen, deliberation originates 
from the crisis or interruption of an enjoyment in the immediate experience and its telos is to establish a new 
value quality in immediate experience through the production of new interactive conditions. The fact that the 
ultimate and appropriate conclusion of deliberation is an act in the overt world and not a mere symbolic 
synthesis is the reflection in the realm of logic of the experiential need of establishing again the conditions for 
new consummations. “Execution of the operation upon symbolized ideational material does not produce the 
consequences constituting resolution of tension. It produces them … only by operationally introducing 
conditions that institute a determinate kind of interaction” (LW12: 288-289). The instrumentality of the process 
of deliberation as an act that serves the cause of immediate experience is mirrored by the instrumentality of the 
intermediate affirmations and their propositional content in order to make the final overt action possible. 
Therefore, the logical need for the actualization/embodiment of the represented value as the adequate 
conclusion of a deliberation is a consequence of the nature of the reconstructive, experiential function of 
deliberation itself. 
 
 
 
3.1. Propositions, Rigor & Productivity and Epistemic Creativity in Deliberation 
 
The metaphysical locus in which values are fully realized is the world of immediate consummations, so that a 
genuine reflective process on moral conflicts always starts from an instance of interrupted consummation and 
always ends up realizing a new consummation through the agent's deed. There is therefore a continuity among all 
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the experiential phases (immediate consummation, deliberation, new action, new immediate consummation) of 
the moral life, and this is the development of values from the status of immediate enjoyments, through the status 
of hypotheses of action, to the status of concrete action in the overt world and new enjoyment. The different 
phases of the moral inquiry show well this continuity. I will focus on the importance of this continuity in relation 
to two specific topics, namely, the normativity of moral principles and the formation of motivation to action. In 
this section, however, I want to highlight the continuity of moral experience in relation to the constant reference 
to the dimension of value in all the phases of the process of moral inquiry or deliberation. Moreover, I will stress 
the fact that all the phases of the process of deliberation are teleologically oriented to the 
actualization/embodiment of a new value, namely, to the realization of a new experiential synthesis. The 
vocation of every reflective value is to become the center of a new consummatory interaction with the 
environment. In that case, the final “consummation” (or “appreciation”) has a structural reference to a previous 
reflection, in the sense that it is the final enjoyment (as a fulfilling climax, peak or culmination) of the previous 
cognitive and deliberative processes about what to do in a context. “Appreciation, if genuine, is toward a subject-
matter that is representative. … Appreciation thus differs in a fundamental way from causal enjoyments that are 
just hit upon or let drop” (LW12: 177). 
Dewey reminds us that “inquiry demands … operations of both observation and ideation” (LW12: 136) and 
both these operations require rational discourse and other non-cognitive skills. Let us focus for the moment on 
the strictly cognitive aspect of this process. Dewey defines inquiry as the “controlled or directed” transformation 
of an indeterminate situation into a new unified whole (LW12: 108). All the different stages of the development 
of deliberation, from the institution of the problem of the case, to the determination of a problem-solution 
through the activity of reasoning (taking for granted, again, that, reasoning is not the only operation involved in 
deliberation), is a controlled, inferential mediation of successive hypothesis of action towards a warranted 
assertion (LW12: 142). When an agent is faced with an indeterminate situation, the organic habits more closely 
involved in this situation are spontaneously turned into “suggestions.” However, the hypotheses of action 
presented in the suggestions are more “mental” events (spontaneous guesses) rather than intellectual operations 
determined by the agent. At the same time, they do not have real logical force, since they need the active 
intervention of the agent to be controlled, modified and used in order to pursue the inquiry (LW12: 300-301). 
The task of inquiry is to establish deliberately the “material means” and the “procedural means” that would lead 
to overcome the problem once realized (LW12: 139; 162), that is, the existential conditions on which the action 
should be performed and the operation itself to be performed. Through the intervention of the agent, the 
suggestions are transformed into “ideas” and “propositions,” that is, into systems of meanings. The rational 
discourse, or reasoning, is a cognitive process put in action by the agent in order to develop the first meanings 
that come to the mind into meanings that are more detailed and close to the exigencies of the present situation 
(LW12: 164). A proposition is the linguistic content of all the different moments of a process of reasoning. In 
other words, it is the symbolic formulation of the relations of meanings of facts and possible actions that 
constitute therefore a system of meanings (LW12: 115). While a judgment is individual, that is, is an individual 
act, propositions are abstract symbolic formulations of relations of meanings and can be therefore particular, 
singular, generic and universal (LW12: 283). As the etymology of the word shows for Dewey, a proposition plays 
the logical function of “proposal” in the construction of the judgment, which in the case of a deliberation 
corresponds to a tentative indication of a hypothesis of action. Propositions are “provisional, intermediate and 
instrumental” (LW12: 283). All the elements implied in an act of deliberation as its subject-matter, that is the 
observations, the moral principles taken into consideration, the declarations about the “facts” of the case and the 
possible solutions of the problem, share the same logical status in so far as they all are propositions. All the 
factors studied during the inquiry are turned into propositions, namely, into “tools” or “instruments” for the 
reconstruction of the indeterminate situation. Again, the status of the knowledge of all the elements implied in 
the process of deliberation is hypothetical. This is also true of the moral principles. Since the task of the 
reasoning is to contribute to the determination of an end-in-view in order to reconstruct the situation, the moral 
reasoner (1) has to choose which moral principles are suitable for the case. Just like a map is not a constant or 
suitable instrument for all of our journeys, similarly moral principles are “not always operative in the existential 
work of reconstructing existential material” (LW12: 138). Moreover, she (2) has to use and cognitively operate on 
the chosen principles in order to apply them to the present situation. In both cases, the moral principles of the 
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agent have only a hypothetical relevance and normative authority at the outset of the process of deliberation. 
Therefore, the logical function of all the propositions is the one of an hypothesis, that states that under 
certain condition C, if a certain operation O is performed on an set of existent objects M, certain desired 
consequences E will probably occur (“if … then”, LW12: 165). Dewey clearly states that a genuine inquiry only 
takes place when the agent has to discover and establish the content of all the variables present in the 
hypothetical proposition. It is possible, indeed, that the agent acts often on the basis of her moral taste and the 
“relatively immediate judgments” that spring from it (LW4: 209). It is instructive to read at length a passage in 
which Dewey criticizes the mistaken or oversimplified account of an action through a practical syllogism 
constituted by a general premise, a particular premise and a conclusion. Dewey states the traditional account of a 
practical syllogism is the following: 
 
The propositions “I am ill” and “When one is ill, one should consult a doctor” are taken 
respectively as the minor and major premises of a syllogism form which the conclusion “I should see a 
doctor” necessarily follows. The interpretations rests upon taking advantage of an ambiguity, It may 
be but a linguistic rendering of a genuine judgment already made. … Taken literally, however, the 
interpretation means that there was no inquiry and no judgment. It only means that the person in 
question, whenever he fancies he is ill has the habit of going automatically to a physician. Here is no 
element of doubt or indeterminateness, no inquiry and no forming of propositions. There is a direct 
stimulus and it is responded to in accord with a previously formed habit. The alleged syllogism is but 
an externally imposed account of what has taken place in action in which no logical forms are 
involved. The situation is of significance because it brings out by contrast the situations in which 
judgment does occur. A man may have a regular habit of consulting physicians because he is 
valetudinarian and on that account does not exist judgment. Or he may have the tendency to go 
whenever his symptoms are severe and yet on this particular occasion be in doubt whether he is 
sufficiently ill to justify going. Then he engages in reflection. … The account which reduces a 
proposition of practice to a formal combination of a singular and a general proposition thus applies 
only ex post facto linguistic analyses of either an act performed from habit without the intermediation 
of judgment or else of a judgment that has been completed. (LW12: 166-167) 
 
Rational discourse and reasoning, among the other operations of the agent, is precisely aimed at defining 
these different variables through the inferential articulation of different propositions. Dewey's classification of 
proposition includes particular, singular, generic and universal propositions (LW12: 283-309). Particular and 
singular propositions have the form “This is X.” The value of X, however, varies if we are dealing with a 
particular or a singular proposition. In the former case, X means a particular “quality” expressed by “this” in a 
precise spatio-temporal moment, and not a stable property. In the latter case, X means a stable property of X, or 
a “kind” to which X belongs in a more or less stable way.3 Generic and universal propositions have the form 
“All X are Y,” where the value of both X and Y vary according to the use of the proposition as a generic or a 
universal one within a process of inquiry. Generic propositions are about “kinds” of things and have existential 
import, for they refer to spatio-temporal connections between existents. On the other hand, universal 
propositions do not have existential import. They formulate “necessary relations” between abstract characters (or 
possibilities) and may be valid even though nothing in existence possesses any of the latter. Dewey claims that 
“particular propositions function as instruments for determining the problem involved in an indeterminate 
situation, while the other forms listed represent stages in the attainment of the logical means for solution of the 
problem” (LW12: 309). He also states that “all propositions about policies to be pursued, ends to be striven for, 
consequences to be reached are propositions about subject-matters having the formal relation means-consequences, 
and are, in the sense defined, causal propositions” (LW12: 456). What is important to stress here is again the fact 
that the logical form of the conclusion of the moral deliberation is a conjunction of singular and particular 
propositions, that is, propositions about a selected material M on which to perform O here and now. The logical 
analysis of the propositions of the moral deliberation confirms that the telos of the moral deliberation is to 
actualize/embody a value. The determination of the problem has the propositional form “this is X here and 
now.” The identification of the material and procedural means is developed through universal propositions 
which have the propositional form “X is Y,” through generic propositions “All X are Y” or “This and this and 
                                                            
3  The distinction can probably be associated to Peirce’s distinction between a mere 1rstness and a 3rdness (both understood as 
actualized in a concrete instance, 2ndness). 
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this and … are Y” and particular propositions “this belongs to the type X in a more or less stable way.” The final 
proposition is a causal proposition constituted by a set a conjunction of particular propositions, i.e. “here and 
now, in these conditions C, if I do O on this selection of existent conditions M, the desired consequence E will 
occur.”  
The description that we have been given is completely formal. The problem is to define how the agent brings 
about the inferential process. In fact, it is clear that a set of propositions might imply many different conclusions. 
In other words, many different propositions can be inferred from a proposition or a set of propositions 
according to the purposes and ends that give direction to the process of reasoning. The quality of the individual 
problematic moral situation plays here its teleological role, in the sense that it is first for the determination of its 
problem and second for the solution of this problem that the inferences are performed. The “peculiar quality” 
and “unique doubtfulness” (LW12: 109) of the problematic situation play therefore a teleological function for the 
inquiry (LW12: 128). Hugh MacDonald has recently defined Dewey's position a “moral holism” (MacDonald 
2004: 109-122). The meaning of this definition is that for Dewey the entire moral reflection originates from and 
revolves around what he calls the particular “problematic situations,” that is, situations in which the fluidity of 
human agency is somehow interrupted by the occurrence of a problem. The whole cognitive process develops 
through series of different disjunctive propositions indicating alternative courses of action, towards a final action 
(LW12: 173; see exhaustiveness of the disjunctive propositions). The direction of the reasoning is from a 
“vague” idea or proposition to a “workable” and “applicable” hypothesis of action in an individual situation. The 
inferential development of a system of meanings goes in the direction of finding “through a series of 
intermediate meanings, a meaning [that] is finally … more clearly relevant to the problem in hand than the 
originally suggested idea” (LW12: 115). This means that a genuine process of moral deliberation, therefore, needs 
to have what Dewey calls “rigor and productivity” (LW12: 313-314). The development of a particular system of 
meanings into series of different propositions and implications needs to be performed in a particular direction, 
namely, the solution of the problem at hand, and needs to show the following two properties. First, (a) in the 
process of reasoning, the propositions inferred from a precious set of propositions have to be “equivalent in 
logical force” with the previous set of propositions. This is the requisite of rigor, which means that the inferred 
proposition has to be helpfully and correctly directed toward the production of an end-in-view. Second, (b) the 
proposition inferred must not be “tautological” in relation to the set of propositions from which it is derives. 
This second requisite is the productivity of reasoning, which entails that the informative content of the inferred 
proposition is richer than the ones of the previous propositions and tends to the knowledge of an “operationally 
applicable” plan of action here and now. Dewey often insists on the fact that a moral principle does not have all 
the “instruction” and “information” necessary to become a “working principle” of action here and now, that is, an 
end-in-view (EW4: 262). The capacity of finding “equivalent” but not tautological propositions in the process of 
deliberating about what one ought to do in a particular case is therefore the basic capacity required by a sound 
process of reasoning. All these three properties, rigor, productivity and equivalence in reasoning are again 
teleological properties and aim at the establishment of the appropriate end-in-view of the situation. The crucial 
problem is then how in any given case the vague and general propositions employed acquire “that content which is 
a condition of their determinate applicability.” In other words 
 
It is not enough that the propositional function “If Y, then X” should be seen to be a required 
from for reaching any scientifically grounded conclusions. It is necessary that Y should be given a 
determinate value such that X may also have be given a determinate value. In addition, it is an 
acknowledged principle that no universal proposition “implies” singulars, so that in any case there is 
no direct transition from universal to existential propositions. (LW12: 374) 
 
In the case of a moral deliberation, the “singulars” that are not “implied” by a general proposition are the 
singular (and, even more so, particular) propositions that constitute the conclusion of the deliberation. All the 
efforts of the inferential process, including the choice of the moral principles that are relevant in this particular 
case, are directed towards the ideation of the appropriate end-in-view. The proposition articulated in conclusion 
of the deliberation, that is, in the moral judgment, is therefore an end-in-view in which the material and the 
procedural means have been selected and developed in relation to an individual situation and synthesized in the 
end-in-view (LW12: 168). The claim that a general proposition does not imply neither a singular nor a particular 
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proposition means that the problem of the contextual “deduction” of consequences from a general premise is 
for Dewey a problem of application of that general proposition to a subject-matter. Application, Dewey says, is 
in its essence a matter of “selection” and “arrangement” (LW12: 374). In other words, in a genuine process of 
inquiry, to say that “All X are Y,” “This is X,” therefore “This is Y” requires not only the selection of the general 
proposition “All X are Y” as a suitable one for the present case, but also the need to identify “this” as an “X,” 
for example. Therefore, the application of a general proposition to a particular subject-matter requires not only 
the knowledge of the general premise and of formal rules of inference, but requires a real inquiry, through 
observation and existential or imaginative experiments, into the problematic situation. In other words, the 
application of a general proposition requires the acquisition of new knowledge about the particular problematic situation 
that is the subject-matter of the inquiry. “Reflective observation … partakes of the nature of analysis and 
synthesis” (LW12: 177). Dewey explains in the following way the interplay between deduction/analysis and 
induction/synthesis: 
 
As far as processes of inquiry are concerned, there is no difference between induction and 
deduction. Sagacity in evaluation, scrupulous care in notation and record, cherishing and development 
of suggestion, a keen eye for relevant analogies, tentative experimentation, physical and imaginative 
shaping of material so that it takes the form of diagrammatic representation, are all demanded 
whether the subject-matter is observational or conceptual; that is, whether the function of the subject-
matter in question is inductive or deductive. The distinction between induction and deduction does 
not lie then in the process of inquiry but in the direction which the processes take – according as the 
objective is determination of relevant and effective existential data or relevant and effective 
interrelated conceptions. … The notion that there is one logic of induction and another of deduction, 
and that the two logics are independent of each other, is an expression of a certain stage of intellectual 
history. … The processes involved in the work of analyzing and reordering accepted material cannot, it 
seems to me, be any different from those involved in any strictly existential inquiry. 
 
The fact that deduction/analysis and induction/synthesis4 are not possible as distinct logical operations but 
always happen simultaneously implies that an essential component of every inquiry is what I call epistemic creativity. 
The deliberative reasoner, in order to deduce a conclusion from a general proposition, has therefore to discover 
and select the contextual conditions and ways to perform that operation. That is to say, the process of analysis or 
deduction, in so far as it is application, is brought about simultaneously with a process of synthesis or induction. 
Since it is a logical necessity that the subject-matter of every new deliberation includes new synthetic factors, the 
conclusion of every moral judgment is necessarily a new and unique “good.” (MW14: 146).5 Again, the process 
of deliberation has the realization an individual action as its regulative principle.  
Epistemic creativity, however, is not limited only to the problem of the knowledge required by a new 
application or exemplification of an old moral principle, but can also have a power of radical reform in our 
standards. Dewey writes 
 
The generalized and abstract conceptions of truth, beauty and goodness have a genuine value for 
inquiry, creation and conduct. They have, like all genuine ideals, a limiting and directive force. But in 
order to exercise their genuine function they must be taken as reminders of the concrete conditions 
and operations that have to be satisfied in actual cases. In serving as such generalized instrument, their 
meaning is exemplified in their further use, while it is also clarified and modified in this use. (LW12: 
179) 
 
The first element implied in this passage is the need for application. Application, however, might imply a 
possible change in the conceptions we have and, therefore, in our moral principles and standards. This means 
that the inquiry in the present situation can be relative to new and unforeseen possibilities of action, which might 
require modification of our general principles and standards. The synthetic and inductive moment of the moral 
                                                            
4 See also LW1: 151-153. 
5  Also, Dewey says that the “individualized” value in context is the real “absolute,” as opposed to the a-contextual absolutism and 
“relativism” (e.g. EW4: 263-264; 317). It also follows from this that “the construction of a moral judgment” is literally the 
construction of a (contextual) good (e.g. LW12: 123; LW4, Ch. 10). Dewey’s “constructivism” is a corollary of his theory of a moral 
knowledge as distinctively practical (oriented to action, MW8: 14-82) and in itself does not imply any rejection of “objective” moral 
rules and values.  
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inquiry can exemplify the property of epistemic creativity in two ways. (1) First, epistemic creativity means that 
synthetic knowledge is necessary for the application here and now of a general moral principle. In this, 
“creativity” in knowledge means production of the semiotic conditions for the application of a moral principle. 
(2) Second, it can refer to synthetic knowledge about new unforeseen possibilities of action that lead to a 
modification (instead of application) of our moral principles. In this case, “creativity” in knowledge means 
creation of new moral principles and standard and eventually of new habits (LW12: 250). The synthetic moment 
of knowledge can refer both to the needed conditions of application of a general rule or to the condition for a 
need modification in the general rule. It cannot be established in advance whether a new situation is an instance 
of (1) or (2), but it is the duty of the agent to be attentive and curious enough to detect what the new situation 
asks from him.  
This point makes us understand Dewey's stance in relation to the problem of deduction in ethics. It is often 
claimed (e.g. Lekan 1998; 2003) that Dewey's reconstruction of moral reasoning and deliberation is in overt 
opposition to a deductive approach in ethics. Although this claim is true, it might hide an ambiguity. The 
ambiguity relies on the fact that Dewey is not rejecting the idea that deductive inferences play a role in moral 
reasoning. As we have seen, deduction/analysis, performed in synergy with induction/synthesis, is an 
indispensable component of all reasoning. The conclusion is that Dewey does not argue against the idea of 
deduction in itself, but against one possible use of deduction and against one broad philosophical interpretation 
of the role of deduction in the development of knowledge. His argument is against deduction as a non-creative 
rational process and to the usually related understanding of moral principles as fixed moral axioms (fixed moral 
principles indicating “end-in-themselves”). This is also the chore of Dewey's anti-Platonism of values 
(“hypostatization” of the good as “ontological absolutes,” LW12: 178). The non-creative use of deduction 
exemplifies a process of deliberation in which the construction of the new moral judgment, or the mediation of 
the new overt act, is more an occasion for the repetition of old schemes rather than for an intelligent response to 
the novelty of the situation. The stress on the novelty of the situation and the exigency of a “creative” attitude is 
not rhetorical since we have seen that deliberation always requires in its logical structure new synthetic 
knowledge. The intrinsic problem of a wrong conception of deduction relies first and foremost in the bad logical 
use of moral principles, in the sense that, when they are assumed as moral axioms, they do not work as “tools” 
for actualizing the potentialities of the present situation, but as rules to which the situation has to be conformed. 
In this sense, the possibility of epistemic creativity is essentially undermined in both of its versions. Dewey 
explains 
 
From the standpoint of method, such conceptual generalizations … prejudge the characteristic 
traits and the kinds of actual phenomena that the proposed plans of action are to deal with. Hence, 
the work of analytic observation by which actual phenomena will be reduced to terms of definite 
problems that may be dealt with by means of determinate specific operations is intrinsically 
compromised from the start. (LW12: 499-500)    
 
 
Just like deduction was the logical structure of demonstration in the study of the natural world, in ethics 
deduction was used as the unmediated and a-contextual prescription of alleged moral axioms (LW12: 480). 
However, for Dewey, just like for Peirce before and for C. I. Lewis later, deduction is not the structure of 
scientific demonstration anymore, but the analytic process of inferring conclusions from hypotheses to be tested 
experimentally. The negative exemplifications of this philosophical use of the wrong conception of deduction 
were the conception of ends-in-themselves that are fixed in and by Nature (and hence ontological and 
cosmological) in classical moral and political theory; the doctrine of “natural laws,” in the variety of forms 
throughout different epochs; the theory of intuitions of a priori necessary truths, and finally the doctrine of an 
intrinsic hierarchy of fixed values. In Logic (W12: 497-498), Dewey describes the case of Adam Smith's and John 
S. Mills's classical political theory, showing how the logical method connected to its natural norms of the 
economical behavior of men is a perfect instance of the wrong, axiomatic use of deduction. The natural norms 
were such as “the universal desire of each individual is to better his condition,” “each individual has the desire to 
do so with the least effort (since effort constituted cost in the sense of pain to be minimized),” “each individual 
has the impulse to exchange goods and services in maximum satisfaction of wants at least cost,” etc. Dewey's 
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concern is not first and foremost about the truth or the falsity of these claims, but about the method and the 
logic implied in such an approach to human behavior. For him, the problem is that a dogmatic and axiomatic use 
of deduction rules out all the possibilities of creativity in knowledge and action because of its own constitutive 
logic. “Classical political economy, with respect to its logical form, claimed to be a science in virtue, first, of 
certain ultimate first truths, and, secondly, in virtue of the possibility of rigorous “deduction” of actual economic 
phenomena from these truths. From these “premises,” it followed, in the third place, that the first truths 
provided the norms of practical activity in the field of economic phenomena; or that actual measures were right 
or wrong, and actual economics phenomena normal or abnormal, in the degree of their correspondence with 
deductions made from the system of conceptions forming the premises” (LW12: 497-498; see also EW4: 262). 
The norms are supposed to “govern” human deliberation and moral economic assessment, not as cognitive tools 
of new and creative experiential syntheses but as natural fixed demands to be reproduced. 
 
 
 
3.2. Non-Discursive Factors in Deliberation 
 
Rational discourse strictly considered as the series of analysis-synthesis acts and of corresponding 
propositions is only an abstract account of the full reality of reasoning. As a matter of fact, inquiry and 
deliberation include also “qualitative” and “aesthetic” dynamics, that is, semeiotic operations that are not 
formalizable in or reducible to rational discourse but that are somehow the necessary conditions for it. The 
general statement for this need is the following: 
 
 
It is quite true that certain things, namely, ideas, exercise a mediating function. But only a twisted 
and aborted logic can hold that because something is mediated, it cannot, therefore, be immediately 
experienced. The reverse is the case. We cannot grasp any idea, any organ of mediation, we cannot 
possess it in its full force, until we have felt and sensed it, as much so as if it were an odor or a color. 
Those who are especially addicted to thinking as an occupation, are aware when they observe the 
process of thought, instead of determining by dialectic what they must be, that immediate feeling is 
not limited in its scope. Different ideas have their different “feels,” their immediate qualitative aspects, 
just as much as anything else. One who is thinking his way through a complicated problem finds 
direction on his way by means of this property of ideas. Their qualities stop him when he enters the 
wrong path and send him ahead when he hits the right one. They are signs of an intellectual “Stop and 
Go.” If a thinker had to work out the meaning of each idea discursively, he would be lost in a 
labyrinth that had no end and no center. Whenever an idea loses its immediate felt quality, it ceases to 
be an ides and becomes, like an algebraic symbol, a mere stimulus to execute an operation without the 
need of thinking. … When there is genuine artistry in scientific inquiry and philosophic speculation, a 
thinker proceeds neither by rule nor yet blindly, but by means of meanings that exist immediately as 
feelings having qualitative color. (LW10: 125) 
 
The first point to stress is that the qualitative, non-discursive operations performed in inquiry are not 
activities separate from the rational ones. As Dewey says, these operations constitute the “qualitative thought” of 
men (LW5: 243-263). We have seen in Chapter 3 that according to Peirce sentiments are as cognitive acts as 
inferences are. Similarly, Dewey maintains that “qualitative thought” a necessary function for the rational 
discourse to be developed as discursive. Human thinking, as rational discourse, requires sensitivity for “ideas” 
and directions of inquiry just like it needs capacity for subtle observation and perception in the existential 
conditions of a problematic situation in order to select the suitable factual evidence for elaborating the end-in-
view. In other words, the non-discursive dimension of the thought is an internal condition of the discursive 
development of thinking, not an extrinsic emotive coloring or outcome. This is true of the indeterminate moral 
situation from its emergence to its resolutive transformation, since both the conceptual determination of the 
problem and its final moral judgment require a selection and organization of elements that would not be possible 
without the teleological function of the individual “quality” of the situation (LW12: 124). As we read in the 
passage, for the reasoner endowed with skills in non-discursive operations, ideas perform a fundamental 
semeiotic function in their “immediate felt quality.” This means that a first and fundamental function of the idea 
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is to have a non-linguistic, non-propositional and non-discursive (that is, “qualitative” and “felt”) evidential 
ground for intellectual operations. Although non-linguistic and non-propositional,6 ideas perform semeiotic 
functions in so far as they give direction to inquiry. Of course, once grasped and qualitatively selected, ideas can 
and must be developed in systems of meanings and propositions thought rational discourse. However, Dewey 
seems to claim that none of the further symbolic stages of inquiry could be performed without the previous 
qualitative and non-propositional semeiotic function of the ideas. These non-logarithmic semiotic functions 
ground all the other symbolic and somehow logarithmic operations in the process of inquiry. 
Just like any other semeiotic process, also the qualitative semeiosis of ideas relies on the reasoner's 
interpretative habits. It is the expert reasoner who has developed a certain “familiarity” with her subject-matter 
and who therefore performs on it certain operations more easily and successfully. As a matter of fact, the 
“immediacy” of the qualitative semeiosis to which Dewey refers has to be understood, in a Hegelian sense, as a 
mediated immediacy. It is true that the qualitative semeiosis is not mediated in the sense that is not the product 
of a deliberative process of operations on symbols, but it is however the result of a spontaneous inference based 
on the reasoner's interpretative habits. These various habitual skills include “familiarity with the material, sagacity 
in discrimination, acuteness in detection of leads and clews, persistence and thoroughness in following them 
through, cherishing and developing suggestions that arise” (LW12: 280). Dewey underlines this concept in 
relation to the notion of “taste” (EW4: 308; LW4: 209). Taste is a disposition that operates more or less 
spontaneously in the life of a person but that is “the funded product of much thoughtful experience.”  
A person might have “taste” in intellectual, aesthetic and moral subject-matter. This part of the character is so 
important that Dewey claims that “the formation of cultivated and effectively operative good judgment or taste 
with respect to what is esthetically admirable, intellectually acceptable and morally approvable is the supreme task 
set to human beings by the incidents of experience.” Let us focus briefly on the case of morals, in which “taste” 
plays the role of classical virtue of wisdom (EW4: 353).7 In this field of experience, moral taste is a capacity of 
perception of important moral features of a situation. It is so crucial for moral life that Dewey claims that 
“educated interest or taste is, ultimately, supreme, the unum necessarium, in morals” (LW2: 76). It is relevant at least 
under two respects. First, in morally demanding situations, the agent is not always led to engage in a fully 
developed reflective process, but has to rely mostly on her moral taste in order to figure out the indeterminate 
situation she is facing and acts consequently. In this case, the agent acts upon her “relatively immediate 
judgments” (also “tact” or “intuition”)8 without recurring to rational discourse. The agent's habits and attitudes 
work more as direct “causes” of evaluation in the new situation (LW12: 245) instead of working as the organic 
conditions for propositional reasoning. As we can see, this is certainly a Peircean legacy in Dewey’s 
understanding of the role of deliberation in a problematic context. Second, when the agent starts a reflective 
process of deliberation, her taste for moral features operates as one of the most important leading principles in 
order to detect the possible connections and implications among “ideas” on what is the action required here and 
now. Among the different cognitive materials dealt with in deliberation, the selection of the moral principles that 
are adequate and relevant for the present situation is a momentous example. The choice of the right standards 
for the case is not only a matter of rational discourse, but is also at its bottom a matter of moral taste for the real 
demands of the situation and the moral principles that can function as the best tools of reconstruction. Of 
course, moral taste is fundamental at the same time for detecting the existential conditions of the case, its “facts” 
and their suitable operational meaning. As we have seen, the development of deliberation is always and at the 
same time a process of application/analysis/deduction of a conceptual, operational matter and a process of 
discovery/synthesis/induction of a material, existential matter. It is clear then that moral taste operates 
conjunctively with both processes. 
In Dewey's view, there are in moral inquiries two non-discursive capacities of moral perception that are 
crucial for producing a grounded moral judgement in an individual context. These are the capacity for 
“sympathy” and for “imagination.” Among the scholars, Gregory Pappas (2008) and Thomas Alexander (1992; 
1993) have stressed the indispensability of these two operations in the most interesting way. Also Stephen 
Fesmire (1995; 1999; 2003) and Mark Johnson (2010) have given an interpretative contribution to this part of 
                                                            
6  Dewey disagrees with Peirce on the “propositional” nature of feelings, without endorsing though a non-cognitivist perspective. 
7 Cf. e.g. Bohman (2010: 196), “context sensitivity” is the highest realization of moral rationality. 
8  See EW4: 309. 
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Dewey moral theory.9 In what follows, I want to provide a more comprehensive account of moral deliberation 
beyond its strictly linguistic aspects, but also to show the role played by the non-discursive and qualitative 
dimension of it. Once again, the elements of deliberation taken into consideration prove to be directed toward 
the actualization/embodiment of a value. The qualitative operations of deliberation, in their contextual use and 
organization of conceptual and material elements, are teleologically directed by the individual quality of the 
situation and teleologically active in order to help the discursive process to articulate that vague quality into a 
“workable” end-in-view. One final point has to be made here. Qualitative phenomena are operative not only in 
the making of the moral judgment, but also at its end, when the overt action is performed in the world. In fact, 
as Dewey points out, the success in the production of a desired action is usually accompanied by a pleasant 
emotive reaction: 
 
the valuation of an act assumes an objective and a subjective form. The objective is the analysis of 
the act into its various conditions, its definition or limitation – the ideal, intention, etc. The subjective 
is the feeling excited in the individual, by either the contemplation of the act in thought or by its actual 
execution in deed. The thought, the intention, is not colorless; it represents a projection of the self, 
and the moral emotion is simply the realization by an individual of the value of the projected act for 
himself as an individual. The thought of every act must have, therefore, its own peculiar, qualitative, 
emotional accompaniment. (EW4: 300) 
 
If the qualitative thought and the other non-discursive factors in deliberation are instrumental to the moral 
judgment, the final experience of pleasure that accompanies the action is expressive of it. In Ethics, Dewey, 
reformulating Aristotle, states that a human moral act has three formal properties, that is: 1. a certain “state of 
mind,” or the conception of an end-in-view (the agent has to know, or be aware, of the end-in-view she is 
pursuing); 2. the choice, or the end-in-view as a motive (the agent choses her end-in-view and reflectively 
transforms that end-in-view into a stimulus for her action) and 3. expressivity (the choice has to be the 
expression of a “character”, or the “general tenor and set of personality”). Dewey's full account of the features of 
a moral act needs to be completed with this reference to the experience of pleasure that ought to accompany a 
morally good act. Pleasure, therefore, is the final qualitative response of the agent to its action during and after 
the realization of the action (EW3: 266-267; 276-277). The pleasurable experience is a natural outcome of the 
actualization of an action, in which the psychological tension of the indeterminate situation is released. However, 
the chore of this new qualitative experience is again the valuable action, that is, the actualized/embodied value. If 
the qualitative semeiotic processes within deliberation are teleologically oriented to the construction of the value 
to be actualized, the final pleasure is a semeiotic response that is causally determined by that value once it is 
embodied through the new interaction. In the pleasure that accompanies the morally good action, therefore, the 
causal and the reflective values coincide in the one final experience of pleasurable consummation. A genuine 
moral deliberation, just like the artistic activity, grows and terminates with an action that is colored by a particular 
“moral emotion,” in which the development of deliberation itself is finally fulfilled as a process also from an 
affective viewpoint (EW3: 300-301). Of course, also this final moment in the reconstruction of the situation is 
not without moral import. As it has been recognized since Plato, the moral value of a pleasure depends on the 
object to which it is intentionally referred. Similarly, an objective moral good that is not emotionally experienced 
as such by the agent implies that the agent herself is not fully virtuous. Therefore, the final act cannot be morally 
good only in the intention of the agent and in its consequences, but needs to be felt as such. For instance, a 
morally good action requires that eventually the sense of duty “must be swallowed up in inclination and love” 
(EW4: 315; cf. also EW4: 295). The actualization/embodiment of a true moral value requires the agent's 
appropriate joyful response, so that if this response is missed, the deliberation and the moral judgment might be 
said to be incomplete. The pleasurable experience of a morally good action is a constitutive part of the 
deliberation in its final outcome. It follows that part of the moral task of every moral deliberation is to develop in 
the agent's character a moral taste that recognizes with emotive responses the moral nature of her acts. 
 
 
                                                            
9 The “imaginative” is distinct from the “imaginary” (MW9: 244-245), as the product of human mind is distinct from a bad, too abstract 
product of human mind. See also LW1: 170-171. 
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4. “Is” 
 
This comprehensive account of deliberation, propositions and moral judgment has also a revolutionary 
impact in the conception of the logical function of the copula “is” in the construction of the moral judgment and 
in its final outcome.10 Dewey agrees formally with the traditional conception that the standard form of the 
proposition is the connection of a subject and a predicate through the copula “is.” However, he reinterprets the 
meaning of this logical structure showing how human agency and semantics are thoroughly entangled. As we 
have already mentioned in Chapter 4, Dewey points out that etymologically the word “is” indicates to stay or to 
change, to remain or endure, that is, a “mode of action” (LW12: 137; 307). The copula can be used as a mere 
connection of abstract characters outside a process of inquiry, like in the case of universal propositions, used 
simply to communicate an informative content or to report someone else's opinion (LW12: 174; 284) or at a very 
abstract level of the inquiry. In this case, the copula designates “a non-temporal or strictly logical relation 
between meanings” (LW12: 137). On the contrary, if a proposition is used as a moment in the development of 
the deliberation and has a clear existential reference, the copula has itself a clear existential reference and 
therefore a “temporal force” that is missing in the previous case. As we have seen, the subject of a proposition 
corresponds to the existential material that contains the “facts” of the case, or the existent conditions on which 
the possible operation should be performed, while the predicate represents this possible operation. In the 
intermediate propositions, the copula means that in this problematic situation this very existential material 
(existential reference) could be used in this very kind of way (type of operation), while in the conclusion of the 
process it means that very existential material ought to be used in this kind of way. In both cases, however, the 
copula is the logical connector in a hypothetical or normative practical synthesis between an existential matter 
and an operation. Dewey explains that 
 
the judgment, like inquiry, is temporal. It is temporal not in the external sense that the act of 
judging takes time, but in the sense that its subject-matter undergoes reconstitution in attaining the 
final state of determinate resolution and unification which is the objective that governs judgment. It is 
necessarily involved in what has been said that the linguistic form which expresses, or is the symbol 
of, judgment is a true verb; that is, one expressing action and change. … The situation to which the 
sentence refers determines unambiguously whether “is” has an active force, expressing a change going 
on actually or potentially, or whether it stands for a relation between meanings or ideas. In a sentence 
having no contextual situation, its logical force is indeterminate. For any sentence isolated from place 
and function in inquiry is logically indeterminate. The copula in a judgment, in distinction from the 
term of formal relations, expresses, accordingly, the actual transformation of the subject-matter of an 
indeterminate situation into a determinate one. So far is the copula from being an isolable constituent 
that it might be regarded as what sets the subject-and-predicate content at work executing their 
functions in relation to one another. In complex undertakings a plan for division of functions is 
usually laid out on paper. But this plan is not the actual division of labor. The latter consists in the 
actual distribution of the active factors of what is doing in their cooperation with one another. The 
distribution, as well as the cooperation, is arranged with reference to an end or objective consequence. 
The plan may be set forth and explained in propositions; its propositional exposition may be a means 
of criticism and of rearrangement of the plan of distribution. But the actual division can only be 
enacted. As just indicated, it may be stated in symbols, and symbolic representation of the division 
may be an indispensable means of an actual enactment. But it no more is a functioning division of 
labor than a blueprint is a house in process of building or a map is a journey. (LW12: 137-138)  
 
This is the most fundamental example of the pragmatic account of the impossibility of establishing 
dichotomies in our understanding of reality. In this case, the dichotomy would be represented by the 
propositional content of an act of affirmation and the mental act, on the one hand, and the eventual, overt deed 
of the agent on the other hand. If what I have said so far is correct, this distinction does not hold any more as a 
fundamental dichotomy, but has to be understood as a distinction that takes place in experience under certain, 
limited conditions. These conditions are of course the emergence of a problematic situation and the reflecting 
activity of turning or formulating habits of action into linguistic propositions that follows it. In this sense, the 
                                                            
10 What is at stake here is not the copula as a sign of one type or the other (also as the absence of sign, e.g. Peirce), but the unifying 
function played by the copula or by every other systems of notation. 
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distinction between propositional content and moral judgment represents the contextual modality in which the 
development of the action of the agent takes the form of a rational discourse on what the future action should 
be. However, as we have seen, the rational discourse as a dimension of deliberation aims at the 
actualization/embodiment of the prospected end-in-view. The propositional content of the sequence of 
affirmations grows until it becomes the overt act itself. The symbolic synthesis represented in a proposition is the 
existential and experiential final synthesis in the making. At the end of the process of deliberation, there is no 
distinction anymore between the propositional, representational content about future possible operations and 
subjective acts of judgment. In the final act, the distinction of “object” and “subject” is partially and momentarily 
overcome. The simple action on symbols, operated in the internal phases of deliberation, does not realize this 
unity, since the use of symbols still belongs to the dimension of propositional representation. “As long as the 
operations are not executed, the subject-matter of such propositions is therefore abstract or non-existential” 
(LW12: 302). “Possibility” of operation, that is, the logical function and meaning of every predication, “is 
existentially actualized only when the operation is performed not with or upon symbols but on existence” 
(LW12: 288-289). The consequence is that in the moral judgment the subject-matter elaborated in the previous 
moments of deliberation coincides with the act itself that the agent is performing here and now. Dewey is hinting 
at this when he claims that “the subject-matter (object) of final judgment is a situation … it is a qualitative 
existential whole which is unique” (LW12: 124). Early on, Dewey writes: 
 
Moral theory, then, is the analytic perception of the conditions and relations in hand in a given act, 
– it is the action in idea. It is the construction of the act in thought against its outward construction. It 
is, therefore, the doing, – the act itself, in its emerging. So far are we from any divorce of moral theory 
and practice that theory is the ideal act, and conduct is the executed insight. (EW3: 95) 
 
This means not only that the intelligence that is already operative at the symbolic and imaginative level grows 
in deliberation until the relations propositionally established through rational discourse enable the agent to act 
upon them “in the overt world.”11 It entails the stronger thesis that the intelligibility of the subject-matter about 
possible operations that is represented in the symbolic syntheses of propositions becomes the intelligence in action 
of the moral judgment every time that an end-in-view is actualized. Similarly, the telos of the logical function of 
the copula is not to synthesize a subject and a predicate in a symbolic representation, but to be actualized in the 
living and experiential synthesis of the overt act (see also LW2: 17).12  
 
 
 
5. “Ought-to” 
 
As we have seen, the appropriate conclusion of a deliberative process is not a moral judgment as a symbolic 
synthesis of a subject and a predicate, and not even a hypothetical “decision” to act in the future if a set of 
conditions occurs, but it is an actual “choice.”13 In this sense, Dewey’s metaethical stance about the metaphysical 
status of “values” is close to Peirce’s, insofar as asking what is a moral value independently from a reflection on 
human agency and its vocation to normativity is seen as a serious mistake. We have also seen that the (almost 
ultimate) conclusion of a deliberation is a belief, or warranted assertibility. Dewey defines the belief as “the 
settled condition of objective subject-matter, together with readiness of act in a given way when, if, and as, that 
subject-matter is present in existence … overtly or in imagination” (LW12: 15). Although the conclusion of a 
deliberation might be the establishment of a future plan of action, so that a concrete deed does not have to take 
place here and now, its experiential and logical telos is however the action itself. This means that the moral 
judgment in its ultimate and fullest realization is an actual/existential operation, through which the agent acts in 
                                                            
11 Dewey shows that the distinction between thinking and acting is flawed also from the physiological viewpoint (EW4: 272). Cf. LW1: 
237-238 on thinking and acting in relation to the problem of focal perception. 
12 This point is overlooked almost by all the scholars. Tristan (2002: 214) claims that copula represents the “unchanging and timeless 
Being.” Burke 1994, which is still the most important work on Dewey's logic, does not address the problem. Garrison (2005: 823; 826; 
828-829) hints at this but does not develop the point. 
13 For instance, Searle 2001 speaks of a level of “practical intentions” as “intentions in action.” See the same terminology in Brandom 
2000. For a broader contextualization of the problem of intention in action in a neopragmatist view, see McDowell 2011. 
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the overt world and synthesizes the ideal and the existent factors of the case into a new unity. Moral judgment, 
just like every other judgment, is transformative. We might be inclined to think that the content of the moral 
judgment is therefore a prescription, an “ought-to” here and now. It is certain that for Dewey the moral 
judgment is practical in nature.14 This means that the moral judgment plays the logical function of producing the 
directing and guiding knowledge about what the agent believes she is supposed to do, rather than a statement of 
what people think is right and just or a purely descriptive belief. Some critiques might argue that the distinction 
between theoretical and practical knowledge is not legitimate from a pragmatist viewpoint, since the meaning of 
every known X always refers to the dimension of human action.15 However, this criticism does not hold. 
Although it is true that the predicate that occurs in every judgment expresses possible operations, there is still a 
difference in the function that a judgment plays as the conclusion of an inquiry (EW3: 108). In the case of 
theoretical knowledge, the end of the inquiry and the function of the judgment are to ascertain the facts and to 
move to their experimental test. In the case of practical knowledge, the end of an act of deliberation is to 
prescribe to the agent what she ought to do in a certain situation. In this sense, there is a functional and logical 
distinction between the knowledge of the actual with implication for the possible (operations, consequences, etc.) 
and the knowledge of the possible in order to change the actual (re-direct the action, transform the situation). 
Dewey is therefore committed to a certain distinction in logical function between the “is” and the “ought,” or 
obligation. Dewey says 
 
Just as the consciousness of truth is not adventitious to a judgment of fact but constitutes its 
content, so the consciousness of obligation is not an annex to the judgment of action. Any being who 
is capable of acting from ideas – that is, whose conduct is the attempted realization of proposed ends 
– must conceive of these ends in terms of something to be done – of obligation. And that is what is 
meant by saying not only that the “ought” rests upon and expresses the “is,” but that it is itself the 
“is” of action. (EW3: 109) 
 
In a passage of Experience and Nature (LW1: 317), we find an interesting observation about the distinction 
between “is” and “ought.” In it, Dewey discusses the extreme of opposite positions on the relation between “is” 
and “ought.” On the one hand, empiricist positions reduce the standard of value to a mere immediate goods. On 
the other hand, rationalism draws the standard of value from a supposed transcendent or transcendental 
dimension of reality. However, it is interesting what Dewey says in confuting the former stance. He stresses 
again the need for a distinction between “is” and “ought,” between “immediate values” and “standards of value” 
(LW1: 317). In fact, if this distinction is not maintained and developed, it is not possible to inquire into the 
nature of genuine moral values as distinct from causal and casual valuings. If the constitutive and prescriptive 
role of human intelligence is not admitted, the “standard” is reduced to another immediate value, so that, “it is 
by definition only another name for the object of a particular liking, on the part of some particular subjective 
                                                            
14 See again in particular Frega 2006a; 2006b; also Welchman 2010; Anderson 2010; McCarthy 1999. 
15  It seems to me that there is a distinction between the meaning of an object O as “Y and Z would happen if S did X” and the 
normative claim that S ought to do X here and now. The factual meaning of O is inseparable from the general dimension of practical 
values. Therefore, if it is true for sure that Dewey overcomes the dichotomy facts/values (against empiricism, logical positivism and 
certain types of analytic philosophy, cf. Putnam), but it is still problematic that the meaning of O, at the same time factual and 
practical, implies a genuine moral value. The clarification of the meaning of an object in terms of possibilities of action implies only 
that the dichotomy facts/values is a misunderstanding and an intellectualization of human experience, since the domain of value is 
embedded with the domain of the meaning right from the origin. Since the properties of any one entity are dispositional properties, 
whose discovery requires interaction and whose actuality consists in interaction, the determination of the properties of the facts of the 
world has a constant element, that is, the reference to the human possibilities of action. This goes back to the problem of the 
mediation of the impulse that constitutes the human level of experience. The fact that the factual meaning of O implies a value 
dimension is a specification, and a formal one, of the nature of the mediation of the impulse; the world is always mediated in 
reference to human purposiveness and possibility of action. However, as we have seen, the mediation does not meet always 
conditions of truth or moral goodness. Just like the domain of the “possible actions” is not identical with the domain of “morally 
good actions,” the domain of possible practical values is not identical with the domain of moral values. There is continuity between 
the two domains, but there is also a discontinuity, that is, the discontinuity resulting from a moral judgment. This discontinuity is 
found in Dewey in the distinction between what is “valued” and what is rationally “valuable.” What is needed for finding the domain 
of moral values is a principle of delimitation of the domain of the values in general. There are two options available: (1) moral 
institutions (the accepted and shared standards of morality). However, these might be in need of reform, as Dewey repeatedly claims. 
The domain of moral institutions is not always identical with the domain of genuine moral values. (2) moral good represented in a 
sound moral judgment. Yes. If there is not a dichotomy between the “is” and “the can be done” (is/can be done dichotomy), there is 
however a distinction between the “can be done” and the “ought to be done” (can/ought modal distinction). See also LW12: 66-67 
on this point. 
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creature. If the liking for it conflicts with some other liking, the strongest wins. There is no question of false and 
true, of real and seeming, but only of stronger and weaker. The question of which one should be stronger is as 
meaningless as it would be in a cock-fight” (LW1: 317). Again, Dewey does not seem to argue against the 
distinction between “is” and “ought” in general. Nevertheless, Dewey seems to be polemical against the notion 
of “ought” as the defining and exclusive logical character of ethical discourse, and, more importantly, as 
constituted in complete isolation from the world of facts. An interesting formula used by Dewey is that the 
“ought” is at the same time the “is,” the “is” of the action to be done (EW3: 105; 108). Some authors, claiming 
to follow Dewey, have tried to reduce the “ought” to the “is.”16 It seems clear to me that Dewey does not 
question that the “ought” is the logical function of the moral judgment.17 Interpretative perplexities result from 
the fact that he argues against five misunderstandings of the moral subject-matter that might be hidden under the 
notion of “ought-to.” His concerns about the notion of “ought” are more broadly philosophical rather than 
strictly logical. First, (a) the sharp distinction between the “is” and the “ought” has brought to the idea that our 
experience of the real world, if genuinely understood, includes only facts but not values. In the light of this 
mistake, therefore, some philosophers felt the necessity either to deny any type of reality to values, or to embark 
themselves in the epistemological endeavor of justifying the existence of value and moral values in particular. 
Dewey's method of experience clearly shows, without the need for a proof, that the world is right from the start 
value-laden for all forms of life and for man in particular. Second, (b) the dichotomy between “is” and “ought” 
might lead to the conviction that science has only a descriptive and explanatory function, so that science has only 
“is-facts” as its subject-matter but never “ought facts” (LW17: 351-352). Dewey's reconstruction in moral 
philosophy is explicitly in opposition to the non-cognitivistic tendencies in ethics present at his time, typically put 
forth by the logical positivists, as it is paradigmatically shown by his Theory of Valuation (both [a] and [b] have 
been questioned by Hilary Putnam's attack to the “dichotomy” between “facts” and “values,” Putnam 2002). 
Third, (c), the sharp distinction between “is” and “ought” has led to the conception that moral values, principles 
and standards are not the critical result of past moral inquiries and experiences, but are transcendent objects or 
transcendental standards, as certain form of Platonism (e.g., T. H. Green) and rationalism (e.g., Kant, Royce) 
have claimed. Similar positions have also claimed for one sort or another of ethical intuitionism. On the contrary, 
for Dewey moral knowledge is empirical in its origin and in its outcome as any other form of knowledge. “The 
“ought,” says Dewey, always rises from and falls back into the “is”” (EW3: 105). Therefore, the ““ought” too is 
from intelligence rather than a somewhat let down from supernal flies or sprung from an unearthly trap” (EW3: 
108). Fourth, (d) it seems possible to read in Dewey also the worry that the consequence of a prescriptive 
understanding of moral knowledge could lead to the idea that moral duty is first and foremost a property of 
moral principles (understood as moral axioms) or hypostatized values (Platonism, again), instead of the content 
of a conclusive moral judgment within a particular context. As Dewey points out, “a man's duty is never to obey 
certain rules; his duty is always to respond to the nature of the actual demands which he finds made upon him.” 
In fact, “the “ought” of a moral principle is never its own justification,” since it always depends from the existing 
practical situation and is, in a certain sense, the “outcome” of certain “facts” and concrete relations to men and 
things (EW3: 105; also LW4: 222). As we have seen, the process of deliberation as inquiry consists of using moral 
principles as hypothetical tools instead of as required or necessary rules (LW12: 264-265). Fifth, (e) the 
dichotomy between “is” and “ought” can lead us to neglect the essential importance of inquiry in moral 
problems and to conceive the moral principles either in a purely sentimental way or as fixed, abstract standards. 
On the contrary, “it is only because the “ought” rests upon and expresses the “is” that it is something more than 
vague, ill-directed sentiment or rigid external command” (EW3: 108). 
Dewey states that the following statements are different linguistic formulations of the same moral judgment 
and have therefore the same logical function. 1. “This act will meet the situation” and 2. “The act ought to be 
done” (EW3: 109). He also makes clear that, as we have seen, 3. every genuine proposition about an end-in-view 
                                                            
16 For instance, Gale (2010b: 72-73). Gouinlock (1978: 219; 224) claims that Dewey is not interested in the normative question and in 
the logical function of the “ought.” An ambiguity of interpretation is present in Tiles (2010: 21-22). Romanell 1958 criticizes Dewey's 
epistemic natural monism because a merely experimental method (observation and verification) cannot discover or establish ethical 
norms. Dougherty 1959 defends the possibility of a naturalistic normative ethics and claims that Romanell's objection confuses 
naturalistic social psychology, anthropology and descriptive ethics with normative ethics. My position is close to Rachels (1977: 160-
164). 
17  See also the normative “gap” between “connotation” and “denotation” in Chapter 4. 
 173  
is a “causal proposition” (LW12: 454-456) and that has in its last formulation a “demonstrative reference” 
(LW12: 356-357). These different formulations of the same moral judgment highlight different but equally 
essential aspects of the moral judgment. Point (1) can be easily linked to point (3) as the statement of the factual 
convenience of certain means for an end and the appropriateness of the end to meet the demands of the context. 
Point (2) stresses the logical function of the moral judgment as directive of the new action. We have therefore 
the following: 
 
I. “I ought to drink this water” is equivalent in logical function to 
II. “This x is water” (singular proposition) and “I ought to do Y on this water in order to get the Z as an 
effect” (prescriptive and causal particular proposition). 
 
Both I. and II. are then logically equivalent to 
 
III. “This x is water” and “if I do Y on this water, this water will quench my thirst here and now.” 
 
The objection that III. is a factual provision rather than a moral prescription misses the point of Dewey's 
logic. What we have to remember is that propositions acquire their “logical force” and function within the 
process of inquiry in a context (LW12: 166). A logical function “accrues to” a proposition only when this 
proposition is used within a process of inquiry to reach a definite goal. For instance, material-existential 
propositions within a moral inquiry are not used in their pure declarative or enunciatory function of describing 
or reporting existent conditions, but as an evidential basis (sign) of a possibility of future interaction (LW12: 
252). In the case of a process of deliberation, III. is the propositional content of a moral judgment and 
constitutes therefore a moral “ought,” although this aspect is not linguistically explicit. In Dewey's view, “when a 
linguistic form is separated from the contextual matter of problem-inquiry it is impossible to decide of what 
logical form is the expression” (LW12: 290). It is true that III. can represent the linguistic formulation of content 
of the conclusive judgment of a factual inquiry, but that proposition at the same time would not have the same 
logical function of the one that appears in the moral judgment.  
 
 
 
6. The Aesthetic Aspects of Deliberation and the Notion of Formativity 
 
Dewey refers often to the role of the “aesthetic” in moral life not only in relation to its lived immediacy, but 
also as an essential feature for an adequate understanding of certain aspects of the process of deliberation. Some 
scholars (Gouinlock 1972; 1978; Alexander 1992; 1993; Pappas 2008; Fesmire 1995; 1999; 2003; Gale 2010b) 
have pointed out the implications of aesthetics for the moral life. Gregory Pappas, in particular, highlights the 
importance of the “aesthetic” in the methodological necessity of starting moral reflection from the individuals’ 
immediate experience and not from abstractions (Pappas 2008: 20 ff.). In continuity with these authors, it seems 
to me that it is possible to highlight at least nine further “aesthetic” features of the moral life and reflection. Let 
me list below the nine notions of “aesthetic” that Dewey develops in relation to the moral subject-matter:  
 
(i) The moral problematic situation is characterized by an individualizing problematic quality. This unifying 
quality is the “aesthetic” quality of the problematic moral situation. Paradoxically, in a moral problematic 
situation, the unifying quality is at the same time the symptom of disunity, moral conflict and need for 
reconstruction. 
(ii) The moral problematic situation aims at its own resolution and consummation, which is somehow 
suggested by the individualizing quality. The final consummation to be found and produced is the “aesthetic” 
telos of the problematic moral situation. 
(iii) The process of deliberation requires the use of “qualitative” thought. The qualitative thought might also 
be called “aesthetic” thought. 
(iv) The process of deliberation requires the use of an “aesthetic” attitude, that is, the use of creative 
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imagination.  
(v) The process of deliberation requires the use of “aesthetic” materials, that is, moral instances understood as 
exemplars of ethically good conduct. This aspect of the “aesthetic” dimension of moral deliberation leads us to 
talk of the character of formativity of all the moral examples.  
(vi) The final consummation is not the action simply represented and prescribed in the symbolic content of 
the moral judgment, that is, the moral judgment in its propositional and symbolic stage of constitution, but is the 
actualization or embodiment of that prescription in action. “Aesthetic” means here the actual interaction 
between the agent and her environment in the immediate experience as opposed to a purely symbolic stage of 
the development of the action (e.g. LW10: 139; 178). 
(vii) The final consummation has to be of a certain type in order to be ethically good. It has to produce “the 
growth of the meaning of the present experience” (realization of the best or broader values possible; full 
awareness of these values). The category of “aesthetic” refers here to the moral growth required by an ethically 
good action. 
(viii) The final action has to show an “aesthetic” balance between means and ends, that is, an adequate 
proportion.  
(ix) The final action has to realize a full interest of the agent in her present action. The fully interested 
engagement of an agent with her own activity is an aesthetic character of her agency (LW8: 348). 
 
Although different, there is a common ground that binds together all these meanings of “aesthetic” in morals, 
that is, the reference to the dimension of moral value and to its final embodiment. In this respect, the aesthetic 
and the logical in deliberation coincide in their ultimate telos, which is the actualization of the value needed in 
the present context. In (i), the moral problem arises because a consummatory experience is interrupted, so that it 
is necessary to reconstruct a new moral order in that context. In (ii), the dimension of the moral value is present 
as the moral synthesis required as the telos of the ongoing process of moral inquiry. In (iii), the value refers both 
to the property of ideas of being “felt,” immediate signs for the direction of the development of reasoning, and 
to the fact that the ultimate goal of this process of reasoning is the embodiment of a moral value. In (iv), the 
exercise of imagination aims to perceive the actual in the light of the possible. In the case of moral deliberation, 
the possibility refers to the action that could and ought to be conceived and actualized. In (v), moral examples 
are “formative” of new, possible moral syntheses, in the sense that they constitute standards of action and moral 
attitude that can (and ought) to be taken into consideration as tools for a problematic situation through the 
embodiment of the conceived value. In (vi), the moral value reaches its contextual highest possibility of 
expression in its proper actualization in a point in space and time. In (vii), the meaning of aesthetic refers directly 
to the fundamental property that an action needs to have in order to be a genuine ethical good, that is, growth. 
In (viii), the aesthetic refers to a formal property of balance that needs to be shown by the articulation of means 
and end in every action that is ethically good. Finally, in (ix), perfect interest of the agent in her deeds is the 
realization in the field of everyday life of the artist's full engagement with the means and the products of her 
work. 
Some of these features (vii and viii) are constitutive parts of the fundamental moral ideal that Dewey calls the 
“growth of the meaning of the present experience” (see §9). In this section, I limit the discussion to what I call, 
drawing from Dewey, moral formativity. I believe that moral formativity is a deep and crucial point for a theory 
of metaethics and ethics. This point of intersection between aesthetics, ethics and logic shows that aesthetic 
reflection is close, according to Dewey, to the logical development of deliberation and moral judgment. Points (i) 
and (ii) have been sufficiently explained. Points (iii) and (iv) are explained in 6. Point (vi) has been developed 
throughout all the chapter. Point (xi) is another formal property of a genuine moral act. In this section, therefore, 
it is sufficient to address the problem of the moral exemplarity as “formativity.” Although Dewey addresses the 
problem of what a form is in his Art as Experience, he introduces the notion of formativity in the Logic. As we 
have seen, Dewey explains that the logical forms and properties originate in the ongoing processes of critical 
inquiry, so that the logical principles that a competent inquirer uses are the outcome of the past experience. This 
means that the logical principles are genetically a posteriori in themselves and “operationally a priori” for the 
(competent) inquirer. It is in relation to the notion of operationally a priori that Dewey introduces the category of 
formativity. He says that logical forms and principles, once formulated and critically established, are “formative,” 
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because “they regulate the proper conduct of the activities out of which they develop” (LW12: 21; see Seigfried 
2002). The parallel with the genesis and the role of moral principles and standards is striking. It is interesting, 
therefore, to see the deep connection that lies in relation to formativity at the bottom of the logical, the 
aesthetical and the moral subject-matter. First of all, it is important to point out the nature of the work of art and 
of its function. The reality of the work of art is to play a certain function in experience. For sure, it has an 
independent subsistence as the “completeness of relations within a chosen medium” (LW10: 139). However, its 
full meaning cannot be abstracted from the net of actual and potential interactions that it has or could have with 
the individuals. The nature of the “work” of art consists in its “working.” (LW10: 144). “Only when the 
constituent parts of a whole have the unique end of contributing to the consummation of a conscious 
experience, do design and shape lose superimposed character and become form” (LW10: 122).18 Through art, 
meanings of objects that are otherwise “dumb, inchoate, restricted and, and resisted” are clarified for the artist at 
first and the observer later, since the function of the work of art is the “creation of new experience” (LW10: 
138). In other words, “in esthetic experience … the material of the past … is not employed as a bridge to some 
further experience, but as an increase and individualization of present experience. The scope of the work of art is 
measured by the number and variety of elements coming from past experiences that are organically absorbed 
into the perception had here and now” (LW10: 128). Therefore, the work of art constitutes the realization of a 
“form” in the experience of the artist and in the experience of the perceiver. Through the fruition of the work of 
art, the perceiver has to overcome a problem in his experience just in the same way the artist did in producing 
the work of art. Both in the case of the production and the fruition of the work of art, the people engaged in a 
genuine aesthetic experience re-build their past experiences into new “patterns” (LW10: 143). Since the work of 
art functions as a factor of reconstruction of individuals’ experiences, it is “instrumental as well as final” and its 
appreciation has no final terminal end. When an aesthetic experience occurs thanks to a work of art, “we are 
carried to a refreshed attitude toward the circumstances and exigencies of ordinary experience” (LW10: 144). 
Dewey also writes 
 
Form is a character of every experience that is an experience. Art in its specific sense enacts more 
deliberately and fully the conditions that effect this unity. Form may then be defined as the operation of 
forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment. 
The connection of form with substance is thus inherent, not imposed from without. It marks the matter 
of an experience that is carried to consummation. (LW10: 142) 
 
Dewey says that the content of “an” experience can have exemplar value (LW10: 43) for other similar 
experiences. In other words, an experience is the concrete universal, that is, an exemplar realization of aesthetic 
or moral excellence that is “a part of the acknowledged world,” that is, an existent like anything else that exists 
and, at the same time, an inspiring standard for further experiences of “reconstruction” and “recreation” (LW10: 
112). This function of being an inspiring standard is what I call aesthetic formativity. Dewey is often critical of 
moral casuistry (MW14: 165). This means that we have to understand the essential difference between moral 
casuistry and moral formativity. According to Dewey, casuistry constitutes the worst outcome of an axiomatic 
approach to moral subject-matter, since it brings the fixity and the self-sufficiency of the moral principles straight 
down to the procedural rules in typified context of action. “Casuistry, so called, is simply the systematic effort to 
secure for particular instances of conduct the advantage of general rules which are asserted and believed in.” This 
is to say that casuistry is simply the production of moral axioms, just like in a bad conception of systematic 
theory of morals, but with the further danger that its moral rules have a less vague content and in this sense have 
a stronger pretense on what the particular good of a situation is. On the contrary, moral formativity pertains to 
the appropriate use of moral examples as “instrumental” standards for facing new occasions of action and not as 
ends-in-themselves. In the case of morals, aesthetic formativity applies to the possible function of moral 
examples in order to provide orientation and inspiration in facing new moral problems and free the potentialities 
of value contained in them. The universality of moral examples is not a “monotonous identity” in so far as it 
allows for new interpretations and experiential syntheses. Varying Kant’s formula, it is likely to say that moral 
examples have the status of concrete generalities without concepts. Moral exemplars are “symbols” in so far as 
                                                            
18 Cf. in the same quotation the difference between other objects and the work of art. 
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they are “direct vehicles, concrete embodiments, vital incarnations” (LW1: 72). Saying that they are formative 
means that they are “potential” and productive” (LW1: 89). These examples have however to be continually 
criticized through the experimental, evolutionary (MW2: 3-38) or historical method and its two questions (LW17: 
351-360).19 An existent is a concrete generality only if “it can continuously inspire new personal realizations in 
experience” (LW10: 114-115). From a Deweyan perspective, both the work of art and the moral examples as 
concrete universals “continue to operate in in indirect channels” through the “re-education of vision” that they 
produced in the individual (LW10: 144). 
 
 
 
8. The Continuity or Developmental Unity of Human Agency in Epistemic and Ethical Normativity 
 
The unity and continuity of every moments and parts of human agency is one of the most fundamental tenets 
of Dewey’s approach to the subject. He claims, for instance, that 
 
the key to a correct theory of morality is recognition of the essential unity of the self and its acts. 
(LW7: 288) 
 
The unity can be understood in a weak sense and in a strong sense. According to the weak interpretation, the 
unity and continuity between the self and its acts is a matter of expression. In particular, the act is “unity” with 
the self” (1) because it is the actualization of an end-in-view constructed by the self, and (2) because it is the 
realization of an interpenetration of dispositions, or moral “character,” in a concrete action. The self is not a 
“cause” of the act, as a match is somehow the cause of a fire. This is because the self as the responsible factor 
for the emergence of an act in the world is not external to the act as an effect, but it enters it. In particular, as we 
have just seen, it enters it because the action is the actualization of an intention and volition of the self, and 
because it is the actualization, in different measures according to the situation, of dispositions acquired through 
experience and developed in the character. At this level, the notions of “conduct” and “ character” are very 
instructive (LW7: 168-173). According to Dewey, the notion of “conduct” grasps the agency of the single 
individual in its continuous typicalities, that is, as characterized by more or less stable emotional, cognitive and 
practical dispositions that enter in different measure into every single action. As we have seen, the 
interpenetration of different habits in the agent corresponds to her “character.” It follows that the typical way of 
behaving of an agent, or “conduct,” results from her “character.” More precisely, the notions of “conduct” and 
“character” designate the same reality of the subject, but apprehended from two different points of view: the 
former is the subjective set of dispositions understood as the effect and deposit of the previous actions, while the 
latter is that same interpenetration of dispositions understood as the antecedent of the future actions, as their 
responsible factor. Dewey puts forward a non-atomistic conception of human agency, according to which every 
act is connected to others in a “series” or in a “chain.” This connection is neither of a causal-deterministic type, 
nor of an external causation, but consists in the formation of habits, that is in leaving “an enduring impress on 
the one who performs them, strengthening and weakening permanent tendencies to act.” It does not determine a 
mechanical repetition of certain acts, but the formation of a self of a certain type, whose stability is given by its 
“enduring unity of attitudes and habits.” According to Dewey, self, character, intentions, volitions and concrete 
actions are the different moments of the development of human agency, when “human agency” is appropriately 
considered as a dynamic whole (LW7: 287). Moreover, since the self is an integrated set of habits always in actual 
interaction with the environment, the present action of a self coincides with what that self is at a given point in 
time and space. “The self is what he is doing” (Lectures: 205). Although the topic of this section is limited to the 
problem of the continuity between epistemic and ethical normativity in morals, it is important to hint at the 
problem of practical motivation in order to understand the pivotal role of Dewey's unitary conception of the 
self-in-action. Dewey's conviction is that practical motivation becomes a somehow unsolvable philosophical 
problem when it is addressed on the assumption that the human self is passive in nature. In fact, if one starts 
                                                            
19  Roughly, the two questions are: (1) “What is the genesis of a standardized value?” and “What are the effects of this standardized 
value?”.  
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from an abstract conception of the self as not essentially engaged within experience and action, practical 
motivation becomes a hard problem because it becomes necessary to explain how it is possible that a passive self 
is activated and motivated by an intention. On the contrary, as Dewey argues on both empirical and speculative 
bases, the self is originally in action, at first impulsive and then controlled and intentional.20 This is why desire 
and aspiration accompany the whole process of deliberation and turn the end-in-view into a motivation in actu 
when the self chooses it. 
I turn now to the continuity in human agency exemplified in normativity. I have tried to show throughout the 
previous sections not only the experiential and logical necessity of moral deliberation in producing embodied 
values, but also the deep continuity of experience that lies at the bottom of both consummatory and reflective 
stages of moral life. This continuity is provided by the binding force of value, here as the actual consummatory 
experiences and there as the telos of their reflective reconstruction in deliberation. Experience therefore shows a 
developmental unity in its rhythmic alternation of consummatory moments and reflective endeavors. As I have 
started to show, from the moment in which experience emerges as problematic, human action grows through the 
work of intelligence from a mainly imaginative status to the concrete actuality of the action in the overt world. 
This is the underlying conception of the continuity or developmental unity put forth by Dewey when he claims 
that “theory is the cross-section of the given state of action in order to know the conduct that should be; practice 
is the realization of the idea thus gained: it is theory in action” (EW3: 110; cf. also EW4: 224). We can now 
deepen the nature of this developmental continuity in reference to one classical problem in theories of moral 
deliberation, that is, the problem of the normativity of the moral principles.  
When we talk about normativity in Dewey's ethics, we have to remember that normative criteria apply both 
to the reflective human agent in the role of a moral reasoner and to her in the role of an agent. Dewey writes: 
 
in inquiry a deliberate operation intervenes; first, to select the conditions that are operative, and 
secondly, to institute the new conditions which interact with old ones. Both operations are so 
calculated that as close an approach as possible may be made to determining the exact kind of 
interaction, inclusively and exclusively, necessary to produce a determinate set of consequences. 
(LW12: 288; see also 107-108) 
 
A reflective human agent binds herself to criteria and principles both as a reasoner and as an agent in the 
overt world. In the former case, the principles are strictly speaking logical, while in the second case, the 
principles are moral. More precisely, the agent as a moral reasoner binds herself to standards of action, used as a 
principle of inference in reasoning on moral subject-matter, while she binds herself, at the end of the process of 
inquiry, to a new end-in-view, which synthesizes, if it is the case, those principles into a new consummatory 
experience. In so far as the value represented in the moral principle becomes part of the content of the end-in-
view, the agent binds herself to that principle, as it is applied here and now. 
Moral principles are at first used as “governing” or “leading” principles in moral reasoning, as the principles 
of inference among moral meanings and propositions. In this case, moral principles play the function of 
epistemic principles and have therefore epistemic normativity. In this case, we can speak of logical goodness. Be S a 
reflective human agent, P the governing or leading principles of a process of moral deliberation and C a 
particular problematic context or situation that requires moral deliberation; P is “contextually normative” in C iff 
P successfully allows a “rigorous” and “productive” (LW12: 316) inference from certain vague propositions to a 
proposition that is applicable in C and that indicates an “intelligent” action (LW12: 480). Among these principles 
we find the general principle of “intelligence” (LW12: 480). Dewey also stresses the fact that when a process of 
deliberation is a sound one, the moral principles owned by S are selected on the basis of their relevance for C 
and turned into the logical status of propositions within the process of inquiry. They are tools in the 
reconstruction of a problematic situation. This means that moral principles need first of all to be considered as 
logical principles of a deliberation in dealing with a moral problem in the preparatory steps of the inquiry and 
only later and occasionally as the standard of a morally good action. We can also say that, when a process of 
deliberation is needed, a moral principle always appears at first as a belief for imaginative conduct and only later 
and occasionally as a belief for overt action. Only if it is the case, the process of deliberation establishes that a 
                                                            
20 Cf. Anderson 2010. 
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moral principle is somehow relevant for the reconstruction of the present situation and uses it in order to move 
from a vague proposition or system of propositions about the problem and its possible solutions to an applicable 
one. When a moral principle is actually used as a tool in the production of a conclusive proposition, it becomes 
part of the content of that proposition. When the proposition is acted upon in the conclusion of the deliberation 
(the conclusion of the process of deliberation, or the conclusive moral judgment is the overt action), the 
dimension of value displayed in the “principle” in the form of a proposition becomes embodied in the action. 
This fact shows the singular and most interesting aspect of Dewey's account of moral normativity, in the sense 
that the continuity of the activity of deliberation and overt action is exemplified also in the continuity of the 
contextual normativity of the moral principles used as logical principles of inference and as criteria of the 
experiential moral synthesis in the action. In bringing the process of inquiry to its conclusion and consummation, 
S turns herself into a reflective agent in the overt world. The value hypostatized in a linguistic formulation of a 
“moral principle” (for reasons of communication) has gone through different transformations, from the status of 
a proposition about a hypothetical convenient action, to the status of a leading principle in matters of morals, to 
the content of a moral judgment, to the embodiment in the overt action. Once again, the value is realized 
through different phases and eventually realized in actual, operative interactions between S and certain 
conditions of her environment. Moral principles, therefore, are turned at first into “logical forms” in a moral 
inquiry and only secondarily and eventually into the content of what S ought to do here and now. Again, in other 
words: before the over action, a moral standard can only be a leading principle of inference among propositions 
about moral subject-matter; this logical function is pushed up to its extreme consequences, when the moral 
judgment is produced; when the overt action is performed, the moral standard does not play its role of 
inferential principle anymore but is applied and becomes realized as an actual value. Inquiry and moral judgment 
are for Dewey “practical” in nature, so that the final overt action is only the final realization of an activity that 
has started before as “dramatic rehearsal.” From the outset to the extinction of a problematic situation, then, 
human agency grows from the form of a deliberation about what to do (which includes not only cognitions, but 
also feelings, sympathy, imagination, etc.) to the final consummation of the overt deed. This developmental 
dynamic is also apparent in the case of normativity, in which a moral principle grows from the status of logical 
principle about moral subject-matter to the one of eventual component of the final action judged to be ethically 
normative here and now for an agent. 
When deliberation has established that a certain context requires the application of a certain moral principle, 
that moral principle becomes the content of the end-in-view. In this case, the moral principle has an ethical 
normativity in the context, in the sense that its intelligibility is required to become part of the intelligence in action 
through the effort of the self. Epistemic normativity has turned into ethical normativity and will become an 
ought-to be in action here and now. In this case, we can talk of moral goodness. Be S a reflective human agent, 
X the content of her moral judgment and C a particular problematic context or situation that requires moral 
deliberation and action; X is “contextually normative” in C iff X brings about new conditions which will produce 
in C a desired actual interaction between S and her environment, whose qualities (new actualizations in her 
immediate experience) (1) remove the problem that initiated the process of deliberation, (2) actualize all the 
possible values, required by C, in removing the problem and (3) foster or at least do not hinder habits other 
values, according to the ideal of the “growth of the meaning of the present experience.” I take (1), (2) and (3) to 
be the analysis of the content of the principle of the “growth of the meaning of the present experience.” 
 
The whole process of working out ends, of selecting means, of estimating moral values, of 
recognizing duty, is, as we have seen, one of activity at every point; it is dynamic and propulsive 
throughout. The deed is simply this activity focused, brought to a head. The deed is the activity, 
concluded; it is the “round up,” and in this conclusion at once (1) defined, marked out, and (2) 
unified. (EW4: 337) 
 
It is true that from a pragmatic viewpoint, epistemic and ethical normativity are not two different domains of 
the normativity of deliberative agency, but instead two moments in the development of the normativity of the 
moral judgment in context. In fact, reasoning is as deliberate a conduct as intentionally raising one's arm, so that 
the ethical question is somehow essential to both cases. However, the continuity between thinking and acting 
(overtly in the world) does not mean that functional differences cannot be found. In this case, the functional 
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difference lies in the fact that, within the same deliberative process, the moral principles are at first epistemic 
instruments of individuation of the problem and of hypothetical resolution of it and only eventually and if it the 
case applied factors in the intelligent, final reconstruction of the situation through a concrete deed. 
 
 
 
8. Moral Progress and Epistemic Ethical Fallibilism in the Light of Dewey's Ethical Contextualism 
 
In the previous sections, I have stressed the centrality that the embodied value plays in Dewey's 
understanding of moral deliberation at each one of its stages, both as a telos or as an actual realization. It seems 
to me that the concept of embodied value is also crucial in order to fully understand the reasons of Dewey's 
doctrines of moral progress and ethical fallibilism. A first element necessary to understand Dewey's views on 
ethics is his conception of moral progress. Some authors have stressed the fact that looking for an ultimate ideal 
or grounding value in Dewey's ethics is to misinterpret his radical reconstruction of the real needs of lived moral 
life, moral psychology and of the status of the systematic theory of morals.21 For sure, this interpretative caution 
is correct in the case of three particular understanding of “ultimate” ideals and values, that is, when a moral value 
coincides with a specific end-in-view, when a moral principle is understood as a moral axiom and when a moral 
value is worshiped as an immutable Platonic entity. However, as a matter of fact, Dewey presents two clear 
claims about the ultimate moral ideal of human conduct. The first is expressed in A Study of Ethics, in which 
Dewey claims that ideal of human conduct consists in the realization of the “concrete individuality” of the self 
(EW4: 357). The second is contained in Human Nature and Conduct and Ethics, and states that the ultimate ideal of 
self-control is the “growth of the meaning of the present experience” (MW14: 182; 194; 196). Both these claims 
are better understood as formulations of the ideal of moral progress, individual and social. A second element 
necessary to understand Dewey's stance is his epistemic fallibilism in ethics (ethical fallibilism now on). 
According to him, every moral principle and standard not only emerge from experience, but can also be 
reformed and eventually abandoned on the basis of new contextual experiences. For Dewey, even logical 
principles are “provisional” in their validity for inquiry, so that logic itself is a “progressive” discipline (LW12: 
21). As we have seen, the propositional function of moral principles is to be linguistic “tools” for the 
reconstruction of the indeterminate situation, that is, for the realization of the new experiential synthesis required 
by the situation. If the moral principles and their correlative ends are instead used as moral axioms or ends-in-
themselves, the new experiential synthesis is not an intelligent response to the objective needs of the situation, 
but the reproduction of old behavioral patterns. Dewey’s ethical fallibilism claims that, in the progress of our 
knowledge and moral self-awareness, there are “relative discontinuity or nodal points” that can lead us to revise 
drastically our moral principles and standards (EW4: 317), both in our individual and social experience. In this 
section, I claim that Dewey's idea of radical fallibilism in ethics makes the pair with his broader conception of 
moral progress and civilization and can be understood only within this framework. His ethical fallibilism, 
however, does not entail that is not possible to find genuine values and ideals (in inquiry and in the other 
dimensions of human conduct) that are continuous through different and successive contexts. In other words, 
Dewey’s ethical fallibilism and contextualism does not imply an immediate rejection of cross-contextual 
principles. 
It seems to me that there are three common mistakes in the interpretation of Dewey’s ethical fallibilism and 
conceptions of ethical ideals. The first mistake is that, since Dewey is a moral contextualist or situationalist, 
therefore it is impossible on his assumptions to find moral ideals and principles which are entitled to claim a 
normative authority also beyond a limited set of particular contexts.22 It seems that the pragmatist rejection of 
external and meta-contextual principles, together with the fundamental idea of contextual application, leads 
sometimes to the rejection of the possibility of cross-contextual moral principles, or moral principles that are 
continuous through different and successive contexts. However, even if we keep firm the essential importance of 
the contextual genesis and applicability of all moral principles, this assumption does not imply that there cannot 
                                                            
21 See in particular Pappas (2008: 58); Putnam (2002: 98); Carden (2006: 49). 
22  This is the interpretation given for instance by Barhurst 2002, who sees in Dewey the forerunner of contemporary moral 
particularism. 
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be abstract principles that, in their abstraction, have a cross-contextual normative authority and apply to all the 
possible subject-matters encountered in particular situations. Of course, the principle in its abstractness is the 
result of a historical work of scientific refinement of moral experiences and standards and not an a priori intuited 
absolute model of goodness. At the same time, it does not constitute a “workable” end-in-view directly, but it 
requires the agent's reflective mediation in the use of that principle to reconstruct an individual situation. 
However, in its abstractness, the moral principle can have a cross-contextual normative force. Generalization can 
lead, even from a pragmatistic viewpoint, to the establishment of a cross-contextual ideal. Dewey observes: 
 
Abstraction is the heart of thought; there is no way—other than accident —to control and enrich 
concrete experience except through an intermediate flight of thought with conceptions, relations, 
abstracta. What I regret is the tendency to erect the abstractions into complete and self-subsistent 
things, or into a kind of superior Being. (LW 7:216; cf. also LW7: 343) 
 
The ideal of moral progress, in both its formulations, is exactly a cognitive abstraction that plays its 
instrumental crucial role in helping the reconstruction of each indeterminate situation and the realization of new, 
appropriate experiential syntheses. This ideal is an abstract principle that has, at the same time, normative 
authority in all contexts and directive power in the deliberative process.23 
The second mistake is to understand ethical fallibilism only in a weak sense. One first point to make is that 
ethical fallibilism does not cover those cases in which a principle that seems to be prima facie normative turns out 
to be not the case in a particular deliberation after some reflection on it, like e.g. in Aristotle, Aquinas and W. D. 
Ross. As we have seen, this is more a problem of the appropriate selection and application of a moral principle 
in a particular case rather than a problem of its general fallibility. Dewey's point is more radical because it entails 
that a moral principle might lose its normative value not only in limited contexts but also in general. For 
instance, we can say that the moral principle (i) “be loyal to all the members of your community” is fallible in a 
weak sense since it ought not to be selected and applied in the case in which a member of my community is 
planning an attack against some other members of the same community. However, this falsificatory instance 
does not imply that the moral principle has lost its general normative authority. It only means that in this 
particular case other moral principles and concern have a priority over it, e.g., “promote the well being of all the 
members of the community.” It is true that the moral principle (i) will be conceived in a somewhat different way 
after that situation, but this will be only the occasion for a better comprehension and growth of the meaning of 
the same principle, since a better understanding and formulation of X requires a continuity in its normative 
content and authority. The principle “be loyal to all the members of your community” will still be a moral 
principle after the example provided. This feature of ethical fallibilism also marks a difference between the 
generalizations of natural sciences and the generalizations of a scientific ethics. If a scientific law in one of the 
natural sciences is not confirmed in an experiment, it means either that the experimental conditions are 
inaccurate or that the law has to be revised/relativized (or rejected, in extreme cases). On the contrary, if a moral 
principle Y is not furthered here and now in a moral judgment, this fact does not mean that there is something 
wrong with the moral principle Y. If the deliberation is a sound one, the fact that Y is not applied here and now 
only means that this is not the case for Y and that the realization of other values is required. In the Logic, Dewey 
makes clear that the theory of inquiry neither excludes the possibility of cross-contextual principles, nor the fact 
that the irrelevance of a principle in a particular situation implies that it ought to be rejected. He says:   
 
But when it is found that there are habits involved in every inference, in spite of differences of 
subject-matter, and when these habits are noted and formulated, then the formulations are guiding or 
leading principles. The principles state habits operative in every inference that tend to yield 
conclusions that are stable and productive in further inquiries. Being free from connection with any 
particular subject-matter they are formal, not material, though they are forms of material that is 
subjected to authentic inquiry. Validity of the principles is determined by the coherency of the 
consequences produced by the habits they articulate. If the habit in question is such as generally 
produces conclusions that are sustained and developed in further inquiry, then it is valid even if in an 
                                                            
23 However, there are scholars who acknowledge this point. Welchman (2010: 183-184) distinguishes in Dewey between “thin-cross 
cultural” and “thick context-dependent” moral concept. Cf. also Hook 1959; Callan 1982; Pekarsky (1990; 1991); Pappas 2008 has the 
most refined and articulated appraisal of this point. 
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occasional case it yields a conclusion that turns out invalid. (LW12: 22) 
 
As it is clear, this account of the role played by “habits” and “principles” in inquiry applies to moral principles 
and virtues as well. Dewey's epistemic moral fallibilism implies a strong fallibilism, in the sense that moral 
principles might eventually lose their normative authority not in isolated cases, but in general. This claim leads to 
the third possible mistake in the interpretation of Dewey's ethics, in relation to the broad philosophical ground 
on which the notion of fallibilism makes sense. This possible mistake results from the understanding of the 
notion of fallibilism without reference to the idea of moral progress and civilization. Dewey's radical 
experimentalist approach, including discovery and self-correctiveness as its essential features, entails a substantive 
fallibilism in moral knowledge as in any other field of human knowledge. Two initial considerations can be in 
place here. Dewey's fallibilist claim is easily understandable in relation to the case of detailed procedural rules of 
conduct and of social institutions. As it is shown in “The Evolutionary Method as Applied to Morality” and in 
other texts, the analysis of the conditions and the consequences of a social practice enables us to assess that value 
scientifically. However, this position might sound odd in the case of abstract moral principles. Are the moral 
principles “be loyal to all the members of your community” and “a peaceful community is better than a 
belligerent one” fallible? Dewey's answer is positive. However, the plausibility of this stance can be shown if 
some philosophical ghosts are ruled out. First, a radical fallibilism in ethics does not imply that all or some of the 
moral principles that we consider correct at the present time will turn out to be wrong. It only entails that, in 
principle, any one moral standard might lose its normative authority on the basis of further experience. Second, 
some critiques might argue that this epistemic position represents the logic ground of ethical relativism. On the 
contrary, it seems to me that Dewey aims to account for the possibility of a genuine development of moral 
practices and knowledge once we have established that an intuitive knowledge of a priori moral principles and 
values is impossible. Therefore, this position does not require that the moral principle “be loyal to all the 
members of your community” will be falsified, although it does not deny this eventual possibility. In general, it 
represents a broader account of how human knowledge in all fields develops and ought to be furthered in 
experimental spirit.  
If it is true that Dewey claims that moral “forms,” just like “logical forms,” originate through human practices 
within precise contexts and sets of conditions, it is possible and maybe likely that new “forms” will develop as 
experiential and moral novelties in the future through new interactions of conditions and practices. Therefore, 
Dewey's main concern in developing the idea of fallibilism in ethics is to stress the fact of the historical process 
of civilization and of its moral products. It is not unlikely that in the first phases of the history of humankind the 
conditions of life led individuals to belligerent and violent moral habits and social standards, which could be 
hardly assimilated to moral principles of benevolence. Moral progress and civilization developed, on the basis of 
new conditions (environmental, social, political, economical, scientific and religious), through the experience of 
new valuable “qualities” and the reformation or substitution of old standards with new ones. At a certain point in 
the history of mankind, the belief that the other human being was only a resource for one's interests has been 
questioned by the perception of the value of the other person in her individuality, although at certain conditions, 
e.g. the bindings of blood. In this sense, the former moral standard “all the living beings, including the human 
beings, are an instrumental resource for my survival” was somehow falsified by new social experiences in which 
the exceeding value of the human being appeared for the first time on earth. A new standard, such as “a human 
being cannot be subjugated to my will and interests,” took its place in the mentality of a community at a certain 
moment of the development of history. As I will show in the last section, Dewey's idea is that certain 
experiences, with their inner teleologies and their defying fulfilling “qualities,” are possible as immediate value 
experiences only within a certain context, that is, under certain historical and anthropological conditions, so that, in a 
certain sense, if those conditions do not occur, the relative experiences and qualities are not even possible. Quality 
is the individualizing feature of an experience, as we have seen. We have also seen that an experience is 
essentially characterized by a dynamic structure as a development towards a final consummation. Its structure is 
a telos. Therefore, the emergence of a new quality through a new interaction implies the introduction of a new 
telos. In fact, says Dewey, life is “a thing of histories, each with its own plot, its own inception and movement 
towards its close” (LW10: 43). These histories evolve together with the development of new interactive 
conditions. New experiences, qualities and telos are made possible by new interactions. The notions of moral 
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progress and civilization are very instructive in this regard. On the one hand, Dewey seems to deny the 
possibility of moral progress, or at least to question it. In a passage, after criticizing reductionist moral 
philosophers who consider the morality of benevolence to be “illusory” because it is temporally subsequent and 
somehow causally determined by the “savage morality” of a previous phase in history, Dewey writes: 
 
The idealist falls into exactly the same error from the other end. He assumes that the last thing has 
a superior and a finer value, and that everything that has gone before has to be interpreted as a sort of 
half-baked inadequate attempt to get what we have now gotten. The significant thing is the process of 
moralization and that process shows itself both in primitive morality and in such morals as we have 
now. There is no more finality attaching to our present stock of ethical conceptions. The only thing 
that does have finality is the relation between the process, between a situation, and a certain way of 
looking at that situation which exists now and all the time. (LW17: 359-360) 
 
In this text, the idea of moral progress seems to be undermined by a radical moral particularism. Similarly, in 
another passage, Dewey claims that “in the strict sense of the term, there has been no evolution of morality” 
(LW17: 393). However, these statements do not coincide with a rejection of the reality and possibility of moral 
progress. In fact, Dewey is not arguing against the idea of moral progress as such, but against a certain 
conceptions of history and its implicit conception of moral civilization. In particular, he is arguing against the 
Hegelian view of history as a teleological development toward a final revelation of an absolute moral goodness. 
According to Dewey, the crucial mistake of this theory of history is that it does not take into account the notion 
of context and its constitutive conditions. If the context is the center of the moral life, a final, perfect realization 
of moral goodness to which the past epochs are mere instruments of realization or tentative approximations is a 
metaphysical myth. Similarly, just like Hume maintains, the fact that a perfect, final realization of moral goodness 
does not exist entails that there cannot be an a-historical or meta-historical moral model for assessing the 
instances of behavior of different epochs. It is at this level that the notion of context plays its crucial role in 
relation to the possibility of talking about a linear moral progress and of assessing different cultures from a 
unique viewpoint. Deweyan contextualism means that it is only within a concrete context, which is a system of 
interactive historical conditions, that certain consummatory experiences are possible and can emerge as such. Of 
course, it also implies that within certain historical conditions, certain teleologies and “qualitative” fulfillments 
are simply impossible. For instance, the value that a human being as such is a subject of moral dignity becomes 
possible as a consummatory experience (a “quality” as a causal value) and can be eventually established and endorsed as a 
normative value through a reflective process (moral or reflective value) only if a specific set of conditions have 
developed, e.g., a certain history of struggle for the survival, a certain welfare and social stability, a certain kind of 
exchange among different communities, a certain critical and intelligent attitude, etc. At the same time, this claim 
also implies that without these conditions a particular value is not possible neither as a causal value, nor as a 
reflective value. In this case, the context is a set of historical interactive conditions that make possible the 
consummatory experience “every man is a subject of moral dignity,” that is, the experience in which different 
factors operate, as a new teleology, towards the possibility of experiencing the moral dignity of each human 
being as their own fulfilling “quality.” The other side of this conception is that every particular context has its 
own conditions of consummatory experience and therefore in a certain sense its own moral standards. Dewey 
writes that human beings have to trust “either the world and themselves to realize the values and qualities which 
are the possibility of nature” (LW4: 240). An agent is supposed to meet the moral standards that spring out of 
the consummatory experiences that are possible in her historical context and not a somewhat “external” and 
meta-contextual moral ideal. In this sense, every historical context and epoch has its own moral ideal and its 
moral outcomes need to be assessed according to its own experiential possibilities. Of course, the real, genuine 
moral standards of a historical context is not identical in principle with the social institutions accepted in it. In 
fact, as Dewey stresses over and over, socially accepted moral values and standards might be inadequate to the 
new emerging and not yet acknowledged moral possibilities of a situation. As a consequence, this approach 
implies that different historical contexts and epochs are incommensurable only if we think that a common, 
external and meta-historical model of moral goodness is needed to compare them. In this sense, different 
historical contexts have their own standards of moral excellence and they can all be examples of morality at the 
same title. 
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In another text, however, Dewey not only affirms that moral progress is possible, but also states its most 
momentous stages. According to this reconstruction of the history of moral civilization, the turning points of 
moral civilization have been 1. the replacement of superstition with “intelligence” as the appropriate tool to 
address moral problems and the correspondent “faith” in experience,24 2. “the widening, the extension of the 
field, of the area of human beings between whom moral relations exist” and a sense of “sympathy” beyond the 
limits of restricted communities, 3. the development of a “uniform, impersonal standard and ideal of action,” 
that is, the ideal of justice, which takes the place of narrow social institutions and standards, and 4. the 
“democratic ideal,” understood as the “respect and the reverence for the capacities of the individual, because 
there is something unique in him not found in others” (LW17: 395-400). Although the realization of these ideals 
is an ongoing process that shows many shortcomings, it is true that modern societies are “sensitive, as the people 
in the past … were not.” This movement in history constitutes therefore a moral progress, but neither because 
the appearance of the values of equality and moral dignity among all human beings, justice, intelligence and 
democracy, are the actualization of an “external,” meta-historical or final, moral goodness, nor because human 
beings at that point in time finally realized those values that have always been there ready to be realized. The 
point is that only the occurrence of new interactive conditions makes certain consummatory experiences possible, so 
that they can become new moral habits and standards through moral reflection if it is the case. This point shows 
the essence of the connection between fallibilism and moral progress. Dewey's concern is to show that the 
appearance of the conditions for the experience of, let us say, the moral dignity of a human being outside the 
limits of one's family, clan and community, constitutes a “relative discontinuity or nodal points” with the 
previous phases of history. The discontinuity is strengthened when these value experiences are reflected upon, 
put in relation to other experiences and values and thus turned into new moral, normative values and standards. 
This evolutionary and developmental process concerns the life of people and communities in different epochs as 
much as the life of single individuals in the same epoch. In the process of moral reflection, these new moral 
“qualities” and “consummations” (e.g., the consummatory experience of the moral dignity of a man as such) are 
judged to be the right consequences to produce, or the right ways of organizing deliberately and practically the 
conditions of the present context. The experience of the moral dignity of the human being beyond familiar, 
political and religious circles was at that time a new, teleological value “quality” whose experience was enabled by 
the new contextual conditions. When human beings reflectively established a new set of values, the previous 
moral principle (a) “a man who does not belong to my clan does not have moral dignity” was substituted by (b) 
“every man has moral dignity.” This shift from (a) to (b) marks the abandonment of (a) and is an example of the 
fallibility of a moral principle. 
A new individual situation might bring about new interactive conditions and therefore new teleologies and 
consummatory experiences. Among all the possible teleologies and consummatory experiences of a context, it is 
the agent's responsibility to reflectively select the most appropriate and develop them into moral values, if it is 
the case. The priority of the causal consummatory experience, however, is not only temporal, but also epistemic 
sometimes. This means for sure that there is a continuity, deeper than the discontinuity, between causal moral 
values and reflective values, so that “appraising … represents a more or less systematized development of what is 
already present in prizing” (LW15: 105; cf. also MW3: 166). However, it also means that the qualitative 
experience of certain teleologies and consummations has the experiential power to lead the agent to the reflective 
resolution that these teleologies and consummation have to be preferred to others or have to substitute old ones. 
In other words, these qualitative experiences might play the function of the evidential ground (in an anti-
foundationalist and anti-intuitionalist sense) for the production of new reflective moral values. Dewey writes: 
 
There are values, goods, actually realized upon a natural basis – the goods of human association, 
of art and knowledge. The idealizing imagination seizes upon the most precious things found in 
climacteric moments of experience and projects them. We need no external criterion and guarantee of 
their goodness. They are had, they exist as good, and out of them we frame our ideal ends. (LW9: 33) 
 
The consummatory experience “every human being has moral dignity” is a clear instance of the “goods of 
                                                            
24 See LW1: 174-175 on the relation between “myths and fancies” and experimental intelligence are different ways to perform the same 
function of control on experience. The shift from the former to the latter marks an improvement, so that following superstitious 
methods is a flaw in addressing any question and problem.    
 184  
human association” that might be experienced (“realized”) as a causal consummation (“upon a natural basis”). 
This experience might constitute a sufficient experiential authority in itself, without the need to an “external 
criterion and guarantee,” for playing also the role of the epistemic ground for its transformation into a moral 
reflective value. According to the claim contained in this text, the experience of certain “qualities,” teleologies 
and consummations, might constitute itself the ground on which an old value is replaced by a new one. The 
continuity of moral experience between valuings and evaluation is given by the diffuse presence of “intelligence,” 
although in different fashions throughout all experience.25 Dewey writes that 
 
Critical appreciation, and appreciative, warmly emotionalized criticism occur in every matured sane 
experience. After the first dumb, formless experience of a thing as a good, subsequent perception of 
the good contains at least a germ of critical reflection. For this reason, and only for this reason, 
elaborate and formulated criticism is subsequently possible. The latter, if just and pertinent, can but 
develop the reflective implications found within appreciation itself. Criticism would be the most wilful 
of undertakings if the possession and enjoyment of good objects had no element of memory and 
foresight in it; if it lacked all circumspection and judgment. Criticism is reasonable and to the point, in 
the degree in which it extends and deepens these factors of intelligence found in immediate taste and 
enjoyment. (LW1: 300) 
 
One more point needs to be addressed here, namely, the nature of ethical novelty. I have talked about new 
interactive conditions of a context and consequent possibilities of new consummatory experiences and moral 
values. The contextual “novelty” here referred to as one of the most fundamental factors in the process of moral 
progress is a particular type of novelty, and not the undifferentiated and unqualified novelty that characterizes an 
interaction simply considered from the viewpoint of its existence. In fact, from a strictly metaphysical viewpoint, 
every single interaction of a set of conditions is an absolute novelty. Take the example of the presence of some 
water here and now. “This water” that emerges here and now from the interaction of certain conditions is an 
absolute individuality and novelty, “just as if it were a special creation made by the deity, and when it is gone it 
does not come back. When we get water again it is another water, so far as its existence is concerned” (LW17: 
355). Therefore, also in the case of value experiences, it is true that from a Deweyan metaphysical viewpoint 
every individual instance of “qualitative” consummation at the end of an experience within a certain context is an 
absolute novelty in the world. As this individual existent consummatory interaction, it did not exist before, and 
will not occur ever again. However, although the “quality” of this individual interaction is every time a 
metaphysical novelty, this type of novelty is not relevant in all cases in relation to the problem of moral progress. 
In fact, most of the time a new consummatory is reconnected to past experiences on the basis of the agent's 
habits of memory and imagination. In this case, the new interaction produces a consummatory “quality” that is 
the new instance of the same type of a past value experience. That is to say, the interactive conditions of a 
context allow new instances of old types of consummatory experiences, or at most complications and variations 
of those, but do not make possible new types of qualitative and consummatory experiences. In this case, a new 
consummatory experience in its individual existence represents an absolute novelty from a metaphysical 
viewpoint, but from the point of view of the type of consummatory experience, it only means the reproduction 
of an old pattern. For instance, for a certain period of time in the history of humankind, the interactive 
conditions only allowed a certain type of consummatory experience in relation to the moral status of a human 
being and its normative value, e.g., (i) “only the members of my community have moral dignity.” As a 
consequence, every case of consummatory experience and moral deliberation in that context in relation to the 
moral status of the human beings was only the new application of the same moral principle (i) and the new 
occurrence of the value experience implied in it. It is true that the meaning of a moral principle grows through its 
actualizations/embodiments, but in this case the possible growth is only a variation or complication of the same (i). 
Nevertheless, as it happened in the history of humankind, the development of contextual conditions can bring 
about the emergence of new types of experiences and teleologies, that is, new types of “qualitative” 
consummations, and therefore the possible institution of new moral values through reflection. If Dewey is 
neither a general consequentialist, nor an utilitarian, it is not correct to say that the full structure of his fallibilism 
                                                            
25 Cf. Jung (2010: 153-154) points out that language and reflection is the “reflective articulation of what is already operative in the form 
of bodily actions schemas and preconscious volitions.” 
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in ethics is exemplified, for example, by the idea that at a certain point in history the moral principle (i) turned 
out to be a bad means for a certain desired, fixed consequence, that is, for a fixed consummatory goal, say, the 
maintenance of well being of the members of the same community. In this case, since the denial of the status of 
moral dignity to the members of different communities brings about potentially harmful tensions between a 
different community and my community, the principle (i) has to be abandoned because it is a bad means for the 
realization the consummatory goal “preserving or improving the well being of all the members of my 
community.” Of course, this utilitarian structure in the assessment of a moral principle is a component of the logic 
of moral assessment and is well exemplified in the case of the consideration of the usefulness of highly 
specialized moral standards, social institutions and technical procedures in varying historical contexts. However, 
to state that this utilitarian logic is the chore of Dewey's ethical fallibilism is to deny the possibility of a genuine 
consummatory novelty in value experiences on the basis of the development of the contextual conditions and human 
intelligence. It also means to reduce Dewey's understanding of the novelty in experience to a mere occasion for 
instrumental improvement of old moral consummatory goals. In the example provided, a genuine growth from 
(i) to (ii) “all human beings have moral dignity” requires a novelty in experience that is neither the mere 
metaphysical novelty of a new individual existent, nor the perception of a new means for an old type of 
consummation, but a novelty as the possibility of a new type of “qualitative” consummation or value experience. 
In other words, at a certain point in history, thanks to certain contextual conditions, the consummatory 
experience of the human beings outside one's community not as a thread or an instrumental resource but as 
“equally dignified” human beings became possible. This fact represents a radical novelty in experience as a new 
type of consummation or value experience, and starts the work of reflection in order to put it in relation with 
other experiences and values and try to figure out whether this new “problematic” good is a genuine good, 
entitled to replace the previous one. 
 
 
 
8.1. “Faith” in Experience 
 
A comprehensive account of Dewey’s ethical fallibilism has to take into consideration the role of “faith” in 
experience. “Faith” in experience means that experience has the power and the resources to lead the inquirer to the 
development of appropriate strategies of inquiry and to eventual successful conclusions in inquiry. In relation to 
this point, Dewey claims that “common experience is capable of developing from within itself methods which 
will secure direction for itself and will create inherent standards of judgment and value” (LW1: 41). Of course, 
the faith in experience is not an assumption or blind postulate. On the contrary, it is a broad characterization of 
human experience resulting, through generalization, from innumerable instances in which human beings have 
inquired into particular problems and have found in experience itself the resources for developing, correcting 
and making the same inquiries somehow successful. In particular, the principle of faith in experience can refer to 
four different cases. 
(i) Development of the appropriate epistemic attitudes and viewpoints. A prolonged and honest inquiry into moral 
problems has the power to discover the attitudes and viewpoints from which both means and ends ought to be 
judged and selected in deliberation. “Intelligent inquiry” is the product of a cumulative process of experience 
over generations and varies in nature according to the viewpoints adopted.26 In a sense, superstition also 
represents an intelligent conduct, in so far as it prescribes certain attitudinal standards and requires their 
endorsement in activity. However, “intelligence” as a process of inquiry whose normative criteria are 
intesubjectively produced through experience, tested in experience and open to indefinite process of self-
correction, is only a late achievement. Experimental intelligence is therefore to be preferred to superstitious 
behavior because it constitutes a better viewpoint in addressing indeterminate situations and in producing 
solutions to them. 
Dewey writes that 
                                                            
26  In order to overcome Moore’s naturalist fallacy argument, Rachels (1977: 169) provides a Deweyan clarification of moral “good” 
based on the centrality of the viewpoint assumed: X is good iff “X is such that would be desired by someone who had considered, 
intelligently and without prejudice, X’s nature and consequences.” 
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one can only see from a certain standpoint, but this fact does not make all standpoints of equal 
value. A standpoint which is nowhere in particular is an absurdity. But one may have an affection for a 
standpoint which gives a rich and ordered landscape rather than for one from which things are seen 
confusedly and meagerly. (LW6: 14-15) 
 
On the basis of real cases, men have judged that addressing a moral problem with an experimental attitude is 
better than addressing it with a superstitious one because it produces more effective solutions of it (the solutions 
meet the needs of the situations more effectively) and because it enables us to experience things in a way that 
would not be possible otherwise. The issue of the correct attitude and the viewpoint in moral inquiry is so 
important that Dewey claims that “the question of method to be used in judging existing customs and policies 
proposed is of greater moral significance than the particular conclusion reached in connection with any one 
controversy” (LW7: 338). These general viewpoints can of course be formulated in abstract principles, such as 
“adopt an experimental attitude in inquiry,” “be open-minded and ready to change your convictions on the basis 
of experience,” etc. Experimental intelligence is primarily for Dewey, as it is for Peirce, not a procedural matter, 
but a virtue, an attitude in experience. Pappas synthesizes these virtues in openness, courage, sensitivity, 
conscientiousness and sympathy (2008: 187 ff.). He also stresses the virtues of trust (2008: 239), responsibility, 
humility, love of learning, forgiveness and compassion as present in Dewey's work but somehow 
underemphasized (2008: 265-266).27 
(ii) Development of the appropriate specific criteria of inquiry in a subject-matter. The intelligent inquiry into a morally 
problematic situation has the power to lead the agent to discover (and to develop/reform when and if it is 
necessary) the specific criteria and principles according to which inquiry in a certain subject-matter ought to be 
performed. Also “wide sympathy, keen sensitiveness, persistence in the face of the disagreeable, balance of 
interest enabling us to undertake the work of analysis and decision intelligently are the distinctively moral traits – 
the virtues of moral excellencies” (MW12: 173-174). As we have seen, this feature is also important for Peirce’s 
epistemic pluralism. As far as moral inquiry is concerned, the principle of “democracy,” the principle of “justice” 
and the ideal of the “growth of the meaning of the present experience” belong to this category.  
(iii) Development of new means for old moral values. 
(iv) Development of new consummatory experiences that become new moral values. This is the case of the substitution of 
the moral principle “a human being who does not belong to my clan does not have moral dignity” with the other 
principle “every human being has moral dignity.” (I will focus on this point in the next section.) 
 
The content of the principle of faith in experience is therefore that experience itself, and, in particular, every 
individual situation or context, has the resources to instruct the inquirer to find (i), (ii), (iii) and (iv). This is the 
meaning of the claim that the individual situation is “the controlling factor” in Dewey's view, “namely the 
function of a problematic situation in regulating as well as in evoking inquiry” (LW14: 44). In all the four points, 
faith in experience implies that an attentive and sensitive attitude towards a situation can bring consummatory 
experiences and knowledge that exceed all the previous consummatory experiences and all the information 
contained in the previous standards and principles of the agent. It is this conception of the function played by 
the individual situations that determines Dewey's ethical fallibilism and opens the possibility of moral progress. 
At the same time, however, Dewey's claims about ethical fallibilism have to be contextualized within his theory 
and put in place. As we have seen, the fact that all the “forms” developed through experience (logical, ethical, 
aesthetic, etc.) are fallible in principle does not entail that they are falsified now or that they will be falsified. The 
most important case of a form that seems to be non-fallible is the “form” exemplified by the habit of 
experimental intelligence and by the principles that codify it. Dewey acknowledges this when he claims that 
“since reflection is the instrumentality of securing freer and more enduring goods, reflection is a unique intrinsic 
good. Its instrumental efficacy determines it to be a candidate for a distinctive position as an immediate good, 
since beyond other goods it has power of replenishment and fructification” (LW1: 303-304). The falsification of 
the principle of experimental intelligence and of the virtues related to it on the basis of experience is self-
                                                            
27 Cf. also Honneth (1998: 702-703). He stresses the same point but is critical of Dewey since the openness to others as an effect of 
sympathy is not warranty of universality. In this sense, Dewey's revised notion of sympathy cannot be a translation of the Kantian 
categorical imperative. 
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contradictory. In fact, the experimental viewpoint described in (i) is not fallible, since 1. the hypothetical 
discovery of its falsification presupposes its use and 2. the future possibility of improving attitudes, standards, 
means and values relies on the exercise of it, since experimental intelligence is the “tool” that enables to modify 
all the other tools of inquiry. The moral criteria and principles exemplified in (ii) are fallible, since, for example, it 
is not self-contradictory to conceive a situation in which the intelligent behavior does not coincide with the 
respect of the individuality of each human being. Although the fallibility of these principles is highly unlikely, 
they are nevertheless fallible and constantly open to revision thanks to the experimental attitude. In particular, 
the principle of the growth does not seem fallible, since it is the immediate translation in the field of morals of 
the principle of experimental intelligence. The discovery of new means and new moral values on the basis of the 
discovery of new consummatory experiences and teleologies is always possible and therefore the prescriptions of 
particular means and values are fallible. The point to stress here is that all the possible discoveries are determined 
by the individual situation, which therefore plays a regulative, teleological function in every inquiry and which 
furnishes to the agent the possibility of growth in knowledge, action and consummatory experience in relation to 
all the points stated above. 
 
 
 
8.2. Metaphysical Condition, Sensitivity Condition, and Reflective Condition in Contextual 
Normativity 
 
The fact that ethical normativity is context-dependent means that moral values are in a sense functions of a 
context. I have already shown that the contextual normativity of certain moral values, in the form of moral 
principles, means that it is the individual nature of a problematic situation that asks for the application of certain 
moral principles instead of others. In this section, I aim to show a deeper meaning of the relevance of context 
for the emergence of moral values. There are three conditions within the context that make possible the 
appearance of values and their varying over time. The three conditions are what I call (1) the metaphysical 
condition, (2) the sensitivity condition and (3) the reflective condition. All the three conditions are the sufficient 
complex condition for the emergence and establishment of a moral value, although taken in isolation they are 
just necessary. Dewey states that the task of moral criticism is to “liberate and extend the goods which inhere in 
the naturally generated functions of experience” (LW1: 305). This task constitutes the process of “embodying 
intelligence in action” (LW1: 304). What follows is an attempt to unpack the many aspects of this claim.  
(1) To understand the relevance of the metaphysical condition, it is important to stress again Dewey's 
metaphysical stance when we refer to the notion of context. Every context is made of actual interactions of a 
multitude of different conditions and general relations that get actualized in those interactions. Man is one of the 
centers of these interactions in which the individual qualities become “conscious.” Consciousness describes a 
type of interaction between contextual factors, one of which is the human being herself, which is characterized 
by “the conspicuous and vivid presence of immediate qualities and of meanings” (LW1: 96). In the case of 
morals, the individual qualities that emerge from a situation have the form of “immediate goods,” “enjoyments” 
and in general consummatory experiences, while the general relations are the general traits of a human nature 
codified in social and cultural habits. The important point is that new interactive conditions and new modalities 
of interaction can produce new “qualitative histories” (LW1: 323). In this sense, the notion of a “predetermined 
limited number of ends inherently arranged in an order of increasing comprehensiveness and finality” has to be 
rejected (LW1: 296). This is because: 
 
since there is only relative, not absolute, impermeability and fixity of structure, new individuals 
with novel ends emerge in irregular procession. It must recognize that limits, closures, ends are 
experimentally or dynamically determined, presenting, like the boundaries of political individuals or 
states, a moving adjustment of various energy-systems in their cooperative and competitive 
interactions, not something belonging to them of their own right. (LW1: 296) 
 
As some scholars have stressed (e.g. Bennett 1980), a context is in a Deweyan sense an evolving system. 
While the approach of the natural sciences have to recur to artificial and isolated systems, in which by definition 
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no intervening external factors are allowed, it is important to remember that nature is not such an isolated 
system. New interactions of intervening processual conditions bring about the “uniqueness” and the “novelty” 
of new individual events (LW1: 95; LW1: 323; LW3: 114; LW4:197; LW4:167). In particular, the human being is 
that point of interaction in nature in which interactions happen at their most intensive and extensive level, since 
she is able of consciousness and awareness of meaning. From the viewpoint of moral life, this evolutive process 
means first of all that changes in the context introduced by new interactive conditions and new modalities of 
interaction (evolving systems) can bring about new consummatory teleologies and new possibilities of value. The 
fact that human beings exist “within nature” and are not “little god[s] outside” of it (LW1: 323) not only refers to 
the fact that the means of their action has to be produced on the basis of their environmental resources. At a 
more fundamental level, it means that all the possibilities of value, including moral value, have to be made 
possible by the context before human beings can sense them and intervene reflectively on them. This is what I 
have called the metaphysical condition for the appearance of a causal value CV. In this sense, new possibilities of 
value are primarily conditioned not by the moral sensitivity, responsibility and willingness of human beings, but 
by broader metaphysical conditions. As it is clear, the contextual normativity of a value requires at least the 
metaphysical condition for its appearance as a new consummatory experience.28 
2. However, the metaphysical condition is not enough for the emergence of a new value. Although certain 
conditions can make a certain value possible, its realization as a value depends on the responsiveness of human 
beings to those conditions. In its first emergence, a value is an immediate good, or immediate enjoyment, and 
depends on metaphysical conditions as much as the capacity of moral perception of man. This condition I call 
sensitivity condition. The human being has to experience a new consummatory teleology in its “causal” and “casual” 
immediacy before having the possibility to establish it eventually as a reflective value, and sensitivity is in this a 
necessary condition (LW7: 269). The human being is a function of her experience also in the sense that the 
consummatory experience of a new consummatory teleology in a context is given to the man as a new 
“immediate good” thanks to the occurrence of new conditions of interaction, among which her sensitivity and 
attention play a crucial role. In this case, the meaning of “function” is more passive than active. Of course, as we 
have seen, also the valuings have a constitutive and implicit reference to possibility of action, but they are 
unintentional enjoyments of certain states of affairs and objects rather than purposeful acts. The main objection 
to this stance is that, since a human being's valuings depend on her moral constitution, no novelty in the 
immediate experience of value is possible, since the limits of what is experienceable are determined by that very 
constitution. However, this objection assumes that the moral constitution of man is a closed system and that 
therefore experience is not generative of new values. As Pappas has shown (2008: 21-22; see also Shusterman 
1999), we do not experience ourselves as inside or trapped in our subjectivity and language. Adopting the 
“method of experience” in philosophy implies first of all that we acknowledge the fact that experience is a matrix 
of new contents and values, so that the linguistic and in general habitual dispositions of the agent are not an 
obstacle to new experiences and enjoyments. Although it is true that our valuings depend on our moral 
constitutions (character, habits of taste) and on our linguistic categories, it is even truer that contexts are evolving 
systems and that novelties are brought about by new interactive conditions. Dewey does not claim that 
immediate experience is not theory laden. On the contrary, he claims that the neutral, brute matter of fact or 
given is a myth and that all experience – pre-reflexive and reflexive – is always “selective” (LW1: 31). However, 
not all primary experience is theory-laden or tragically limited by non-linguistic dispositions. The fact that we 
have a pre-reflective selectivity in our immediate experience (cf. habits, language and concepts socially 
apprehended) does not mean that all the content of our experience is determined by our linguistic and non-
linguistic presuppositions. The encounter with reality in experience is a rough mix of selectivity and gross 
givenness. Therefore, it is possible that man becomes sensitive to new consummatory teleologies, when and 
where these are made possible by the context. In this experience, man encounters something of the nature of 
what Kant describes as a teleology without a scope in his theory of aesthetic judgment. Dewey himself stresses 
the fact that “the attitude involved in the appreciation” of new consummatory teleologies is “esthetic” (LW1: 70-
71) and that the consummatory teleologies are “esthetic objects” at full title (LW1: 75-76). To become an 
immediate experience, the metaphysical conditions require the human being's sensitivity. When this happens, old 
                                                            
28 In LW12: 46, Dewey links fallibilism to the fact that “we live in a world in process. 
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generalities, such as a moral principle and habit, might start to be questioned, more or less consciously. As a 
matter of fact, human beings always have a determined moral character and are therefore always committed to 
certain moral values, so that the experience of the new consummatory teleology might constitute for him a 
“problem.” The agent might start to consider whether or not traditional principles and habits are limited, limiting 
and inadequate in relation to what is operating in the actual, dynamic state of affairs (the new consummatory 
teleology) of the present, immediate experience. What is interesting to stress here is the fact that the first 
moment in the process of genuine and radical moral improvement is not the abstract conception of a good, but 
the received experiential synthesis of a good that is given in a valuing. The immediate enjoyment of a good is the 
unintentional embodied value that asks for assessment and that, at the same time, compels the agent to an 
assessment of his present moral standards and commitments. The moral intelligibility stored in symbolic 
syntheses has always to be compared and assessed through the moral intelligence operating in experiential, 
concrete synthesis here and now. The necessity of any reflective endeavor is temporally preceded by an 
immediate experience of goods. Dewey stresses this point over and over. For instance, he says that “man is 
naturally more interested in consummations than he is in preparations,” so that “consummations  have first to be 
hit upon spontaneously and accidentally … before they can be objects of foresight, invention and history” (LW1: 
71; cf. also LW1: 308). Even more explicitly, he claims that 
 
like any finalities, [consummatory teleology] had to be hit upon, achieved without premeditation 
before it might become an object of reflective choice and endeavor. (LW1: 98)  
 
Sometimes Dewey also talks of moral reflection as the “way of deliberate quest for security of the values that 
are enjoyed by grace in our happy moments” (LW4: 241). For instance, the immediate experience of the value of 
the moral dignity of a human being who does not belong to my community precedes every reflection on that 
event. According to Dewey, this is made possible by many different conditions of interactions. This possibility 
introduces not only the appreciation of a new consummatory value, but a conflict and contrast between the new 
immediate value (“also this man, who does not belong to my own community, deserves absolute respect”) and 
past, alleged moral values, codified in a moral principle and incarnate in a habit of moral perception and conduct 
(“only the members of my community are subjects of moral dignity”). This contrast is part of the problematic 
nature introduced by the new immediate value. It demands a process of reflection, in order to consider whether 
that value can be turned into a reflective moral value. Most of the time, this process aims to produce new 
“integrative” assimilation of the new value to the past.29 However, sometimes the conflict cannot be synthesized 
without a tragic loss in terms of values that ought to be realized and that instead cannot be perpetuated into a 
new synthesis. As we have seen, Dewey acknowledges this tragic feature as a real possibility in moral conflicts in 
the contrast of the “good,” the “duty” and the “virtue” in Three Independent Factors in Morals.  
3. In addition, the emergence of a problem asks for a reflective process of inquiry in trying to reconstruct the 
situation. In the case of the type of moral problem I am considering, the task of deliberation is to consider 
whether the new consummatory teleology can be considered a genuine moral value or not. As Dewey says, 
“possession and enjoyment of goods passes insensibly and inevitably into appraisal. … Primitive innocence does 
not last. Enjoyment ceases to be a datum and becomes a problem” (LW1: 298). This is what I call the reflective 
condition for the emergence of a moral value. At this level, the emergence of a moral value coincides with its 
deliberate and conscious institution as such through a reflective process. In this case, the problem faced by 
reflection is not only to see whether or not the new immediate consummatory teleologies, taken in isolation, 
might be turned into moral reflective values. There are no moral values in isolation, since reflection itself is logos, 
an activity of connecting elements into a system and of making their relations explicit. Most of the time, “moral 
conflicts” are conflicts between goods that are or have been satisfying and that now are found to be 
incompatible, not between good and evil (LW4: 212). The formula used by Dewey is that the reflective process 
turns the immediate values into intelligible objects through the analysis of their “conditions and consequences” 
(LW1: 298; LW1: 305; LW1: 321; LW4: 208; LW4: 219). The structure of the evaluation is the analysis of the 
“conditions” and of the “consequences” of the value. Evaluation is performed at multiple levels, in particular 
because the different phases of appraisal of a good are structured according to an experimental attitude. In what 
                                                            
29 See Alexander (1993: 388) and Honneth (1998: 701). 
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follows, I explain what are the phases of evaluation of a new consummatory teleology, or immediate value, as a 
possible new moral value. In particular, this structure of the evaluative process (analysis of conditions and 
consequences of a value) applies at a threefold level. 
(i) The first level of “criticism” consists in putting the new immediate value in relation with already accepted 
moral values, in order to test its entitlement to be established as a new moral value. According to Dewey, this 
new connection of traditional and new values is the new object to be evaluated. As every new object of genuine 
inquiry, all its factors and elements have a hypothetical status, so that in this process of evaluation not only the 
new immediate value, but also the old ones are in question. In fact, as we have seen, the agent starts to consider 
whether traditional principles and habits are limited, limiting and inadequate in relation to what is operating and 
“at work” in the actual, dynamic state of affairs (the new consummatory teleology) of the present, immediate 
experience. The new, individual interaction, realized in a new qualitative consummatory teleology, can bring 
within the context new moral factors and axiological possibilities to be considered. Hence, Dewey's ethical 
fallibilism. The test has to be performed using the ideal of “growth” as a criterion and experimental intelligence 
as a method. Dewey claims that “the better” in morality “is that which will do more in the way of security, 
liberation and fecundity for other likings and values” (LW1: 321). The aim is to perpetuate “more enduring and 
extensive values” (LW1: 302). The task of morality is “freeing and harmonizing” the moral potentialities of a 
context (MW14: 159; cf. also LW10: 273). “Appraising” here means “to bring to conscious perception relations 
of productivity and resistance” among values, and thus to make them significant, intelligible and mutually more 
intelligent through this connection. In this case, the analysis of the conditions refers to the causes of the 
immediate experience of that value (“What changed in the environment to make this experience possible?, 
“What changed in me?,” etc.), while the analysis of the consequences concerns the consideration of the relations 
of that immediate value with other values, already established. This is the first kind of consequence that moral 
evaluation has to take into account. If this new value does not hinder or narrow the other values and on the 
contrary fosters, develops or reinforces them, then that value might be established as a new moral value and the 
moral horizon of the agent can be reformed. In this case, the institution of a new moral value implies the 
reconfiguration of the axiological horizon of the agent, so that the conflict is synthesized into a new 
comprehension of the moral nature of man. Old standards can be detailed, reformed or in extreme cases 
abandoned, and new standards arise. At this level of moral reflection, the point is to figure out if the new good 
can be admitted and endorsed as a moral value on the basis of the ideal of growth and through the use of an 
experimental attitude. This is still an imaginative process. In the case of a positive response of the dramatic 
rehearsal, however, the hypothesis has to be tested in experience. 
(ii) The second level of the evaluation concerns the attempt to re-produce intentionally and purposefully that 
consummatory experience that has been judged worthy of being pursued. A fitting definition of moral reflection 
at this level is “the conscious art of remaking goods” (LW1: 321). Here the study of the conditions of the 
appearance of a value is instrumental for an efficient realization of that consummatory experience through a 
concrete action. In fact, the agent's action is the means, or intentional condition, thanks to which, through the 
interaction with environmental, unintentional conditions, the consummatory experience is supposed to be 
reproduced (LW12: 454-456). On the other hand, the study of the consequences of the action is the attempt to 
verify whether or not one's action has really realized the consummatory experience to which the agent was 
aiming. The evaluative moment requires the human being's initiative not only in imagination, but also in the 
action in the overt world. Through deliberation and action (which is, as we have seen, the conclusion of 
deliberation), the human being is a fully active and creative factor in the production of the moral values context 
required by the context. 
(iii) The final level concerns the retrospective consideration of what successful instances of realization of 
consummatory experiences have actually realized. The new conditions of interaction purposefully established by 
the agent produce new “qualities,” new  consummatory experiences. Do these consummatory experiences really 
constitute an instance of growth of experience? Are our new standards, habits and decisions really making our 
actual interactions grow? We might also say: are these consummatory experiences really convenient for the 
flourishing of human life? A moral value is genuine only if produces the growth within our new experiential 
syntheses. The final moment of criticism implies that the “re-making in subsequent action” of a consummatory 
experience “tests the conclusion of theory” (LW1: 323). Moral values and principles should be “treated as 
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intellectual instruments to be tested and confirmed … through consequences effected by acting upon them” 
(LW4: 221). The ideal of “growth” has to play again its fundamental role, not in measuring the immediate 
consummatory experience as a candidate of future action, but in assessing what an action already performed has 
brought about in experience. At the same time, the method of experimental intelligence is the best resource for 
establishing whether the case under examination is an instance of human flourishing or not. A consummatory 
experience constitutes a real instance of growth only if an “ideal” experimental intelligence would recommend 
and recognize it as such. “An ideal spectator is projected and the doer of the act looks at his proposed act 
through the eyes of this impartial and far-seeing objective judge” (LW7: 246). At this level, Dewey rehabilitates 
Kant's categorical imperative (MW5: 283-284), not as a demand for strong universalism in morals, but more 
because the categorical imperative is a tool to consider a particular case from a general perspective, and because 
it prescribes the use of experimental intelligence.30 Of course, in most of the cases, the ideal experimental 
perspective, being a historical viewpoint, includes many moral principles, values and standards that are not 
questioned. Certain virtues are not questioned, since they are constitutive of intelligence itself. It is also likely that 
other moral values (“be loyal to friends,” “do not kill for the sake of pleasure”), although fallible in principle, will 
not be falsified. “Conscience” is the virtue of the honest agent who, on the basis of an experimental, 
retrospective evaluation of the consequences of her action, acknowledges its moral status. What is important to 
notice is again the fact that the produced consummatory value is the new experiential synthesis on the basis of 
which moral principles and beliefs need to be tested. If these principles do not show in actual interactions an 
effective amelioration, it is likely that they are not good standards. 
                                                            
30 This is also the crux of Putnam’s rehabilitation of Dewey’s ethics (see Putnam 2000 and 2004). 
Conclusion  
 
 
 
The task of the previous chapters has been to inquiry into some aspects of Peirce’s and Dewey’s philosophy 
in order to try to clearly formulate and tentatively answer some problems related to human agency. I shall 
conclude that there is much work still to be done in the pragmatist tradition on these topics. In particular, I take 
this endeavor to be of some importance, both from a historical and theoretical stance. In particular, I believe that 
a deep, historically informed and philologically rigorous reconsideration of Peirce’s and Dewey’s thought could 
shed some light on contemporary matters, including what has been called the “resurgence of pragmatism” in the 
past years (see Bernstein 1992). In this work, I have tried to accomplish the first part of this task, by making clear 
what Peirce’s and Dewey’s problems and what their tentative answers were, hopefully contributing to the 
pragmatist scholarship’s task to articulate in a precise way the tenets of the classic pragmatists. It is not necessary 
to repeat here the detailed analyses presented in each chapter and their results. However, in this conclusion I 
only want to restate the mutual entanglement of normativity and experience in both Peirce’s and Dewey’s views 
and face two objection to my overall reading. I have shown how, according to Peirce and Dewey, the problem of 
normativity grows out of the womb of human practices. For Peirce, as we have seen, all human practices (using 
the notion of “practice” in a broad sense, including in it also epistemic procedures and affective dispositions) are 
studied within the framework of what he calls the problem of the “fixation of the belief.” As a consequence, the 
problem of fixing a belief presupposes a critical distance from any “sign” that is taken into consideration and 
entails the need for figuring out what is the best experiential method to creatively formulate explanatory 
hypotheses and testing their validity. Moreover, the fact that the fundamental categories of the “Normative 
Sciences” are evaluative categories brings to light that Peirce sees in self-controlled human agency an irreducible 
normative vocation. At the same time, I have shown that the pragmatic maxim itself suffers from (or benefits of) 
a tension between a merely explicating function of the meaning of “concepts” and a prescriptive indication of 
how “concepts” ought to be developed (and therefore, what “concepts” ought to be held). Similarly, for Dewey, 
the dimension of value is coextensive with human experience as a whole, since we are always immersed at least 
in what he calls “casual” values. The presence of dissatisfaction and contradictions within our already-value-
laden experience lead us to the normative question about how we ought to guide our action and “reconstruct” 
our experience. For Peirce and Dewey, the dimension of value is already present in experience, so that the need 
for a rational normativity of human agency grows out of experience and is responsibly assumed in what they 
respectively call deliberation about Ideals and moral inquiry. 
In a comment on the never-ending issue of the relation between Peirce’s pragmatism and contemporary 
analytic philosophy, Nathan Houser writes: 
 
Quite clearly we can say that Peirce was an empiricist or, at least, a minimal empiricist as described 
by McDowell. He held, rather like Brentano, that the mark of the mental is directedness toward the 
world (although he thought of this directedness as purposive in some general sense). For Peirce to 
suppose that thought has a purpose follows straightforwardly from his naturalism – from viewing mind 
in the context of biological evolution. “What is the function of thought?” Peirce asked. “To produce 
belief,” he answered. And what is belief? “Belief,” Peirce said, “consists in the establishment of habits or 
rules of action,” very much like software programs that prepare us for what we are likely to confront, or 
what we at least may confront. Peirce would have agreed with McDowell that this view puts things in a 
normative context. (2011: 64-65) 
 
I would like to stress one point that emerges from Houser’s remark. Peirce has usually been portrayed as the 
great denier within the pragmatist tradition of the importance of a philosophical inquiry into morality. However, 
if it is true that Peirce’s philosophy is rooted into a normative conception of experience, it follows that Peirce’s 
claims about the inutility of philosophy in the moral life should be better understood in their context. As a 
consequence, it is a mistake to say that Peirce was not interested in normative ethics, although his ethical system 
is not fully developed beyond his reflections in the context of the Normative Sciences. A different strategy is to 
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interpret Peirce’s philosophical enterprise on the basis of the two categories of “scientia” and “sapientia.” As 
Colapietro remarks, 
 
There is little question that, in Peirce’s writings, philosophy as scientia largely eclipses philosophy 
as sapientia. But, at the center of Peirce’s philosophy, there is an askesis, a self-imposed discipline. But 
there is also a confidence that the insights derived from this discipline will contribute to wisdom. “The 
soul’s deeper parts can only be reached through its surface” (CP 1.648). In this way, the insights 
obtained from “mathematics and philosophy and the other sciences … will by slow percolation 
gradually reach the very core of one’s being; and will come to influence our lives.” Impersonal inquiry, 
where personal concerns are sacrificed for the overarching ideals of a communal undertaking (where 
one comes to identify oneself with the success of what transcends oneself), is a moral achievement of 
personal agents. (2004b: 119) 
 
Famously, Peirce once claimed that “every symbol is a living thing, in a very strict sense” (CP 2.222). As a 
consequence, Peirce’s stress on semeiotic is not at odds with the normative sciences at all, including ethics and 
aesthetics. On the contrary, it is the life of signs themselves that has the power to orient us in freely thinking 
what is true, acting what is good and feeling what is admirable in itself. It is in the sign itself that something like a 
moral exigency emerges. 
On the other side, Dewey’s most recent fortune (or misfortune) is due to Richard Rorty’s popular claim that 
Dewey is with Heidegger and Wittgenstein the most important philosopher of the twentieth century (1979: 5) 
since he gave up the task of developing a metaphysical philosophy and started a different project, something of 
the nature of a historical, radically situated critical appraisal of (his) culture. There is no doubt that Rorty’s 
interpretation is correct in some sense, although it is unjustified to catalogue Dewey as the king of pragmatism 
and, at the same time, dismissing Peirce as a victim of Kantianism and “methodolatry” (1999: 36). Indeed, it is 
true that Dewey harshly criticized some metaphysical stances of his time, such as some versions of the new 
realism (e.g. W. P. Montague, W. T. Bush, Woodbridge) and critical realism (e.g. J. B. Pratt, Roy W. Sellars; see 
Hildebrand 2003). However, while a quick overview of Dewey’s work might lead us to take Rorty’s opinion at 
face value, a closer analysis of Dewey’s thought shows that some traditional interpretations of Dewey as a 
reductionist naturalist are simply wrong. My attempt to develop an analysis of Dewey’s theory of experience in 
semeiotic terms aimed to show that both Peirce and Dewey similarly approached the problem of normativity (in 
all its forms) relying on human experience’s vocation to growth.  
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